Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[Rive]

In a previous press release, Tepco referred to the location as...

So most likely it's from the first floor, with some tricky lights. Thanks :-)

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111012/index.html On 12 October an emergency drill simulating a magnitude 8 earthquake near Fukushima Daiichi will be carried out. 30 workers will be employed to install fire trucks and hoses to pump seawater in order to confirm that the cooling of the reactors can be restored within 3 hours.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111013/0500_kunren.html The drill assumed that tanks and pumps had been broken by an earthquake. 40 people installed fire trucks and 300 m of hoses, so that cooling was restored to one reactor in 1 hour 10 minutes. In the future Tepco will perform other drills assuming a tsunami with debris spread on roads, and occurrences at times when gathering people is more difficult, such as on holidays and during the night.

 

[Edano]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111013/0500_kunren.html The drill assumed that tanks and pumps had been broken by an earthquake. 40 people installed fire trucks and 300 m of hoses, so that cooling was restored to one reactor in 1 hour 10 minutes. In the future Tepco will perform other drills assuming a tsunami with debris spread on roads, and occurrences at times when gathering people is more difficult, such as on holidays and during the night.

and a station blackout ?

 

[maddog1964]

and a station blackout ?

I will have to go back and reread the info Tsutusji has been so wonderful to provide us with, but I believe one of the main "assumption" of the drill is that they ARE in "station blackout"

Please stay factual on this PF. thread. There are other threads related to sarcasim!

The drill being done in the manner stated in the above quote makes complete logical sense. Identifiy what does not work well first (base line), correct, then add the variables one at a time so that a correct and effective procedure can be developled/refined and "taught to the employees". Thats why they do drills!

 

[tsutsuji]

and a station blackout ?

My understanding is that it is assumed by the drill that the present equipment is inoperative (either materially broken or out of electric power), and a whole new diesel powered equipment must be installed quickly enough.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/13_14.html (in English) says the drill is performed using a "mock facility" [it is probably what is shown on http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/111012_05.jpg ]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111012_02-e.pdf pictures of the drill (large size pictures at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/index-e.html )

 

[Edano]

My understanding is that it is assumed by the drill that the present equipment is inoperative (either materially broken or out of electric power), and a whole new diesel powered equipment must be installed quickly enough.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/13_14.html (in English) says the drill is performed using a "mock facility" [it is probably what is shown on http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/111012_05.jpg ]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111012_02-e.pdf pictures of the drill (large size pictures at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/index-e.html )

thank you for your links. still, the factual information tepco provides on this drill, is poor.

 

[nikkkom]

I guess in the grander scheme of things it is futile to expect that station personnel will always react properly to large emergencies. It's just too different from their day-to-day job. People are going to be shocked, mentally unprepared. Scared. Etc. And make mistakes.

I bet you can train Fukushima people (because they have a very good reason to take this training very seriously), but on other stations, especially in other countries, their readiness will be about the same as on Fukushima pre-disaster.

Maybe we need to have mobile team(s) _specially_ trained to deal with NPP accidents? They can have helicopters, air-mobile generators and pumps, battery-backed portable lights, etc, but more importantly, their full time job would be to be trained and ready to react to serious accidents on NPPs in their region. I think a team like this could have saved F1, by restoring electric power to cooling systems.

 

[jim hardy]

""I think a team like this could have saved F1, by restoring electric power to cooling systems.""
my own opinion is only an ounce of prevention could have saved that plant. The electrical system needed to be made submersible. Once it gets wetted you are in for weeks of manual cleanup.
the seawater has to be washed out of the electric system, corrosion fixed, and all the motors dried out. That's slow, tedious work. Alternative is build a new electric system and that's huge.


now , to surround the electrical rooms with basically a submarine hull is more like a pound of prevention
but just look at the tons of cure going on now.

some poor fellow someplace is rue-ing the day he didn't act on those mid 1990's geology reports of probable big tidal waves. i have to believe the executives would have acted had they known.

 

[Rive]

...now , to surround the electrical rooms with basically a submarine hull is more like a pound of prevention ...

There was three different issue with the power backup:

- the water damaged the equipment itself
- the water damaged the cooling of the equipment (water outlets and pumps near the sea).
- the water damaged the fuel reserves of the equipment

I would prefer simply to move the equipment and its fuel reserves a different place, hillside: and modify it for air cooling.

 

[nikkkom]

some poor fellow someplace is rue-ing the day he didn't act on those mid 1990's geology reports of probable big tidal waves. i have to believe the executives would have acted had they known.

I think it's exactly executives who squashed flat any suggestions that F1 is unsafe. In the name of saving a few tens of millions dollars. Engineers tend to be much more honest (they know that laws of nature can't be overruled). In both Challenger and Columbia disasters engineers felt that something is definitely not right, were begging their bosses to do something, and were overruled.

 

[zapperzero]

I guess in the grander scheme of things it is futile to expect that station personnel will always react properly to large emergencies. It's just too different from their day-to-day job. People are going to be shocked, mentally unprepared. Scared. Etc. And make mistakes.

I bet you can train Fukushima people (because they have a very good reason to take this training very seriously), but on other stations, especially in other countries, their readiness will be about the same as on Fukushima pre-disaster.

Maybe we need to have mobile team(s) _specially_ trained to deal with NPP accidents? They can have helicopters, air-mobile generators and pumps, battery-backed portable lights, etc, but more importantly, their full time job would be to be trained and ready to react to serious accidents on NPPs in their region. I think a team like this could have saved F1, by restoring electric power to cooling systems.

Well, Japan didn't even invest in specialized robots, let alone a SWAT team.

There should be equipment on hand, but to be honest, I don't think such a specialized team is needed, or indeed desirable. Just think - if such a team had been established when F1-1 was built, it would have had 50 years to ossify into incompetence and complacency.

There should be a team of bureaucrats tasked with management and logistics and provided with very wide-ranging administrative powers in an emergency, a la FEMA, but the actual responders should be trained plant operators who are kept on call, on a rotation basis, just like a militia.

Every X years, or upon entering the profession, people would have to pass a training course, do some practice exercises and be ready to deal with any real emergency that might occur, for a given period.

This has double benefit - you can have many more competent responders for when things go really, really bad, plus you instill a healthy fear of the unknown and maybe a few good practices into, essentially, all the personnel of all the plants.

The team that is on-site when the unthinkable occurs should be treated as victims regardless of their physical status - i. e. evacuated ASAP and replaced with new, rested people with zero preconceptions.

 

[NUCENG]

Well, Japan didn't even invest in specialized robots, let alone a SWAT team.

There should be equipment on hand, but to be honest, I don't think such a specialized team is needed, or indeed desirable. Just think - if such a team had been established when F1-1 was built, it would have had 50 years to ossify into incompetence and complacency.

There should be a team of bureaucrats tasked with management and logistics and provided with very wide-ranging administrative powers in an emergency, a la FEMA, but the actual responders should be trained plant operators who are kept on call, on a rotation basis, just like a militia.

Every X years, or upon entering the profession, people would have to pass a training course, do some practice exercises and be ready to deal with any real emergency that might occur, for a given period.

This has double benefit - you can have many more competent responders for when things go really, really bad, plus you instill a healthy fear of the unknown and maybe a few good practices into, essentially, all the personnel of all the plants.

The team that is on-site when the unthinkable occurs should be treated as victims regardless of their physical status - i. e. evacuated ASAP and replaced with new, rested people with zero preconceptions.

IAEA is talking about fielding an ERO team they would deploy to direct emergency response at future accidents. This concerns me because it may actually reduce effective response. The discussion of the external support teams you are discussing is also a concern if it seeks to remove plant staff from the response. Okay, here is a short description of typical emergency response processes at US nuclear power plants. This discussion is my opinion that any changes need to support existing staff and response, not replace it.

Licensed operators receive continuous refresher training on emergency procedures including use of large control room simulators with impressive fidelity to the real plant. Crews are typically on a rotating shift schedule and have a shift rotation each cycle in training. They are periodically given knowledge examinations, plant walkthroughs, and graded simulator exercises as a part of maintaining their licenses. This training is conducted at the plant but is monitored and inspected by the NRC.

All licensed operators and most radiological workers at US nuclear power plants are assigned to duties in the Emergency Response Organization. During an emergency there is an on-site Technical Support Facility with extensive communications capability to NRC state and local emergency response organizations. The plants are capable of manning this facility around the clock for an extended period of time. In addition there is an offsite Emergency Operating Facility, including capabilities for briefing the press. This facility takes over operational control from the TSC after it is manned. Again this facility has extensive communications capabilities.

Plant technicians and maintenance workers also gather at a designated facility or location to perform duties as assigned. Radiation monitoring and plume tracking teams are dispatched both onsite and offsite to monitor a potential release. There is also onsite, TSC, and EOF meteorological monitoring teams that run plume prediction models and provide data to support evacualtion and sheltering recommendations.

Emergency response organization is typically exercised about 4 times per year and periodically includes response by state, local, and NRC organizations. Recently, the industry has also included exercises of response to security events such as terrorism. Once per year a plant receives a graded inspection by NRC during an ERO exercise. Non-security results are discussed in inspection reports which are available as public documents.

The idea of having an external agency that can come into a plant and take over emergency response sounds good but may not be achievable. The level of training such a team could have will never be as complete as the people who operate and maintain a specific plant. The real motivation for this proposaL may be the mistrust and misinformation we have seen with TEPCO. Fixing that does not require a team to replace or override the plant staff.

There may be some specific support functions from external responders that could be incorporated into emergency response. External generators and repair teams for off-site power lines is one. Right now plants would typically call on the utility and have written agreements from the utility and from the grid operators to restore power to nuclear plants as a high priority.

Another area involves the evacuation plans. These plans are not exercised to the same levels as plant operations. That is natural, because it would be a severe impact and expense to basically shut down normal activities in a 10 mile zone around a plant. However, with the increased threat of terrorism (even if not aimed at a nuclear plant) it seems to me that some exercises need to be run to validate plans and to provide lessons learned to any type of evacuation event.

The support of unmanned aerial drones and exploratory robots may be another useful capability that is a prospect for shared cost and implementation as an external support team.

To summarize: I believe that the EROs at US nuclear power plants would probably perform better than the Fukushima plant staff and management did. However, there are certainly lessons to be learned and incorporated in US plants based on the Fukushima accident. This also applies to local and state emergency responders and the NRC. The real challenge for the future is to get every plant across the world ready to respond to the level of performance and trust we wish had been there in Japan. I just don't think you do that by basically telling the industry that if they screw up they will be relieved of their responsibility by an external organization.

 

[nikkkom]

The idea of having an external agency that can come into a plant and take over emergency response sounds good but may not be achievable.

I do not propose that they completely take over the plant. I propose that the emergency team brings in known-working emergency-grade equipment and supplies, along with their expertise.

The key points here are

(1) The equipment is not on site during the event which caused emergency. It *can't* be damaged (flooded/burned/sabotaged/...) because it is physically not at the plant.
(2) The equipment is highly mobile (air-mobile). It will be delivered even if roads are flooded, blocked, or destroyed.
(3) The equipment includes items which may be unavailable on the plant because they are not needed during normal plant operation, or because they may be broken/lost/inoperable because they are usually not needed during normal plant operation. Potassium iodine pills, battery-backed lights (what F1 personnel BADLY needed!), flexible water hoses, robots, satellite communications, etc...

The level of training such a team could have will never be as complete as the people who operate and maintain a specific plant.

IIRC there were cases when "people who operate a specific plant" did not know how to operate emergency valves on their own plant, or even did not know where those valves are!
The "red team" by the nature of its mission *will* have these docs at hand (because every NPP will be obliged to provide them).
Again, there is no need to send plant personnel home when "red team" arrives. They can (and should!) work together.

The real motivation for this proposal may be the mistrust and misinformation we have seen with TEPCO.

Thinking that Tepco is a pinnacle of arrogance and incompetence and everybody else are much, much better may turn out a dangerous self-delusion. Call my cynic, but I don't think we can assume that no other operator is equally bad.

 

[NUCENG]

I do not propose that they completely take over the plant. I propose that the emergency team brings in known-working emergency-grade equipment and supplies, along with their expertise.

The key points here are

(1) The equipment is not on site during the event which caused emergency. It *can't* be damaged (flooded/burned/sabotaged/...) because it is physically not at the plant.
(2) The equipment is highly mobile (air-mobile). It will be delivered even if roads are flooded, blocked, or destroyed.
(3) The equipment includes items which may be unavailable on the plant because they are not needed during normal plant operation, or because they may be broken/lost/inoperable because they are usually not needed during normal plant operation. Potassium iodine pills, battery-backed lights (what F1 personnel BADLY needed!), flexible water hoses, robots, satellite communications, etc...



IIRC there were cases when "people who operate a specific plant" did not know how to operate emergency valves on their own plant, or even did not know where those valves are!
The "red team" by the nature of its mission *will* have these docs at hand (because every NPP will be obliged to provide them).
Again, there is no need to send plant personnel home when "red team" arrives. They can (and should!) work together.



Thinking that Tepco is a pinnacle of arrogance and incompetence and everybody else are much, much better may turn out a dangerous self-delusion. Call my cynic, but I don't think we can assume that no other operator is equally bad.

We appear to be in violent AGREEMENT about bringing in emergency equipment and supporting recovery.

Your last two paragraphs are where we differ. The need for a "red team" is not a substitute for making sure the in-plant staff know their business. I worked at one nuclear plant as an engineer for 15 years. I had access to all the drawings and precedures and even a library of photographs of major components. I performed walkdowns to support modifications and often spent a lot of time finding and verifying a specific valve or small component. Whenever I could I asked for support from an operator, who was experienced in startup valve and component checks, because it speeded up the process tremendously. That same difference would exist with your "red team" concept. The solution is to make sure the in-plant staff is fully trained and exercised to perform required actions in an emergency. I repeat, my belief is that you will never be able to train a "red team" to that level across the various plant designs.

As to self delusion, I am unapologetic in my support for safe and continued operation of nuclear power plants. Go back and look at my initial posts on this forum and you will see the tone shift from a general defense that the TEPCO team was probably doing their best. I was astounded to see some of the facts emerge about basic issues like knowing where their emergency procedures were, how they had to get permission to vent containment, how they allowed containments to overpressurize, deliberate misinformation and suppression of information, and many more. I could not fathom how a regulator could have allowed them to ignore updates to the seismic and tsunami risk.

to paraphrase, "Thinking that Tepco is a pinnacle of arrogance and incompetence and everybody else are much, much better may turn out" to be ACCURATE. Many of the lessons learned may actually confirm the wisdom of doing this differently in the US. That doesn't mean we won't find things we can do better, or justify sitting on our laurels. I am more of a realist than a cynic and am willing to bet that you are too. I want you to keep questioning and watching and discussing issues that you see. You may not accept this on faith, but that is the way most nuclear employees and managers, in my experience, approach their jobs.

 

[jim hardy]

one needs to be cautious. Bureaucracy becomes a self feeding monster.

if i remember correctly, the morning after TMI our NRC sent in a team to "take over".
That lasted about an hour - the reaction when they entered the control room was basically "wtf are all these gages?" and they promptly turned things back over to the utility.


you don't want to create another FEMA.

imho there should be onsite provisions for last ditch emergency connections of water and power -
and the workingmen should be trained as to their locations and function...
"Pressure washer goes here to keep pump seals cool
hook the welder to this outlet right here to keep up station battery
and that secondhand locomotive engine up on top of the hill gets connected to this motor junction box using this spool of cable right here for AC to pump seawater for ultimate heatsink..."
and tried out a couple times a year in e-drills.


"""I think it's exactly executives who squashed flat any suggestions that F1 is unsafe. In the name of saving a few tens of millions dollars. Engineers tend to be much more honest ""

in the utility i worked for they intentionally alternated levels of management. If you walked vertically up the organization chart you'd encounter an engineer then an up-through-the-ranks fellow who they'd sent to school for an MBA. That layering went clear to the top. It gave the company a healthy balance. Seems not a bad idea for a company that operates machinery to have some machinery people in the chain of decisionmaking.

i don't know that engineers are any more "honest" in an ethical sense but they do tend to be practical and risk averse. Comes from getting humiliated so often by Mother Nature and her boyfriend Edsel Murphy.

old jim

 

[tsutsuji]

A robot has entered Fukushima Daiichi unit 1 first floor again yesterday and measured the radiation as the same place where steam had been found in June. Although unit 1's temperature has declined from 100°C to 70°C and steam was not observed again, the radiation remains extremely high with 3000 ~ 4700 mSv/h. It is planned that the construction of unit 1's cover will be completed today.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111014_03-e.pdf "Survey results of pipe penetration on 1st floor of Unit 1 reactor building of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station"

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111014_02-e.pdf "Completion of installing the roof panel of the cover for the reactor building at Unit 1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station"

 

[nikkkom]

As to self delusion, I am unapologetic in my support for safe and continued operation of nuclear power plants. Go back and look at my initial posts on this forum and you will see the tone shift from a general defense that the TEPCO team was probably doing their best. I was astounded to see some of the facts emerge about basic issues like knowing where their emergency procedures were, how they had to get permission to vent containment, how they allowed containments to overpressurize, deliberate misinformation and suppression of information, and many more. I could not fathom how a regulator could have allowed them to ignore updates to the seismic and tsunami risk.

to paraphrase, "Thinking that Tepco is a pinnacle of arrogance and incompetence and everybody else are much, much better may turn out" to be ACCURATE.

In other words, you propose to accept the theory that all other NPP operators in the world are much better than Tepco.

Sorry, I simply can't do that. I could possibly buy it after Chernobyl, by saying that it was an outlier data point. But it happened *again*. Another NPP operator, in another country, but similar symptoms of not treating safety seriously enough.

Apparently, the system needs serious fixing. I propose a fix which adds another layer of accident response, one decoupled from NPP operator and its possible arrogance/stupidity/greediness/lapses in preparedness.

What do you propose? Basically nothing apart from minor patching-up of some safety rules?

Many of the lessons learned may actually confirm the wisdom of doing this differently in the US.

Speaking of US. Are emergency vents of US plants also have *no filters at all*, like Fukushima's ones didn't have?
Meaning: they will also vent Cs-137 and Cs-134 if, God forbid, it would ever come to venting of overheated reactor? How much adding filters to those lines would cost? I bet a few orders of magnitude less than $200bn for cleanup which Japan will need to spend now...

 

[NUCENG]

In other words, you propose to accept the theory that all other NPP operators in the world are much better than Tepco.

Sorry, I simply can't do that. I could possibly buy it after Chernobyl, by saying that it was an outlier data point. But it happened *again*. Another NPP operator, in another country, but similar symptoms of not treating safety seriously enough.

Apparently, the system needs serious fixing. I propose a fix which adds another layer of accident response, one decoupled from NPP operator and its possible arrogance/stupidity/greediness/lapses in preparedness.

What do you propose? Basically nothing apart from minor patching-up of some safety rules?



Speaking of US. Are emergency vents of US plants also have *no filters at all*, like Fukushima's ones didn't have?
Meaning: they will also vent Cs-137 and Cs-134 if, God forbid, it would ever come to venting of overheated reactor? How much adding filters to those lines would cost? I bet a few orders of magnitude less than $200bn for cleanup which Japan will need to spend now...

No, I cannot speak for all countries. But I can speak from experience in the US. If you can't do the same then perhaps your opinion may be just that - opinion, and uninformed at that.

Proposing a fix that works is good, but I have explained why that fix may not be what you are asking for. Instead of discussing the reasoning I provide you imply that I am justifying doing nothing. Nothing could be further from the truth. I agreed with the concept of some external response teams to support emergency response in my initial response. But I am convinced that your more expansive red team needs a lot more discussion.

So if you will stop dismissing my motives and twisting my position we can carry on a reasonable discussion including venting capabilities. If not, you can reinforce your opinion without my help.

 

[Bodge]

Not the first time I've said it, but its (way past) time to decommission all NPPs that over ~35 years old. More 'unforseen' events WILL occur, a combination of time, luck, human error and chaos theory will ensure it.

Also,

4 generator failures hit US nuclear plants [AP] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9886829

...Four generators that power emergency systems at nuclear plants have failed when needed since April, an unusual cluster that has attracted the attention of federal inspectors and could prompt the industry to re-examine its maintenance plans...

"Three diesel generators failed after tornadoes ripped across Alabama and knocked out electric lines serving the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry nuclear plant in April. Two failed because of mechanical problems and one was unavailable because of planned maintenance.

Another generator failed at the North Anna plant in Virginia following an August earthquake. Generators have not worked when needed in at least a dozen other instances since 1997 because of mechanical failures or because they were offline for maintenance, according to an Associated Press review of reports compiled by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

"To me it's not an alarming thing," said Michael Golay, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies risk at nuclear plants. "But if this trend were to continue, you'd certainly want to look into it."...

 

[clancy688]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111013/0500_kunren.html The drill assumed that tanks and pumps had been broken by an earthquake. 40 people installed fire trucks and 300 m of hoses, so that cooling was restored to one reactor in 1 hour 10 minutes. In the future Tepco will perform other drills assuming a tsunami with debris spread on roads, and occurrences at times when gathering people is more difficult, such as on holidays and during the night.

So if I understand everything correct, they are installing an auxiliary cooling system from mobile devices which doesn't use any plant hardware (except the reactor internal pipes of course).

Just wondering, now that we know that there are probable station blackout scenarios which may lead to major accidents, especially with older plants, wouldn't it be a wise idea to employ such mobile hardware throughout the world near older plants with similar designs and design faults like Fukushima?
If there would've been such a, how should we call it, "emergency cooling restoration team", close to Fukushima I, they probably still wouldn't have been able to save Unit 1, but there should've been enough time for such a team to restore cooling functions on Units 2 and 3.

At least I'd consider it as pretty awkward if there'd be a similar SBO ten years or so in the future and the whole world has to helplessly watch a reactor popping again because nobody thought of bunkering a couple of mobile pumps and hoses... Just a little example from Germany again (yeah, I like examples...):
We have a pretty decent highspeed railway system and throughout the whole network there are some big tunnels. So what happens if a train crashes inside a 10 km long tunnel? How the hell are the rescue workers supposed to arrive on scene? Walking?
So there are a six special tunnel rescue trains on call throughout Germany. They are specifically engineered for that task and they are always on readiness for duty, they can respond to the scene within five minutes after alert.

 

[Most Curious]

"Down for maintenance" and "failed" are two very different things. Media has an agenda and truth is not counted for much with them.

Failure to maintain is a guarantee of failure in the future! Agreed it is a little problematic when 1 unit of 3 or 4 is on scheduled maintenance when an emergency arrises and then one of the remaining units fails. Of course, that is why there are 4 units to provide power when only one needs to work to accomplish the task.


A requirement to shut down any plant at 35 while not building new ones to replace them is a receipe for blackouts. If we want power, we MUST build new plants whether nuclear, coal or other fuel. The "pie in the sky" renewables and over reliance on conservation will NOT get the job done, no matter HOW MUCH the "green weenies" and anti everythings WANT it to be so.

Everything has risk, particularly doing nothing. I for one have no desire to cook over an open fire while freezing in the dark! That being said, I recognize much is to be learned from the Japanese disaster and hopefully that new knowledge will be used to improve American facilities. No doubt there are weak spots in US systems that MUST be addressed but in a calm, well engineered manner. To be sure, no plant owner want to see his investment destroyed by an accident that could have been prevented. Much of Japan's problem originated in government, just as ours does. What we do NOT need is the environmental whackos meddling in engineering matters they poorly understand and have no desire to learn - that has contributed to major problems in siting, delays and blocking of needed facilities. Those needed NEW facilities could have allowed retirement of OLD facilities sooner. Place the blame where it properly belongs!

 

[clancy688]

A requirement to shut down any plant at 35 while not building new ones to replace them is a receipe for blackouts. If we want power, we MUST build new plants whether nuclear, coal or other fuel. The "pie in the sky" renewables and over reliance on conservation will NOT get the job done, no matter HOW MUCH the "green weenies" and anti everythings WANT it to be so.

Just for the protocol:

We (Germany) shut down our eight oldest nuclear plants immediately after 3/11. http://www.spiegel.de/images/image-204764-galleryV9-xxmj.jpg" what happened.
We basically only lost the power we would've exported anyway. Some time later, in May, there were 13 out of 17 nuclear plants total out of action (because of maintenance and the moratorium). All plant operators began warning of possible blackouts. And again exactly nothing happened.
I can't speak for other countries. But at least Germany has absolutely nothing to fear from abolishing nuclear power. We have the capacity to compensate. Even now. And there are many new conventional plants under construction.

 

[WhoWee]

Just for the protocol:

We (Germany) shut down our eight oldest nuclear plants immediately after 3/11. http://www.spiegel.de/images/image-204764-galleryV9-xxmj.jpg" what happened.
We basically only lost the power we would've exported anyway. Some time later, in May, there were 13 out of 17 nuclear plants total out of action (because of maintenance and the moratorium). All plant operators began warning of possible blackouts. And again exactly nothing happened.
I can't speak for other countries. But at least Germany has absolutely nothing to fear from abolishing nuclear power. We have the capacity to compensate. Even now. And there are many new conventional plants under construction.

If the plants are viable - wouldn't it be better to operate?

 

[NUCENG]

Not the first time I've said it, but its (way past) time to decommission all NPPs that over ~35 years old. More 'unforseen' events WILL occur, a combination of time, luck, human error and chaos theory will ensure it.

Also,

4 generator failures hit US nuclear plants [AP] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9886829

The information in that article quotation about Browns Ferry is incorrect or misleading. I was unable to retrieve the original article, but assume that the quote was accurate.

The event report of the severe weather event at Browns Ferry is available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2011/20110428en.html

The preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence is available at:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1111/ML111180005.pdf

On initial demand seven of eight emergency diesel generators started and carried load as designed. One EDG was out of service for maintenance. One offsite 161 kV source remained available. The following day the three reactors were in cold shutdown.

One diesel developed an oil leak on its governor and was declared inoperable. But it was still considered available, meaning that it could be started and carry loads under manual control. See:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1111/ML111190004.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1111/ML111180005.pdf
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2011/20110502en.html

About 4-5 days after the storm a diesel generator output breaker tripped causing a short power loss. The trip was a result of a false sensed diesel overspeed condition.

Additional details of the event can be found in Licensee Event Reports available through the NRC ADAMS web based document system under accession numbers:
ML11188A154
ML11180A007
ML11180A267
ML11180A056

Bottom line - plant safety functions were successful. If your expectation is a zero failure rate, that is not how the defense in depth principle works.

 

[cockpitvisit]

We basically only lost the power we would've exported anyway. Some time later, in May, there were 13 out of 17 nuclear plants total out of action (because of maintenance and the moratorium). All plant operators began warning of possible blackouts. And again exactly nothing happened.

What happened ist that instead of exporting power, Germany started importing it from neighboring countries (mostly France) during peak demand times. I doubt the same is possible in the US, since a neighboring country with a huge supply of energy would be required.

Abolishing nuclear power by constructing more conventional nuclear plants is of course possible, at the cost of a higher CO2 output and higher pollution.

 

[nikkkom]

No, I cannot speak for all countries. But I can speak from experience in the US. If you can't do the same then perhaps your opinion may be just that - opinion, and uninformed at that.

Proposing a fix that works is good, but I have explained why that fix may not be what you are asking for. Instead of discussing the reasoning I provide you imply that I am justifying doing nothing. Nothing could be further from the truth. I agreed with the concept of some external response teams to support emergency response in my initial response. But I am convinced that your more expansive red team needs a lot more discussion.

For the third time - it's not *me* who proposed red team to replace station personnel, it was zapperzero who said that. I told you twice that I propose red team to *augment* station personnel. Maybe with authority to order disaster prevention measures even it they damage the plant - regular station personnel may be hesitant to do that because management will be unhappy with the resulting losses, with repercussions to careers of those who caused them.

So if you will stop dismissing my motives

What motives? I did not talk about your motives at all. I just asked what do you propose, apart from crossing fingers and believing that station personnel in US is better than in Japan.

we can carry on a reasonable discussion including venting capabilities.

Please do. What's the status of venting capabilities at US plants?

IIRC vents were reinforced sometime ago to be more resistant to seismic damage and such, so at least venting will not pour hundreds of tons of 200+ Celsius hot steam through the cracks in the piping into the reactor building, which is a good thing to know.

But do they have any meaningful scrubbers? Simple answer, "yes" or "no"? In F1 there were no scrubbers.

 

[clancy688]

Abolishing nuclear power by constructing more conventional nuclear plants is of course possible, at the cost of a higher CO2 output and higher pollution.

I basically had the same discussion with NUCENG months ago. Since this is going offtopic, I'll just link you to it.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3357626&postcount=176

 

[Bodge]

Replace the old plants with passively cooled Generation III designs, invest in the Thorium fuel cycle, triple investment in solar and fusion research.

The risks of running the old plants is an increased cancer burden for the world.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111015_04-e.pdf Infrared pictures of top parts of unit 1 and unit 3

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.jnes.go.jp/jyohou/kouhyo/kaiseki_published.html The analysis documents released by JNES

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119660.pdf Analysis of criticality safety of metal casks: in order to find out how the humidity inside casks can bring criticality, an analysis was made based on constant assumptions. It was found that criticality is not reached even if there is humidity, etc.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119661.pdf Causes of 15 March unit 4 explosion/blaze: At unit 4 it is possible that fuel pool water declined, spent fuel was exposed, hydrogen was produced from a reaction between steam and fuel cladding tubes and exploded. Adding water in pools and cooling is also needed at other units.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119662.pdf Radioactivity of the spent fuel pool releases: Two sets of hypothesis were used to calculate conservative estimates of the spent fuel pool releases.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119663.pdf What happens if the present water injection at units 1,2,3 stops: Analysis of the time taken for fuel exposure, RPV damage, PCV damage under a set of hypothesis such as being 144 hours after reactor shutdown.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119664.pdf Reactivity effects of injecting seawater into spent fuel pools: Even if only seawater is injected, 600 ppm borated water is effective, as it can reduce reactivity by about one half.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119665.pdf Reactivity control by injecting boron or seawater in storage pools: a major criticality control effect is obtained when seawater or boron is injected in spent fuel pools.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119666.pdf INES level based on fuel damage proportion: Inferring from the fuel damage proportion, INES level 5 is estimated. An estimate of the proportion of Zr reaction needed for hydrogen explosion is found for each unit.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119667.pdf Whether criticality can occur with the mist produced at unit 4 SFP. If the racks are lost, criticality is possible.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119668.pdf Boric acid quantities needed for recriticality prevention: Using the most severe hypothesis, the quantity of boric acid needed to maintain subcriticality is 18.3 tons.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119669.pdf Risk assessment of cooling methods at units 1,2,3: Assessment of hydrogen explosion risk, steam explosion risk, salt damage risk encountered in plant cooling operations.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119671.pdf Temperature rise in spent fuel pools (water-zirconium reaction): temperature behavior of fuel in steam atmosphere when water level declines in the perspective of fuel meltdown.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119672.pdf Quantities of salt deposits in unit 2: assesment of salt deposits caused by seawater injections. As the salt concentration for saturation is not reached, there is no salt deposit.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119673.pdf Estimate of Fukushima Daiichi radiation releases. Based on remote monitoring values, the releases are reverse calculated using a simple model.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119683.pdf Unit 1 leakage area estimate (about the conditions on the morning of 12 March before the wet well vent and hydrogen explosion): As the reactor water level is declining, because the RPV pressure is not increasing, it is thought that all the generated steam is leaking and the leak's area is estimated.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119682.pdf Quantities of salt deposits in unit 2 (revised version): Estimate of the salt deposit quantities resulting of seawater injection. With a 410 l/min water injection rate, it is thought that there is enough margin, and salt deposits are not created.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119681.pdf Estimate of radiation from drywell vent pipe and temporary pit at units 1,2,3: Estimates of dose rates from temporary pit, from drywell venting pipe, and in the flowing water.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119681.pdf CCI study: Judging from the situation at the plant until now, the melted fuel has fallen little by little. The heat flux of crust dryout exceeds decay heat, so that the solidification of melted objects occurs.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119679.pdf study of criticality of unit 4 fuel pool: assessment of criticality after the fuel assemblies are damaged, the fuel rod pellets fall to the bottom and are spread or form compact bodies. In a very conservative assessment, criticality is possible, but with a realistic credit (U235x07), even if the pellets fall down criticality does not occur.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119678.pdf Answer about the Evacuation prepared zone (EPZ) if the release quantity is changed from one to three reactor cores. Taking into account the external radiation dose of the whole body, the EPZ is extended by about 19 km. If the thyroid equivalent dose of children is taken into account, the EPZ is extented by about 16 km.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119677.pdf conversion of unit 3 PCV releases (permeability). The release (permeability) is calculated with a simple Bernouilli equation, without taking critical flow into account.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119676.pdf Answer about the Evacuation prepared zone (EPZ) if the release quantity is changed from one reactor core to two or two and a half reactor cores. With two and a half reactor cores, taking into account the external exposure of the whole body, the EPZ is extended by 15 km. Taking into account children equivalent thyroid doses, it is extended by 12 km. With 2 reactor cores the EPZ is extended respectively by 11 and 8 km.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119675.pdf Answer about the concentrations of core materials in the suppression pool (boron, cesium). concentrations of core materials in the suppression pool (boron, cesium) in a scenario of damage by excess of temperature.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119674.pdf possibility of PCV damage caused by hydrogen explosion. Even if explosion occurs, the design maximum pressure of reactor vessel is high and the resistance to pressure is sufficient. A break of the top part of the reactor vessel causing PCV damage is not thought to be possible.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119684.pdf radiation releases caused by unit 1 venting. If venting is performed in the future, the added release into the atmosphere is thought to be small.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119685.pdf assessment of hydrogen and oxygen concentrations at unit 1: Using conservative hypothesis, oxygen concentration is 2.1% and the combustion limit of 7% in steam atmosphere is not exceeded.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119686.pdf core-concrete reaction (MCCI) possibility and consequences: assessment of progression possibility of core-concrete reaction (MCCI) and concrete erosion consequences.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119687.pdf Answer to NRC recommend. (MELCOR analysis results in case of loss of all AC power): Past results of MELCOR analysis in case of loss of all AC power). Estimates of the time it takes for RPV and PCV damage in cas of loss of all AC power.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119688.pdf confirmation of the presence or absence of core recriticality: Study of the causes of neutron measurement data above the detection level revealed at Fukushima Daiichi monitoring points.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119689.pdf About the neutron leak at unit 4 storing pool: From 14 March to 15 March, neutron measurement data above detection level have been revealed at the Fukushima Daiichi monitoring points. Study of the causes of these measurements.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119690.pdf Comment about Tepco document "countermeasures against leaks during the storage of highy radioactive water in the concentrated waste tratment facility buildings". Comment about Tepco's assessment of cesium diffusion. That assessment is nearly valid.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119691.pdf Forecast of radiation doses in each area and at at each time, based on an analysis of the real measured values. In order to understand radiation exposure consequences before a monitoring system is secured, estimates are given for each area from 14 March to 18 March.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119692.pdf recriticality prevention at unit 1 during the shift to closed loop cooling: Based on the survey results obtained after the Three Mile Island accident, recriticality is analysed assuming the debris are in a conic shape and surrounded by borated water.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119693.pdf forecast of radioactive substances released from Fukushima Daiichi: calculated estimate of fission products from unit 1. Presentation of needed data for fission products in other units.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119694.pdf quantity of gaseous iodine releases at Fukushima Daiichi. Calculation using reference books of gaseous iodine releases from unit 1 polluted water to the gaseous part of the building.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119695.pdf About the validity of the operator's assessment of the improvement of working environment at unit 2: confirmation of the validity of the operator's assessment, using a calculation of the radioactive substances' concentrations in the air in the plant premises.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119699.pdf Possibility of hydrogen explosions at units 2 and 3. Study of possibility of hydrogen explosion occurrence if reactor cooling is not carried out, and if reactor cooling is carried out.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119698.pdf Time it takes for meltdown at unit 4 fuel pool: Calculation of the time taken until meltdown, for the fuel with the highest decay heat, based on real heat insulation conditions.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119697.pdf Study of earthquake safety of unit 4 reactor building in the present conditions. Study intended at confirming the validity of the operator's assessment of earthquake safety in the present conditions of the building, assuming the greatest aftershock of the present earthquake.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119696.pdf Study of earthquake safety of unit 3 reactor building in the present conditions. Study intended at confirming the validity of the operator's assessment of earthquake safety in the present conditions of the building, assuming the greatest aftershock of the present earthquake.

 

[Shinjukusam]

Tsutsuji, that is an incredible amount of information, once again we are in your debt.

 

[etudiant]

http://www.jnes.go.jp/content/000119660.pdf Analysis of criticality safety of metal casks: in order to find out how the humidity inside casks can bring criticality, an analysis was made based on constant assumptions. It was found that criticality is not reached even if there is humidity, etc.


This represents a mountain of work.
It is just stunning that all this industriousness is so wasted, analyzing what went wrong rather than working to minimize the impact on the Japanese people.
The technicians are certainly performing well, it seems the problems are in the executive suite. For instance, the management of contamination beyond the 50km radius as well as the policies on foodstuff safety just seem entirely ad hoc, with no overall leadership or direction.
Is individual leadership a la Soichiro Honda or Akio Morita such a rare commodity in Japanese politics?

 

[Bodge]

A document was given to the press in June, which included estimates of radioactive releases in the 1st 100 hours of the crisis.

On page 13 a table is given with the following header:

解析で対象とした期間での大気中への放射性物質の放出量の試算値

"Estimated amount of radioactive material released into the atmosphere over the time period covered by the analysis" {google translate}

It shows 1.2254x10^12 becquerels of Plutonium 238, 239, 240, 241 combined, 99% of which was Pu-241

I have 3 questions:

1.) Is there a way to convert the 1,225,400,000,000 becquerels into number of grams of Plutonium released?

2.) Is this estimate referring to "releases into the environment" or "releases into the atmosphere", i.e. air or water or both?

Google translate suggests that this is just for the first 100 days into the air only.​

3.) What will happen to the 7.6x10^13 becquerels of Neptunium-239 shown on the same table - what mass of Plutonium-239 will result?



http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/06/20110606008/20110606008-2.pdf

 

[NUCENG]

For the third time - it's not *me* who proposed red team to replace station personnel, it was zapperzero who said that. I told you twice that I propose red team to *augment* station personnel. Maybe with authority to order disaster prevention measures even it they damage the plant - regular station personnel may be hesitant to do that because management will be unhappy with the resulting losses, with repercussions to careers of those who caused them.



What motives? I did not talk about your motives at all. I just asked what do you propose, apart from crossing fingers and believing that station personnel in US is better than in Japan.



Please do. What's the status of venting capabilities at US plants?



IIRC vents were reinforced sometime ago to be more resistant to seismic damage and such, so at least venting will not pour hundreds of tons of 200+ Celsius hot steam through the cracks in the piping into the reactor building, which is a good thing to know.

But do they have any meaningful scrubbers? Simple answer, "yes" or "no"? In F1 there were no scrubbers.

I went back to see if I owe you an aplology and I stand by what I wrote in response to your post. For the second time I agreed with your discussion of external SUPPORT teams. I questioned the practicality and workability of external teams being able to be effective based just on training and drawings and procedures. I already responded to zapperzero on that point.

You twisted my motives when you said " In other words, you propose to accept the theory that all other NPP operators in the world are much better than Tepco." I never said anything of the kind and I have been very clear that I speak from experience in the US nuclear industry. I resoect that you disagree.

Then you add.
"Apparently, the system needs serious fixing. I propose a fix which adds another layer of accident response, one decoupled from NPP operator and its possible arrogance/stupidity/greediness/lapses in preparedness.

What do you propose? Basically nothing apart from minor patching-up of some safety rules?"

And then you talk about "crossing your fingers and believing" US operators are better than Japan. You may not be questioning my motives, IN YOUR MIND, but you are definitely not engaging in intellectually honest discussion.

In spite of that fact, I will try one more time.

The short answer is that US BWR hardened vent systems, that I have studied, are not filtered. These systems were classified for use in a beyond design basis event. That is the last ditch effort to minimize releases to the environment in a severe accident once it is impossible to prevent those releases. Now, your turn. Keep it respectful.