I What has changed since the Copenhagen interpretation?

  • #51
atyy said:
I think Haag's and Peres's statements are pretty fundamental parts of QM. If Frauchiger and Renner break it, I'm not sure what they are talking about can be called QM.
I don't know if measurements being in principal irreversible is a fundamental part of QM. Haag and Peres think so, others think not, why are Haag and Peres's particular views on measurement fundamental to QM? In many interpretations it is reversible in principal, are those interpretations simply wrong then?

Also Frauchiger-Renner rather than using or discussing reversibility of measurements, more make the assumption that Wigner is correct to assign a superposed state to his friend rather than a mixed state, is that correct in your view or do you think Wigner should be assigning a mixed state?

(This is necessary before talking about objective collapse in Bohmian Mechanics)
 
Physics news on Phys.org
  • #52
DarMM said:
I don't know if measurements being in principal irreversible is a fundamental part of QM. Haag and Peres think so, others think not, why are Haag and Peres's particular views on measurement fundamental to QM? In many interpretations it is reversible in principal, are those interpretations simply wrong then?

Frauchiger and Renner are trying to show that QM is not a universally valid theory. From the point of view of Copenhagen, QM has long been argued not a universally valid theory because the observer has a special status and the first thing that one does is to make the classical-quantum cut - this is the point of view of those who believe there is a measurement problem. Attempts to solve the measurement problem that have reversible measurements are BM and MWI. From the BM point of view, QM is not a universally valid theory (because of the measurement problem), and even BM is not a universally valid theory (because of what BM calls "quantum equilibrium"). Since BM is not an interpretation that believes that Copenhagen QM is a universally valid theory, it seems that it is not in FR's version of QM. I think MWI is controversial enough even among proponents that it doesn't deserve the label of "intellectually coherent" at the moment. [I guess I am saying that Copenhagen (with a classical-quantum cut, irreversible measurements, and collapse) should be the only "textbook" interpretation.]

DarMM said:
Also Frauchiger-Renner rather than using or discussing reversibility of measurements, more make the assumption that Wigner is correct to assign a superposed state to his friend rather than a mixed state, is that correct in your view or do you think Wigner should be assigning a mixed state?

(This is necessary before talking about objective collapse in Bohmian Mechanics)

OK, I'll have to think about that and discuss another time then.
 
  • #53
I think all these QM interpretations, especially the "collapse", are so useless. That is because none of them address the origin of the problem, why the wavefunction, where does it come from and not why it does this or that upon measurement. I have seen many "derivations" of Schrodinger equation but they all seem to be like a mathematical trick with no fundamental/logical principle involved.
 
  • #54
DarMM said:
So let's say in the Wigner's friend scenario, Wigner should be using a mixed state, not the pure state:
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|\uparrow, A_{\uparrow}\rangle + |\downarrow, A_{\downarrow}\rangle\right)$$
with ##A_{\uparrow}, A_{\downarrow}## device states?

Ok, I've now read the Wigner's friend scenario. If the pure state refers to the friend (A) and his spin, and if Wigner has not interacted with or measured his friend and the spin, then Wigner uses the pure state, since no measurement has occurred.
 
  • #55
atyy said:
then Wigner uses the pure state, since no measurement has occurred.
The friend has performed a measurement though right, just Wigner hasn't yet. Do you mean Wigner can use the superposed state because he hasn't performed a measurement, even though the friend has?
 
  • #56
DarMM said:
The friend has performed a measurement though right, just Wigner hasn't yet. Do you mean Wigner can use the superposed state because he hasn't performed a measurement, even though the friend has?

Yes, from the point of view of Wigner, the friend has not performed a measurement.
 
  • #57
atyy said:
Yes, from the point of view of Wigner, the friend has not performed a measurement.
So then you are working with subjective collapse and the Frauchiger-Renner paper shows you cannot combine reasoning from Wigner with that of his friend, i.e. a statement that the friend considers true (or another way of saying it: one they assign probability one to, i.e. certain ) A and another that Wigner considers true B, cannot be considered at once without contradictions.
 
  • #58
DarMM said:
So then you are working with subjective collapse and the Frauchiger-Renner paper shows you cannot combine reasoning from Wigner with that of his friend, i.e. a statement that the friend considers true (or another way of saying it: one they assign probability one to, i.e. certain ) A and another that Wigner considers true B, cannot be considered at once without contradictions.

Why do you need FR to do that? Wigner does not consider his friend a user of QM, since the friend is on the quantum side of the cut.
 
  • #59
atyy said:
Why do you need FR to do that? Wigner does not consider his friend a user of QM, since the friend is on the quantum side of the cut.
So the cut is an objective feature of reality?
 
  • #60
DarMM said:
So the cut is an objective feature of reality?

No, the cut is a subjective feature that Wigner imposes on his reasoning about measurement outcomes. Within QM, Wigner is agnostic about the reality of things on the quantum side of the cut. If he wants to reason about the reality of his friend, Wigner cannot use Copenhagen, but he must use a more comprehensive theory such as Bohmian Mechanics (or GRW etc).
 
  • Like
Likes Demystifier
  • #61
Then you are consistent with Frauchiger-Renner. QM taking the subjective collapse view, unlike General Relativity or Kolmolgorov probability theory, is not consistent with inter-agent logic.

You cannot consider other agents and their outcomes, even in principal.

Take the Wigner's friend case where the friend agreed to measure a spin. It seems odd to say that Wigner cannot even consider "If my friend got spin up", but if you think so then Frauchiger-Renner has nothing new to say for you. It's simply that some thought there was a version of Copenhagen where you can at least consider the outcomes of other agents in general.
 
  • #62
DarMM said:
Then you are consistent with Frauchiger-Renner. QM taking the subjective collapse view, unlike General Relativity or Kolmolgorov probability theory, is not consistent with inter-agent logic.

You cannot consider other agents and their outcomes, even in principal.

Take the Wigner's friend case where the friend agreed to measure a spin. It seems odd to say that Wigner cannot even consider "If my friend got spin up", but if you think so then Frauchiger-Renner has nothing new to say for you. It's simply that some thought there was a version of Copenhagen where you can at least consider the outcomes of other agents in general.

OK, I haven't studied FR closely enough yet, but at least at the qualitative level we seem to agree.

One can consider "other" agents, but they must all be on the same classical side of the classical-quantum cut, maybe for example the demonstration that collapse and unitary evolution from all different special relativistic frames of reference produce consistent results (even though the states in different frames are not related by unitary transformation)

Are there really Copenhagen versions in which an agent can be on both sides of the quantum-classical cut? I mean, it would be like saying that the cat is both "dead and alive" and "dead or alive", which seems ridiculous. Maybe QBists try to do that, since I think FR say QBism is inconsistent?
 
  • #63
Before I respond to that post I just want to ask, when you say an agent on both sides of the cut, in the Wigner's friend case, the friend is on the classical side of the cut for himself, but on the quantum side for Wigner.

So he is on both sides of the cut, but it's a different side for different agents. I assume you are asking about being on both sides for one agent.
 
  • #64
DarMM said:
Before I respond to that post I just want to ask, when you say an agent on both sides of the cut, in the Wigner's friend case, the friend is on the classical side of the cut for himself, but on the quantum side for Wigner.

So he is on both sides of the cut, but it's a different side for different agents. I assume you are asking about being on both sides for one agent.

Yes, I believe the usual version of Copenhagen is one in which Wigner only grants "agent" or "reality" status to things on the same side of Wigner's classical-quantum cut.
 
Last edited:
  • #65
DarMM said:
So let's say in the Wigner's friend scenario, Wigner should be using a mixed state, not the pure state:
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|\uparrow, A_{\uparrow}\rangle + |\downarrow, A_{\downarrow}\rangle\right)$$
with ##A_{\uparrow}, A_{\downarrow}## device states?

Let's try a different answer from the one I gave in post #54, where I said Wigner uses a pure state.

I think another possibility is that Wigner accepts that his friend has done a measurement. In this case, Wigner and his friend are on the same classical side of the classical-quantum cut, and A represents the friend's ancilla. If the friend performs a measurement, but does not tell Wigner the result, and if Wigner accepts his friend's measurement as a measurement, then Wigner should use a mixed state.
 
  • #66
atyy said:
I think Haag's and Peres's statements are pretty fundamental parts of QM. If Frauchiger and Renner break it, I'm not sure what they are talking about can be called QM.

Anyway, would you agree with Demystifier that collapse in BM is objective (post #17)?

It's a little ambiguous. One meaning of "wave function collapse" is that after a measurement, the wave function changes discontinuously to the collapsed wave function. That does not happen in BM. Another meaning is that upon collapse, one or more possible outcome is selected. In BM, all outcomes are predetermined, so in a sense, everything is pre-collapsed. I'm not exactly sure what @Demystifier would say about it, but it seems to me that BM is not consistent with the usual idea of wave function collapse.

The "pilot wave" wave function always evolves according to Schrodinger's equation. But that's the wave function for the entire universe, in the sense of Many-Worlds. If you instead focus on an effective wave function for just part of the universe, a single system, then the effective wave function might have something like collapse.
 
  • #67
atyy said:
Let's try a different answer from the one I gave in post #54, where I said Wigner uses a pure state.

I think another possibility is that Wigner accepts that his friend has done a measurement. In this case, Wigner and his friend are on the same classical side of the classical-quantum cut, and A represents the friend's ancilla. If the friend performs a measurement, but does not tell Wigner the result, and if Wigner accepts his friend's measurement as a measurement, then Wigner should use a mixed state.

That's the practical approach to resolving paradoxes in QM: Assume that there is no such thing as a pure state consisting of a superposition of macroscopically different states. There can only be mixed states.

However, I find that assumption to be a "soft contradiction". QM does not in any way limit the size or complexity of the systems that can be described by it.
 
  • #68
stevendaryl said:
It's a little ambiguous. One meaning of "wave function collapse" is that after a measurement, the wave function changes discontinuously to the collapsed wave function. That does not happen in BM. Another meaning is that upon collapse, one or more possible outcome is selected.
One or more? Surely only one; given that it is only one then those two meanings are equivalent.

In other words, the (wave function) collapse is a discontinuous collapse resulting in a random selection of one of the possible outcomes.

This discontinuity in the time evolution of ##\psi## is the key clue that ##\psi## needs to be modeled by some non-continuous equation; the linear PDE is a simplification which preserves unitarity.
 
  • Like
Likes ftr
  • #69
stevendaryl said:
That's the practical approach to resolving paradoxes in QM: Assume that there is no such thing as a pure state consisting of a superposition of macroscopically different states. There can only be mixed states.

However, I find that assumption to be a "soft contradiction". QM does not in any way limit the size or complexity of the systems that can be described by it.

Let me state, more precisely, what I think the contradiction is. But first, let me formulate an alternative to the Born rule: Instead of saying "A measurement of a system always produces an eigenvalue of the operator that is measured, with a probability given by blah blah blah", you say: "At any given time, the probability that the universe is in some particular macroscopic configuration is given by blah blah blah". This is a specific case of the Born rule, in which the system is the entire universe, and the observable is the universe's macroscopic configuration. You don't need the general Born rule because by definition, a measurement of a microscopic quantity means setting up a measurement so that the microscopic quantity is amplified to produce a macroscopic effect. So if you know the probabilities for macroscopic configurations, then that tells you the probabilities for various measurement results (since they are macroscopically different).

This form of the Born rule can be mathematically described this way: If we let ##\Pi_j## be the projection of the state of the universe onto the macroscopic state number ##j## (you can't have continuum many macroscopically distinguishable configurations, so it's enough to consider a countable collection of projection operators), and you let ##|\psi(0)\rangle## be the initial state, at time ##t=0##, then the probability of being in state ##j## at a later time ##t > 0## is given by:

##P(j) = \langle \psi| e^{iHt/\hbar} \Pi_j e^{-iHt/\hbar} |\psi\rangle##

Then the issue of collapse can be stated this way: What if, we ask what the probability is of being in state ##j## at time ##t_1## and then later being in state ##k## at time ##t_2##? Here are two possible answers:
  1. ##P_{collapse}(j,k) = \langle \psi| e^{iH t_1/\hbar} \Pi_j e^{iH(t_2 - t_1)/\hbar} \Pi_k e^{-iH(t_2 - t_1)/\hbar} \Pi_j e^{-iHt_1/\hbar} |\psi\rangle##
  2. ##P_{no-collapse}(j,k) = \langle \psi| e^{iH t_2/\hbar} \Pi_k e^{-iH t_2/hbar} |\psi\rangle##
If the state ##|\psi\rangle## is itself a pure macroscopic state (##\Pi_i |\psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle## for some macroscopic configuration ##i##), then there will be negligible difference between these two numbers. That's because the macroscopic configuration ##k## includes the record of having previously gotten some particular result for some past measurement. So for each ##k##, the probability ##P_{collapse}(j,k)## will be approximately zero for all except one value of ##j##. For that value of ##j##, there will be a negligible difference between ##P_{collapse}## and ##P_{no-collapse}##.

So under the assumption that the world currently is in a macroscopically pure state, the collapse assumption is harmless. Assume it or not, it makes no difference.

Eventually, though, the state of the universe will drift away from being macroscopically pure, and the distinction between ##P_{collapse}## and ##P_{no-collapse}## will grow larger and larger.
 
  • #70
Auto-Didact said:
One or more? Surely only one; given that it is only one then those two meanings are equivalent.

Well, in an experiment such as measuring the spin in the x-direction of an electron that has been prepared to be spin-up in the z-direction, there is, a priori, more than one possible outcome, spin-up or spin-down. In BM, which is deterministic, only one of them is actually possible, and we only consider them both possible because we have incomplete knowledge of the current state.

In other words, the (wave function) collapse is a discontinuous collapse resulting in a random selection of one of the possible outcomes.

In that sense, BM has no collapse. Nothing discontinuous ever happens. Except in the classical sense of changing a probability distribution based on acquiring more information.
 
  • #71
stevendaryl said:
Well, in an experiment such as measuring the spin in the x-direction of an electron that has been prepared to be spin-up in the z-direction, there is, a priori, more than one possible outcome, spin-up or spin-down. In BM, which is deterministic, only one of them is actually possible, and we only consider them both possible because we have incomplete knowledge of the current state.
Of course there is more than one outcome possible, no one is arguing that. The point is that there is only one outcome out of all possibilities selected in a measurement.
 
  • #72
stevendaryl said:
That's the practical approach to resolving paradoxes in QM: Assume that there is no such thing as a pure state consisting of a superposition of macroscopically different states. There can only be mixed states.

However, I find that assumption to be a "soft contradiction". QM does not in any way limit the size or complexity of the systems that can be described by it.

I was thinking a bit differently. If Wigner accepts that a measurement has been performed, then the wave function collapses. If Wigner knows the measurement outcome, then his state is the pure state obtained after collapse. However, if he does not know the outcome, then he uses a state that he considers a proper mixture (the collapsed states for the different outcomes weighted by the Born rule probabilities).
 
  • #73
atyy said:
I was thinking a bit differently. If Wigner accepts that a measurement has been performed, then the wave function collapses. If Wigner knows the measurement outcome, then his state is the pure state obtained after collapse. However, if he does not know the outcome, then he uses a state that he considers a proper mixture (the collapsed states for the different outcomes weighted by the Born rule probabilities).

That's what I would call a "soft contradiction". Wigner thinking of his friend as a collection of atoms that obey Schrodinger's equation tells him one thing. Thinking of his friend as an observer capable of performing measurements tells him something else.
 
  • #74
stevendaryl said:
That's what I would call a "soft contradiction". Wigner thinking of his friend as a collection of atoms that obey Schrodinger's equation tells him one thing. Thinking of his friend as an observer capable of performing measurements tells him something else.

Isn't that's just the measurement problem?
 
  • Like
Likes Auto-Didact
  • #75
atyy said:
Isn't that's just the measurement problem?

I suppose so.
 
  • #76
atyy said:
Maybe QBists try to do that, since I think FR say QBism is inconsistent?
FR more says that if you want to have subjective collapse, you have to move to a position like yours or QBism, i.e. Wigner must not even consider his friend's events.

QBism is like your view and is explicitly compatible with FR.

As Matthew Pusey says in his summary it strengthens positions like yours and QBism.

atyy said:
Are there really Copenhagen versions in which an agent can be on both sides of the quantum-classical cut? I mean, it would be like saying that the cat is both "dead and alive" and "dead or alive", which seems ridiculous.
This is essentially what I was saying to @Demystifier , yes it seems ridiculous, but is has never been proven to actually be contradictory until now. That's really all FR is in a way.

As @Demystifier said the only surprising thing is that you need such an extreme scenario to demonstrate the contradiction.

I don't have the freedom for a long post right now but when I do I'll go into why some people thought it might be possible to consider an agent on both sides of the cut.
 
  • Like
Likes Demystifier
  • #77
Why does the particle have to be in superposition in the first place.
 
  • #78
stevendaryl said:
In BM, which is deterministic, only one of them is actually possible, and we only consider them both possible because we have incomplete knowledge of the current state.

But after the measurement, our knowledge of the current state has changed, because we know which outcome occurred. And we reflect that changed state of knowledge in the new wave function we use to predict further measurement results. So it seems like BM is perfectly consistent with an epistemic view of wave function collapse.
 
  • #79
ftr said:
Why does the particle have to be in superposition in the first place.
Which particle?
 
  • #80
Say particle in a box for example, or electron in hydrogen atom ... etc
 
  • #81
DarMM said:
This is essentially what I was saying to @Demystifier , yes it seems ridiculous, but is has never been proven to actually be contradictory until now. That's really all FR is in a way.

As @Demystifier said the only surprising thing is that you need such an extreme scenario to demonstrate the contradiction.

If FR is a technical result about the extent to which the classical-quantum cut can be shifted, could it be understood as an extreme variant of Hay and Peres's "Quantum and classical descriptions of a measuring apparatus" https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9712044 ?
 
  • Like
Likes Demystifier
  • #82
PeterDonis said:
But after the measurement, our knowledge of the current state has changed, because we know which outcome occurred. And we reflect that changed state of knowledge in the new wave function we use to predict further measurement results. So it seems like BM is perfectly consistent with an epistemic view of wave function collapse.

My comment was in reference to @atyy saying:

Anyway, would you agree with Demystifier that collapse in BM is objective (post #17)?

I would think that objective means that it's not epistemic.
 
  • #83
stevendaryl said:
I'm not exactly sure what @Demystifier would say about it, but it seems to me that BM is not consistent with the usual idea of wave function collapse.
Let me put it in a slightly metaphorical form. In BM, there is no collapse from the bird's view, but there is from the frog's view.
 
  • Like
Likes Auto-Didact and stevendaryl
  • #84
atyy said:
If FR is a technical result about the extent to which the classical-quantum cut can be shifted, could it be understood as an extreme variant of Hay and Peres's "Quantum and classical descriptions of a measuring apparatus" https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9712044 ?
Yes, it seems related.
 
  • #85
PeterDonis said:
So it seems like BM is perfectly consistent with an epistemic view of wave function collapse.
In BM there are two different notions of the wave function: (i) the wave function of the full system and (ii) the wave function of the subsystem. The collapse of (i) is epistemic, but the collapse of (ii) is ontic.

Let me explain a bit. Suppose that the full system consists of two particles, with positions ##x_1## and ##x_2##. The full wave function is ##\Psi(x_1,x_2,t)##. In BM there are also particle trajectories ##X_1(t)## and ##X_2(t)##. Then the wave function of the subsystem 1 is
$$\psi_1(x_1,t)=\Psi(x_1,X_2(t),t)$$
The wave function ##\psi_1(x_1,t)## is ontic, it does not always satisfy the Schrodinger equation, and in a measurement setup it may collapse. This collapse of ##\psi_1(x_1,t)## is ontic.

Not also that standard QM does not have an analog of ##\psi_1(x_1,t)##. To describe a subsystem, the standard QM must use a density matrix (a partial trace of the full density matrix), rather than a wave function.
 
Last edited:
  • Like
Likes zonde
  • #86
Demystifier said:
In BM there are two different notions of the wave function: (i) the wave function of the full system and (ii) the wave function of the subsystem. The collapse of (i) is epistemic, but the collapse of (ii) is ontic.
What if there are three nested systems? Doesn't the full system have to be the whole universe? Otherwise the nature of the wave function changes depending on what one regards as the full system.
 
  • #87
A. Neumaier said:
What if there are three nested systems?
Than only the biggest one is counted as the full system, while the other two are subsystems. One of those two is in fact a sub-subsystem, but it doesn't change much.

A. Neumaier said:
Doesn't the full system have to be the whole universe?
Strictly speaking, yes. But if a smaller system is not much entangled with the rest of the Universe, then one can use an approximation by treating this system as a "full" system.

A. Neumaier said:
Otherwise the nature of the wave function changes depending on what one regards as the full system.
Fortunately this is no the case, because there is a well defined criterion for a definition of full system - a system with zero (or small, for practical purposes) entanglement entropy.
 
  • #88
Demystifier said:
if a smaller system is not much entangled with the rest of the Universe
But any observable system is significantly entangled with the rest of the universe. Otherwise we (being part of the rest of the universe) cannot observe it.
 
  • #89
A. Neumaier said:
But any observable system is significantly entangled with the rest of the universe. Otherwise we (being part of the rest of the universe) cannot observe it.
If that was true, then we could never use pure states in quantum theory, except when we describe the whole Universe. Obviously, it is not true. Sure, when Prof. Zeilinger performs measurement of an electron, then the electron is entangled with the measuring apparatus and with Prof. Zeilinger. In this case, the full system consists of electron, measuring apparatus and Prof. Zeilinger. But it still does not need to include the whole Universe. The entanglement between Prof. Zeilinger and his dog, for instance, can be neglected for the purpose of studying the electron in the Zeilinger's laboratory.
 
  • #90
Can BM treat the whole universe at least in principle, or any infinite number of particles?
 
  • #91
Demystifier said:
If that was true, then we could never use pure states in quantum theory, except when we describe the whole Universe.
Indeed, pure states are almost never used, except for very tiny systems where we know the state because we either just measured a complete set of commuting observables, or projected away all alternatives.

Essentially all quantum optical studies (except for textbook ones) are described using Lindblad equations (for density matrices!) to account for the unavoidable dissipation. All analyses that use pure states only need to be corrected by accounting (often in some hand-waving way) for losses.
 
  • #92
Demystifier said:
The entanglement between Prof. Zeilinger and his dog, for instance, can be neglected for the purpose of studying the electron in the Zeilinger's laboratory.
But the entanglement entropy, your measure that decides what can be neglected, will be large! It can perhaps be neglected for studying an electron spin only (except if the dog jumps at the equipment) but not for studying the full system consisting of electron, equipment, and Zeilinger.
 
  • #93
ftr said:
Say particle in a box for example, or electron in hydrogen atom ... etc
Oh, we don't know. What is actually going on in superposition is unknown. Knowing that might entail an answer to the measurement problem.
 
  • #94
A. Neumaier said:
Essentially all quantum optical studies (except for textbook ones) are described using Lindblad equations (for density matrices!)
It looks a bit like an overstatement to me.
 
  • #95
martinbn said:
Can BM treat the whole universe at least in principle, or any infinite number of particles?
Yes.
 
  • #96
Demystifier said:
It looks a bit like an overstatement to me.
To convince yourself, look at the details of an analysis of the conditions for making experiments checking the Bell inequalities fully trustworthy.
Whenever quantitative details matter you need more accurate models than what you get just from pure states.In diffraction experiments for buckyballs, the pure state prepared is just one qubit, not the multiparticle state. Most pure states are approximate, and comprise very few qubits since one cannot prepare the pure states for bigger systems. An exception are ground states and low lying excited states of molecules with well separated energy levels, these can be prepared reasonably well - but not their superpositions!
 
  • #97
Demystifier said:
Yes.
How?
 
  • #98
martinbn said:
How?
You would help me to explain it to you if you would first tell me why do you think that it can't.
 
  • Like
Likes Auto-Didact
  • #99
Demystifier said:
why do you think that it can't.
How does Bohmian mechanics model the destruction of particle pairs? It would presumably require that the particles meet at the same position, which is exceedingly improbable.
 
  • #100
martinbn said:
Can BM treat the whole universe at least in principle, or any infinite number of particles?
I don't think it is possible, for any theory, to describe the whole universe. This is especially ridiculous in thermodynamics. People derive entropy considering some simple thermal machines from the 18th century and in the next sentence they speak of the entropy of the universe.
 
Back
Top