Is time an illusion? Exploring the concept of time as a constant state of change

[Doctordick]

I am only answering Rade because I wish to make sure others aren't sucked into his obvious misdirection of attention.

Sure does sound like an "assumption" to me, sounds like a claim you are taking for granted as being a fact, (not to mention your "three simple things"--all assumptions you wish us to take for granted as facts).

They do not qualify as "assumptions" as none of them contain any information at all; they merely lay down the issues germane to the problem facing us.

Ontology can be referred to as a set as anything can be "referred to" as a set. As I explained to AnssiH, even nothing can be referred to as a set, namely the "Null" set. This step does nothing except pull in the vocabulary associated with the mathematical concept of sets.

The second, "an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way", merely asserts my (and I hope any other rational person's) lack of interest in arguments based on invalid ontological concepts. Since the "valid ontology" I am talking about has not been defined, no ontological concept has been eliminated and nothing at all need be "taken for granted as facts".

And, finally, "there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant", corresponds very closely to the statement "all I know for sure is that I know nothing for sure". I would say that any violation of that statement would constitute an assumption but either that is over Mr. Rade's head or his intention is to purposely misinterpret things in order to create a mock battle. I don't believe he is stupid so I attribute his acts to the second purpose.

His second post is about as well thought out as his the one above. He first sets a possible set to be considered as an example:

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism". If that were the case, then it could certainly be argued that the specific solution [&] could be essentially identical to the common world view held by Humanity (one could no more prove that wrong than one could prove solipsism is wrong). If such a view could be obtained from nothing, might it also not be obtained from three valid elements?

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&]). So let's go on.

let [1,2,3] be the set of valid ontological elements that are omitted from [&], therefore the set [1,2,3] is called "the future"

The entire "valid ontology" underlying reality consists of but six elements? Well now, that certainly deserves the title "semi-solipsism" and, just as an aside, how does he happen to know that? I suppose Rade must be presuming he is God and is actually aware of the entire "valid ontology" underlying reality; in that case it would seem reasonable that one of those six elements is Rade himself (the all knowing God) and the rest of [&] whatever epistemological solution for reality that might be, is based mostly on self generated illusion. (Maybe some of you can see why I don't hold out a lot of interest in "solipsism".) But, let us go on anyway.

Certainly, in his example, "the total of all possible valid ontological elements as relates to [&] is the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]"; but then he says:

... let us find a second such collection, as the set [X,Y,C,7,8,9].

Where in the world is he going to find that set? He has already specified that "all of reality" (the valid ontological elements known plus the valid ontological elements not known being the total collection of valid ontological elements) consists of nothing but [A,B,C,1,2,3]. Certainly [X,Y,C,7,8,9] is either not a collection of valid elements or he has merely given different names to the elements of the valid ontology under discussion.

Now, you claim that "the past", which is the set [A,B,C], ...can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...

Yes, I certainly did and, in Mr. Rade's example (since the future is known), the entire set of possible "pasts", "future" and "presents" can be explicitly listed. (Note that any member of this collection could be considered to be a possible "past", "future" or present; which role it plays is a function of [&] your epistemological explanation.)

The entire collection of possibilities consist of the following:
No elements -- [NULL],
One element -- [A], , [C], [1], [2], [3],
Two elements -- [A,B], [A,C], [A,1], [A,2], [A,3], [B,C], [B,1], [B,2]. [B,3], [C,1], [C,2], [C,3], [1,2], [1,3], [2,3],
Three elements -- [A,B,C], [A,B,1], [A,B,2], [A,B,3], [A,C,1], [A,C,2], [A,C,3], [A,1,2], [A,1,3], [A,2,3], [B,1,2], [B,1,3], [B,2,3], [C,1,2], [C,1,3], [C,2,3], [1,2,3],
Four elements -- [A,B,C,1], [A,B,C,2], [A,B,C,3], [A,B,1,2], [A,B,1,3], [A,B,2,3], [A,C,1,2], [A,C,1,3], [A,C,2,3], [B,C,1,2], [B,C,1,3], [B,C,2,3], [A,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [C, 1,2,3]
Five elements – [A,B,C,1,2], [A,B,C,1,3], [A,B,C,2,3], [A,B,1,2,3], [A,C,1,2,3], [B,C,1,2,3]
Six elements – [A,B,C,1,2,3]

That collection can be seen as the entire collection of possibilities for a possible past given Rade's proposed six element valid ontology. Given anyone of those pasts, the future is represented by a specific member of the collection (the member which completes the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]). The present is defined to be the difference between two possible pasts. Now, if your explanation of reality ([&], your epistemological construct) is going to allow knowledge of reality to vanish (i.e., to proceed from a past which contains an element of that valid ontology to one which lacks that particular element, which one could call a "reality of forgetfulness") then the present could consist of any selection from the above collection (you could move from one past to another without constraint). I guess one could call that "time travel". :rofl: :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

However, our explanations of reality (our epistemological constructs) generally do not allow for valid knowledge of the past to vanish as including such a concept kind of defeats the usefulness of the explanation. Thus it is that our explanations of reality usually allow only addition of valid ontological elements not subtraction. That constraint (and please note that the constraint is a self imposed constraint on the acceptability of an explanation and not a constraint on reality) forces one to consider only a limited set of ordered "presents" and any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence.

But I'm sure you will correct the error(s) of my thinking

Actually, I don't think that is possible; I make these comments for others who you might confuse. To paraphrase another, "when people are confronted with new information, their most probable reaction will be to deny that information as to do otherwise requires them to review their beliefs".

... may take me a while to reply sometimes, because there are days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

To restate the issues succinctly, we are trying to build a solid foundation upon which we can construct solid and dependable speculative edifices. That foundation is called a "valid ontology" (reality). Of interest is exactly what conclusions can be drawn from a valid ontology (reality) given that the ontology is both unknown and undefined (remember, it is our speculative edifices which presume definitions for these ontological elements). Confusing? Perhaps, but it is really no more than a clear statement of the problem facing any entity trying to understanding reality.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

And that we are capable of building a number of rational (self-coherent) models because there are elements that are unknown to us. I.e. if these unknown elements were known, they would constrain our worldview into the "correct ontological view" (so to speak). But since they aren't known, the other elements are to an extent unconstrained too (which is why they are called assumed ontological elements), which is to say we can build many different models?

That would be a very accurate assessment of the situation.

Well I'm starting to get lost more and more. You seem to be drawing a relationship to a subjective experience of time (or motion).

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view. There is a very strong compulsion amongst human thinkers to construct speculative edifices in order to define a specific ontology. I think they want that so that they can use their intuition to provide them with solutions. (Another issue I tried to communicate a long time ago; and failed.) I am hoping that my response to Rade's confused presentation will make this issue a little clearer.

... and the "valid ontological elements omitted from that specific solution" are referring to elements that would yield a different mental model? Something that a person has not yet formed, but might in the future?

Maybe, maybe not! The issue here is that the future, in my definition, constitutes aspects of reality (valid ontological elements) of which he is ignorant. I am only saying one thing: being ignorant of them, he cannot build a speculative edifice based upon them. But that does not mean that his speculative edifice is "incorrect" (i.e., contains a demonstrable flaw). It could be that he just happened to make a good guess: i.e., his speculative edifice just might be built on a foundation containing a valid ontological element which were not represented in his past. What is important here, and I will get to it in detail later, is that it is impossible to differentiate between valid and invalid ontological elements so long as no flaw can be found in the speculative edifice. You should understand that, if it were possible to determine the difference, one could prove solipsism invalid. But this is an issue down the line from where we are now and I wouldn't worry about it if I were you. Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Like I said, I'm very much struggling to interpret you properly.

Again, I think you are trying to find the consequences of what I have said. All I want is for you to accept the steps themselves; I will show you the consequences as I build upon them.

Do both collections of "valid ontological elements" refer to the same specific solution (as for the 'past' and 'future')? If so, why is the second collection required? If not, what is the connection between them?

I think you are viewing ontology as something defined by the "solution" (some speculative edifice) and not as an issue unto itself. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution. To repeat myself, I have defined reality to be a valid ontology (the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists). I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more.

looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[sd01g]

There is the illusion that "time has slowed down" "time flies"
These phrases illustrate the illusions we have created out of the simple measurement system of time.

There are many illusions we have built around the measuring system of time. Another one is where we have arbitrarily decided that
"time is up" or "there's no time".

An illusion can be defined as a representation of an object or idea that is not the actual object or idea.

Time is a conceptual representation of change and motion.

An "inch" or a "foot" or a "meter" are specific to conceptual models that are not based on anything in nature other than our own conceptual way of partitioning the universe.

Measuring systems don't seem like an illusion to us because they are our tools we use to organize our environment and our experience of it.

The system only applies to humans and their way of thinking. To all other species, the measurment of change and motion and the measurement of distance and volume are all illusionary and have no relation to the actual universe. They are simply conceptual representations of reality.

I agree that we experience time at different rates according to our conscious state. In deep sleep, time seems to stop. Depending on our brain chemistry balance and synaptic activity, we experience time at different rates-sometimes fast, sometimes slow, sometimes stopped.

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

 

[baywax]

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

I can agree that studying brain activity as one of the sources of illusion makes sense.

Trying to find a congruent experience and understanding of time that is shared in more than one set of brain activities would be like trying to find a common pattern of CO2 activity in two separate glasses of pop. The commonalities would be restricted to how "the bubbles go up and down and burst on occasion".

 

[I_AM]

I can no longer see time. All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters. This concept of time we have is slowly deteriorating from my mind. There is no time, all things are just constantly changing? Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing. Time will never leave us, we must learn to leave time.

you summed it up well as time = change or the marking of, nothing more :)

"All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters."

" Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing."

 

[Rade]

.. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution...

Here then, with this statement, we see how the philosophy being presented by Docterdick is based on contradiction. How ? In a previous post where he discussed my example of a past set with valid ontological elements [A,B,C], Doctordick made this claim:

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&])...

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS ! (ps, he does state that C refers to a "process", what he calls fertilization, thus C is not referring to any "thing", nor is C a "thing that really exists").

...I have defined reality to be a valid ontology...

OK, now we are getting somewhere--"reality" is defined by Doctordick as a valid "study of being" (= ontology--note the "ology" in the word = "study of"). So, the philosophy of Doctordick is that, priori to the existence of an entity that could carry out the operation of "ology", there was (by his definition) no reality, which is nothing more than the position of logical positivism.

...(the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists)...

Bravo. Finally it is "explained" that the "Philosophy of Doctordick" derives from one of the fundamental axioms of logic--the Law of Identity-- A = A; let A = "the entirety of what exists". So, here I agree with Doctordick, any "valid philosophy" must have the Law of Identity as a fundamental assumption--what is called an axoim. But, note that before Doctordick can say [A] = [A], FIRST MUST BE [A] AS EXISTENCE ITSELF, thus, the fundamental axiom of ALL VALID ONTOLOGY is the axoim "Existence Exists" -- this is what is "undefined", the axiom [existence exists] is undefined, not the "ontology" or "study of" [the entirety of what exists]. And here we have one of many reasons why I do not agree with this approach to the development of a philosophy based on the axiom of "undefined ontology", it is "existence" itself that must be "undefined", not the "study of existence", where "being = existence".

...I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more...

Here we read yet another contradiction in the philosophy being presented, for he has made it clear in previous posts that this is not "the whole of it"--for the "whole of time" must not only include the past and future, but also the "present". Now, let me make a prediction, I predict Doctordick will contradict himself in any attempt to respond to this comment, and he will attempt to claim that within his "valid ontological set" are not only two parts (past and future), but will build yet another layer of contradiction to add "the present" as a "mathematical operation" to his "valid ontological set", even after we are informed that past and future is "the whole of it". I claim that the discourse of Doctordick on the past, future, and present elements of time is a long drawn out argument based on one contradiction after another after another, etc., derived from the false axiom of the "undefined ontology".

 

[AnssiH]

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism".

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

That is probably true.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

Yes of course. I've been known to reduce everything into a "physical system" in my (materialistic) semantical mind ;) I know what you are saying though.

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view.

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Ok, let's hear how this continues.

 

[AnssiH]

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS !

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)

And then he talked about your example separately, as in "what if the set were referring to a specific set of egg, fertilization, etc..."

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

If you are confused by that definition, note the following: "given known information" can be absolutely anything you wish it to be (whatever it is you are explaining); your "expectations" consist of what you expect (as guided and defined by that explanation). :yuck:

I have laid out the situation as follows:

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past". Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future".

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence. Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based. That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Looking forward to hearing from you again -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

Still having problems with the "present". I can see that;
Anything known = the past
Anything unknown = the future
But when you say:

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence

.

Does this mean that "Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of 'specific elements of the known' occurring in some specific sequence"?
In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".
I am aware that your emphasis lies with the procedure "to obtain expectations" and not with any specific solution.
Previously you have stated:
"Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) 'the present'."
I am still a bit baffled about the arrival of the second collection.

 

[Doctordick]

In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".

You sort of have the emphasis on the wrong issue. I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated).

I introduced a concept (which I choose to call "time", because of where it leads me; which you will have to wait to see) which allows me to include the fact that, whatever it is that an explanation explains, explanations are based on less than full knowledge of the entire "valid ontological set". Not only that, but different explanations are often based on different knowledge. Any logical analysis of the problem of setting up "speculative edifices" based on different collections of knowledge must include a mechanism for handling such changes. I am simply defining any change in the valid ontology underlying the analyzers "speculative edifices" to be the present.

Surely you see the obvious connection to your personal world view: the past is continually changing as you proceed into the future (information which was once part of your unknown future becomes part of your past), that change is what you have chosen to call the present (to quote someone on this thread, "everything happens in the present"). The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only. Actually, I'll get back to that issue later, when I will point out some of the consequences of relaxing that constraint.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

... That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

...Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence...

. Yes, and it is the "specific sequence" of these events that is a form of constraint and thus what allows for "prediction".

...Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based.

I think "time" would find it strange indeed that it must wait for you (or any human) to put together a list before it could exist.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology"...

Well, here we have it in a nutshell, a rehash of worn out logical positivism--as if there was no "time" in the universe before the personal experience of Doctordick.

...As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed...

Yes, exactly--exactly why what you present has no value at all, for the simple reason that "valid ontological elements" (REALITY) is fixed.

 

[Rade]

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)...

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ? Just two of many confused notions being put forward by Doctordick as the axioms of a new philosophy.

 

[Rade]

...The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only...

OK, so here we have the fundamental "assumption" of the philosophy being presented by Doctordick--it is the "assumption" of a "non-unique and dis-continuous process". Which is fine with me, as long as it is clear to all that then the philosophy being presented by Doctordick DOES begin with "an assumption"--which is the negation of what has been claimed in previous posts, and the reason I have stated all along that this philosophy derives from a logical contradiction--it claims no use of "assumption" when in fact one clearly exists.

 

[mosassam]

Dear Doctordick, is the life you share with your wife/lover/children/relatives/friends etc. an assumption?

 

[Rade]

... I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated)...

But this is just plain false. Consider the TV remote control I now hold. The functionality of its program guide can be viewed as being a valid ontological metaphor of the concept "time", a type of "tinder-box". And what a capital tinder-box it is, for when I strike it once in the negative direction (the past) out comes the TV show about the dog that sat upon the chest of copper money, and when I strike it a second time in the positive direction (the present) out comes the TV show about the dog who had the chest of silver, and when I strike it a third time in the positive direction (the future) then appears the TV show of the dog who had the chest of gold. Your philosophy of the past of interest (say my interest in TV shows) being "built from a collection of presents" is thus falsified.

 

[AnssiH]

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

It just struck me a bit odd when you said solipsism is a case of "nothing existing" since the subjective experience exists. Call it an illusion or add any other kind of spin on it whatsoever, but at least one thing always exists in it, which is the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having.

Perhaps it's a bit irrelevant to this discussion, but I wonder if you agree that in your framework too we would say that at least one ontological element exists in solipsistic view. Because if you don't agree, then perhaps I have understood something wrong about your philosophy.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Ok yeah. I guess you don't assume this view is the ontologically correct view of "time/motion" though? I.e. that the ontological nature of time is still somewhat shrouded behind some elements we are ignorant of.

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

Yeah that's a reasonable/useful definition.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

Yeah so it's not an attempt to pin down the ontological nature of time? This seems to be one source of confusion, it is easy to take your description as an assertion about the true nature of time... (reading the other posts, looks like many people already did...)

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Well it seems pretty clear but I have a feeling I could be interpreting some things little bit wrong. I'm trying not to jump ahead and start guessing how do you label ontological elements without defining anything. Let's see it.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood.

I'll let Thomas Kuhn explain it more:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutions

There are more recent authors reminding us of the same distinction. Like, say, Andrew Pickering. ("Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics")

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ?

Well I think our confusions are basically the same. I.e. I am wondering if even the minimal framework - which exist because without it there could be no discussion/thoughts about ontology at all - is already such that it precludes correct ontology. (Although of course we need to understand "valid" as different than "correct"... this is in fact the same difference as there exists between ontology and scientific models; model can be valid but not true. It's a muddy field we are walking on :)

I was explaining this concern in post #269 in more detail.

But then let's see how far we can get with this minimal framework, you know...

-Anssi

 

[Paul Martin]

I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

I think this needs to be emphasized because I think it is a common stumbling block for people trying to understand Dick's work. Maybe a simple analogy will help.

Suppose one were interested in solving a particular problem whose solution is a solution to a quadratic equation. To solve that particular problem, one would have to know the coefficients of the particular equation. It would also be helpful to know the quadratic formula.

But if, on the other hand, one were not interested at all in solving any particular quadratic equation, but instead were interested in deriving the quadratic formula, then knowing any particular coefficients would be irrelevant and completely useless. The quadratic formula can be derived without such knowledge. And, armed with the quadratic formula, one can solve many quadratic equations if only the specific coefficients are known.

Similarly, Dick has developed a general method of solving the problem of producing expectations from any set of information, without any need to be specific about, or to know, any of that information.

For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements.

So the problem Dick is attacking is the problem of producing some "mechanical" process, like that of plugging coefficients into the quadratic formula and calculating the solutions, which will produce expectations from known information.

Now, here's a question for you, Dick. What exactly constitutes "known information"? Known by whom? Shannon has given us a definition for 'information' which is essentially an ordered set of bits which presumably represents something. As I see it, the representation part of it must be defined prior to the gathering and ordering of the bits. Of course, the "representation" may not be strictly necessary for the existence of information. For example, physical entities beyond the ken of any intelligent being are considered to carry information in physical theory as far as I know. The instruments on the Voyager spacecraft might very well have captured some information and stored it in ordered bit patterns on board after the radio lost its ability to transmit that information back to Earth. I would think those stored bit patterns would still be considered "information". The bit patterns were arranged according to a pre-planned representation scheme even though they have not been known by any intelligence to date.

But you specifically referred to "known information". So it seems that you require a "knower" and a process or state of "knowing". That requirement seems to be an assumption in your work that you overlook. It seems that we must assume some kind of "knower" in order to have "known information". No?

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based.

Let's take that a little slower. Let's examine just exactly what is required for that first step.

You say, "In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need ..." One? Who is this One? It seems to me that a requirement that you overlook is some intelligent or conscious agent (One) who is, or will be, instrumental in going about solving the problem, not to mention being interested in the problem in the first place.

From what you have said before, I think you would say that you, or I, or some reader of your work, is the "one" who is the agent that will "operate" the mechanism your work spells out. This seems to me to be a huge complex assumption, that is if you consider you, or me, or others to be these complex material bodies-with-brains existing in some kind of physical world "out there".

I agree that if you posit such a "One", then your development is without error -- at least any error that I could detect. But I think you should acknowledge that such a "One", who is in a position to "know" information, is a necessary assumption behind your work. No?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[raolduke]

Its to bad time is money, because we are all going god-damned broke.

 

[Rade]

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood...

But when someone (as did Doctordick) claims...that you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption...taken at face value I find this to be a false statement, since the process of Science is all about making predictions, it is the essence of the "hypothesis"--where one makes an educated prediction (in the present) of the future based on "uncertain knowledge" of the past. Now, the prediction (the hypothesis) may in fact be that "no prediction of the future can be made"--but, you see, this is not the same as saying "no prediction (eg, hypothesis) can be made"--which I take to be the false statement of Doctordick.

Now, it seems to me that there are only two types of "knowledge" (1) certain knowledge, and (2) uncertain knowledge. I hold that Science = process of gaining uncertain future knowledge of the metaphysical. Thus as you say, Science is "not reality itself", Science is the process of gaining uncertain knowledge of the metaphysical given (= reality). If one wishes to gain certain knowledge of the metaphysical it is not by Science that such knowledge will be obtained. Clearly the process of ontology (= study of existence) differs from the process of science (= gaining uncertain knowledge of existence).

 

[Rade]

...I agree that if you posit such a "One", then your development is without error -- at least any error that I could detect. But I think you should acknowledge that such a "One", who is in a position to "know" information, is a necessary assumption behind your work. No?...

This is a valid point you make Paul. But is there not yet a second assumption required by Doctordick ? Is not also required a metaphysical entity "information" -- that is, not only must we assume a "One" in position to know as you rightly claim, but also (and I would hold a priori) we must assume some "existent" that "exists" as "information" that the "One" does "know" ? So, contrary to the claim of Doctordick that he has discovered a philosophy of "undefined ontology" based on "no assumptions"--at least two (perhaps more ?) assumptions are required for his philosophy to be valid, and both asumptions require numerous definitions of an ontological nature. And, in the final analysis, is it not true that what you find to have "development without error" in the philosophy presented by Doctordick is nothing more than a claim to have discovered the Law of Identity--that is that A = A. Is this not the essence of his mathematical equation of explanation derived from "undefined ontology" ?

 

[Doctordick]

Well, I have decided to answer Rade in spite of the fact that I am convinced that he has utterly no interest in what I am trying to present. The fact that he will go to any limit to misinterpret what I say presents a real problem as it confuses those who have a genuine interest.

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

This is no more than misdirection of attention. The issue is not prediction of the future (that is no more than a presumption of the correctness of one's proposed solution), the real test of "scientific explanation" is that it consistently predicts the past: i.e., the collection of events known to the examiner.

Yes, and it is the "specific sequence" of these events that is a form of constraint and thus what allows for "prediction".

What you are saying is that it is the validity of the explanation to explain what is known (the past) which is taken for evidence that the explanation will work in the future: i.e., that is the source of the "belief" that the prediction will be upheld (a pure and unadulterated assumption).

I think "time" would find it strange indeed that it must wait for you (or any human) to put together a list before it could exist.

And I should take your "doubt" as evidence that "time" is more than a convenient tool for organizing what you know? I think not! "Belief" is not the primary test of truth! The primary test of truth is consistency with what is known (which is "your knowledge of the past").

Well, here we have it in a nutshell, a rehash of worn out logical positivism--as if there was no "time" in the universe before the personal experience of Doctordick.

What I am saying is that there is no need for the concept of time beyond organizing the information upon which your world view is built; and I will demonstrate that fact when my comments are seriously considered. What is important is that the deduced consequences are consistent with experiment (that would be all the "known experiments" as consistency with "future experiments" is an assumption).

Yes, exactly--exactly why what you present has no value at all, for the simple reason that "valid ontological elements" (REALITY) is fixed.

Ah, without listening to what I have to say, you assert that "what present has no value at all". It must be nice to know everything! I am at a loss to understand your inability to think anything out.

... but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ? Just two of many confused notions being put forward by Doctordick as the axioms of a new philosophy.

Perhaps; but "undefined" is "undefined". Have you no capability to comprehend working with an unknown?

Dear Doctordick, is the life you share with your wife/lover/children/relatives/friends etc. an assumption?

My personal feelings have little or nothing to do with "logical thought". I always go with what "feels right in my gut" and not logic. Logic is related to understanding and understanding is not required to enjoy life. I have known many people who have never concerned themselves with logical thought or understanding anything and yet have lived a full and successful life. Thinking and understanding can be a fun thing to do but don't bet your life on it, it's too easy to be wrong!

But this is just plain false. Consider the TV remote control I now hold. The functionality of its program guide can be viewed as being a valid ontological metaphor of the concept "time", a type of "tinder-box". And what a capital tinder-box it is, for when I strike it once in the negative direction (the past) out comes the TV show about the dog that sat upon the chest of copper money, and when I strike it a second time in the positive direction (the present) out comes the TV show about the dog who had the chest of silver, and when I strike it a third time in the positive direction (the future) then appears the TV show of the dog who had the chest of gold. Your philosophy of the past of interest (say my interest in TV shows) being "built from a collection of presents" is thus falsified.

Ah, you are aware of things which are not part of your past? A remarkable talent; you should make use of it! By the way, how did you come to be aware of these things without experiencing the "present" of learning them?

It just struck me a bit odd when you said solipsism is a case of "nothing existing" since the subjective experience exists. Call it an illusion or add any other kind of spin on it whatsoever, but at least one thing always exists in it, which is the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having.

From my perspective, solipsism is a worthless hypothesis as it explains nothing; however, it is implicitly included in my analysis which you will discover when we get to the appropriate point. There are some curious insights at that point but, for the time being, let us not speculate about what is or is not required.

Perhaps it's a bit irrelevant to this discussion, but I wonder if you agree that in your framework too we would say that at least one ontological element exists in solipsistic view. Because if you don't agree, then perhaps I have understood something wrong about your philosophy.

Again, the central issue is that I want to clarify exactly how one comes to create a world view from undefined ontological information. Let us accomplish that first.

Ok yeah. I guess you don't assume this view is the ontologically correct view of "time/motion" though? I.e. that the ontological nature of time is still somewhat shrouded behind some elements we are ignorant of.

What I have defined is not an ontological element; it is a mere tool for organizing and referring to those ontological elements which define reality. If it is indeed necessary to apply the label "time" to a valid ontological element, we can cross that bridge when we get there (in fact, since nothing is defined, we could simply use the label "real time" to refer to the necessary valid ontological element you have in mind). For the time being (using the common interpretation of that phrase) let's not worry about it.

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

Yeah that's a reasonable/useful definition.

Thanks! You are a rare bird to be so accommodating; most people give me a very hard time with that definition.

Yeah so it's not an attempt to pin down the ontological nature of time? This seems to be one source of confusion, it is easy to take your description as an assertion about the true nature of time... (reading the other posts, looks like many people already did...)

You are absolutely correct. I find it very hard to get people to use my definitions as "what I mean". Most everyone wants to comprehend how my definitions correspond to their personal world view; they have no desire to consider a new paradigm no matter how logical the deductions might be (it's easier to just deny the coherence of the definitions). That makes life easy for them and "thinking" is something that most people have no desire to do. They would rather believe the world view created by their subconscious is absolutely true.

But then let's see how far we can get with this minimal framework, you know...

That is what analysis is all about. Thank you for your comments; you are clearly a thoughtful person.

Now, here's a question for you, Dick. What exactly constitutes "known information"?

That is exactly the undefined thing. The moment you define anything, you are working on a speculative edifice (very analogous to that specific quadratic equation you referred to in your excellent example).

Known by whom? Shannon has given us a definition for 'information' which is essentially an ordered set of bits which presumably represents something. As I see it, the representation part of it must be defined prior to the gathering and ordering of the bits. Of course, the "representation" may not be strictly necessary for the existence of information.

You are speculating on the definition of "information"

Or perhaps you could give attention to another of [Kant's] comments:

"It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure." A lot of people will agree that "the only thing they are sure of is that they are sure of nothing"; however, watch their faith in their own beliefs harden up as soon as you propose examining that problem!

But you specifically referred to "known information". So it seems that you require a "knower" and a process or state of "knowing". That requirement seems to be an assumption in your work that you overlook. It seems that we must assume some kind of "knower" in order to have "known information". No?

That itself is a speculative edifice. I put it in exactly the same category as AnssiH's concern about solipsism requiring "the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having". It is the opening assumption of a speculative edifice and, as such, has no place in my approach!

You say, "In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need ..." One? Who is this One? It seems to me that a requirement that you overlook is some intelligent or conscious agent (One) who is, or will be, instrumental in going about solving the problem, not to mention being interested in the problem in the first place.

I am explicitly ignoring "speculative edifices" in general, no matter how simple a specific "speculative edifice" might be. The issue here is the problem of understanding how a usable epistemological solution can be developed from an undefined ontology and "who is solving the problem" is part of that very problem.

But I think you should acknowledge that such a "One", who is in a position to "know" information, is a necessary assumption behind your work. No?

That is, in itself, an aspect of the solution of the problem. Would I deny that such a thing is necessary? Well of course not but it has nothing to do with the problem of understanding what has not yet been defined. You are trying to start the discussion with some issues already defined; that very step itself denies the problem.

Its to bad time is money, because we are all going god-damned broke.

If you are here to make money, you're in the wrong place!

That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

I could certainly predict that my brother-in-law would be elected president in 2008 but I would most probably be wrong! For the benefit of the rest of you, who I hope have a bit more intelligence than Rade, I meant that expectations that those predictions are correct is a presumption. I made an earlier post with regard to this kind of thing that apparently went right over Rade's head.

"Exact Science is a field of study where acceptable assertions are specific, well defined, and precise such that any statements cannot be misinterpreted" ... Which means literally, cast out any assertion which fails to fulfill the rule. It seems to me that there is no other specific, precise and well defined interpretation of that statement. ... For those of you who cannot comprehend an interpretation which makes these statements exact, let me know your personal interpretation and I will do my best to provide additional constraints.

The above is a common practice in any practical science presentation I have ever encountered. It is commonly presumed that the student has sufficient intelligence to find an interpretation which is consistent with all that went before. Rade appears to instead pursue the problem of discovering irrational interpretations rather than trying to find consistent interpretations. He is either intentionally trying to confuse matters or he simply lacks the intelligence to find the consistent interpretation; either way, I consider his comments to be un-thought-out and fundamentally worthless. :yuck:

But, back to AnssiH's post:

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be recognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Well it seems pretty clear but I have a feeling I could be interpreting some things little bit wrong. I'm trying not to jump ahead and start guessing how do you label ontological elements without defining anything. Let's see it.

The first step is to have a specific epistemological solution (in analogy to Paul's quadratic equation, you can consider it a given fact; we are not concerned with what it is, we are merely concerned with the ontology on which it is based) . This specific epistemological solution (this speculative edifice) is based upon some undefined collection of valid ontological elements which are provided in a sequence of "presents" (i.e., a sequence of changes in the "known" collection of valid ontological elements). The problem is that the definition of these "valid ontological elements" is embedded in that specific epistemological solution.

Essentially, the specific epistemological solution is based on some set of ontological elements which we are required to deduce from our comprehension of that solution itself. Now, in any real case, that epistemological solution is based upon an ontology which may or may not be valid. The existence of invalid ontological elements in the foundation of the solution brings on some complex problems; however, the very complexity introduced by these allusions (these unreal or false ontological elements) is actually part of the speculative edifice itself and not part of the reality (that valid ontology) the epistemological solution was created to explain. Thus my first step is to postpone considering these complexities by looking at a simplified (and admittedly unreal) problem; I will analyze the ontological elements of a epistemological solution which is based on a totally valid ontological set (consider it a pure abstract problem).

The speculative edifice (that given specific epistemological solution) is the source of the definition of each and every ontological element upon which it is based and our understanding of the solution is based upon a collection of valid ontological element provided in a sequence of "presents". Since the definitions of those valid ontological elements is embedded in our understanding of the solution, the problem is quite analogous to a decoding problem. Somehow, starting with a sequence of "presents" (each one a collection of changes in our "past" set of valid ontological elements) we have arrived a our current state: that of being aware of a past consisting of the set of valid ontological elements on which the speculative edifice rests. I will of course presume the edifice is without flaw as, if flaws exist in the specific epistemological solution, it does not qualify as a solution (the flaws themselves destroy it as a solution). Since it is taken as given that we understand that speculative edifice (i.e., know all the implied definitions of those ontological elements) it should be clear that we can refer to any specific element in the relevant set. It is that set of references I wish to analyze.

In analogy with Paul's comparison with the general solution to a quadratic equation, in place of the coefficients of the terms in the quadratic equation, we will instead work with reference labels for the ontological elements which go to make up that "past" (actually the sequence of presents) which lead to the final "past" upon which the epistemological solution is based. Rade has proposed an excellent notation for these "undefined references":

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

But the number of letters available is somewhat limited, so let me instead propose using numbers as reference labels as there is no limit to the quantity of discrete numbers available. If you can get your head around what I have just proposed, I will show you my attack on analyzing that sequence of number sets.

Sorry I took so long to respond but I have been quite busy for that last few weeks and had little time to pay attention to what was going on here.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Paul Martin]

...is it not true that what you find to have "development without error" in the philosophy presented by Doctordick is nothing more than a claim to have discovered the Law of Identity--that is that A = A. Is this not the essence of his mathematical equation of explanation derived from "undefined ontology" ?

In a way it is; and in a way it is not. Dick's theorem is equivalent to A = A in the same sense that all theorems are. All equations, by definition, are assertions that the left side is equal to the right side. That is, that both sides are identically equal or the same. The fact that each side might be represented by a different set of symbols doesn't change that fact.

But theorems are more than that. They assert that a single quantity can be expressed in two different ways and that is what makes them useful. The equation expressing Dick's theorem is an extremely complex differential equation (at least it seems complex to me). It is not as trivial as the equation A = A. Several well-known laws of physics, such as Maxwell's field equations, Einstein's field equations, and Schroedinger's wave equation are all solutions to Dick's equation. I think that is remarkable and I think it suggests that there may be even more important, as yet undiscovered, solutions to his equation which could be interpreted as extensions to the known laws of physics.

In my opinion, "the essence of his mathematical equation of explanation derived from 'undefined ontology'" is the precise constraints bearing on the creation of any intelligible universe by any putative creator.

But you specifically referred to "known information". So it seems that you require a "knower" and a process or state of "knowing". That requirement seems to be an assumption in your work that you overlook. It seems that we must assume some kind of "knower" in order to have "known information". No?

That itself is a speculative edifice. I put it in exactly the same category as AnssiH's concern about solipsism requiring "the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having". It is the opening assumption of a speculative edifice and, as such, has no place in my approach!

I feel like shouting, "EUREKA". I think you have finally succeeded in getting me to understand what you have been trying to tell me all along, Dick. I wish I weren't so slow in catching on, but you have to admit that I am persistent.

Yes, as you have pointed out, my interest in coming up with an explanation for consciousness is a speculative edifice. I guess I knew that all along, but knowing it didn't diminish my interest in the question. Now I see what is going on. Let me explain it using a simple-minded analogy.

If one were to speculate that reality is based on Euclidean space, then one could develop a theory of Euclidean geometry, as Euclid did, and from that go on to predict that the sum of the angles in any triangle in real space would always be 180 degrees.

That would be a "speculative edifice". What you pointed out, and which I missed is that not only is the theory and its predictions a speculative edifice -- that much I knew -- but the entire scenario of "one speculating about the nature of reality and coming up with the theory and its prediction" is also a speculative edifice. The "One" doing the theorizing and speculation, and the speculation and theory itself, are all part and parcel of the "speculative edifice".

So if we avoid all speculation, what do we have left? We have nothing but semantical structures of the "If...then" variety, such as my "If one were to speculate...then one could develop...180 degrees". That is, we must start with nothing but logic and build a logical structure with no assumptions whatsoever.

That is what you have done, Dick. Of course you didn't do it all. You started with the structure of Mathematical Analysis which was already in place. It was built gradually starting with Descartes and then bulking up with Newton. Early in the 20th century, Mathematical Analysis was derived from a foundation of pure logic. So by the time you discovered your theorem, it was built on a foundation of nothing but pure logic with no assumptions at all about anything "real". And, since you developed a theorem, you only added some definitions but no assumptions or additional axioms.

Finally seeing this, I can now respond to AnssiH from another thread.

"Rational Mind" is referring to "subjective experience", not to a physical "thing" having an experience.

Yes, I understand that and I agree. But I think you would also agree that you are simply refining definitions of terms that have no intrinsic meaning. They have meaning only in the context of a conversation. And all of this -- the definitions, the conversation, the ideas and concepts -- is nothing but a speculative edifice.

It is not possible to understand or even to think about any system without breaking it into sensible "things" (that then can be thought of being in interaction with each others). Rational mind is based on this kind of classification process. (Another way to put it, the system is broken into semantical components, which make up the mental model we are aware of... Because of having a mental model of reality, we can make predictions about its behaviour. And all our rational behaviour is based on this capability of making predictions)

I might agree with this too. But again, the notions of "thinking", of "systems", of "breaking", of "things", etc. are parts of a speculative edifice.

So, the subjective experience definitely exists,

I agree completely. My favorite way of saying the same thing is that, "Thought happens".

but if we want to understand the real nature of the subjective experience, it can be erroneous to assume identity to one's own mind.

Exactly. Moreover, it can be erroneous to assume anything whatsoever.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

...the real test of "scientific explanation" is that it consistently predicts the past: i.e., the collection of events known to the examiner...

NO, this is an incomplete understanding of relationship of "prediction" to science. The concept of the null hypothesis not only predicts "the collection of events known to examiner", it also predicts the "collection of events unknown to examiner". It would appear you confuse metaphysical "entities" with metaphysical "events".

 

[Rade]

... it can be erroneous to assume anything whatsoever...

While it may be erroneous for you to say that you "assume" that you exist, it is not erroneous for you to say that you "know" that you exist. I think here you explain nicely that the philosophy of Doctordick derives from the mental operation of "to assume" (i.e. it derives from speculative edifice itself) as opposed to the operation "to know" (i.e., a philosophy derived from a non-speculative edifice), for if we know anything about an edifice we know there are only two types (1) the speculative edifice and (2) the non-speculative edifice. And the philosophy of Doctordick derives from the undefined ontology of speculative edifice itself, no ? And hence my reason for finding this philosophy of no value, for I derive philosophy from non-speculative edifice.
Edit: Here I define "non-speculative edifice" as a defined collection of valid ontological elements, "speculative edifice" as an undefined collection of valid ontological elements.

 

[Rade]

...The equation expressing Dick's theorem is an extremely complex differential equation (at least it seems complex to me)...

I see--and does complexity = "reality" or "validity" ? And where exactly in the peer reviewed literature has this new complex equation been published ? Or, if that is asking too much, since you mention famous equations of physics that are solutions, please post the thread links from the physics section where the professional physicians that moderate that section of forum give the Doctordick equation rave review as a new fundamental explanation that unifys other equations of physics. Or, if the professionals in the physics section of the forum are too dense to understand the importance of the equation since it is so complex, could you please post the threads from the math section of this forum where professional mathematicians have looked into the thinking of Doctordick's differential equation and concurred that it offers a new fundamental mathematical "explanation" of explanation itself.

 

[Rade]

...What I have defined is not an ontological element; it is a mere tool for organizing and referring to those ontological elements which define reality...

But---a mere tool is a metaphysical given (= ontological element). Thus, if what you "define" (as you say) is a "mere tool" then what you "define" is an ontological element, and what you then say above has no meaning. For example, suppose I have the ontological elements (A), (B), (C) and I use a "mere tool" (Z) to organize the elements into a set {A,B,C}, then into the set {C,B,A}, then into the set {B,C,A}, and so on. You see--(Z) is also then an "ontological element"--it is the element that one uses to conduct the transformation to form the various sets, think (Z) is "toolbox with three slots"---(A), (B), (C) are tools. Sorry but your "explanations" of what it is you may understand is so convoluted that you put yourself into these types of contradictory corners of logical thinking, which are so numerous in your posts that I find it like a game of "Where's Waldo" to find them over and over and over. Bad me, I stop now Dick--go on with your explanation of explanation itself.

 

[mosassam]

That would be a "speculative edifice". What you pointed out, and which I missed is that not only is the theory and its predictions a speculative edifice -- that much I knew -- but the entire scenario of "one speculating about the nature of reality and coming up with the theory and its prediction" is also a speculative edifice. The "One" doing the theorizing and speculation, and the speculation and theory itself, are all part and parcel of the "speculative edifice"

I truly hope you have hit the nail on the head. Until now I have been utterly bamboozled by what Dr.Dick has been laying down, I believe I have found the source of my "bamboozlement". In trying to understand what Dr.D. has been saying I have been attempting to fit it into my own framework of knowledge (something I have done so automatically I haven't noticed it). In doing so I am constantly bringing my own 'speculative baggage' into things. I have a queasy feeling that it's not the complexity of Dr.D's approach I have been missing, but the simplicity. Nothing can be assumed, not even one's own subjective inclinations. I only have one question:
Are we assuming Logic? (apologies if it's a dumb question)
I feel the onus now on myself to understand fully and accept the inital definitions as to do otherwise involves me 'twisting' things to suit my own point of view.

 

[Paul Martin]

While it may be erroneous for you to say that you "assume" that you exist, it is not erroneous for you to say that you "know" that you exist.

How do you know that?

I didn't say that it is erroneous, I said that it can be erroneous. I don't think we have any way of determining whether any assertion is true or not.

The problem with asserting that "I exist" is the same problem I have with the premise in Descartes' cogito: "I think". We can't really say or know anything about either of these assertions unless and until we are clear about the meaning of the word "I". In trying to define "I", or "you" for that matter, we run headlong into the problem of identity and self that is endlessly debated without yielding a resolution.

It is for that reason that I have morphed Descartes' premise to simply, "Thought happens". Here I don't even mention anything like a self, nor do I specify whether thought happens to a "thing", or by a "thing", nor how it happens, nor where, nor when. I only know that it happens. And, that is the only thing I think I know for sure.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

I see--and does complexity = "reality" or "validity" ?

No. I made no such claim.

And where exactly in the peer reviewed literature has this new complex equation been published ?

Nowhere. People who publish that literature do not consider Dick a peer because he is not associated with any approved university. Not only do they refuse to publish it, they refuse to read it. That also holds for the mathematical literature and the community that controls it.

Or, if the professionals in the physics section of the forum are too dense to understand the importance of the equation since it is so complex, could you please post the threads from the math section of this forum where professional mathematicians have looked into the thinking of Doctordick's differential equation and concurred that it offers a new fundamental mathematical "explanation" of explanation itself.

It's not a matter of density. It's a matter of defending turf.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

I truly hope you have hit the nail on the head. Until now I have been utterly bamboozled by what Dr.Dick has been laying down, I believe I have found the source of my "bamboozlement". In trying to understand what Dr.D. has been saying I have been attempting to fit it into my own framework of knowledge (something I have done so automatically I haven't noticed it). In doing so I am constantly bringing my own 'speculative baggage' into things. I have a queasy feeling that it's not the complexity of Dr.D's approach I have been missing, but the simplicity. Nothing can be assumed, not even one's own subjective inclinations. I only have one question:
Are we assuming Logic? (apologies if it's a dumb question)
I feel the onus now on myself to understand fully and accept the inital definitions as to do otherwise involves me 'twisting' things to suit my own point of view.

I wish I were as quick and sharp as you, mosassam. I have been struggling to understand Dick's result for six or seven years now, and as you can see, I have just now come to catch on to part of it that you have grasped in mere weeks.

I don't feel qualified to answer your question, but I'll try anyway. Yes, I think we are assuming logic. But I don't think we really know what logic is. Aristotle thought logic was an a priori given. Only in modern times have we come to realize that logic is arbitrary; at least there is more than one alternative. We also know that mathematics can sort of be built on logic, and Dick built his result on mathematics. So, in order to develop Dick's theorem, logic has to be assumed.

In another sense, Dick's theorem has the assumption that the unknown information must be intelligible, or communicable. That is, it must admit of some kind of tagging process where the individual elements can be identified and talked about. If they can't, then his result does not obtain. This, IMHO, means that it would be possible for a creator to create a completely random, inconsistent, meaningless universe that wouldn't necessarily have to follow the laws of physics.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[mosassam]

I wish I were as quick and sharp as you, mosassam. I have been struggling to understand Dick's result for six or seven years now, and as you can see, I have just now come to catch on to part of it that you have grasped in mere weeks.

Your 'Eureka' post must be viral because I caught it aswell, a beautiful yet profoundly simple insight. So I, a complete novice, get to stand on your shoulders. Many thanks. (I hope Dr.D doesn't come along and put a spanner in the works)

I don't feel qualified to answer your question, but I'll try anyway. Yes, I think we are assuming logic. But I don't think we really know what logic is. Aristotle thought logic was an a priori given. Only in modern times have we come to realize that logic is arbitrary; at least there is more than one alternative. We also know that mathematics can sort of be built on logic, and Dick built his result on mathematics. So, in order to develop Dick's theorem, logic has to be assumed.

I must certainly say "Balls" to Aristotle's either/or logic and "Hurrah" to quantum 'fuzzy' logic. (I do find it really disturbing that more than one kind of Logic exists, this doesn't seem ... well ... logical). I would also like to propose something, for clarity of discussion, called English Prime or EPrime. No use of the words "is" or "are" may be permitted as any statement that uses them inherently contains metaphysical qualities. (In the extreme, no form of the verb "be" may occur). The clarity this adds to statements can be quite surprising even though it comes across as a silly wordgame.

In another sense, Dick's theorem has the assumption that the unknown information must be intelligible, or communicable. That is, it must admit of some kind of tagging process where the individual elements can be identified and talked about. If they can't, then his result does not obtain. This, IMHO, means that it would be possible for a creator to create a completely random, inconsistent, meaningless universe that wouldn't necessarily have to follow the laws of physics.

The degree to which things must be stripped down seems quite scary (the elusive 'simplicity' I referred to in my last post). Can communication itself be viewed as an assumption? Surely there must be some kind of "consensus" somewhere along the line? Or am I yet again a victim of my own 'speculative baggage'?
I feel that my limitations end at the word "undefined".

 

[Rade]

... Nothing can be assumed, not even one's own subjective inclinations...

Yes, and if no"thing" be assumed, yet some"thing" exists that we discuss, then what exists must be a given--e.g., a metaphysical entity that exists as an axiom without being taken for granted. This is the nice property of the axiom, it is "outside" the mental process of explanation, it is never brought to the table of analysis, it is never reduced to a set with parts that meet the solution to some equation, it is never taken for granted--the axiom is priori to all explanation, it is the concept on which all proofs and explanation rests. And if this is all that Dr. D is saying, is he really saying anything new under the sun ?

 

[Doctordick]

I feel like shouting, "EUREKA". I think you have finally succeeded in getting me to understand what you have been trying to tell me all along, Dick. I wish I weren't so slow in catching on, but you have to admit that I am persistent.

You have been wonderful Paul; most people pretty well take the first excuse they can find to ignore what I say. You have at least recognized that something was there. Thank you!

Are we assuming Logic? (apologies if it's a dumb question)

No, it's not a dumb question at all. Yes, I am essentially assuming Logic; but not as a foundation of ontology but rather as a foundation of communications. As I have said elsewhere, communications require knowledge of the meanings of the symbols used to communicate. The very structure we use for communications is a speculative edifice presumed to be understood by both parties. That this understanding is a presumption should be understood by everyone. One must understand that even mathematics is a speculative edifice. The advantage of mathematics is that great minds have spent thousands of years eliminating inconsistencies in the formal structure. What this really means is that, that when it comes to defined operations I can be pretty sure that everyone (that would be everyone who understands mathematics) will arrive at the same results that I will (we can obtain agreement); something which certainly cannot be professed in an English conversation.

Feynman once said that, "mathematics was the distilled essence of logic". The fundamental issue of "logic" is that it must never contradict itself. The problem with contradiction is that any system which contains a contradiction can give different answers to the same question and thus fails in its purpose if that purpose is to answer questions. What I am trying to say is that I view logic and mathematics as a well researched field which can be used to communicate ideas. I am certainly presuming it is internally self consistent; if it isn't, I will let more brilliant minds than mine worry about it.

People who publish that literature do not consider Dick a peer because he is not associated with any approved university. Not only do they refuse to publish it, they refuse to read it. That also holds for the mathematical literature and the community that controls it. It's not a matter of density. It's a matter of defending turf.

Some twenty years ago, I asked for help getting my stuff published from my thesis adviser I had in graduate school in the sixty's. He outright told me that no one would ever read my stuff because I hadn't paid my dues (that would be, "worked as a publishing scientist") and refused to read it himself. At the time I thought he was "full of it", but it turned out to be a very accurate assessment of the situation. Over the years, I have been confronted with the fact that all physicists I have talked to have insisted it was philosophy and outside their interest; philosophers have insisted it was mathematics and outside their interest and mathematicians have insisted it is physics and -- once again -- outside their interest. I (probably because I was trained as a physicist) have come to the conclusion that it's philosophy and have tried to put it into terms understood by philosophers. (That hasn't been easy.)

This, IMHO, means that it would be possible for a creator to create a completely random, inconsistent, meaningless universe that wouldn't necessarily have to follow the laws of physics.

At this point I disagree with you. If you follow my logic carefully, you will find that the universe follows the laws of physics for the same reason that the books in the library are sorted according to the Dewy decimal system. Physical law is no more than a convenient way of keeping track of completely random information. Just as I introduced "time" as a procedural tool for handling change in "knowledge", all the common concepts of physical law can be likewise be introduced as tools for handling different aspects of that "knowledge". But that will be beyond your comprehension until you completely understand my presentation. Of interest to me is that this fact guarantees that the "foundations" of any flaw free speculative edifice must obey the laws of physics.

But that is far down the road. For the moment, you should examine the problem I am presenting to AnssiH.

But, back to AnssiH's post:
The first step is to have a specific epistemological solution (in analogy to Paul's quadratic equation, you can consider it a given fact; we are not concerned with what it is, we are merely concerned with the ontology on which it is based) . This specific epistemological solution (this speculative edifice) is based upon some undefined collection of valid ontological elements which are provided in a sequence of "presents" (i.e., a sequence of changes in the "known" collection of valid ontological elements). The problem is that the definition of these "valid ontological elements" is embedded in that specific epistemological solution.

Essentially, the specific epistemological solution is based on some set of ontological elements which we are required to deduce from our comprehension of that solution itself. Now, in any real case, that epistemological solution is based upon an ontology which may or may not be valid. The existence of invalid ontological elements in the foundation of the solution brings on some complex problems; however, the very complexity introduced by these allusions (these unreal or false ontological elements) is actually part of the speculative edifice itself and not part of the reality (that valid ontology) the epistemological solution was created to explain. Thus my first step is to postpone considering these complexities by looking at a simplified (and admittedly unreal) problem; I will analyze the ontological elements of a epistemological solution which is based on a totally valid ontological set (consider it a pure abstract problem).

The speculative edifice (that given specific epistemological solution) is the source of the definition of each and every ontological element upon which it is based and our understanding of the solution is based upon a collection of valid ontological element provided in a sequence of "presents". Since the definitions of those valid ontological elements is embedded in our understanding of the solution, the problem is quite analogous to a decoding problem. Somehow, starting with a sequence of "presents" (each one a collection of changes in our "past" set of valid ontological elements) we have arrived a our current state: that of being aware of a past consisting of the set of valid ontological elements on which the speculative edifice rests. I will of course presume the edifice is without flaw as, if flaws exist in the specific epistemological solution, it does not qualify as a solution (the flaws themselves destroy it as a solution). Since it is taken as given that we understand that speculative edifice (i.e., know all the implied definitions of those ontological elements) it should be clear that we can refer to any specific element in the relevant set. It is that set of references I wish to analyze.

In analogy with Paul's comparison with the general solution to a quadratic equation, in place of the coefficients of the terms in the quadratic equation, we will instead work with reference labels for the ontological elements which go to make up that "past" (actually the sequence of presents) which lead to the final "past" upon which the epistemological solution is based. Rade has proposed an excellent notation for these "undefined references":

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

But the number of letters available is somewhat limited, so let me instead propose using numbers as reference labels as there is no limit to the quantity of discrete numbers available. If you can get your head around what I have just proposed, I will show you my attack on analyzing that sequence of number sets.

Again I apologize for the delay; we've had house guests and the forum pretty well takes second place to life.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

Yes, and if no"thing" be assumed, yet some"thing" exists that we discuss, then what exists must be a given--e.g., a metaphysical entity that exists as an axiom without being taken for granted.

I feel a bit cheeky posting as I'm in the company of some serious heads but, in the light of recent developments, I'd like to try on my new insight into this thread. What consequences arise when the 'some"thing"' you refer to in your post remains undefined? In no way am I going to second guess DoctorDick, but it seems that from 'out of the undefined' springs the axioms that we both feel must exist.
I must also ask a question, Rade, that may seem insulting to your intelligence but I promise I don't mean it this way. - How much of yourself do you bring to your posts? Looking at your posts there seems to be a consistency of view that bespeaks your own mindset. You approach DoctorDick's work with a healthy scepticism (and rightly so) and I'm sure you'd agree that any new theorem must stand the 'slings and arrows' of such scepticism. However, this simply demonstrates your own "speculative baggage". DoctorDick has either done something very crafty or he has hit on something quite fundamental in some sense, because it seems that you cannot approach his work with your own opinion. In a way you have to accept what he says because to do otherwise means introducing your "speculative baggage". I may be wrong about this, or may have misrepresented or misunderstood it in some way, but if not, how difficult will it be to have to accept something you intuitively disagree with. (Personally speaking - very difficult as it goes against my fundamental nature, or should I say "speculative baggage")