Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

[Canute]

For science consciousness is a paradigm-shaking problem. Even now, comfortably into 21st century, no logically plausible scientific theory for its existence has yet been proposed. Many researchers remain hopeful that given more time a scientific explanation will be devised. However the longer the problem remains unsolved the more likely it becomes that the logical arguments against the possibility of a devising a scientific explanation hold, and that we cannot explain a strictly first-person phenomena in strictly third-person terms in principle. It seems reasonable to suppose that this is the ause of our inability as yet to conceive of one single scientific experiment that would prove anything at all about it.

My impression is that most of those people who believe that the current scientific model of the universe is correct also tend to believe that recently attempted explanations of consciousness based on low frequency oscillations in the brain, quantum coherence in micro-tubules, supervenience, hetero-phenomenology and so on are so nearly plausible that we must be on the brink of success, and that soon we will make the inevitable breakthrough.

However this view is based on faith rather than evidence of progress. We are no closer to explaining the origins of consciousness than Parmeneides was, and no current scientific theory that claims to explain consciousness, or even claims to explain how it might be explained, stands up to logical scrutiny.

There is no scientific definition of consciousness, no scientific test for its presence or absence, no scientific means of measuring it and no scientific proof of its existence. There is no place for it in the scientific model, no scientific theory requiring it as a postulate, and no scientific description of its properties that does not completely contradict our ‘folk-psychological’ experience of it. If it were not for first-person anecdotes there would be no scientific reason to believe that it exists.

Yet any day now we are expected to succeed in constructing a scientific explanation of it. This is surely ridiculous. The infamous ‘explanatory gap’ is not a crack in the pavement, it is a chasm of Hollywood special effects proportions, and it is no narrower today than it ever was.

 

[metacristi]

I think we must settle once and forever some things (I already explained them but it seems no one really understood in spite of some claims here).Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed.However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?And since there is no proof that human mind is above nature the axiom still stands even in this case (it postulates that we can find a holistic,detailed,explanation of consciousness in which to have a high degree of confidence).But it is considered also fallible,the finding of sufficient empirical or logical reasons leading to its demise.I indicated above some necessary conditions when we would be entitled to do that (this is not sufficient of course for an action would depend also on the philosophical views held by the majority in the scientific community).But certainly we cannot do that now,the actual objections are not sound.This fallibilistic scientific approach of why consciousness can be understood is entirely different from the physicalist approach that science can surely have a detailed theory entirely on phisical terms.At most this view can count as a philosophical view in spite of the fact that there are no serious arguments against now.And from what I know the majority of physicalists accept this.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed. However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?

This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.

 

[hypnagogue]

OK Dark Wing, I see where you are coming from, and I think we are now at a critical point in our discussion. I agree that, on some level, consciousness is contingent or is the result of some compository contingent entities; at some point, it cannot be explained any further other than to say that it is just a brute fact of nature.

However, there are distinctions to be made with regards to your match analogy. Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. (Once we have accepted the contingency of the laws of physics, matter/energy etc., the flame of the struck match follows as a necessary consequence.) Accordingly, we can exhaustively explain the process in more basic terms; by that I mean that by using only a physical explanation involving the contingent laws of physics and matter/energy, we will come to see that the process of the match catching fire as a result of being struck is conceptually necessary. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.

We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, spacetime, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match. Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, luidcrously, even that is a relatively new occurence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting admidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.

Another way of saying this is that consciousness cannot be sufficiently explained with a materialistic reductive explanation, whereas a flaming match can. It is impossible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism (the laws of physics, matter/energy etc.), that a match struck under certain conditions could not catch fire. It is quite possible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism, that brain processes could occur without consciousness.

So while we can derive the flaming match from the basic contingent entities granted to us in materialism, we cannot derive the existence of consciousness from these same characters. Anything that a natural theory a) does not regard as a contingent entity and b) cannot derive from those things it does regard as contingent entities, I submit, is inexplicable in terms of that theory. We need more contingencies, more fundamental entities, than materialism is willing to give us.

Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping spacetime? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.

(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)

there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons.

It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.

"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.

Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.Otherwise we would arrive at [quasi] absurdities.It would imply that [we would have no reason to think that something in nature can be understood and still by pursuing the scientific quest to see that we can understand a lot of things.]By the way there is no claim that we can understand exactly how nature works.The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws.

[edited to make clearer the explanation]

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.

Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness. Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it). The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.

The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws. [/B]

Our disagreement is not about the certainty of scientific proofs, or the certainty of proofs in general. It is about whether science can explain consciousness in the same way it explains everything else. Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it).

It is assumed true in order to assure the internal consistence of the scientific method (as I said otherwise why bother to do scientific research) on logical grounds.True in the sense that a detailed explanation of consciousness is possible in which to be entitled to have a great degree of confidence (as in all the other scientific hypotheses/theories here is nothing special). But no one have faith in it,accepting an axiom does not imply also belief in that axiom.Besides the assumption is testable and even fallible (though in a weaker sense) as I've already shown before.

and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness.

Frankly I do not understand how did you derived that.I think I've explained enough.In fact the burden of proof is on those who make claims as you keep continuing to do.Why is it so?

The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.

Really?On what logical grounds?From all experiments done so far results that nature can be understood.Even the actual conjecture regarding consciousness is evolving why should we then make an exception for consciousness alone?There is absolutely no reason now,logical or empirical,for that.Besides I am unaware that Chalmers argue as you say.As far as I know he only argues that neurology alone is not enough by proposing some philosophical arguments against.Not making however the positive claims that it is surely so as you keep continuing to do.For the moment his proposal still holds,the actual data in neurology can be seen only as necessary but not sufficient to produce conscious experience.There are enough logical and experimental grounds to base this now.Still the actual hypothesis is evolving so we have to wait to see what will happen in the future...

Anyway,in any case have we the right,based on the same,to make openly the positive claim that science cannot explain consciousness!

This assumption is too strong and has no empirical and logical base.For the moment at least.Still even if qualia is something fundamental due to the fact that brain is capable to interact with it (at least this propose the pan protopsychism hypothesis of Chalmers) there is no reason now to think that that interaction cannot be put in evidence.

Basically from what I see you cannot make the difference between an philosophical argument and a positive claim.In other words between something which is a mere possibility and an assumption for which we have sufficient reasons to consider it approximatively correct.As I keep telling you have at most the right to say that your philosophical stance is that science cannot produce an acceptable theory of consciousness or that you are skeptical that such a theory will ever be found.The philosophical arguments are enough for that.But not the positive claims you make.

Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.

And there are,still,no sufficient reasons empirical or logical,to think this is impossible.

 

[Fliption]

metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal;by definition.

Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi

I appreciate that you think your view is rational and 'scientific' However it is not. You don't seem to realize that you are saying things that even scientists disagree with.

I mentioned before that the scientific status of first-person reports is in quation - within science. If third-person reports are deemed unscientific (as they have been until very recently) then consciousness has no scientific existence. The current issue of 'Journal of Conscious Studies' (out today) is given over to the argument on whether there is any such thing as a 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC).

The existence of NCC's is paradigmatic to the to the neuroscientific view of consciousness. However the debate over whether any such exists is not settled. None has yet been identified and there are many who argue that they won't be.

It is therefore not the current scientific view that consciousness exists or that NCC's exist, it is just the view, unsupported by scientific evidence, that they do. Perhaps they are right, but there is orthodoxy of opinion within science on these issues.

Here are some various people who would disgree with your arguments.

“This brings us to…the claim of materialistic science that matter is the only reality and that consciouness is its product. This thesis has often been presented with great authority as a scientific fact that has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. However, when it is subjected to closer scrutiny it becomes obvious that it is not and never was a serious scientific statement, but a metaphysical assertion maquerading as one. It is an assertion that cannot be proved and thus lacks the basic requirements for a scientific hypothesis, namely testability.”

P240 Staislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York

“When we encounter the Void, we feel that it is primordial emptiness of cosmic proportions and relevance. We become pure consciousness aware of this absolute nothingness; however, at the same time, we have a strange paradoxical sense of its essential fullness. This cosmic vacuum is also a plenum, since nothing seems to be missing in it. While it does not contain in a concrete manifest form, it seems to comprise all of existence in a potential form. In this paradoxical way , we can transcend the usual dichotomy between emptiness and form, or existence and non-existence. However, the possibility of such a resolution cannot be adequately conveyed in words; it has to be experienced to be understood.”

Stanislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York

“The view of the new physics suggests: ‘The vacuum is all of physics.’ Everything that ever existed or can exist is already there in the nothingness of space; that nothingness contains all being’

Heinz Pagels – 1990 The Cosmic Code –New York-Bantam Books (quoted in Grof 1998)

“The programme of tracing back all knowledge to its ultimate source in observation is logically impossible to carry through: it leads to an infinite regress.”

Karl Popper – The Problem of Induction (1953)

“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve.”

Max Planck (Karl Ernst Ludwig) (1858-1947)

“It is difficult to decide where science ends and mysticism begins. As soon as we begin to make even the most elementary theories we are open to the charge of indulging in metaphysics. Yet theories, however provisional, are the very lifeblood of scientific progress. We simply cannot escape metaphysics, though we can perhaps over-indulge, as well as have too little.”

Banesh Hoffmann – The Strange Story of the Quantum (Penguin 1968)

"In the standard positivist approach to the philosophy of science, physical theories live rent free in a Platonic heaven of ideal mathematical models. That is, a model can be arbitrarily detailed, and can contain an arbitrary amount of information, without affecting the universes they describe. But we are not angels, who view the universe from the outside. Instead we and our models are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a physical theory is self referencing, like in Goedels theorem."

Stephen Hawking – Goedel and The End of Physics

“ So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain. And so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”.

Albert Einstein (Applies to all systems of reasoning and proof)

(If the connections are not clear I'll expand.)

You are not arguing for the scientific view, you're arguing for your view of the scientific view.

It is even possible to argue, (as I would) that consciousness lies beyond metaphysics, never mind science. Heidegger outlines the reasons thus:

"Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error."

 

[Dark Wing]

Hypnagogue:

Very good, very good, I feel we have come to a point of real discussion now. You understand what I have said; now I must show you why I think it to be so.

Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.

Yes. Understood completely. (and very well put, i must say)

We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, space-time, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match.

This is where we diverge. I believe that it is a conceptual necessity just the same, and in fact is the only case possible with the laws set out inside the system. Agreed, consciousness cannot simply just pop out of nowhere, and cannot just be formed from some higher level of complexity. which means that you have to think at least that consciousness, or at least the building blocks for it are always there, everywhere. This is bordering on pan psychism, I know, and that is a trap that i whish to avoid. So i will try to explain my thoughts on how consciousness might work.

everything on this planet is a configuration of partials. some configurations of those partials make the non-living, and some of those partials create the biological. certain building blocks create certain structures. Now, I believe that the brain is simply a certain configuration of these building blocks that necessarily makes consciousness. Just as H2O is constructed of@ hydrogen one Oxygen, so is the brain a complex structure, the result of which is consciousness. It is a function of biology. there is something about biology, something with in its construction details that makes it necessary. Is this provable? How could you even test such a thing?

I would say that anything that shows an ability to react and interact with its environment would show sufficient conditions for the start of consciousness. I do not take consciousness to be a "you have it or you don’t" thing, it is a matter of complexity, and a matter of how well you are able to interact with your environment. something that could only show signs of conditioning as its environmental interaction would not be as conscious as something who could also deliberate over a reaction to a stimulus. since we witness the ability to condition in every form of biology that i have encountered, i would say that things biological are the basis for consciousness, and it is a necessary thing that it is.

I know that you can't say "just because everything we see does thins, therefore all things must do this", and I am aware that you are arguing that this might just be the observed phenomena that is present and not the necessary: but I believe that the only reason we observe this time and time again is because the configuration of certain thing will make a conscious mind, just while a slightly different configuration creates gold. There is something about biology that does this. What is it exactly? that’s what we are yet to find: we do not have the formula of H2O for the brain yet.

Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, ludicrously, even that is a relatively new occurrence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting amidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.

not a zombie if it is a matter of configuration. Science has only recently had the technology to even consider such things: what needs to be looked at is the point where physics becomes biology: find out what about biology makes it biology, and not just another chunk of jasper on the plain. it is a round peg all right, but that’s because the way it has been thought of and talked about has lead to massive confusion. (not that you are involved in that confusion, your point is very aside from that) It could be that it impossible for a person with the right configuration NOT to have a mind. what we should do, is take a brain, and make a very small change, and see what happens. or disrupt the building blocks a little and see what happens to the brain. My supervisor thought it would be interesting to study the effect of Quantum randomness on synaptic function and neuro-transmitter release. Just to see what an unstable force at the bottom would do to the higher function of biology. Haven’t found anything on it yet though.

So, with that in mind, the match analogy may still stand. It is in virtue of its constituents that it is so. There is no logical reason why it should not be so with the brain, its just not an area that has had a lot of attention till recently, and we are still figuring out what each neuron of the brain does 9the whole 70-80 were devoted to one-one link ups of neuron and response research, they are yet to head lower).

A brain functioning without there being consciousness under this thought would not be conceivable.

Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping space-time? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.

this is what we have to find. i think it is something about the configuration of biology as i said above. but it could be a combination of any of those things. (except warping of space-time, but that’s another argument)

(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)

This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails.

It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.

Materialism does have a lot of work to do to maintain their position, especially those in the camp of Fodor and Dennett. I think those like Place and Smart and the Churchlands have a lot better start on any of those... identity theory is a better place to start than functionalism on any level. at least then you have somewhere solid to start from.

"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.

I agree here, i think i only put that into satisfy AG with whom i have been discussing this a lot of late. I will keep thinking of ways to show what i am saying: it might take me a few goes, this is only the beginning of my project.

 

[metacristi]

Canute,

I'm afraid the quotes you present above cannot raise the credibility of your case.Besides some of them were taken out of context,the author had other things in mind.For example Popper only argued against the possibility to deduce knowledge from empirical facts.In other words we can never be sure we found the absolute truth.This is why all scientific knowledge is always fallible (as I argued extensively here).But we can,provided the existence of relevant experimental samples,have a high degree of confidence in a certain theory inferred from observed facts.This is still possible even with consciousness.We do not need certitudes for that,sufficient reasons are enough.

Secondly,though from what I know Hawking does not exclude the possibility to find a complete theory of everything-in the sense that all what we can possible measure to support it,even if there might indeed exist truths that cannot be derived from the actual axioms of science (I mean a detailed theory in which to have a high degree of confidence not some metaphysical absolute truth),we have no sufficient reasons now to think that consciousness is such a problem.That must be proved first with sufficient reasons.If we were to accept atumatically,by definition,the proposal that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical proposals,logically coherent,are equally entitled to be accepted.No,will say an idealist,qualia are ideas which God send us.I am sure of that.Not so will argue some other person qualia is [name whatever logical possibility that is coherent also with the facts].All would be equally entitled to knowledge primacy.And of course it would be a ridiculous situation.

The rest of the quotes represent personal philosophies,without positive claims involved.I have too a philosophical world view,based also on some personal,strange,experiences.I believe for example that a soul does exist and she survives death and that a creator (defined merely as the formator of the actual order in the universe) does exist.But without any claim of primacy in knowledge (epistemological primacy) or that all rational people should think the same,no,it is a strictly personal belief.I have enough rational base for it.Still this does not mean I have certitudes or that I have automatically the right to change the scientific method to fit with my personal beliefs.Let's be rational,I am open to find out later that my belief is not correct (though for the moment I have enough rational base to believe).

A scientist,though having her own personal beliefs do not have the right to be biased by them.The requirements of the scientific method proved very reliable so far,we have the right to change them only provided solid,sufficient, empirical and logical reasons for that.Which unfortunately lack so far.Even in the case of consciousness.The absence of a detailed (not involving certitudes however) theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.Any student acquainted with the basics of logic will easily recognize a variant of the ad ignorantiam fallacy in case we assume that the above sentence is false.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi

You do not face facts or think honestly. There is therefore no point in continuing to discuss this.

 

[Another God]

Originally posted by Dark Wing
This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails.

One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.

 

[metacristi]

Canute

I see no point to continue either.Your ignorance is too evident to be able have a rational exchange of ideas.Try to sharp your philosophical skills on some serious philosophy forums or read some books first.I think it's better to end this now before arriving at open contempt.

 

[Another God]

Interesting. Admittedly I haven't been reading your posts Canute and Metacristi, I'm glad u both chose to stop before it got too bad, but I am interested now. Perhaps I will read your last few posts and try to comment on them some. Maybe I can help be a neutral mediator...

 

[Fliption]

Well good luck with that AG. I've been trying to do it myself and have been ignored. Metacrista has been making the same points over and over again. Most of them are true but unfortunately they aren't relevant. For example, this statement :

The absence of a detailed theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.

has been repeated several times. But I am positive that no one posting in this forum disagrees with this. No one actually believes that a lack of knowledge today means we won't have knowledge tomorrow. So why does this keep getting repeated? There is actually a valid philosophical argument regarding the ability of science to reductively explain consciousness being discussed here. I've tried to step in and point when I saw things going into the irrelevant to help out but I haven't received a response or even influenced the discussion in several pages.

I guess some people are drawn to conflict as opposed to resolution.

 

[Canute]

Fliption

Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realize that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.

To make amends I'll agree completely with this as yet unanswered post.

From Fliption

metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal; by definition.

Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.

 

[metacristi]

fliption

Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.

From what we know today there is no reason to think that the neurological approach will not be enough or that we should change something in the scientific method itself.The neurological approach suppose also that a third person approach is enough to explain consciousness,so that as much as this hypothesis will be theoretically and empirically evolving we have no sufficient reasons to change something.The working formula is never changed without having very strong,sufficient reasons.

There are some philosophical arguments against the sufficiency of the neurological approach,assuming also that the third person approach is not enough.However all arguments are not sound so far,though possible some of them are valid logically and experimentally possible.The actual approach is still a strong logical possibility.But they are enough to base a rational,purely personal,skepticism only.Exactly this do Chalmers,if you'll read carefully his arguments you'll see that he never claims certitudes or sufficient reasons that it will be sn the contrary he only mentions that he is skeptical.Though he disagrees with the actual approach or with the physicalist philosophical proposals,providing philosophical counterarguments,he is aware that this does not imply certitudes or sufficient reasons.

The first goal of philosophy is not to strive to find explanations/descriptions as precise as possible,this is the task of science and the scientific method,but to rummage among everything we think we know in order to show which of our 'certitudes' and prejudices must be put first under doubt before hoping to affirm something more precise...What he propose is a possibility which we should take very seriously in account in all our further attempts to explain consciousness.The same is valid for Dennett's proposals by the way.As far as I know Chalmers even propose a way to bridge the gap between the third person approach and the subjective experiences. Still scientists have no reason to change the method,Chalmers proposal is not compelling for the moment,the usual approach is still viable.

Only if the actual approach will run into troubles (the theory become stagnant for a very long time with the existence of numerous puzzles piling up) will we have the needed reasons to change the method itself.But if the actual approach will be very successful by proposing a detailed hypothesis,with very few puzzles (or none),making also predictions about how the subjective experience appears though not empirically confirmed at that moment,in the absence of any alternative scientific approach scientists will have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in that hypothesis.Implying also that there is no need to change the method.Indeed the simple fact that (at that moment in the future when we will have a detailed theory) we cannot test the predictions made of how subjective experience appears is not a proof that those explanations are not correct in fact.

As I've argued before the explanation provided might be correct though we will,possible,never be able to confirm them using the third person approach.Indeed the explanation might very well be an alternative way to describe the same phenomenon equivalent to the subjective experiences itself (this is one of the counterarguments against the Mary's chamber objection).Those who make the positive claim that it is not so should provide sufficient reasons against.Not simple philosophical arguments,which in the vast majority can count as strong possibilities but never as sufficient argument,which science always seeks.

You begin in your argumentation from the false assumption that we have already sufficient reasons to think that the method must be changed or this is simply false.There are no such reasons now.Maybe not even in the future,as I've argued above,though possibly we will never be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experience appears.We only have some philosophical arguments,though very serious,that it might be so.And some alternative methods proposed.But the old approach is still viable and might be so even in the future.That's why there are no good reasons now to adopt the new variants of the scientific method proposed maybe not even in the future.Only time will show whether the actual methodology of science will resist further...

I leave for all unbiased readers the task to establish who is dogmatic and who is not.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Canute
Fliption
Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realize that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.

I wasn't really referring to you Canute. None of my posts have been directed at you. I have followed your comments and agree with them. I have mostly been trying to get metacrista to address some specific things. Some of the very things you are saying. It's hard to know what his/her response is when there is so much stuff that doesn't seem relevant included. Makes me wonder if he/she really understands what is being discussed.

Sorry for confusion.

 

[metacristi]

Please refrain to make commentary about things you do not understand.Manifest ignorance not conscienced as yours is never an excuse.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
fliption

Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.

If it seems I have focused on single points, it is because I think they are irrelevant points. There is no contextual mis-interpretation of them. When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.

I've read your explanation once again. It's seems to be more of the same. It says over and over that there is no reason to think that current methods cannot reductively explain consciousness and that a mere philosophical argument is not sufficient to suggest otherwise. But there is then no attempt to discuss the actual philosophical argument that Hynagogue has so eloquently presented here. If you look at it, you will see that it is not just some a'priori statement. It can be applied to real emperical things. My analogy of wall colors is an example of how some things are emperically impossible.

Go to the analogy and say where it is wrong. Relating your view to it would be helpful. Any unbiased participants would surely agree and are welcome to jump in.

 

[metacristi]

Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.

 

[metacristi]

When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.

What main argument?What knowledge gaps?We are always open to find there are knowledge gaps,scientifc knowledge is always provisional.Are you accustomed with the basics of the scientific method?The fact that some predictions have not been yet tested at a certain moment means nothing.We do not have the right for the moment to believe they will also be confirmed but in any case have we the right to conclude they are wrong.You must provide sufficient arguments to show that the predictions made by such a detailed theory of consciousness I talked above,counting as an explanation of the subjective experiences,are wrong or at least not enough to really describe subjective experiences.Scientists are prepared to find it is not enough but only in the front of sufficient reasons either by disproving the conjecture at a whole or by discovering new facts not taken in account initially.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.

Yes, I did read it. It was the exact same response as all the others. The additional thing that you did in that post was to say that the philosophical argument was not logical. You said that no one has been able to convince you that it is and that many scientists agree. But there were no words explaining why it is illogical. It just is.

Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
What main argument?

The one that is in the title of this thread.

What knowledge gaps?

The gap we currently have around consciousness.

The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.

If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.

 

[metacristi]

At limit if the third data confirmations will not be possible for an enough long time I think the first data accounts in direct correlation with the third data observations will be finally accepted.After all if a majority of reliable subjects will report approximatively the same subjective experiences in connection with a certain observed neural state this could be seen at limit as an intersubjective confirmation,anyway a strong reason to believe that there is a correlation between some subjective experiences and brain states.But I am not at all sure the final conclusions will be that we should not reduce subjective experiences at brain's functioning,that qualia involves something more.

 

[metacristi]

Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.

No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.

Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.

The topic of this article is what this thread is about. If you want to weigh in please do. But you have to engage in philosophy to dispute a philosophical claim. Ignoring the issue and defining the scientific method for us is not sufficient nor relevant.

"Vast knowledge" is only a good thing if it's relevant. So if I don't have what you're looking for, I suspect it doesn't matter with regard to the topic at hand.

 

[olde drunk]

METACRISTI !

you have criticized several posters! why are you exempt??

quite frankly, i don't have the slightest idea what point you are trying to make. perhaps you can break it down, slowly, for us mortals of poor intellect.

WHAT IS YOUR POINT??[BRIEFLY PLEASE],

peace,

 

[metacristi]

fliption

And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.

But the claim is that the reduction is impossible.Again I ask why is it so?The fact that we cannot measure directly subjective experiences now maybe never is not an explanation.It is not about the impossibility to reach certitudes,we are always prepared for that,it is about the claim that there cannot exist a detailed theory of consciousness based on neurology alone in which to have a high degree of confidence,capable to account for subjective experiences also.

Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.

Read again.I only said it not sound.It is logically valid but at least one of the premises is not true.Therefore I cannot conclude that the conclusion is true.Maybe it is but this does not follow from the premises.Hence it fails to prove that the reductive approach is incoherent as it was aimed.Finally I really doubt that a purely logical argument will be able to achieve that.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
fliption

And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.

This is you disagreeing with the conclusion of the philosophical argument. But you don't ever specifically say why you disagree with it. Other than to say it isn't sound.

Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained". It is one thing to give a rational explanation for how something happens and then concede that the explanation could be wrong. This is what science does, so we all agree that it can't be certain about many of it's explanations, as you have repeated many times. In these cases, the explanation goes something like this:

Reductive explanation:

Step 1 happens and necessarily causes
Step 2 to happen which then necessarily causes
Step 3 to happen which allows for the
End Result/Conclusion to happen and therefore be reductively explained

This is an explanation that would cause a rational person to say "ahhh yes I see how this works." If we test this explanation emperically we can test it at each point and conclude that this explanation is emperically verified. But of course it isn't certain.

On the other hand this uncertainty does NOT mean that there is an explanatory gap allowed to exists in the reductive explanation itself. You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%. A real explanation will allow you to measure anything that needs measuring, in principal(Not necessarily in practice). Of course the results could be wrong.

Here is how I perceive consciousness to be as it relates to the example above.


Step 1 brain stuff happens and necessarily leads to
Step 2 Details around neurology happen which could lead to
Step 3 Consciousness

We can test emperically that brain states in step 1 correspond to conscious events in step 3 and assume that the explanation is emperically verified because of the correlation. But the problem is that the link between step 2 and step 3 is not a necessary step and there is nothing you can even postulate that would make it so. This is not even an explanation because it just jumps over where the real gap exists. If a rational person looked at this explanation, they would not say "ahh that's how it works". They still wouldn't know except that somehow neurology magically creates a subjective experience.

So if you are calling this last example a reductive explanation then I agree with you that a reductive explanation of consciousness can be developed by science. But this is not what I and what I think others here are calling a reductive explanation. So perhaps the definition of what it means to be reductively explained is where we need to focus.


Just to be sure all of this is clear, here's another analogy:

A mother gets home from work and finds orange juice on the ceiling of her bedroom. She goes to each of her 2 sons to find out how this happened.

1st Son: Saw son #2 walk in there with a glass of orange juice and the cat jump on his head and he threw the glass up, splashing the juice onto the ceiling.

2nd Son: Saw son #1 walk into the room with a glass of orange juice and close the door behind him.

The first one is a reductive explanation. It could be completely false but it is the better explanation. The second is not a reductive explanation because you still don't know how the juice got on the ceiling. You can even verify that the second story is absolutely true. It still doesn't explain anything. You would then have to go interrogate the first son.(or change the natural ontology with regard to consciousness )

 

[Dark Wing]

Originally posted by Another God
One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.

This does not quite sit right with me yet. I have been thinking all night why not. Mayby its that the fuel is not actually a starter in the brain process, (though you might say that an experience or a stimulus is) or that you have an officialkick off point caused by energy or friction at all. More so the brain just IS, it never starts as such, just when the right configuration appears, then it just is.

That does not make much sense either. I will keep thinking. But i think the annalogy, although showing its point, proberly can't be taken litrally all the way down (if it can, then bring it on! it has to be better than the computer annalogy)

 

[Dark Wing]

Flipton:

Nice post. well explained. (i have not heard the orange juice analogy before, but its a good way to describe the diffrences). and good work taking on a mediating position there, looks as if it might start working. There is much philosophy to discuss here, and it gets lost in the throw is everyone turns it into a shamble.

 

[Canute]

metacristi

I don't think anybody is trying to browbeat you or put you down. But you just repeat your claims over and over like a mantra rather than engage in a debate on the issues. It gets a bit frustrating.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Fliption
The one that is in the title of this thread.

The gap we currently have around consciousness.

The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.

If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.

Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.

This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.

Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.

Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.

Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"?

 

[metacristi]

Fliption

Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained".

By reductionism in general,I understand the usual definition ‘the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.’In the case of consciousness reductionism has usually two meanings: 1.that consciousness can be explained in terms of laws of physics and chemistry. 2.that consciousness can be explained in terms of the complex functioning of the neural network. It is this second approach which is usually favorized by the scientists in the cognitive sciences.

You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%.

It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…First there are almost never 100% certitudes.At least in the majority of cases we cannot establish that.That's why the default is that we must always be open to new facts.We accept those as ‘complete explanations’ based on observed facts only.There are sufficient reasons for the moment,experimentally derived,to assume that.It is the best we could achieve so far.We cannot put in evidence finer causes and we assume they do not exist.If put in evidence,we introduce them in the explanation by enlarging the theory.Thus we are always entitled to expect new data.There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.And this is valid for all logical arguments against reductionism so far.The conclusion might be right but it does not follow from the premises therefore there is no obligation for all rational persons to believe it is true.I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts (that’s why we must first confirm the predictions of scientifc theories experimentally in order to have a high confidence in their truth) even if the argument were sound.Namely that there is no reason to believe that unique and inevitable conclusions,derived from a true set of premises empirically inferred,are true before confirming them experimentally.But I’m afraid no one will understand…

Secondly the lack of a more detailed reductionist (at the neuronal network) theory of consciusness now does not entile the conclusion we will not find one later. From what I’ve seen you argee with this possibility.What you failed to notice is that my argument is much stronger than that.Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see) the fact that there is an explanation of how the subjectice experiences appears from the functioning of the brain leaves open the possibility that is is actually true.A fully reductionist scientific approach explaining qualia as being due to the functioning of the brain,as it is usually done in science in general is still possible (no certitudes implied only sufficient experimental reasons to have a high degree in its truth).Moreover,as an irony,maybe exactly using a first person type of research,as Chalmers advocate,will we be able confirm what the reductionist approach postulated.Chalmers went much further (I'm afraid the logical arguments he propose are not sound either;I do not think however that he really believes in the experimental necessity of the conclusion since in his papers he only say it is skeptical about the possibility of reductionism) and proposed that,in spite of the possible existence of such correlations,we should not attempt to reduce qualia at the brain functioning not even in that case,by proposing that it is possible that qualia is fundamental (he is confident we will be able to confirm that later).Unfortunately this is entirely a philosophical,though fully compatible with observed facts,argument,maybe true in absolute.But not accepted by the scientifc method in case that the existing theory happens to be very successful by proving the existence of clear correlations between subjective experiences and the functioning of the brain also+no other scientific alternative exists.In that situation we will not have any reasons to believe qualia is indeed fundamental or implies something more,that there is a gap in knowledge in your sense finally.Scientists will be fully entitled to say that we have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the truth of the existing theory-this a fact which happen very often in usual science.Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.Even if first it will be used a first person type of research and only after proposed a detailed theory things will not change in case that clear correlations will be put in evidence.That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.Till then scientists will have the right,based on all observed facts,to consider the reductive explanation as sufficient to explain consciousness exactly how we do in the case of a vast majority of scientific explanations you and other say are able to convince people.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.

This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.

Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.

Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.

Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"? [/B]

This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.

What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?

Are string theorists microphenomalists?

And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?

Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".

And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?

I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common defintion. I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.

Are string theorists microphenomalists?

I would say say so. For them everything is epiphenomenal on strings.

And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?

Nope, I just checked and it's still sixteen.

Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".

Not quite nothing at all though.

And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend? [/B]

Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.

Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi

It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…

Yes I understand how this feels. I sympathize. Eliminating the run-on sentences might help. I'd appreciate you taking care of that before you assume your sentences are clear and everyone but you is an ignoramus because they can't understand. Thanks.

And did you think you were arguing? If so then let me know because I don't come here to argue. I don't have time for that. I come here to attempt a progressive discussion. I actually want you to attempt to prove hypnagogue/chalmers wrong. That's the whole point of the forum. But you don't seem to be interested in trying to grasp the issue.

This post is just more of the same. Insulting my intelligence, more descriptions of science that I already completely understand and find irrelevant, and total disregard for and complete silence to my analogies and other desperate attempts to pull you down into the real discussion. Yet again, you have totally ignored what I'm trying to point you to and gone off and simply copied and pasted your standard 5 paragraph response. Only this time without the indentions.

There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

"There is no compel to believe"? You're right, I just don't undestand.

You say this about hypnagogue's points because you do not understand the premises. If you did you would see that a white wall will never be black, no matter how long and hard you look at it. You are surface reading, looking for key words to trigger your pre-conceived conclusions. It is the only thing that explains these responses.

I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts

Ok, you keep looking at that white wall to see if it's black. A white wall by definition cannot be black. If our premise is that a wall is white, you do not need to verify emperically that it isn't black. It cannot be by definition. This is very simple. If you disagree with the premise then you have to say why. You cannot just assert it. Unless, of course, you're just arguing.

But I’m afraid no one will understand…

It's because we're all just slow and you're not. It must be hard to be you.

Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see)

Try english.

Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.

No not all philosophical arguments are equally valid. The fact that you say this simply re-enforces my belief that you haven't understood what is really being said here.

That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.

Why should something that is not reducable necessarily involve something more? I'm not even sure what this means, let alone why I have to prove it.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common definition.

"What it is like to be..." ...a frog, a man, an electron?

I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.

Here's how I would define information within the context of what I have proposed: Input -- of whatever quality -- from a source other than self that causes a change -- however minute -- in the self.

I would say so. For them (string theorists) everything is epiphenomenal on strings.

What might "epiphenomenal" mean? Per the American Heritage Dictionary -- henceforth AHD -- it means "besides". Besides what?

Not quite nothing at all though.

Since I did not stop to take inventory of my entire internal world to see if ANYTHING was "axiomatic", I left room for the possibility that something might be.

Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.

If you say so.

Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.

It did sound a bit pejorative but I'm over it now. In any case, in the greater scheme of things, an entire lifetime is a "microphenomenon" ...perhaps an "engram" in the mind of the Universe (should the Universe HAVE a mind). Meanwhile, our cells are "having experiences" and "communicating with" one another (via chemicals and electricity) and may thus be "conscious" of whatever they can sense and respond to. Likewise, particles, stars and galaxies.

You see, Canute, I am more than a microphenomenonalist; I'm a full-on panpsychist who is proposing that the detection of information -- simple or complex -- that alters in any way the behavior of the detecting "entity" -- simple or complex -- is perhaps all the "reducing" we need to be doing with regard to "consciousness"

 

[Canute]

Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.

However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."

I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.

Before I answer this, I guess we're assuming that bats are conscious to begin with? We don't know this for certain but we can reasonably assume it. Having said that then my answer would be this: While observing the AI bat do a lot of the things the same as a real bat, you can point to the specific code/hardware wiring that allows each of those individual things to happen. But if the bat truly does have consciousness, you cannot point to any such thing. It is an unnecessary addon with no way to point to it's cause in your AI design. If someone asked, "how did you achieve it being conscious?"...you're answer would be "I have no idea".

Since we're talking about bats your point has more weight because we don't know for certain what a bat feels. But if the AI were a human, and all of the facts were the same would you claim the exact same thing? Can you claim an AI human is conscious simply from it's behaviour without understanding how it was done in the design?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."

From which piece of scientific research do you conclude that? From a scientific point of view it might be true, but there's no evidence that it is. There's not even any scientific evidence that bats are conscious (or people come to that).

I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here.

No 'experience' then. Or are you saying that experience is a physical substance?

If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing. [/B]

Feelings, experience and what it is like to be a bat. If you do a search on Harnard + Dennett you may find their email argument on this point, on which Dennett has to give way.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.

My apologies ..although, technically, I was being "pi**y" (rhymes with "missy") ...my preferred conversational style. It's a bit like Touret's Syndrome, except harder to control. Mostly, I'm playing.

However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.

I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.

You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.

What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious?

 

[Dark Wing]

... Redefine consciousness? May I ask exactly what definition of consciousness you have that is constant amongst all that talk of it? As far as I know, every author has their own definition in which they work with...

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.

As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.

You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.

Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.

What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious? [/B]

I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness. I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.

I dispute it.

Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.

So say.

I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness.

Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]

I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.

How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious" because, in fact, I think "consciousness" is a matter of DEGREE! IOW, it might be on a continuum from VERY SIMPLE to VERY COMPLEX ...based on the complexity of the detection and response system of the entity.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I dispute it.

Ok.

So say.

I stated a fact.

Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]

Hmm. I don't think I'm clever enough to unpick this muddle. You seem to be confusing 'emptiness' and 'nothing'.

And of course our life is about how we handle suffering, if you use suffering in the Buddhist sense of the word.

How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious"

It's a well known example from the literature, not mine.