Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I honestly have never come across one, although of course many people believe one is possible.

Might I suggest a few books?

A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.

Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.

Agnosticism is almost always the best way.

Not quite. The scientist doesn't have to assume that your words are true.

Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.

It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun ) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.

We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.

I don't quite see it like that, but I roughly agree.

What exactly do you disagree with?

Perhaps you're right. What is true is that there has been remarkably little proper analysis published of 'hetero-phenomenology' outside of philosophy.

Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.

Again, I don't know of any. Can you give an example?

Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".

It's honest of you to acknowledge this. His theory appeals to scientists for obvious reasons, but is less appealing to people with no axe to grind.

Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?

“None of this stuff about heterophenomenology helps one bit with answering that hard question. It only concerns easy questions, such as how good experimenters/theoreticians can be at mind-reading, how good subjects can be at mind-describing -- and I'm ready to grant that both experimenters and subjects can be as good as you like, as good as any cognitive science could need, right down to the last JND!

But that still won't tell you how/why JNDs feel like something -- though, given that they do, mysteriously, feel like something, it will explain why they feel like this rather than like that. But that's an easy question again; it presupposes, or "brackets" [to use your Husserlian phrase] the answer to the hard question of how/why any of these excellent functional correlates/substrates of behaving feel like anything at all (rather than just functioning, i.e., doing, zombily).

Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/dennett-chalmers.htm

(This link is worth checking for some of the obvious counter-arguments to Dennett. I'd be interested to know whether you think Harnard's objections can be answered. I can't see how they can be. Dennett doesn't seem to answer them anywhere).

I'll check it out.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Canute
Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.

Canute the following is a link to a thread by hypnagogue where this interaction question is addressed. I personally found it to be a compelling argument and didn't see a rebuttal that came close to killing it. You might want to take a look at it if you haven't already.


https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=6793

 

[hypnagogue]

Just to reiterate the basic argument, perhaps more simply this time, and once again inspired by (and for the most part paraphrasing) Chalmers:

For any purely physical explanation of consciousness, we will always have the following further question: how is it that this set of physical processes is associated with consciousness? Thus, even the complete physical account leaves something out; there is something extra, above and beyond physical phenomena, needed to explain consciousness. For instance, if one explains to me the exact processing of every neuron in the visual cortex, it is still not clear to me why this set of neurons should somehow entail the conscious experience of vision. Why should these neurons be associated with consciousness in the first place? Why should they be associated with the experience of vision, instead of the experience of hearing? And so on. This is, of course, the explanatory gap.

Physical explanations do nothing to address the explanatory gap. The best a committed materialist can do without disregarding the problem altogether is to identify consciousness with the associated physical processes: s/he says, "the neurons just are consciousness, the same way as water just is H2O."

The latter is a successful reductionist argument: given the complete physical account of H2O, it is a conceptual necessity that the structural and functional properties of H2O combine to form the structural and functional properties of water. It is not even sensible that, having grasped the explanation fully, I ask, "why don't H2O molecules combine to form rocks?" Unfortunately, the case of consciousness is disanalogous. Even if we accept the identification of neuronal processing with consciousness, it is not by any means a conceptual necessity that the structural and functional properties of neurons combine to form the qualitative experience of consciousness. It is entirely sensible that, having fully grasped a physical explanation of consciousness, I still ask, "well, why is it that this particular set of neuronal processing is associated with visual consciousness and not auditory consciousness?"

This explanitory deficit persists since the identification of consciousness with neuronal processing is conceptually contingent upon observation of a brute fact of nature that cannot be explained in simpler or more basic terms. Thus, we say that the identity is episetmically primitive; it cannot be deduced a priori from the physical facts about neurons in brains, but must be taken as an inscrutible given observed in nature ("it just is!").

But no other identity in nature is epistemically primitive. For epistemically primitive phenomena, we reserve terms such as fundamental laws. The form and existence of such laws cannot be deduced from simpler principles, but rather are accepted to exist as contingent brute facts observed in nature. And if conscious exeprience falls under this same rubric, why should it not also be granted the same sort of fundamental, non-reducible place in our ontology?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
That was pretty much my point, about how this mystic viewpoint is the enemy of scientific discovery...it was in the days of the vitalists, and it is now.

Again, disanalogous cases. The vitalists had only to explain those physical processes directly observable to them; they never had to ask, "why is it that reproduction, growth, etc. are accompanied with life?" On the other hand, when we analyze the brain we are compelled to ask "why is it that brain processing is accompanied with consciousness?"

The "mystification" of consciousness is not a human invention; it is built into the problem itself. That is why the problem is so hard.

 

[hypnagogue]

For what it's worth, here is what Chalmers has to say of Dennett.
(taken from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/moving.html )

-----
To have any chance of making the case, a type-A materialist needs to argue that for consciousness, as for life, the functions are all that need explaining. Perhaps some strong, subtle, and substantive argument can be given, establishing that once we have explained the functions, we have automatically explained everything. If a sound argument could be given for this surprising conclusion, it would provide as valid a resolution of the hard problem as any.

Is there any compelling, non-question-begging argument for this conclusion? The key word, of course, is "non-question-begging". Often, a proponent will simply assert that functions are all that need explaining, or will argue in a way that subtly assumes this position at some point. But that is clearly unsatisfactory. Prima facie, there is very good reason to believe that the phenomena a theory of consciousness must account for include not just discrimination, integration, report, and such functions, but also experience, and prima facie, there is good reason to believe that the question of explaining experience is distinct from the questions about explaining the various functions. Such prima facie intuitions can be overturned, but to do so requires very solid and substantial argument. Otherwise, the problem is being "resolved" simply by placing one's head in the sand.

Upon examing the materialist papers in this symposium, such arguments are surprisingly hard to find. Indeed, despite their use of various analogies, very few of the contributors seem willing to come right out and say that in the case of consciousness, the functions are all that need explaining. Only Dennett embraces this position explicitly, and even he does not spend much time arguing for it. But he does spend about a paragraph making the case: presumably this paragraph bears the weight of his piece, once the trimmings are stripped away. So it is this paragraph that we should examine.

Dennett's argument here, interestingly enough, is an appeal to phenomenology. He examines his own phenomenology, and tells us that he finds nothing other than functions that need explaining. The manifest phenomena that need explaining are his reactions and his abilities; nothing else even presents itself as needing to be explained.

This is daringly close to a simple denial - one is tempted to agree that it might be a good account of Dennett's phenomenology - and it raises immediate questions. For a start, it is far from obvious that even all the items on Dennett's list - "feelings of foreboding", "fantasies", "delight and dismay" - are purely functional matters. To assert without argument that all that needs to be explained about such things are the associated functions seems to beg the crucial question at issue. And if we leave these controversial cases aside, Dennett's list seems to be a systematically incomplete list of what needs to be explained in explaining consciousness. One's "ability to be moved to tears" and "blithe disregard of perceptual details" are striking phenomena, but they are far from the most obvious phenomena that I (at least) find when I introspect. Much more obvious are the experience of emotion and the phenomenal visual field themselves; and nothing Dennett says gives us reason to believe that these do not need to be explained, or that explaining the associated functions will explain them.

What might be going on here? Perhaps the key lies in what Dennett has elsewhere described as the foundation of his philosophy: "third-person absolutism". If one takes the third-person perspective on oneself -- viewing oneself from the outside, so to speak - these reactions and abilities are no doubt the main focus of what one sees. But the hard problem is about explaining the view from the first-person perspective. So to shift perspectives like this - even to shift to a third-person perspective on one's first-person perspective, which is one of Dennett's favorite moves - is again to assume that what needs explaining are such functional matters as reactions and reports, and so is again to argue in a circle.

Dennett suggests "subtract the functions and nothing is left". Again, I can see no reason to accept this, but in any case the argument seems to have the wrong form. An analogy suggested by Gregg Rosenberg is useful here. Color has properties of hue, saturation, and brightness. It is plausible that if one "subtracts" hue from a color, nothing phenomenologically significant is left, but this certainly doesn't imply that color is nothing but hue. So even if Dennett could argue that function was somehow required for experience (in the same way that hue is required for color), this would fall a long way short of showing that function is all that has to be explained.

A slight flavor of non-circular argument is hinted at by Dennett's suggestion: "I wouldn't know what I was thinking about if I couldn't identify them by their functional differentia". This tantalizing sentence suggests various reconstructions, but all the reconstructions that I can find fall short of making the case. If the idea is that functional role is essential to the (subpersonal) process of identification, this falls short of establishing that functioning is essential to the experiences themselves, let alone that functioning is all there is to the experiences. If the idea is rather than function is all we have access to at the personal level, this seems false, and seems to beg the question against the intuitive view that we have knowledge of intrinsic features of experience. But if Dennett can elaborate this into a substantial argument, that would be a very useful service.

In his paper, Dennett challenges me to provide "independent" evidence (presumably behavioral or functional evidence) for the "postulation" of experience. But this is to miss the point: conscious experience is not "postulated" to explain other phenomena in turn; rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. And if it turns out that it cannot be explained in terms of more basic entities, then it must be taken as irreducible, just as happens with such categories as space and time. Again, Dennett's "challenge" presupposes that the only explananda that count are functions.[*]

*[[[Tangentially: I would be interested to see Dennett's version of the "independent" evidence that leads physicists to "introduce" the fundamental categories of space and time. It seems to me that the relevant evidence is spatiotemporal through and through, just as the evidence for experience is experiential through and through.]]]

Dennett might respond that I, equally, do not give arguments for the position that something more than functions needs to be explained. And there would be some justice here: while I do argue at length for my conclusions, all these arguments take the existence of consciousness for granted, where the relevant concept of consciousness is explicitly distinguished from functional concepts such as discrimination, integration, reaction, and report. Dennett presumably disputes this starting point: he thinks that the only sense in which people are conscious is a sense in which consciousness is defined as reportability, as a reactive disposition, or as some other functional concept.

But let us be clear on the dialectic. It is prima facie obvious to most people that there is a further phenomenon here: in informal surveys, the large majority of respondents (even at Tufts!) indicate that they think something more than functions needs explaining. Dennett himself - faced with the results of such a survey, perhaps intending to deflate it - has accepted that there is at least a prima facie case that something more than functions need to be explained; and he has often stated how "radical" and "counterintuitive" his position is. So it is clear that the default assumption is that there is a further problem of explanation; to establish otherwise requires significant and substantial argument.

I would welcome such arguments, in the ongoing attempt to clarify the lay of the land. The challenge for those such as Dennett is to make the nature of these arguments truly clear. I do not think it a worthless project - the hard problem is so hard that we should welcome all attempts at a resolution - but it is clear that anyone trying to make such an argument is facing an uphill battle.[*]

*[[[One might look to Dennett's book Consciousness Explained for non-circular arguments, but even here such arguments for the relevant conclusion are hard to find. The plausible attacks on a "place in a brain where it all comes together" do nothing to remove the hard problem. The book's reliance on "heterophenomenology" (verbal reports) as the central source of data occasionally slips into an unargued assumption that such reports are all that need explaining, especially in the discussion of "real seeming", which in effect assumes that the only "seemings" that need explaining are dispositions to react and report. I think there may be a substantial argument implicit in the "Orwell/Stalin" discussion - essentially taking materialism as a premise and arguing that if materialism is true then the functional facts exhaust all the facts - but even this is equivalent to "if something more than functions needs explaining, then materialism cannot explain it", and I would not disagree. At best, Dennett's arguments rule out a middle-ground "Cartesian materialism"; the hard problem remains as hard as ever.]]]

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Might I suggest a few books?

A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.

I asked for an example of a plausible theory showing that consciousness is brain. Which one of these is your proposed example? (The truth is that there is no example. There are conjectures and hypotheses, some of them, like Dennett's, quite elaborate. But nothing deserving to be called a theory).

Agnosticism is almost always the best way.

I agree that not making assumptions is always the best way. But there's no inherent virtue in agnosticism.

Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.

Not in my opinion, but it's a small point.

It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun ) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.

We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.

Imo that is an incorrext use of the Feenoman example, and not Dennett's argument.

What exactly do you disagree with?

You said that the heterophenomenological approach deals with subjective experience. But that is precisely what it doesn't deal with. Dennett's argument, stripped to the basics, is functionalist, not much different to the arguments of Watson and Skinner, It is a 'black box, approach in which consciousness is reduced to the behavioural signs of consciousness. Subjective feelings are left out of his theory entirely.

Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.

I think you're probably right. This is my complaint.

Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".

There is no self-consistent and plausible physicalist theory of consciousness. I'll risk stating that as a bald fact to make it easy for you to find a single exception. (I'll check the thread and respond there to 'hexagon' theory).

Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?

Very true. But there's no point in a theory that appeals to scientists but doesn't stand up to logical analysis.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
I'm afraid I don't know anything about Tathagata and so forth, or the sutras.

To me the indestructible Tathagata Womb is the conceptual essence of Buddhism. You find the Womb in the: http://www.buddhistinformation.com/Lankavatara_sutra.htm .
This link might be useful. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/iti/iti4.html#112 .
The essence of the Universal Womb as explained in the Anuradha Sutta . Buddha: "Very good, Anuradha. Very good. Both formerly & now, it is only stress that I describe, and the cessation of stress."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-086.html ( Samyutta Nikaya XXII.86 - the Anuradha Sutta)
Please note that Buddha himself is also called the Tathagata.

Originally posted by Canute
But I have some questions if you don't mind. What's the relationship between emptiness and the membrane?

The Tathagata Womb is stress (Elasticity that gives in the dual worlds interconnectivity and attraction: gravity). We can use the 'image' membrane as a human concept to present that 'stress'.
The Womb represents Sunyata (emptiness).
This emptiness is transformed (restructured) in local events.
The local events contain basic duality (like photons) or very complex combinations of duality (like we human are).
The local events have a lifetime ... so 'time' comes in.
Between the local events we see Tratityasamutpada (interdependent causality - the Karmatic wheel). That causes suffering (stress on a local level), which is a local (human) attraction to other dual structures. If you want to overcome Samsara you have to reduce the stress in yourself (being attracted to dual forms).

Originally posted by Canute
Doesn't the idea of a physical membrane being fundamental to existence contradict Buddhist ontology completely?

No. What is 'physical' in Buddhism? Where does it stops? Does it exists? When I say a 'real' membrane I mean a basic boundary that has dynamics (the property of stress). That indestructible membrane will always be embedded in the localities (holons) once the infolding begins.
Matter and energy are just different 'appearances' of the membrane.

Originally posted by Canute
How does this theory account for the existence of the membrane in the first place? What is the membrane made of?

.
Seen from the human world the membrane can be represented as singularity. We can use the image of a single basic 'string' which is hollow or a hollow membrane-sphere, which are in fact both the same.
The 'material/energy' of the membrane? You want me to give the answer that Siddartha Gautama didn't gave himself? He gave us 'stress' and 'indestructible'. ;-).

Based on this two elements I offer an engineering concept of how their combination gives locally zones in which duality is joined, and where the coupling creates super-stress.

 

[Canute]

I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.

Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Again, disanalogous cases. The vitalists had only to explain those physical processes directly observable to them; they never had to ask, "why is it that reproduction, growth, etc. are accompanied with life?" On the other hand, when we analyze the brain we are compelled to ask "why is it that brain processing is accompanied with consciousness?"

The "mystification" of consciousness is not a human invention; it is built into the problem itself. That is why the problem is so hard.

Ok, what of Edelman and Giulio, quoted here.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Canute the following is a link to a thread by hypnagogue where this interaction question is addressed. I personally found it to be a compelling argument and didn't see a rebuttal that came close to killing it. You might want to take a look at it if you haven't already.


https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=6793

For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.

I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by pelastration
Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.

Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.

Our level of reality in life and science is Dual. The friction of that local duality causes tension (= suffering).
I suggest you think for ourself if duality is possible without ISOLATION, a boundary. What happens with two different energies (ie. + and -) when they are meeting but are not isolated?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.

But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious?

Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.

Just to disagree with Hypnogogue for once - monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism and idealism are related in much more complicated ways than this. Mind-body dualism may help explain consciousness, and may not. We don't know yet. Many, including Dan Dennett, think dualism is illogical (so do I, but I haven't read the thread hypno referred to as showing an exception).

One can be either a materialist or an idealist and still be a dualist (or not). There are all sorts of variations.

Hypno - where was your argument for dualism - I missed it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.

Well, we should remain open-minded. However, if Materialism makes no claims that are illogical or that lead to infinite regress, and provides a possible explanation of consciousness, then I would suggest that we drop Dualism in favor of Materialism. Yet, it remains to be seen if Materialism really can do all of those things.

 

[Canute]

But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.

But, according to this dictionary of Philosophy, Materialism should never refer to anything non-physical. Any reference to such things would put it in the realm of Dualism. Perhaps many things that have been considered "Materialistic" in the past, are not really so?

 

[Canute]

It's confusing. The modern term is 'physicalism', which says quite simply that nothing non-physical exists.

However consciousness is a problem in this view. Some physicalists get around this by saying that there is a physical basis for every mental phenomonon, and that feelings, concepts, etc are 'epiphenomenal', non-causal and no more than the steam from a train whistle.

The problem with this is that it is essentially dualism in disguise. Also it ignores the fact that Huxley, who coined the train analogy, was referring to a train that was driven very causally by exactly the same sort of steam. It is also strange that there is no other known case of something being physically caused but not physically causal.

As I see it strict physicalism must assume that feelings, concepts etc. are physical, not an easy position to defend.

 

[olde drunk]

if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron??

imho, condciousness creates the physical and it's attributes. why would the same electron or same chemical reaction create two different behaviors?? even identical twins, with so much in common, are separate and distinct individuals.

peace,

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by olde drunk
if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron?

Strictly speaking physicalism is stronger than that. It claims feelings ARE physical, not just physically caused.

 

[metacristi]

Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

I think we should be much more careful here.Maybe we will never have sufficient reasons to think that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of physics and chemistry indeed.But this does not mean automatically that consciousness,at least qualia,are fundamental features of reality.

The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes (implying very faint interactions in the neural network) which creates conscious experience (for example the lack of sufficiently precise measurement devices) or a too high complexity (after all human brain is one of the most complex things in the universe).Moreover there could be implied final limitations,for example if consciousness is a chaotic phenomenon,given also its huge complexity,I am not so sure we will ever be able to prove that conscious experience can be reduced at the laws of physics.The simple fact that reductionism,possible,cannot be proved with sufficient reasons does not entail also the conclusion that consciousness do not reduce in reality at physical laws.

Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach (which by the way is not reductionist though it let's the door open to find further that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of nature).Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.

Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory...

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes

Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.

Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,

What is 'epistemilogical privelege'? (I keep asking this)

rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,

Not in the opinion of most people.

the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.

Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.

We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach

So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.

Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.

It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.

The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.

That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.

Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.

I rest my case.

But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory... [/B]

But of course.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.

Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.Not yet at least.Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.They can only base a rational skepticism.Nothing more.As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena .This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.In other words it has epistemological privilege.To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.

Not in the opinion of most people.

This is not at all relevant.The fact that many people believe something does not make it rational.The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts.That's why for example the majority of the so called 'common truths' (which people agree about based on very superficial observations) are not reliable unlike scientific statements which are accepted only after carefully observing facts,inferring also from experiments their sufficient causes.Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.

Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.

You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer for all practical purposes but it does not imply final claims.Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.The existence of few puzzles (facts that cannot be accommodated within a theory) and even some anomalies do not really put a pressure on a scientific theory which is theoretically and experimentally evolving.In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.Basically scientists prefer the best approach as the standard of knowledge for the moment,they do not NOT RELY however on the actual theory (which imply a high degree of confidence in its truth,empirically based) for we do not have yet sufficient reasons for that (it's clear we are rather at the beginning of our quest).

We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach

So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.

Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness (the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific but nothing impedes one day to find such an alternative,based on empirical facts also [superior or at least equal with the actual approach],implicitly proving [or at least casting a doubt in the previous conclusions] that neurology is not enough.Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument (for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).

Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.

It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.

Canute there is no claim here that behaviorism is correct (as a matter of fact it is dead from a long time as a serious scientific hypothesis) but only that from all empirical evidence available there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?Those who make blatantly the positive claim that it is not conscious should provide such empirical evidence.But it is entirely rational (based on the philosophical arguments pointing the difficulties of the existing approach) to be skeptical or to say that 'my philosophical opinion is that such an android is not conscious'.

The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.

That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.

Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.Here we go directly from axioms to theorems,truths derived from axioms,whilst in science experiment is the highest authority and we must begin from there in constructing backward our theories.Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).Anyway in the vast majority of cases we cannot assign a very high degree of confidence (which to entitle us to rely on them) to all the premises so we must always be open to accept they are fallible.Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.

I rest my case.

If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes (for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).Of course it would be only a [strictly personal] belief,you would have no base to make the positive claim in exterior (implying epistemological primacy also over the knowledge provided by the scientific method) that a soul does exist if you cannot prove it inter subjectively based on the best method existent,the scientific method (at most you can say you have strong subjective evidence to believe,without any claim of epistemical privilege,that a soul does exist).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.

I don't need it explaining. I know already.

We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.

You have a very strange idea of the relationship between deduction and induction. These 'philosophical objections' are no more or less than logical objections. You can't just ignore them. The hypothesis that consciousness can be reduced to matter is a philosophical conjecture. It's got nothing to do with observations. There has never been a single scientific observation that suggests it is true.

After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.

It is claimed by many people, including me, that the way science defines itself precludes it from explaining consciousness. Nobody is claiming that consciousness is not part of nature.

Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.

So where are the facts supporting science's positive claims that it can explain consciousness?

I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.

There is no 'priority', there is just what can be proved or disproved by whatever method happens to work. Do you really think that science can be conducted without philosophising?

As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena.

And I've told you before that I think you're wrong.

This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.

What?

In other words it has epistemological privilege.

I you use this term again without defining I'll just give up responding. I'm worn out from asking you what you mean by it.

To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness

You mean like lots of thinkers have already done? Do you imagine that philosophy is not based on empirical facts?

or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.

Why does it have to be superior? It just needs to be a way of doing it. Are you allergic to philosophy or something? If you are you won't be able to do any science.

The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts... snip...Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.

Well I'll disagree. Rationality consists in thinking rationally. It's not the exclusive preserve of any particular sub-discipline of academic study. Also 'facts' may be observed or deduced.

You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).

Very funny.

Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.

Yes, this is where it differs from philosophical deduction.

The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer but it does not imply final claims. Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.

Perhaps you shopuld bear this in mind when you're claiming that science can overcome the logical arguments of many philosophers and explain consciousness.

In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).

Sorry but that's nonsense.

Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.

What do you mean 'alternative to standard knowledge'. What standard knowledge? We don't know, that's the whole point. I think you mean standard assumptions.

Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness

I don't know. Generally people generalise their objection, and simply say that science cannot explain consciousness. This is sometimes for the simple reason that science can't even define it, and can hardly start explaining it before it's done even this.

{QUOTE](the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?[/QUOTE]
There is not one shred of evidence that it is correct.

Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?

Yes.

The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific

I agree. The question remains whether they are right or wrong.

Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).

In the opinion of many there are some very good reasons.

Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument

That's exactly what they do, which is why those objections are taken seriously.

(for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).

You can't confirm scientifically that something cannot be explained by science. The idea is irrational.

there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.

There is no such empirical evidence. It cannot be proved either way, or so science asserts. There is no scientific test for the presence or absence of consciousness. Science has not yet managed to prove that consciousness exists.

The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?

I understand exactly what you mean, and agree. Fortunately philosophically deduced conclusions are not provisional.

Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.

So pigs might fly?

Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).

Of course.

Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.

You're drawing a line between science and philosophy that doesn't exist.

If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.

Yes there is.

At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes

That's what I've been saying. Of course I have first hand subjective evidence not amenable to scientific scrutiny, it's called experience. It's all any of us have when it comes to consciousness (or anything else come to that). You've said this yourself by arguing that one can't tell whether an android is conscious or not.

(for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).

I don't think souls exist.

 

[Fliption]

Well I agree with Canute. Completely. Science is a tool of philosophy. Not the other way around. Nor are they competing approaches to knowlegde. SO I'm pretty sure scientists haven't dropped a pig out of an airplane to see if it can fly.

It seems to me that if you have no emperical evidence either way, then philosophical implications would certainly influence the focus of experiments and scientific theories. It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.

I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infinitely reducable?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Fliption
It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.

That's it exactly.

I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infinitely reducable? [/B]

Well, we know that the BB is unreducable. Some assert that spacetime is likewise, and that there are fundamental quanta of time and space. Some argue that consciousness is.

All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Canute
All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.

Right, but I want to hear one of the people with an opposing view answer it.