Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

[metacristi]

Dark Wing

You jump from "there is a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neuron level" to "there is no qualia". but there are some very distinct correlations. depression is a great example here. Yes, there is a great deal of work to do, but that means nothing. Its not an argument against the idea, and I was wanting to talk of this idea as a poosible way of the contingent world, not as an idea that is already proved.

If we have found very strong links to some, then its worth searching for more. Many reaserchers of perception will argue for the exsistance of the "grandmother cell", where there is a very specific cell in the brain designed only to respond to your grandmothers image. Infact, a lot of the cortex is set out like that: one cell only responding to very very specific information. If that be the case, then is it not at least plausable that one CAN develop a one to one "reduction" to the brain? but in saying they are correlated, then you are still assuming that these states exsist in their own right, and IMO they do not.

I have not intended to say that 'there is no qualia'.I only wanted to stress that we still have a lot of work to do even in the so called 'easy' problem (to use the terminology of Chalmers) without talking of the possible existence of a fudamental qualia irreducible to the functioning of the brain (the 'hard' problem).But from what you say I deduce that you accept the mere conjectural status of the actual hypothesis,without making the claim that it is very close to the actual truth (in absolute).

Neither do I deny the possibility that qualia might appear as an emergent property of the complex functioning of the neural network of the brain (as the actual main view conjectures) without the need to postulate also that qualia needs something more or that consciousness is made of a different,though possible capable to interact with usual matter,'substance' (as epiphenomenalism+interactionist dualism assume).Or that the actual conjecture cannot be improved.The only problem I see now is that we are far away from having the reasons which to entitle us to have a great degree of confidence in the actual view (namely the actual variant of the emergentist approach).I have nothing with the actual view strictly technically speaking.Apart from criticising some of scientists' too optimistic expectations sometimes of course.Indeed it is still an open question whether the actual view will be confirmed with sufficient reasons practically.So far there is no known emergent phenomenon that is conscious or at least proto conscious.

 

[hypnagogue]

metacristi, the objection here can be stated very simply.

1. Any purely physical explanations of consciousness will leave us free to rationally imagine a result to the contrary. That is, you can give me any theory T that tells me brainstate X or computation Y leads to conscious aspect Z, but I can still rationally imagine X or Y taking place without Z occurring as well. That is, if I imagine X or Y taking place without Z occurring as well, T cannot explain to me definitively why I am wrong, other than to say simply "that is just not how it is observed to be in nature."

2. Explanations that exhaust the necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon leave us with a conceptual necessity-- that is, having fully understood the explanation, it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise. For instance, having understood the facts about the microscopic bonding structure of H2O molecules, it is impossible for me to rationally imagine that a large collection of H2O molecules in a container at STP could exist without the properties of water being the macroscopic result-- the latter is a conceptual necessity following from the former. (If I do imagine otherwise, the conventional scientific explanation can explain to me step by step how I am wrong, rather than baldly asserting so.)

3. It follows from 1 and 2 that any physical theory of consciousness is does not include some necessary or sufficient causes. We have every reason to believe that explaining brain processes is necessary in explaining the details of human consciousness, so that leaves us to conclude that explaining brain processes (or computational processes) is not sufficient. There is something missing from the physical account.

There is simple but powerful intuition behind this claim. Any successful explanation of a phenomenon P in terms of a set of composite phenomena C must explain the mechanisms whereby the existence of C necessitates that P follows. For this to be possible, there needs to be some sort of combinatory effect in the phenomena C that somehow 'add up' to P. For instance, in the case of water, we have the structure and functions of H2O molecules adding up to the macroscopic structural and functional properties of water.

Now, in the traditional materialist ontology, we have our characters spacetime, matter, energy, and so on, with various associated properties. It is not clear at all that any of these materialist characters, as we traditionally conceive of them, have the right characteristics to somehow 'add up' to consciousness, no matter how they are arranged.

Indulge me in an analogy that is bound to be imperfect, but, I think, useful. In nature we observe two things of a fundamentally different character: material reality and consciousness. Without yet assuming that these two are distinct, we can still notice fundamental differences in our conceptions of these two things. All things in objective material reality have spatial extension; consciousness does not have spatial extension. All things in objective material reality are defined in terms of extrinsic or relational properties (for instance, mass is a relational property defined in terms of an object's resistance to acceleration); at least some elements of consciousness are defined in terms of intrinsic or inherent properties (for instance, the subjective experience of red is defined only in terms of its own redness). And so on.

A simplistic mathematical analogy would involve two sets of numbers with fundamentally different properties; for our purposes, let's say material reality as we conceive of it is represented by the real numbers and that consciousness is represented by the imaginary numbers. If we set out to explain consciousness starting from a materialist ontology alone, it is a bit like we are starting off assuming that only real numbers exist and then trying to show that we can somehow combine some set of reals to yield an imaginary. In the end it is a doomed exercise, because no combination of reals can add up to i. It is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the imaginary component. Likewise, I believe that no combination of physical processes alone can account for consciousness, because the materialist ontology leaves out a critical element. Any attempt to do so is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the 'experience' component. The solution to our mathematical problem is to recognize that we can't derive i from the reals; rather, we just add it in as a fundamental character in our mathematical ontology and proceed. Likewise, the solution to our problem of consciousness is to recognize that we can't derive experience from physical processes; rather, on some level, we just have to add some new fundamental character into our natural ontology and proceed.

 

[Fliption]

It looks as if I don't need to respond to your response AG. I was just going to add that if emergent properties can hide mysteries than there would be no need to replace consciousness with an illusion. We could just simply say that consciousness DOES exists and it is an emergent property of physical processes. But I think we're straight on all that now.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

The scientific method provides the best methodology known of establishing the truth about natural facts.This is a fact accepted by all serious philosophers and scientists.But it is not considered infallible nor the best methodology ever possible.That's why scientific knowledge is always fallible,it never makes definitive claims,being always provisional.Scientists are always open to make the finding that something is missing.But this finding must be based entirely on experiments.Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge (there is another use,not relevant here,to show that some assumptions still hold even in cases that cannot be experimented for the moment;Heisenbergs mental experiments is one example-though I strongly doubt that we are entitled to conclude from here that HUP can be extended to all singular events).

Secondly we are entitled rationally to assign different degrees of confidence in the approximative truth of a certain assumption about natural facts upon the number of relevant successful experimental confirmations.Providing a systematic observation (done with the best measurement devices) and the existence of a relevant sample of successful tests,on a certain domain of definition and in the limit of what can be observed,we are even entitled to have a very high degree of confidence.This is exactly the rational base of why we are entitled to assign a much higher degree of confidence in the scientific explanations than in the so called 'common truths' (assumptions about facts inferred from very superficial observations).

Since science is entirely concerned with observed facts,if we managed to find all relevant causes for a certain phenomenon that can be put in evidence empirically at a certain moment,based on which to propose a detailed and widely tested theory,not falsified yet,especially in the absence of any other scientific alternative hypothesis,we would be fully entitled to have a very high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct.This does not imply certitudes,technically we are still open to doubt,but the existence of those sufficient causes fully entitle some people to think that it is actually very close to the truth,maybe the best theory possible and so to RELY on the theory not merely to prefer on the ground that it is the best approach at a certain moment.

If we could propose a detailed successful holistic theory of consciousness,extensively tested,we would be exactly in such a situation.The only requirement is that the theory should also make clear predictions about the mechanisms that create subjective experience.In spite of the fact that for the moment those predictions might not be confirmed empirically because we cannot 'measure' subjective experiences (who can be sure that this will ever be so?) all the above mentioned conditions are present so that scientists would be rationally entitled,backed by sufficient reasons,to rely on that theory.Of course this is not obligatory for all rational persons but it would be a strong base for the conclusion.Not to mention the possible construction of an android whose behaviour is indistinct from that of a human being using it.This does not imply that they (scientists) would not be open to new facts,on the contrary,but for that they would need sufficient reasons to think that there exist something extra.And this sufficient reasons must be based necessarily on empirical facts.Even without accepting that the theory is close to the actual truth,that is without relying on it,merely preffering it to all other hypotheses on pragmatic grounds,we would still need empirical facts to believe that something extra is involved.

So that,even if in absolute maybe subjective experiences involves something 'inbuilt' in the fundamental reality,from all empirical facts known+the low number of puzzles in the theory or no puzzle at all+the existence of an explanation for the subjective experiences inside the existing paradigm (though not confirmed practically for the moment)+the absence of an alternative scientific hypothesis there is no good reason to think that something extra is involved.Indeed the fact that there are some not confirmed yet predictions never constitute a falsification of the existing paradigm.Even if there are final limitations or we will not be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experiences arise for a very long time there are no good reasons to believe that those predictions are wrong if the above presented situation does not change.

Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.

 

[Fliption]

metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.

This is not an opinion, or even an irrelevant mathematical truth that you need to observe in order to verify, as I understand it. It is impossible for you to reductively understand consciousness under the current scheme. Let me give an analogy to see if I can help you see the way this dialogue appears to me.

Let's assume that I've told you that once I have painted a white wall the color black, then it is no longer white. We're assuming 2 things:
1) the wall was white
2) I paint it black

therefore the wall is no longer white.

Now you come along and say, "we can only know that the wall is no longer white if we observe it to be true." This makes no sense because by definition it is true. Because if the wall is still white upon emperical study, then assumption 2 would be wrong and I could not have painted it black. So if we know that both assumptions are true, then we don't have to verify that the wall is no longer white. We know it isn't, by definition. Regardless of how long you observe a black wall, it will never be white!

The only way you can ever succeed in finding a wall that is both white and black is if you change the definitions. Or as Hypnagogue says with regards to consciousness, change the natural ontology.

So no matter how hard you look at a black wall, it is always white. Likewise, no matter what you find emperically under the current assumptions, you will never get rid of the hard problem of consciousness. Go ahead and think of all the possible scientific explanations for consciousness you can think of and let all that are participating show you how they don't(cannot) address the real issue of consciousness by definition.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by metacristi
But this finding must be based entirely on experiments. Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge

Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.

Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.

That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Fliption
metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.

Thanks Fliption, that is an eloquent way of saying exactly what I am trying to say.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Might any exchange of information be considered a form of consciousness?

 

[Dark Wing]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
What do you mean by experience here? There are many neurons whose activities don't activate some kind of experience (hence, the unconscious mind). But more importantly, WHY a subsequent change in experience? Why any experience to begin with?

without experience, and without sense of self we would not be able to form societies, or live in a way that was benificial to self at all. In short, we would not survive if you did not have a sense of consiousness. And all that has to reflect is an ability to interact with one's environment. anything that has the ability to interact with the environment comes into question here. from simple conditioning of cells to pheromone interaction with insects to our higher level social interaction:we need it to predict and controll our world.

So you ask: why? why is it neccesary for it to be the case that we have consiousness?

Its not. The question ends up chasing a dark end, why?

example. when you strike a match you have fire. Why? because friction on phosphorous happens to cause a spark. Why? its not neccesary. Its just happens to be the case in this contingent world. to try and explain it further and further down becomes meaningless. So the brain: we happen to have an attribute of semantics. we can create and derrive meaning from our world. evolutionary advantage? yes. enables us to live better with in a society and interact with our fellow species. maybe it is the case that there were a few zombie nations out there, and they were wiped out. Its concievable. But not in this contingent universe.

Instead, here, when there is neural activity, you have mind. or at least a heightened ability to interact with the environemtn, an ability that goes beyond just neurol activity, but very basic nervous activity on a celluar level. and that's all the brain is: a highly advanced nervous center.

OK, let me see if I have your argument straight.

Step 1. The physical brain processes information.
Step 2. Then a miracle occurs...
Step 3. "The mind" is simply the result of this process.

I think you need to be more explicit in step 2.

ha ha, very good. Infact, i am saying that step 2 does not exsist. it is not the result, it is not the emergant property, it is the process itself. eliminative materialism.

example. Ancient civilisations believed that lightning was a result of thors hammer striking down the mountian tops of Valhalla. We have recently learned that it is infact the depolerisation of electricity. that IS lightning. there is no need for the extra explanation. just a description of the system. Just like a brain that is functioing in certian area's will convince some that they must have a mind, some emergant property of a closed physical domain. when in fact, its just the dopamine pathway activating again. Do we know where exacly the feeling of consiousness is caused? most of the litrature is suggesting the fronal cortex, and they can stimulate all kinds of area's of that with regularity to make a subject feel diffrent things. one surgon kept stimulating a section, and the patient kept laughing: when asked what was so funny, he would say it was the picture of a horse on the wall, or the lab coat of the doctor etc. we don't need that extra explanation, but we can't handle the thought that we are just physical beings. There is no emergant property. there is no majical step from consiousness. its just a contingent fact then when we are stimulated in certianways we will feel like thus.

My argument is not that conscious experience is not causally linked in some way with the brain. My argument is that any explanation invoking only physical processes in the brain is insufficient to solve the problem before us, even though it is still necessary to refer to such brain activity for a theory of human consciousness.

thatis because there is no problem of consiousness. it is a battle of words we are dealing with here. i will see if i can find a good Wittgensteign quote to put in here on this exact topic to show you what i mean by that. although its halpful to theorize with words like "mind" and "consiousness" it will often just lead to semantic confusion, and that's the last thing we want here.

To put it simply, while embracing your bottom-up approach: why should processes in the brain give rise to consciousness at all? Why do these processes not take place like nice materialistic experience-less machines? Why AREN'T we zombies?

there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons. who can explain evolution? Just as a match and fire has its explanation limit, so des the mind and consiousness. you have to start withan underlying fact somewhere.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.

From all I've read so far no philosophical argument has succeeded,in a sound way,to show that the physicalist approach is indeed incoherent.No one is convincing.This is not only my conclusion it is the conclusion of many serious philosophers.Even Chalmers agree that the logical possibility of zombies does not entail their experimental possibility.I'm afraid we are here in a stalemate,at the logical level,comparable with that regarding the argument pro/con the existence of a personal God.One must first believe in the existence/nonexistence of God in order to accept the arguments pro/con God existence.And of course belief is never a proof.Only hard evidence could make the difference.

That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.

As I've explained numerous times before the mere possibility that we will never be able to confirm experimentally the explanations of a very successful otherwise physicalist theory on how subjective experiences appear is not a proof,per se,that there is something more fundamental.

No respectable scientist will argue that a scientific theory explaining very well all observed facts (being very detailed with respect to what we observe) is indeed the best possible theory.For that we should prove first that there are possible only a finite number of alternative hypotheses,logically coherent,compatible with facts and that only one of them has not been disproved yet.This is quasi impossible to do in practice.That's why scientists are always prepared to find that their theories are incomplete or disproved provided new data,though some of them (or possible all of them) might have a great confidence in their approximative truth.So that we can never assume that we exhausted all necessary and sufficient conditions.Not even in your example with the water.Thus there is no logical necessity to believe that it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise,the actual explanation being simply the best we could achieve so far using the best methodology available in front of all observed facts nothing more.

Besides for a certain set of observed facts could exist,possible,an infinity of logical explanations that can be imagined.For example in the case of water we can postulate that the forces at work which hold atoms of H and O toghether are due partly to some invisible quantum leprichauns.This is fully possible though we cannot observe them now.Of course it is the epistemological privilege of science,based on observed facts only,which makes the difference and entitle us to assign a way higher degree of confidence in the truth of the scientific theory.It is always hard facts which make the difference,still this does not mean the leprichaun hypothesis was disproved.Provided new relevant experimental data...it will become science.Exactly this is the case with qualia.But for the moment there is no good reason to think that qualia is fundamental so what's the point of changing something in the scientific method itself?I'm afraid logic alone is not enough to settle things.

[We would be entitled to change some assumptions in the scientifc method itself only if the best existent theory of mind will become theoretically and empirically stagnant for a long time,in spite of the effort of the best minds on Earth and the existence of generous fundings for research,with a lot of anomalies and puzzles piling up,in the absence of any serious scientific alternative hypotheses.In this case I think it is more rational to assume that there is something extra we cannot put in evidence instead of postulating indefinitely that the actual approach will be able to explain away the puzzles later.But of course not even in this case would we be entitled to claim that qualia is fundamental.]

 

[Canute]

For science consciousness is a paradigm-shaking problem. Even now, comfortably into 21st century, no logically plausible scientific theory for its existence has yet been proposed. Many researchers remain hopeful that given more time a scientific explanation will be devised. However the longer the problem remains unsolved the more likely it becomes that the logical arguments against the possibility of a devising a scientific explanation hold, and that we cannot explain a strictly first-person phenomena in strictly third-person terms in principle. It seems reasonable to suppose that this is the ause of our inability as yet to conceive of one single scientific experiment that would prove anything at all about it.

My impression is that most of those people who believe that the current scientific model of the universe is correct also tend to believe that recently attempted explanations of consciousness based on low frequency oscillations in the brain, quantum coherence in micro-tubules, supervenience, hetero-phenomenology and so on are so nearly plausible that we must be on the brink of success, and that soon we will make the inevitable breakthrough.

However this view is based on faith rather than evidence of progress. We are no closer to explaining the origins of consciousness than Parmeneides was, and no current scientific theory that claims to explain consciousness, or even claims to explain how it might be explained, stands up to logical scrutiny.

There is no scientific definition of consciousness, no scientific test for its presence or absence, no scientific means of measuring it and no scientific proof of its existence. There is no place for it in the scientific model, no scientific theory requiring it as a postulate, and no scientific description of its properties that does not completely contradict our ‘folk-psychological’ experience of it. If it were not for first-person anecdotes there would be no scientific reason to believe that it exists.

Yet any day now we are expected to succeed in constructing a scientific explanation of it. This is surely ridiculous. The infamous ‘explanatory gap’ is not a crack in the pavement, it is a chasm of Hollywood special effects proportions, and it is no narrower today than it ever was.

 

[metacristi]

I think we must settle once and forever some things (I already explained them but it seems no one really understood in spite of some claims here).Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed.However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?And since there is no proof that human mind is above nature the axiom still stands even in this case (it postulates that we can find a holistic,detailed,explanation of consciousness in which to have a high degree of confidence).But it is considered also fallible,the finding of sufficient empirical or logical reasons leading to its demise.I indicated above some necessary conditions when we would be entitled to do that (this is not sufficient of course for an action would depend also on the philosophical views held by the majority in the scientific community).But certainly we cannot do that now,the actual objections are not sound.This fallibilistic scientific approach of why consciousness can be understood is entirely different from the physicalist approach that science can surely have a detailed theory entirely on phisical terms.At most this view can count as a philosophical view in spite of the fact that there are no serious arguments against now.And from what I know the majority of physicalists accept this.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed. However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?

This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.

 

[hypnagogue]

OK Dark Wing, I see where you are coming from, and I think we are now at a critical point in our discussion. I agree that, on some level, consciousness is contingent or is the result of some compository contingent entities; at some point, it cannot be explained any further other than to say that it is just a brute fact of nature.

However, there are distinctions to be made with regards to your match analogy. Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. (Once we have accepted the contingency of the laws of physics, matter/energy etc., the flame of the struck match follows as a necessary consequence.) Accordingly, we can exhaustively explain the process in more basic terms; by that I mean that by using only a physical explanation involving the contingent laws of physics and matter/energy, we will come to see that the process of the match catching fire as a result of being struck is conceptually necessary. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.

We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, spacetime, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match. Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, luidcrously, even that is a relatively new occurence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting admidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.

Another way of saying this is that consciousness cannot be sufficiently explained with a materialistic reductive explanation, whereas a flaming match can. It is impossible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism (the laws of physics, matter/energy etc.), that a match struck under certain conditions could not catch fire. It is quite possible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism, that brain processes could occur without consciousness.

So while we can derive the flaming match from the basic contingent entities granted to us in materialism, we cannot derive the existence of consciousness from these same characters. Anything that a natural theory a) does not regard as a contingent entity and b) cannot derive from those things it does regard as contingent entities, I submit, is inexplicable in terms of that theory. We need more contingencies, more fundamental entities, than materialism is willing to give us.

Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping spacetime? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.

(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)

there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons.

It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.

"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.

Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.Otherwise we would arrive at [quasi] absurdities.It would imply that [we would have no reason to think that something in nature can be understood and still by pursuing the scientific quest to see that we can understand a lot of things.]By the way there is no claim that we can understand exactly how nature works.The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws.

[edited to make clearer the explanation]

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.

Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness. Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it). The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.

The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws. [/B]

Our disagreement is not about the certainty of scientific proofs, or the certainty of proofs in general. It is about whether science can explain consciousness in the same way it explains everything else. Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it).

It is assumed true in order to assure the internal consistence of the scientific method (as I said otherwise why bother to do scientific research) on logical grounds.True in the sense that a detailed explanation of consciousness is possible in which to be entitled to have a great degree of confidence (as in all the other scientific hypotheses/theories here is nothing special). But no one have faith in it,accepting an axiom does not imply also belief in that axiom.Besides the assumption is testable and even fallible (though in a weaker sense) as I've already shown before.

and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness.

Frankly I do not understand how did you derived that.I think I've explained enough.In fact the burden of proof is on those who make claims as you keep continuing to do.Why is it so?

The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.

Really?On what logical grounds?From all experiments done so far results that nature can be understood.Even the actual conjecture regarding consciousness is evolving why should we then make an exception for consciousness alone?There is absolutely no reason now,logical or empirical,for that.Besides I am unaware that Chalmers argue as you say.As far as I know he only argues that neurology alone is not enough by proposing some philosophical arguments against.Not making however the positive claims that it is surely so as you keep continuing to do.For the moment his proposal still holds,the actual data in neurology can be seen only as necessary but not sufficient to produce conscious experience.There are enough logical and experimental grounds to base this now.Still the actual hypothesis is evolving so we have to wait to see what will happen in the future...

Anyway,in any case have we the right,based on the same,to make openly the positive claim that science cannot explain consciousness!

This assumption is too strong and has no empirical and logical base.For the moment at least.Still even if qualia is something fundamental due to the fact that brain is capable to interact with it (at least this propose the pan protopsychism hypothesis of Chalmers) there is no reason now to think that that interaction cannot be put in evidence.

Basically from what I see you cannot make the difference between an philosophical argument and a positive claim.In other words between something which is a mere possibility and an assumption for which we have sufficient reasons to consider it approximatively correct.As I keep telling you have at most the right to say that your philosophical stance is that science cannot produce an acceptable theory of consciousness or that you are skeptical that such a theory will ever be found.The philosophical arguments are enough for that.But not the positive claims you make.

Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.

And there are,still,no sufficient reasons empirical or logical,to think this is impossible.

 

[Fliption]

metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal;by definition.

Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi

I appreciate that you think your view is rational and 'scientific' However it is not. You don't seem to realize that you are saying things that even scientists disagree with.

I mentioned before that the scientific status of first-person reports is in quation - within science. If third-person reports are deemed unscientific (as they have been until very recently) then consciousness has no scientific existence. The current issue of 'Journal of Conscious Studies' (out today) is given over to the argument on whether there is any such thing as a 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC).

The existence of NCC's is paradigmatic to the to the neuroscientific view of consciousness. However the debate over whether any such exists is not settled. None has yet been identified and there are many who argue that they won't be.

It is therefore not the current scientific view that consciousness exists or that NCC's exist, it is just the view, unsupported by scientific evidence, that they do. Perhaps they are right, but there is orthodoxy of opinion within science on these issues.

Here are some various people who would disgree with your arguments.

“This brings us to…the claim of materialistic science that matter is the only reality and that consciouness is its product. This thesis has often been presented with great authority as a scientific fact that has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. However, when it is subjected to closer scrutiny it becomes obvious that it is not and never was a serious scientific statement, but a metaphysical assertion maquerading as one. It is an assertion that cannot be proved and thus lacks the basic requirements for a scientific hypothesis, namely testability.”

P240 Staislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York

“When we encounter the Void, we feel that it is primordial emptiness of cosmic proportions and relevance. We become pure consciousness aware of this absolute nothingness; however, at the same time, we have a strange paradoxical sense of its essential fullness. This cosmic vacuum is also a plenum, since nothing seems to be missing in it. While it does not contain in a concrete manifest form, it seems to comprise all of existence in a potential form. In this paradoxical way , we can transcend the usual dichotomy between emptiness and form, or existence and non-existence. However, the possibility of such a resolution cannot be adequately conveyed in words; it has to be experienced to be understood.”

Stanislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York

“The view of the new physics suggests: ‘The vacuum is all of physics.’ Everything that ever existed or can exist is already there in the nothingness of space; that nothingness contains all being’

Heinz Pagels – 1990 The Cosmic Code –New York-Bantam Books (quoted in Grof 1998)

“The programme of tracing back all knowledge to its ultimate source in observation is logically impossible to carry through: it leads to an infinite regress.”

Karl Popper – The Problem of Induction (1953)

“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve.”

Max Planck (Karl Ernst Ludwig) (1858-1947)

“It is difficult to decide where science ends and mysticism begins. As soon as we begin to make even the most elementary theories we are open to the charge of indulging in metaphysics. Yet theories, however provisional, are the very lifeblood of scientific progress. We simply cannot escape metaphysics, though we can perhaps over-indulge, as well as have too little.”

Banesh Hoffmann – The Strange Story of the Quantum (Penguin 1968)

"In the standard positivist approach to the philosophy of science, physical theories live rent free in a Platonic heaven of ideal mathematical models. That is, a model can be arbitrarily detailed, and can contain an arbitrary amount of information, without affecting the universes they describe. But we are not angels, who view the universe from the outside. Instead we and our models are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a physical theory is self referencing, like in Goedels theorem."

Stephen Hawking – Goedel and The End of Physics

“ So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain. And so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”.

Albert Einstein (Applies to all systems of reasoning and proof)

(If the connections are not clear I'll expand.)

You are not arguing for the scientific view, you're arguing for your view of the scientific view.

It is even possible to argue, (as I would) that consciousness lies beyond metaphysics, never mind science. Heidegger outlines the reasons thus:

"Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error."

 

[Dark Wing]

Hypnagogue:

Very good, very good, I feel we have come to a point of real discussion now. You understand what I have said; now I must show you why I think it to be so.

Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.

Yes. Understood completely. (and very well put, i must say)

We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, space-time, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match.

This is where we diverge. I believe that it is a conceptual necessity just the same, and in fact is the only case possible with the laws set out inside the system. Agreed, consciousness cannot simply just pop out of nowhere, and cannot just be formed from some higher level of complexity. which means that you have to think at least that consciousness, or at least the building blocks for it are always there, everywhere. This is bordering on pan psychism, I know, and that is a trap that i whish to avoid. So i will try to explain my thoughts on how consciousness might work.

everything on this planet is a configuration of partials. some configurations of those partials make the non-living, and some of those partials create the biological. certain building blocks create certain structures. Now, I believe that the brain is simply a certain configuration of these building blocks that necessarily makes consciousness. Just as H2O is constructed of@ hydrogen one Oxygen, so is the brain a complex structure, the result of which is consciousness. It is a function of biology. there is something about biology, something with in its construction details that makes it necessary. Is this provable? How could you even test such a thing?

I would say that anything that shows an ability to react and interact with its environment would show sufficient conditions for the start of consciousness. I do not take consciousness to be a "you have it or you don’t" thing, it is a matter of complexity, and a matter of how well you are able to interact with your environment. something that could only show signs of conditioning as its environmental interaction would not be as conscious as something who could also deliberate over a reaction to a stimulus. since we witness the ability to condition in every form of biology that i have encountered, i would say that things biological are the basis for consciousness, and it is a necessary thing that it is.

I know that you can't say "just because everything we see does thins, therefore all things must do this", and I am aware that you are arguing that this might just be the observed phenomena that is present and not the necessary: but I believe that the only reason we observe this time and time again is because the configuration of certain thing will make a conscious mind, just while a slightly different configuration creates gold. There is something about biology that does this. What is it exactly? that’s what we are yet to find: we do not have the formula of H2O for the brain yet.

Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, ludicrously, even that is a relatively new occurrence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting amidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.

not a zombie if it is a matter of configuration. Science has only recently had the technology to even consider such things: what needs to be looked at is the point where physics becomes biology: find out what about biology makes it biology, and not just another chunk of jasper on the plain. it is a round peg all right, but that’s because the way it has been thought of and talked about has lead to massive confusion. (not that you are involved in that confusion, your point is very aside from that) It could be that it impossible for a person with the right configuration NOT to have a mind. what we should do, is take a brain, and make a very small change, and see what happens. or disrupt the building blocks a little and see what happens to the brain. My supervisor thought it would be interesting to study the effect of Quantum randomness on synaptic function and neuro-transmitter release. Just to see what an unstable force at the bottom would do to the higher function of biology. Haven’t found anything on it yet though.

So, with that in mind, the match analogy may still stand. It is in virtue of its constituents that it is so. There is no logical reason why it should not be so with the brain, its just not an area that has had a lot of attention till recently, and we are still figuring out what each neuron of the brain does 9the whole 70-80 were devoted to one-one link ups of neuron and response research, they are yet to head lower).

A brain functioning without there being consciousness under this thought would not be conceivable.

Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping space-time? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.

this is what we have to find. i think it is something about the configuration of biology as i said above. but it could be a combination of any of those things. (except warping of space-time, but that’s another argument)

(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)

This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails.

It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.

Materialism does have a lot of work to do to maintain their position, especially those in the camp of Fodor and Dennett. I think those like Place and Smart and the Churchlands have a lot better start on any of those... identity theory is a better place to start than functionalism on any level. at least then you have somewhere solid to start from.

"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.

I agree here, i think i only put that into satisfy AG with whom i have been discussing this a lot of late. I will keep thinking of ways to show what i am saying: it might take me a few goes, this is only the beginning of my project.

 

[metacristi]

Canute,

I'm afraid the quotes you present above cannot raise the credibility of your case.Besides some of them were taken out of context,the author had other things in mind.For example Popper only argued against the possibility to deduce knowledge from empirical facts.In other words we can never be sure we found the absolute truth.This is why all scientific knowledge is always fallible (as I argued extensively here).But we can,provided the existence of relevant experimental samples,have a high degree of confidence in a certain theory inferred from observed facts.This is still possible even with consciousness.We do not need certitudes for that,sufficient reasons are enough.

Secondly,though from what I know Hawking does not exclude the possibility to find a complete theory of everything-in the sense that all what we can possible measure to support it,even if there might indeed exist truths that cannot be derived from the actual axioms of science (I mean a detailed theory in which to have a high degree of confidence not some metaphysical absolute truth),we have no sufficient reasons now to think that consciousness is such a problem.That must be proved first with sufficient reasons.If we were to accept atumatically,by definition,the proposal that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical proposals,logically coherent,are equally entitled to be accepted.No,will say an idealist,qualia are ideas which God send us.I am sure of that.Not so will argue some other person qualia is [name whatever logical possibility that is coherent also with the facts].All would be equally entitled to knowledge primacy.And of course it would be a ridiculous situation.

The rest of the quotes represent personal philosophies,without positive claims involved.I have too a philosophical world view,based also on some personal,strange,experiences.I believe for example that a soul does exist and she survives death and that a creator (defined merely as the formator of the actual order in the universe) does exist.But without any claim of primacy in knowledge (epistemological primacy) or that all rational people should think the same,no,it is a strictly personal belief.I have enough rational base for it.Still this does not mean I have certitudes or that I have automatically the right to change the scientific method to fit with my personal beliefs.Let's be rational,I am open to find out later that my belief is not correct (though for the moment I have enough rational base to believe).

A scientist,though having her own personal beliefs do not have the right to be biased by them.The requirements of the scientific method proved very reliable so far,we have the right to change them only provided solid,sufficient, empirical and logical reasons for that.Which unfortunately lack so far.Even in the case of consciousness.The absence of a detailed (not involving certitudes however) theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.Any student acquainted with the basics of logic will easily recognize a variant of the ad ignorantiam fallacy in case we assume that the above sentence is false.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi

You do not face facts or think honestly. There is therefore no point in continuing to discuss this.

 

[Another God]

Originally posted by Dark Wing
This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails.

One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

I see no point to continue either.Your ignorance is too evident to be able have a rational exchange of ideas.Try to sharp your philosophical skills on some serious philosophy forums or read some books first.I think it's better to end this now before arriving at open contempt.

 

[Another God]

Interesting. Admittedly I haven't been reading your posts Canute and Metacristi, I'm glad u both chose to stop before it got too bad, but I am interested now. Perhaps I will read your last few posts and try to comment on them some. Maybe I can help be a neutral mediator...

 

[Fliption]

Well good luck with that AG. I've been trying to do it myself and have been ignored. Metacrista has been making the same points over and over again. Most of them are true but unfortunately they aren't relevant. For example, this statement :

The absence of a detailed theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.

has been repeated several times. But I am positive that no one posting in this forum disagrees with this. No one actually believes that a lack of knowledge today means we won't have knowledge tomorrow. So why does this keep getting repeated? There is actually a valid philosophical argument regarding the ability of science to reductively explain consciousness being discussed here. I've tried to step in and point when I saw things going into the irrelevant to help out but I haven't received a response or even influenced the discussion in several pages.

I guess some people are drawn to conflict as opposed to resolution.

 

[Canute]

Fliption

Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realize that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.

To make amends I'll agree completely with this as yet unanswered post.

From Fliption

metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal; by definition.

Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.

 

[metacristi]

fliption

Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.

From what we know today there is no reason to think that the neurological approach will not be enough or that we should change something in the scientific method itself.The neurological approach suppose also that a third person approach is enough to explain consciousness,so that as much as this hypothesis will be theoretically and empirically evolving we have no sufficient reasons to change something.The working formula is never changed without having very strong,sufficient reasons.

There are some philosophical arguments against the sufficiency of the neurological approach,assuming also that the third person approach is not enough.However all arguments are not sound so far,though possible some of them are valid logically and experimentally possible.The actual approach is still a strong logical possibility.But they are enough to base a rational,purely personal,skepticism only.Exactly this do Chalmers,if you'll read carefully his arguments you'll see that he never claims certitudes or sufficient reasons that it will be sn the contrary he only mentions that he is skeptical.Though he disagrees with the actual approach or with the physicalist philosophical proposals,providing philosophical counterarguments,he is aware that this does not imply certitudes or sufficient reasons.

The first goal of philosophy is not to strive to find explanations/descriptions as precise as possible,this is the task of science and the scientific method,but to rummage among everything we think we know in order to show which of our 'certitudes' and prejudices must be put first under doubt before hoping to affirm something more precise...What he propose is a possibility which we should take very seriously in account in all our further attempts to explain consciousness.The same is valid for Dennett's proposals by the way.As far as I know Chalmers even propose a way to bridge the gap between the third person approach and the subjective experiences. Still scientists have no reason to change the method,Chalmers proposal is not compelling for the moment,the usual approach is still viable.

Only if the actual approach will run into troubles (the theory become stagnant for a very long time with the existence of numerous puzzles piling up) will we have the needed reasons to change the method itself.But if the actual approach will be very successful by proposing a detailed hypothesis,with very few puzzles (or none),making also predictions about how the subjective experience appears though not empirically confirmed at that moment,in the absence of any alternative scientific approach scientists will have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in that hypothesis.Implying also that there is no need to change the method.Indeed the simple fact that (at that moment in the future when we will have a detailed theory) we cannot test the predictions made of how subjective experience appears is not a proof that those explanations are not correct in fact.

As I've argued before the explanation provided might be correct though we will,possible,never be able to confirm them using the third person approach.Indeed the explanation might very well be an alternative way to describe the same phenomenon equivalent to the subjective experiences itself (this is one of the counterarguments against the Mary's chamber objection).Those who make the positive claim that it is not so should provide sufficient reasons against.Not simple philosophical arguments,which in the vast majority can count as strong possibilities but never as sufficient argument,which science always seeks.

You begin in your argumentation from the false assumption that we have already sufficient reasons to think that the method must be changed or this is simply false.There are no such reasons now.Maybe not even in the future,as I've argued above,though possibly we will never be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experience appears.We only have some philosophical arguments,though very serious,that it might be so.And some alternative methods proposed.But the old approach is still viable and might be so even in the future.That's why there are no good reasons now to adopt the new variants of the scientific method proposed maybe not even in the future.Only time will show whether the actual methodology of science will resist further...

I leave for all unbiased readers the task to establish who is dogmatic and who is not.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Canute
Fliption
Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realize that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.

I wasn't really referring to you Canute. None of my posts have been directed at you. I have followed your comments and agree with them. I have mostly been trying to get metacrista to address some specific things. Some of the very things you are saying. It's hard to know what his/her response is when there is so much stuff that doesn't seem relevant included. Makes me wonder if he/she really understands what is being discussed.

Sorry for confusion.

 

[metacristi]

Please refrain to make commentary about things you do not understand.Manifest ignorance not conscienced as yours is never an excuse.