Why the bias against materialism?

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
BTW, why is Mentat attributing efficiency to matter?

Actually, I think he may have misspoken...life is not efficient at all, but I think I'll leave it to him to clarify...

 

[sascha]

Mentat, the alternative to Materialism is not just Idealism. There is at least another dozen positions, in case you care.
And Zero, I don't see your point about doubting and spirits etc..

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
BTW, why is Mentat attributing efficiency to matter?

I meant (as can be easily deduced from my previous posts) that it (a living organism) is very effecient at increasing entropy - which is the path of least resistance for the Universe, and thus doesn't need to be "strived for" (as I may have accidentally implied) but is the inevitable tendency.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha

And Zero, I don't see your point.

Which point are you missing?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, the alternative to Materialism is not just Idealism. There is at least another dozen positions, in case you care.
And Zero, I don't see your point.

Materialism is not a belief. Materialism is the negation of Idealism. Thus, any idea that is not Idealistic in any way is Materialistic.

The same comparison can be drawn between "physical" and "metaphysical". Anything that is not physical is it's negation (the metaphysical).

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
I meant (as can be easily deduced from my previous posts) that it (a living organism) is very effecient at increasing entropy - which is the path of least resistance for the Universe, and thus doesn't need to be "strived for" (as I may have accidentally implied) but is the inevitable tendency.

Ahhh, that makes perfect sense. Living things are entropy machines, so their existence seems to be almost a forgone conclusion.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
Ahhh, that makes perfect sense. Living things are entropy machines, so their existence seems to be almost a forgone conclusion.

Yeah, I probably should have just said it like that and avoided misunderstanding .

 

[sascha]

So if I understand you correctly, Mentat, life would be most efficient if it would destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible. Interesting.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
So if I understand you correctly, Mentat, life would be most efficient if it would destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible. Interesting.

Entropy doesn't mean destruction...you don't seem to have enough knowledge of the physical world to be making judgments on it, at least based on this and your posting about evolution.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
So if I understand you correctly, Mentat, life would be most efficient if it would destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible. Interesting.

LMBO!

You can't be serious.

Yes, I suppose this could be true, but I never implied it. I was merely saying that life itself is very good - in itself - at increasing entropy.

 

[sascha]

I did not want to go into the lengths of talking about usable energy and things like that, but these details do not really make so much of a difference.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
I did not want to go into the lengths of talking about usable energy and things like that, but these details do not really make so much of a difference.

What details?

Anyway, can we get back on-topic please?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
What details?

Anyway, can we get back on-topic please?

No, because if we stay on topic, he's out of special cases and exceptions!

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
No, because if we stay on topic, he's out of special cases and exceptions!

Alright, let's play nice now .

Back on-topic: Zero, do you agree with the necessary logical proofs to convince a materialist of an immaterial mind? Are there any that you would add?

Also, does anyone believe they can rise to the challenge of proving either of those points?

 

[sascha]

How can there be special cases and exceptions in a world view that aspires to completeness?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
How can there be special cases and exceptions in a world view that aspires to completeness?

Whoah! Be careful, sascha, this is an entirely different topic, and has much greater potential for side-tracking the thread.

 

[sascha]

Mentat, when asked "what would it take for you to change your mind?" you said
1) It would take an explanation of what the intermediary, between that which is physical and that which is not, is.
2) It would take an explanation of how the mind can have an "inner observer" (of all the phenomenological events) without infinite regress.
So let me give you a proposal.
What you call the intermediary between the physical and the non-physical is the realm of laws and forces. They are not directly measurable, but effective. And the mind does not need an "inner observer" because it does not operate in the observation mode. It operates in the mode of identification with or rejection of ideas. This is an activity, not a state. But activity as such is not in the scope of scientific categories, only results of acts. (This is where the postulate of an observer comes from; it has nothing to do with the nature of the mind, but with the presently usual scientific approach.)

 

[sascha]

You suddenly seem to be busy with other things. I have put my points very succinctly, but we can go into any detail. Yet I will be off for today: here it is 11 p.m.. Don't be astonished if sometimes I am long in responding, as my access to the internet is not very reliable: for the time being it is interrupted now and then.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
No, because to say that the mind is anything other than physical is to imply a line of reasoning that leads to infinite regress - as I've shown numerous times in the past.

This is like saying that because I disagree with their conclusions I'm not going to bother reading the argument. Let's not throw out a perfectly good scientific area of study(complexity) just because we don't like where it leads, alright?

Yeah right. No offense, but you used terms of a completely Idealistic nature (such as "inside consciousness" and "outside consciousness" and "mind" (as something other than the brain, that is)), throughout the entire discussion thusfar, and now you say that you've only been saying "Idealists believe in emergent properties"?

Mentat, if you would like I can go back and show where you yourself have used words like "mind" in a casual manner. It wasn't in a sentence denying that the mind existed or anything like that. You were simply using it because it was a useful word and conveyed the point. That is all I am doing. What I keep trying to tell you is that just because we assign a word to something doesn't mean it actually exists. But once we assign the words it allows for the option of someone to claim that it does, for example an idealist. You're simply trying to build your conclusions into the definitions. A philosophical debate cannot happen when you won't allow the use of words to describe the opposing position.

No, you were saying (before, at least) that Idealists believe that these "emergent properties" are primary while materialists believe them to be secondary.

And I also explained that they don't necessarily mean different things. A materialist can claim that secondary things are only concepts used for the purposes of communication (like color). They don't really exists.

No it doesn't. Don't you realize yet that no one can show love (or anything else that isn't physical) to exist? It isn't logically possible, because, even if Idealism was correct, there would be no way to convey my "thoughts" to you, except through physical means.

Thus, when I say that Zero's definition is OK (though slightly misleading), I am saying that because no Idealist can ever *show* that there is such a thing as "things that exist only 'inside consciousness'".

MENTAT! My example HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ARGUMENT FOR PROVING LOVE! The fact that you don't understand the point of my example is the reason I keep responding and telling you that you aren't understanding my whole point.

I will even go so far as to say that I can agree with what you are saying about how love cannot be shown. But that isn't the point! The point is that someone thinks it can be! Namely the idealists. What is the criteria for something being "shown to exists?" The whole point is not to agree with idealism but to simply make the argument that "shown to exists" is not specific enough of a definition to draw a distinctive line. And this has always been my only point.

Only when someone (you, in this case) wishes to enforce the fact that phenomenological things can be shown to exist. This is, obviously, not the case.

Exactly! Here you are getting my point from above. I am not personally making the argument that idealism is true. I am simply saying that anyone can stand up and claim that love "can be shown to exists" and that is just as obvious to them as the opposite view is to you. The problem is that this definition uses vague words that mean different things to different people, so the definition is not useful.

Now, we can either continue to debate this utterly meaningless problem that you have with Zero's original definition or we can move on (perhaps using my definition instead), like rational people do.

I haven't seen any other definition proposed besides Heusdens and one from an office dictionary which should never be used to understand a philosophical position that has libraries of books written on it. "What rational people do" is understand how to define a dogma before they defend it. Contrary to what you are saying this is extremely important. I am pointing out to you why you will never accomplish anything on these forums on this topic. Everyone is speaking a different language. The only purpose that can be served by continuing in that manner is to use the forum as a venting place where people can be safely insulted.

Color doesn't "really exist" (I can't believe that you, of all people, would ever use the term "really exist" ). Color is a part of our processing incoming light of different wavelengths.

Ok good. Color doesn't exists. But it is a word and a concept nonetheless, no? It is used to describe the subjective experience that exist along with these processes you mentioned. Now that we have a word for it, someone can now step in and claim it really DOES exists. Whether it does or not is not the point. If you don't have words to describe the distinctions then the debate is meaningless. Heusdens definition is very clear about what types of things an idealists would claim is primary. Color happened inside consciousness (and everyone knows and agrees on what that means Mentat as opposed to "shown to exists") and therefore according to a materialists doesn't exists except as another label for the physical process and according to an idealists it does exists.

What's so "unusable" about it? I understand if it seems "radical", since it's counter-intuitive (our consciousness plays a very convincing "trick" on itself), but not unusable.

As is the case with a magician and a gullible audience, the card never really passed through the table (nor did it in any metaphysical make-believe world), it is a trick the brain plays on itself.

Come on now. Let's not be patronizing. For some reason you cannot seem to separate the semantics from the debate itself. All I'm talking about is semantics. You keep dragging things into the debate itself. None of this stuff above is relevant.

Oh, it's easy to see how it helps in explanation, but it's nothing more than that. Color (and all other such words that you believe refer to some "secondary thing") does not exist (in any sense of the word).

But yet it is still a word that can be used in a definition of Idealism. Whether it exists or not IS NOT THE POINT.

And, if you can't be unbiased, then you can't try to define immediately, but must reverse the order that you and Heusdens decided on.

The order? I'm not sure what you're talking about. Heusdens and I didn't decide anything btw. He was presenting you the established philosophical definition of materialism. The one that no other famous materialist seemed to have a problem with.

When I said zero's definition was biased, I mean that the definition forces you to conclude materialism. It assumes it's conclusion. Whereas the definition that Heusdens showed does not preclude a materialist from being a materialist. I have explained how a materialist can use this definition to maintain their view. This definition is simply a better use of words to distinguish the two views. The only bias here is desired biased.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
I'll say that everyone does what they want to, and leave it at that.

I hear the echoes of a foot stomping.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
A scientific experiment occurs in the physical realm and can thus have no relation with the metaphysical (science doesn't deal with such question anyway). So no scientific experiment could ever show this.

OK, so a person that believes knowledge can only come from science
must be a materialists according to you? And I don't know what you mean by the word "physical".

1) It would take an explanation of what the intermediary, between that which is physical and that which is not, is.

An idealists can claim this same explanation must happen but it must come from the materialist side. Who has the burden of proof depends on what view you take to begin with so this shouldn't be used as a reason to "not" accept idealism. Most people would agree that all our knowlegde is subjective. Whether what we are experiencing actually exists at all or exists in the way that we are experiencing it is an assumption. It seems the people making this assumption ought to have the burden of explaining problem number 1.

2) It would take an explanation of how the mind can have an "inner observer" (of all the phenomenological events) without infinite regress.

To be honest I've seen you type this several times but it doesn't mean anything to me. I don't understand what it means.

 

[sascha]

Fliption, you don't seem to understand what Mentat means by the "inner observer", which implies an infinite regress. It is simply the so called "homunculus problem" which the cognitive sciences have. You can find a relatively good discussion of such things for example on The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, on the Web. Even for those people the problem is by far not as "solved" as for Mentat.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, when asked "what would it take for you to change your mind?" you said
1) It would take an explanation of what the intermediary, between that which is physical and that which is not, is.
2) It would take an explanation of how the mind can have an "inner observer" (of all the phenomenological events) without infinite regress.
So let me give you a proposal.
What you call the intermediary between the physical and the non-physical is the realm of laws and forces. They are not directly measurable, but effective. And the mind does not need an "inner observer" because it does not operate in the observation mode. It operates in the mode of identification with or rejection of ideas. This is an activity, not a state. But activity as such is not in the scope of scientific categories, only results of acts. (This is where the postulate of an observer comes from; it has nothing to do with the nature of the mind, but with the presently usual scientific approach.)

1) "The intermediary is the realm of laws and forces" is much to vague. It also fails to address the actual issue at hand: Are...they...physical? If they are not, then they are not a useful intermediary, since nothing non-physical can directly interact with anything physical (that's the whole point for the discussion of intermediaries in the first place). If it is physical, then it cannot interact with the non-physical mind, for the same reason.

2) If it is not in the form of an observer, then why must you Idealists keep talking about "emergent properties" and such phenomenological concepts? The "emergent properties" would have no meaning if there was no conscious homunculus (which, as you well know, leads to infinite regress) to "observe" them.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
You suddenly seem to be busy with other things. I have put my points very succinctly, but we can go into any detail. Yet I will be off for today: here it is 11 p.m.. Don't be astonished if sometimes I am long in responding, as my access to the internet is not very reliable: for the time being it is interrupted now and then.

I understand that completely. I myself am only alotted about one hour, per day, of internet access.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
OK, so a person that believes knowledge can only come from science
must be a materialists according to you? And I don't know what you mean by the word "physical".

For all practical purposes, yes. If the person believes in non-physical phenomena then that may be their own personal belief, but it can never be scientifically verified (see my currently misplaced (In the Other Sciences Forum)thread about the effect of a Materialist view of consciousness on the idea Telepathy).

As to the word "physical", that means (my own definition, though I probably should've looked it up, and given the dictionary definition) "composed of energy or capable of interacting energetically".

An idealists can claim this same explanation must happen but it must come from the materialist side. Who has the burden of proof depends on what view you take to begin with so this shouldn't be used as a reason to "not" accept idealism. Most people would agree that all our knowlegde is subjective. Whether what we are experiencing actually exists at all or exists in the way that we are experiencing it is an assumption. It seems the people making this assumption ought to have the burden of explaining problem number 1.

I have shown to points of logic that disqualify the possibility (even in principle) of their being a non-physical mind. You have shown no such points of logic in the opposite direction. Thus, the burden now falls completely on you, to show me the flaw in my reasoning (either in my counter to your reasoning, or in my materialistic stance altogether).

To be honest I've seen you type this several times but it doesn't mean anything to me. I don't understand what it means.

Ok. The Idealist believes that there is an inner phenomenological world, right? IOW, s/he believes that there is a "purple cow" (even if it doesn't exist materially, it still exists "inside consciousness" (whatever that means)), in your mind. But who is looking at the purple cow? IOW, if I deign to assume that there is a purple cow "in my mind", then I have to ask how it is that I can "see" this cow, without eyes inside of my head (a "mind's eye", as it is commonly referred to). So, we take on the assumption that there is a "mind's eye". Well, now we have an eye, but where does it relay it's information to (my eyes relay information to my brain, so these eyes must relay information to an "inner" mind, right?)? If you follow this reasoning, you will reach infinite regress.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
This is like saying that because I disagree with their conclusions I'm not going to bother reading the argument. Let's not throw out a perfectly good scientific area of study(complexity) just because we don't like where it leads, alright?

Well, like I said, I'm going to try to look up some information. However, the very premise has (at least) two logical flaws, and neither I nor anyone else (so far) has posted a way around them.

So, basically, it'll never be on my "must-read" list, since I have found two enormous flaws in their very premise.

Mentat, if you would like I can go back and show where you yourself have used words like "mind" in a casual manner. It wasn't in a sentence denying that the mind existed or anything like that. You were simply using it because it was a useful word and conveyed the point. That is all I am doing. What I keep trying to tell you is that just because we assign a word to something doesn't mean it actually exists. But once we assign the words it allows for the option of someone to claim that it does, for example an idealist. You're simply trying to build your conclusions into the definitions. A philosophical debate cannot happen when you won't allow the use of words to describe the opposing position.

But that's not the point. You can use words to describe the opposite position; I used "emergent properties" in my definition of Idealism, but I used these words differently than you did. I said that an Idealist believes that there is such a thing as an emergent property (they believe that there is a phenomenological world). You, OTOH, said that an Idealist believes the things that exist in the "mind world" to be primary, while the Materialist believes them to be secondary. This isn't just wrong, but it takes completely for granted that there are such emergent properties (and that it is just their hierarchy in reality that is important to the issue).

And I also explained that they don't necessarily mean different things. A materialist can claim that secondary things are only concepts used for the purposes of communication (like color). They don't really exists.

What does it mean to you to "really exist". To me (taking the materialistic stand) "color" doesn't exist at all. It is just a word, that describes nothing. OTOH, "wavelength" describes something. Thus, color is nothing at all, much like the card's having passed through the table is nothing at all (in itself) but a flawed representation of what happened.

MENTAT! My example HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ARGUMENT FOR PROVING LOVE! The fact that you don't understand the point of my example is the reason I keep responding and telling you that you aren't understanding my whole point.

But didn't you read the second paragraph of that portion? I was merely defending the fact that Zero's definition is not logically incoherent, as you say it is, due to the fact that an Idealist really cannot show any non-physical thing to exist.

I will even go so far as to say that I can agree with what you are saying about how love cannot be shown. But that isn't the point! The point is that someone thinks it can be! Namely the idealists. What is the criteria for something being "shown to exists?"

And that is the key question. That is what it all hinges on. However, if an Idealist were open to reason (and I'm not saying that they aren't, merely saying that they must be in order to understand what I'm going to say next) it could be explained to them that they can show "acts of love" all they want, but they can never show the "love" itself.

The whole point is not to agree with idealism but to simply make the argument that "shown to exists" is not specific enough of a definition to draw a distinctive line. And this has always been my only point.

As I've said before, I don't really need to debate this point with you, as it is not the main line of argument, and I have no real reason to defend Zero's definition since (IMO) mine seems better anyway. However, I see a flaw in your reasoning against his definition, and so I'm pointing it out (in case you missed it before: "you really can't show anything non-physical to exist).

Exactly! Here you are getting my point from above. I am not personally making the argument that idealism is true. I am simply saying that anyone can stand up and claim that love "can be shown to exists" and that is just as obvious to them as the opposite view is to you. The problem is that this definition uses vague words that mean different things to different people, so the definition is not useful.

Yes, I did point out to Zero before that it uses vague terms, and can be rather easily misconstrued. However, after a degree of reasoning on the matter, it still holds up. A person may be able to say "I can show that the purple cow exists", but I challenge them to actually do it. Descartes recognized this boundary (though he was actually an Idealist (and the founder of the detestable Cartesian Dualism )) when he finally conclude that the only thing he could ever be certain of where the things within "his own mind".

I haven't seen any other definition proposed besides Heusdens and one from an office dictionary which should never be used to understand a philosophical position that has libraries of books written on it. "What rational people do" is understand how to define a dogma before they defend it. Contrary to what you are saying this is extremely important. I am pointing out to you why you will never accomplish anything on these forums on this topic. Everyone is speaking a different language. The only purpose that can be served by continuing in that manner is to use the forum as a venting place where people can be safely insulted.

I never thought I was being insulting. I do apologize if I've come off that way. I also acknowledge that we cannot continue in exactly the way we have been, however we can continue with the definitions that I proposed, and that you (seemed to) agree(d) with.

Ok good. Color doesn't exists. But it is a word and a concept nonetheless, no?

No. It is a word. It describes as much of a concept as the term "nothing" (remember the "Exercise in 'Nothing' Semantics"?) or as the term that Manuel_Silvio and I coined, "Uncertainty" (with a capital "U", which was supposed to mean that one takes absolutely nothing for granted, but this is logically impossible, so "Uncertainty" doesn't describe a concept (which is what a word is supposed to do) but is just a word).

It is used to describe the subjective experience that exist along with these processes you mentioned. Now that we have a word for it, someone can now step in and claim it really DOES exists. Whether it does or not is not the point.

But the question of "whether it really does exist" has it's answer implied already in your having described it as "the subjective experience". Manuel_Silvio and I also went over this quite a bit: If a concept can be assigned to the word, then the word is describing something that "really exists". "Real existence" must account for the conceptual as well as the physical, until it is proven (as it has been, currently, in my mind) that the 'conceptual' (or subjective) doesn't exist.

If you don't have words to describe the distinctions then the debate is meaningless. Heusdens definition is very clear about what types of things an idealists would claim is primary. Color happened inside consciousness (and everyone knows and agrees on what that means Mentat as opposed to "shown to exists") and therefore according to a materialists doesn't exists except as another label for the physical process and according to an idealists it does exists.

No! Have you really missed my point this drastically, or are you speaking out of habit? Nothing exists "inside of consciousness", as far as the materialist is concerned.[/color] Don't you get that yet? The logical materialist (which is what I hope to be considered for the timebeing) doesn't make the distinction between what "really exists" and what exists "only inside consciousness", because nothing exists "inside consciousness".

Come on now. Let's not be patronizing. For some reason you cannot seem to separate the semantics from the debate itself. All I'm talking about is semantics. You keep dragging things into the debate itself. None of this stuff above is relevant.

I didn't mean to be patronizing, but my point is still relevant (I think), since you just may be the gullible audience.

I am running out of space, so I will complete my response in the next post.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
But yet it is still a word that can be used in a definition of Idealism. Whether it exists or not IS NOT THE POINT.

But it is. A word is one thing, and I'm fine with (and, in fact, approve of) your assigning just words to the definitions. However, the words that you have chosen (some of them, anyway) imply concepts that are biased toward the Idealistic PoV (the same sin that you accuse Zero of).

When I said Zero's definition was biased, I mean that the definition forces you to conclude materialism. It assumes it's conclusion.

It does nothing of the kind. I have already vindicated it beyond your arguments thus far, since nothing that doesn't exist physically can be "shown to exist". You have even agreed on this point, just not on what it logically leads to (that Zero's definition doesn't have the implications that you originally assumed it had).

Whereas the definition that Heusdens showed does not preclude a materialist from being a materialist.

Yes it does. As I've said numerous times, to say that a Materialist believes that "the things that exist 'inside of consciousness' are secondary" is to assume that the Materialist believes there is such a thing as that which is "inside consciousness" in the first place.

 

[sascha]

Mentat, concerning your saying "you really can't show anything non-physical to exist", what is a teacher doing who can make a pupil understand (and thus 'see' the logical existence of) for example the law of Pythagoras?

I can accept that in your view e.g. color doesn't exist. But it does, and is a word and a concept, for thinkers holding other positions (and as mentioned, there is not just Materialism and Idealism around). In your claim of holding the only possible world-view you forget the relativizing effect of fundamental beliefs and assumptions (not only the conscious ones).

Mentat, you ask: are laws and forces physical? But what is it to be "physical"? You say "composed of energy or capable of interacting energetically", as if this were the final solution. Well, as also this thread showed, the constitution of matter is not such a simple thing. We have been discussing how physics is presently trying out the ideas of "energy" and "information", and I have drawn the attention to the fact that even these terms are not yet strictly primal -- apart from not being very "material". So what IS physical, after all? -- My point is that understanding fully the reality of things leads into ideas / notions / concepts / categories (call them as you may) that are precisely not any more in the realm which is associated with materiality -- such as existence, measurability, palpability, etc. One can remain in less 'ethereal' terms, but then the grasp of reality is reduced. This may not please some, but there are reasons why this is so. In my understanding, matter finally consists of laws and forces, and in this sense they are material indeed. But as your answer shows, you cannot conceive this. Well, what can I do?

To the other point of that question: the "inner observer" has not much to do with the "emergent properties"; these are not really part of a phenomenological or idealist terminology (you will find none of that with Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc., or with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc., but only with some post-linguistic-turn interpretations of phenomenology or idealism). "Emergent properties" are only final conceptual needs, as a consequence of having chosen assumptions, in the last decades. Under the condition of choosing to consider a topic (e.g. consciousness) only from outside -- which is not the phenomenological position, nor the idealist, if you read the said authors -- one can be in seeming need of postulating "emergent properties" in the hope of solving certain self-made riddles (self-made by the assumptions). The homunculus is such a postulate; but it has to do with a 'modern' way of approaching the subject matter, it is by far not the absolute truth about it.

Beyond that, we still have some other points open.

Mentat, when I drew your attention to the fact that you must choose which thing or thought you want to be attentive to (because no material contraption does this for you), you said you had explained before how you can have choices, by referring to Dennett (i.e. by believing in his hypotheses). But you had merely indicated some invented algorithm, you gave no real explanation (strictly tracking back phenomena to laws of nature). On the other hand you maintain that the mind is determined by material contraptions. So to me your point of view is still contradictory -- less in your explicit arguments, but rather in consequnce of the tacit assumptions. Consciousness does not explain all of mental life, because it does not react on its own. There is a use of consciousness. In the end, either the intentional activity is determined by the claimed mechanism, which relativates the invented theories, or it is a free choice, which invalidates the presupposition that the determinations are material / mechanical.

Zero, you ask me why I think human thinking is qualitatively different from, say, canine thinking. The difference is that animals can develop some sort of 'language' but not conceive anything that is linked to infinity, i.e. pure ideas (laws like of the geometrical circle) and ideals (e.g. systematic completeness, truth, etc.). This does not exclude that some humans are so underprivileged or degenerated that they remain at a more or less animal level in their mental life.

The big question is to what degree people are aware of what is going on in their own minds. So many are indeed at the mercy of this and that -- and there the theories are justified whereby there is something material / mechanical that determines the outcome. But this is not a strictly universal truth, because it is not compelling for absolutely everybody. Everything depends on how the individual chooses to use his or her mind.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
As to the word "physical", that means (my own definition, though I probably should've looked it up, and given the dictionary definition) "composed of energy or capable of interacting energetically".

What criteria would I use if I wanted to know if something qualified as energy or not?

I have shown to points of logic that disqualify the possibility (even in principle) of their being a non-physical mind. You have shown no such points of logic in the opposite direction. Thus, the burden now falls completely on you, to show me the flaw in my reasoning (either in my counter to your reasoning, or in my materialistic stance altogether).

As you stated in another post, quoting Descarte...all you can know is what is in your own mind. So to claim that there is something else is an assumption. The person who is assuming that there is something material to represent the subjective experience of the world is creating the dualism and thus has issue number one to resolve. Before you respond to this, please go read the thread started by Hypnagogue about the existince of an onjective world. The discussion that goes on there is one of the best I've seen on this topic. You'll see that your number one is more of a problem for a materialist (if you have an open mind that is)

Ok. The Idealist believes that there is an inner phenomenological world, right? IOW, s/he believes that there is a "purple cow" (even if it doesn't exist materially, it still exists "inside consciousness" (whatever that means)), in your mind. But who is looking at the purple cow? So, we take on the assumption that there is a "mind's eye". Well, now we have an eye, but where does it relay it's information to (my eyes relay information to my brain, so these eyes must relay information to an "inner" mind, right?)? If you follow this reasoning, you will reach infinite regress. [/B]

I don't see it. Sascha has posted that there is information on it. I'll have to read on it. But at the moment I don't see why the logical chain is necessarily true.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, like I said, I'm going to try to look up some information. However, the very premise has (at least) two logical flaws, and neither I nor anyone else (so far) has posted a way around them.

So, basically, it'll never be on my "must-read" list, since I have found two enormous flaws in their very premise.

You don't know anything about it so you don't know exactly what the premises are. I cannot imagine the confidence one must have to think out a logical problem with a certain view and then not allow that view to respond. Dangerous! Get used to the taste of your toes . I used to have to brush my teeth often.

But that's not the point. You can use words to describe the opposite position; I used "emergent properties" in my definition of Idealism, but I used these words differently than you did. I said that an Idealist believes that there is such a thing as an emergent property (they believe that there is a phenomenological world). You, OTOH, said that an Idealist believes the things that exist in the "mind world" to be primary, while the Materialist believes them to be secondary. This isn't just wrong, but it takes completely for granted that there are such emergent properties (and that it is just their hierarchy in reality that is important to the issue).

I have explained 3 times that the words secondary and primary don't mean what you think it means. But I think I see the problem we're having and I'll try to point it out below.

What does it mean to you to "really exist". To me (taking the materialistic stand) "color" doesn't exist at all. It is just a word, that describes nothing. OTOH, "wavelength" describes something. Thus, color is nothing at all, much like the card's having passed through the table is nothing at all (in itself) but a flawed representation of what happened.

"really exists" is a figure of speech. This question of yours also points to the same problem that I mentioned above. I'll try to explain below...

But didn't you read the second paragraph of that portion? I was merely defending the fact that Zero's definition is not logically incoherent, as you say it is, due to the fact that an Idealist really cannot show any non-physical thing to exist.

Zero's definition is crap Mentat. It may be useful in a casual conversation but it does not lend itself to a philosophical discussion.
First of all Zero's definition doesn't mention anything about being "physical" as you are claiming. Second of all, what is physical? (you answered this in a previous post. I'm just pointing out the never ending semantic questions.) And thirdly, whether Idealism is true or not does not mean that you get to assume your conclusion in the definition.

And that is the key question. That is what it all hinges on. However, if an Idealist were open to reason (and I'm not saying that they aren't, merely saying that they must be in order to understand what I'm going to say next) it could be explained to them that they can show "acts of love" all they want, but they can never show the "love" itself.

Yep that's what it all hinges on. And an idealists would make the same claim about a materialists. I can hear them saying "If they were only open to reason." Just as you did.

I don't know how much philosophy you've studied but great care must be used on definitions if the discussion is ever going to get out of the semantic realm. So much of what gets discussed in this forum is problems with semantics. In this case, the best course of action is to arrive at a definition that doesn't require the opposite view to "use reason" and agree with your conclusion in order to agree with the definition.

As I've said before, I don't really need to debate this point with you, as it is not the main line of argument, and I have no real reason to defend Zero's definition since (IMO) mine seems better anyway.

As I said before, I have seen no other definition except for this one. What exactly is your definition?

However, I see a flaw in your reasoning against his definition, and so I'm pointing it out (in case you missed it before: "you really can't show anything non-physical to exist).

No that's not a logical flaw of mine. I'm saying nothing about the existence of things. I'm defining words.

I never thought I was being insulting. I do apologize if I've come off that way. I also acknowledge that we cannot continue in exactly the way we have been, however we can continue with the definitions that I proposed, and that you (seemed to) agree(d) with.

I wasn't referring to you specifically. By no means. But certain others here are not interested in a productive discussion and are gleeful at yet another opportunity to insult someone who disagrees with them with sarcastic, pastronizing remarks.

But the question of "whether it really does exist" has it's answer implied already in your having described it as "the subjective experience". Manuel_Silvio and I also went over this quite a bit: If a concept can be assigned to the word, then the word is describing something that "really exists". "Real existence" must account for the conceptual as well as the physical, until it is proven (as it has been, currently, in my mind) that the 'conceptual' (or subjective) doesn't exist.

AND HERE IS OUR PROBLEM! I do not believe that a concept must exist in the objective world for it to exist as a subjective idea. And you apparently don't agree. More below...

No! Have you really missed my point this drastically, or are you speaking out of habit? Nothing exists "inside of consciousness", as far as the materialist is concerned.[/color] Don't you get that yet? The logical materialist (which is what I hope to be considered for the timebeing) doesn't make the distinction between what "really exists" and what exists "only inside consciousness", because nothing exists "inside consciousness".

I have not missed your point as you will see by going back and re-reading what I'm saying. I'm saying your point is irrelevant. Over and over again I have said it. I understand that materialist don't believe anything exists "inside consciousness". But it is irrelevant. I think the problem we're having is linked to this word-concept issue. You claim that color does not exists and if we assign a word to it then we are assuming the concept it represents does exists. But color doesn't have to exist. What DOES exists is the perceived subjective experience of color. There is something distinctive that people perceive and are referring to when they refer to color. For the purposes of communication "color" is a useful word because it refers to the character of a subjective experience. The word "wavelength" just won't do. Whether this perceived thing objectively exists or not does not need to be decided at the stage of assigning a word to refer to the idea. We have a word for 'GOD' to. But using the word 'god' doesn't mean you believe it exists. Does it? The word is used to describe a "conceptual idea" that people find useful.

This is all about communication. All I am trying to do is find a definition that uses words that people can all understand and interpret exactly the same. after doing that, the "REAL" debate can procede. If I have to insert a chinese word into help I will. It's not about proclaiming truths etc etc. It's about communicating what your view actually is so that a person who uses words differently from you can understand your view. My first example of the materialist and idealists discussing the definition says it all I think.