metacristi
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Seen from a purely philosophical perspective the interesting fact is that irrespective of which system of axioms has really the edge (mykeyork's or the orthodox one, remain to be seen) the question 'why' Pauli's principle is not really answered. No more than 'why' Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle, though it can be argued that it can be deduced formally from the standard formalism of QM (even this can be safely contested, see Popper's critique, valid for the deduction of Pauli's Principle too, for, upon Born's interpretation of the wave function, we are allowed to talk only at a statistical level not for singular cases).
But let's assume that at the level of pure formal description they might be seen as resulting as formal deductions from some sets of axioms. Unfortunately for really answering the 'why' question we need a causal deduction of Pauli's Principle and this requires an interpretation of the formalism proved as being superior at least to all existing alternatives. The purely descriptional deduction of Pauli's Principle from a formalism can be seen at most as showing the high coherence of it with the system of axioms from which it is purely formally deduced, in a purely descriptional way, nothing more.
Now Mike York's solution has elements of interpretation incorporated, it's not really only 'plain QM' (for ex. the assumption of completeness is clearly part of the interpretation) but it is too sketchy at this point to count as a causal deduction of Pauli's principle. Even if he would eventually provide one his solution should prove to be at least theoretically progressive, being capable to accommodate more facts than its alternatives but in a sizeable way. One or two extra accomodations of facts (if it can really provide this, personally I'm skeptical) does not makes it really superior. This is why, for example, the capacity to handle spin till 11th decimal place of quantum electrodynamics (still) does not make it really superior to a relativized Bohm's research program, I don't think the hidden variables path is a 'dead end'-as some, for example on motl's site/blog, emphatically claim. The fact that Lorentz invariance is dropped is not at a all a problem coherence with previous accepted scientfic knowledge is not neccessarily a sign of truth.
But let's assume that at the level of pure formal description they might be seen as resulting as formal deductions from some sets of axioms. Unfortunately for really answering the 'why' question we need a causal deduction of Pauli's Principle and this requires an interpretation of the formalism proved as being superior at least to all existing alternatives. The purely descriptional deduction of Pauli's Principle from a formalism can be seen at most as showing the high coherence of it with the system of axioms from which it is purely formally deduced, in a purely descriptional way, nothing more.
Now Mike York's solution has elements of interpretation incorporated, it's not really only 'plain QM' (for ex. the assumption of completeness is clearly part of the interpretation) but it is too sketchy at this point to count as a causal deduction of Pauli's principle. Even if he would eventually provide one his solution should prove to be at least theoretically progressive, being capable to accommodate more facts than its alternatives but in a sizeable way. One or two extra accomodations of facts (if it can really provide this, personally I'm skeptical) does not makes it really superior. This is why, for example, the capacity to handle spin till 11th decimal place of quantum electrodynamics (still) does not make it really superior to a relativized Bohm's research program, I don't think the hidden variables path is a 'dead end'-as some, for example on motl's site/blog, emphatically claim. The fact that Lorentz invariance is dropped is not at a all a problem coherence with previous accepted scientfic knowledge is not neccessarily a sign of truth.
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