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Our philosophy prof is an idealist (panpsychist). His main argument against materialism goes something like this: materialism states that everything can be reduced to physical concepts, such as mass and energy, and intercations between elementary particles. But pain is not a physical concept and can not be reduced to physical concepts. Granted, pain corresponds to physical processes, but the the feeling, the sensation of pain itself is not physical, a concept such as pain would never be found in a physics book. Therefore, either I do not really feel pain, or materialism is false.
He argues that an amoeba is also conscious (sentient) at some lower level, but an amoeba's consciousness is not the lowest level of consciousness. Atoms have a mind and are sentient too at some very low level, as are elementary particles. The simplest form of consciousness (sentience, mind) is a state of constant well being, which is experienced by indestructible elementary particles.
Here are some exerts form his online book:
What are your thoughts on this? I myself lean towards materialism. I don't see much logic behind assigning minds to electrons just because humans have minds. True, electrons do share some properties with humans, they both have mass for example. But then there are some properties which humans have, but electrons don't, such as color and size. As he himself admits, "Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter," and I don't think things which can't be refuted have a place in any kind of theory. Even if there is something else besides presently known physical concepts such as energy, couldn't this "something else" be described by mathematics and intergrated into physics? He also states that mystery is simply what hasn't been explained by science yet. So it seems to me that he doesn't ascribe anything particularly mysterious to his panpsychism. From what I can tell, he merely claims that concepts such as energy and mass aren't enough to explain everything. But how does this refute materialism? He claims that the whole is not merely a sum of its parts, but is this contrary to materialism? Seems like another play on words to me. You can arrange a bunch of circles in the shape of a triangle. Is this triangle greater than the sum of its parts? Well, I don't know, I don't think the question makes much sense anyway. I need to argue either for dualism, materialism, or idealism (this isn't directly for a grade, we're supposed to submit synopses by eMail, and later use these synopses and the prof's comments on them to write a term paper, this synopsis should have been submitted a while ago, but I'm a procrastinator, so...). But I find it pretty hard to do when many arguments for idealism seem like a play on words and our concepts of things to me. As far as the argument about having emotions and feeling pain goes, I realize that physics can't explain this, but I don't really see how it supports panpsychism. It just seem pretty ridiculous to me to attribute human qualities such as sentience to other objects. Even if electrons have some properties foregin to modern physics, calling these properties "mind" and "sentience" seems like a huge oversimplification bordering on plain nonsense. All we're doing at that point is calling something completely different from actual sentience, which we know, by the same name. So, to say that an electron is sentient at some lower level is like saying that a ribosome is just a low-level-human being. It doesn't make a lot of sense. After all, the universe is not only stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we canimagine. I'd like to hear your thoughts on whether materialism is correct and how I can defend it. Or maybe I should subscribe to panpsychism? (Both the prof and I reject dualism on the basis of Occam's razor.)
He argues that an amoeba is also conscious (sentient) at some lower level, but an amoeba's consciousness is not the lowest level of consciousness. Atoms have a mind and are sentient too at some very low level, as are elementary particles. The simplest form of consciousness (sentience, mind) is a state of constant well being, which is experienced by indestructible elementary particles.
Here are some exerts form his online book:
Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter... [some sentences omitted] When a theory is not empirically refutable and is simpler than an alternative theory... [parts omitted] Dualism multiplies types of reality beyond necessity: panpsychism does not.
One problem which most students quickly point out with this argument is this: if your mind is identical with a portion of your brain, that portion cannot be plausibly identified with a single elementary particle or even brain cell. It is presumably identical with a large mass of brain cells. But this makes us wonder how an elementary physical particle can - as panpsychism argues - itself be an elementary soul or mind. Either a brain mass is a single mind or it is an aggregate of independent minds. But it cannot be both at the same time. A solution to this problem may begin with the distinction between a dead or decomposed brain and a live one. Let us assume that a dead brain is but an aggregate of low-level minds (souls, individual centers of feeling). In a live brain mass, independent minds are merged into a single high-level mind. The merger of low-level minds, as they attain a threshold level of organized interaction (e.g., in coming out of a coma or dreamless sleep), is perhaps the emergence of a high-level mind.
The Main Heuristic Thesis of Chapter Two:
"Primitive animism," the cosmology of pre-historical humanity, is largely true. It holds that all nature is pervaded by souls or spirits. It can be defended by first showing that the human mind is expressed materially in the human brain. Either humans radically diverge from the rest of nature, which expressed an inner nature quite mysterious to us, or the inner essence of everything material is mind or soul on some level of development. The theory of evolution holds that more highly organized physiology evolved from less organized physiology. More complicated mentality then evolves from simpler mentality. Even the simplest biological mentality distinguishes pain and well-being. An organism shows stimulus-response behavior. Pain links stimulus and response. Response reduces pain and restores the sense of well-being. The simplest starting point for mental evolution is a sensation of well being uninterrupted by pain. Such mentality is a pre-biological mentality of inanimate matter.
What are your thoughts on this? I myself lean towards materialism. I don't see much logic behind assigning minds to electrons just because humans have minds. True, electrons do share some properties with humans, they both have mass for example. But then there are some properties which humans have, but electrons don't, such as color and size. As he himself admits, "Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter," and I don't think things which can't be refuted have a place in any kind of theory. Even if there is something else besides presently known physical concepts such as energy, couldn't this "something else" be described by mathematics and intergrated into physics? He also states that mystery is simply what hasn't been explained by science yet. So it seems to me that he doesn't ascribe anything particularly mysterious to his panpsychism. From what I can tell, he merely claims that concepts such as energy and mass aren't enough to explain everything. But how does this refute materialism? He claims that the whole is not merely a sum of its parts, but is this contrary to materialism? Seems like another play on words to me. You can arrange a bunch of circles in the shape of a triangle. Is this triangle greater than the sum of its parts? Well, I don't know, I don't think the question makes much sense anyway. I need to argue either for dualism, materialism, or idealism (this isn't directly for a grade, we're supposed to submit synopses by eMail, and later use these synopses and the prof's comments on them to write a term paper, this synopsis should have been submitted a while ago, but I'm a procrastinator, so...). But I find it pretty hard to do when many arguments for idealism seem like a play on words and our concepts of things to me. As far as the argument about having emotions and feeling pain goes, I realize that physics can't explain this, but I don't really see how it supports panpsychism. It just seem pretty ridiculous to me to attribute human qualities such as sentience to other objects. Even if electrons have some properties foregin to modern physics, calling these properties "mind" and "sentience" seems like a huge oversimplification bordering on plain nonsense. All we're doing at that point is calling something completely different from actual sentience, which we know, by the same name. So, to say that an electron is sentient at some lower level is like saying that a ribosome is just a low-level-human being. It doesn't make a lot of sense. After all, the universe is not only stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we canimagine. I'd like to hear your thoughts on whether materialism is correct and how I can defend it. Or maybe I should subscribe to panpsychism? (Both the prof and I reject dualism on the basis of Occam's razor.)