Why something rather than nothing?

[vectorcube]

Was that even reasonable? Are you after a debate or merely a loud proclamation of your apparent belief that every discussion should be easy for you to state and analyse. Why should that be so?

The question is not really hard, and i had fun trying to analysis it. Most answers to the question tend to have very elogant analysis.

 

[vectorcube]

who's the joker here.

Who am i talking to?

How can space exist or be observable without time and observers? How can distinguishable things exist without logic? Explain. That's the essence of this puzzle and what you've refused to address.

Are you joking me?
I was asking you why your claim " time implies space" is true? I don` t think i ever comment about the relationship between time, and space.

 

[vectorcube]

Vectorcube, what level of education have you actually reached? What courses have you taken? Have you yet published anything? I mean how qualified are you to pass judgement?

I took a lot of upper & graduate courses in philosophy. I also read a lot of philosophy textbooks. I wrote papers for classes, but never publish anything on philosophy.
What about you?

Even within any philosophy department you would have to deal with professors who are deconstructionists, theologians, eastern experts. How do they like being called sick and deluded?

Most are in english departments. Good poetry is only good at eluminating the human soul.

 

[apeiron]

I took a lot of upper & graduate courses in philosophy. I also read a lot of philosophy textbooks. I wrote papers for classes, but never publish anything on philosophy.
What about you?
.

Yeah, I've published in philosophy journals. Written four books. Spent 30 years on these issues.

 

[qraal]

Who am i talking to?

I could make a rude reply, but what do you really want to know? Addressing the person making an argument isn't actually getting to the point is it?

The argument is: why is there something instead of nothing? You seem to be claiming it's an incoherent question to start with, which isn't an incoherent claim itself but your approach seems confrontational and oddly restrictive.

Are you joking me?
I was asking you why your claim " time implies space" is true? I don` t think i ever comment about the relationship between time, and space.

Time implies space at least according to Special & General Relativity. Can't have one without the other. Or do you think that's incorrect? Would you like to explain why?

 

[apeiron]

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

There exist fact C (everything) such that C makes the obtaining of fact A (something) more likely than the obtaining of fact B (nothing).

So, when confronted with "why A rather than B?", one need only answer with fact C.

It is of course absurd to suggest that C (everything) is part of A (something), but on the other hand completely obvious that A is necessarily a part of C, and so trumps fact B. There is an underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing.

We then have to go through the whole argument again because now the question becomes why an everything rather than a nothing.

Which is where we turn to vagueness as a still better choice.

 

[vectorcube]

Yeah, I've published in philosophy journals. Written four books. Spent 30 years on these issues.

Great, i am going to have to give you a sticker. I will say the samething i said in so many other post. I don` t care about your big your brain. I don` t care for new age, pretentious philosophy which you seem to be all over on. How much of "nothing is everything" is going to be your theme??

 

[vectorcube]

I could make a rude reply, but what do you really want to know? Addressing the person making an argument isn't actually getting to the point is it?

I do want them to know that i am talking to them.

The argument is: why is there something instead of nothing? You seem to be claiming it's an incoherent question to start with, which isn't an incoherent claim itself but your approach seems confrontational and oddly restrictive.

Explain to me why you think this is so. My analysis is just one way of looking at the question, and to this day, i know two, and three people that gave a very elogant analysis of the question( robert nozick, derek parfit, and some guy i can ` t remember).

 

[vectorcube]

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

There exist fact C (everything) such that C makes the obtaining of fact A (something) more likely than the obtaining of fact B (nothing).

So, when confronted with "why A rather than B?", one need only answer with fact C.

It is of course absurd to suggest that C (everything) is part of A (something), but on the other hand completely obvious that A is necessarily a part of C, and so trumps fact B. There is an underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing.

We then have to go through the whole argument again because now the question becomes why an everything rather than a nothing.

Which is where we turn to vagueness as a still better choice.

You made the distinction between something, and everything. It is a unnecessary distinction because the question of "Why something...? " deals already directly the the set of all contingent concrete things. If we called this set S. S contains every contingent concrete object. It is already everything.

 

[apeiron]

If we called this set S. S contains every contingent concrete object. It is already everything.

But not everything is a contingent concrete object in any proper definition. And if it were, then posing the question in terms of something is what would be redundant.

The existence of some thing does not then necessitate the existence of all possible things. But the existence of every possible thing does then also necessitate the existence of some thing.

Perhaps that is why Nozick (Invariances p148) says: "Philosophers of modality count with three number: 0, 1, all."

It is sophistry rather than logic to redefine your terms when you get caught out.

 

[apeiron]

( robert nozick, derek parfit, and some guy i can ` t remember).

Full references please.

 

[vectorcube]

Full references please.

Nozick, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Explanations

Parfit,http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil3600/parfit.pdf

 

[vectorcube]

But not everything is a contingent concrete object in any proper definition. And if it were, then posing the question in terms of something is what would be redundant.

Curious, but what exactly do you think the question "why something..." refer to? It refers to every single concrete contingent thing that exist. What is not included? Ghost? Should i include batman& robin as well ?

The existence of some thing does not then necessitate the existence of all possible things. But the existence of every possible thing does then also necessitate the existence of some thing.

This has nothing to do with what i am saying at all! When i say "everything", i am not at all saying "all possible worlds exist". I am not at committed to the existence of possible worlds, or anything of that sort. The "everything" here refers to all concrete contingent thing.
The description in terms of conrete contingent things are more general. It would apply whether or not possible worlds exist.

Perhaps that is why Nozick (Invariances p148) says: "Philosophers of modality count with three number: 0, 1, all."

It is sophistry rather than logic to redefine your terms when you get caught ou

Not at all, but this is unrelated to the topic. Something personal about youself, so you can believe whatever you like.

 

[apeiron]

This has nothing to do with what i am saying at all! When i say "everything", i am not at all saying "all possible worlds exist". I am not at committed to the existence of possible worlds, or anything of that sort. The "everything" here refers to all concrete contingent thing.
The description in terms of conrete contingent things are more general. It would apply whether or not possible worlds exist.

Weasel away. You either are talking about mere somethingness or you attempt some clear and honest definition of everythingness. This is not a race where you are allowed to back both horses.

For example, the Parfit cite you supplied...

"Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every
possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis..."

So Parfit is rightly attempting to distinguish mere somethings from some true conception of everything. And your concrete contingent things would have to be a subset of even a many worlds view.

Then...

"This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained."

So here Parfitt is treating everything and nothing as limit states of possibility. Then the actual, that which obtains, is taken as gaining support from being aligned with one limit rather than the other. The maximal is serving as fact C to favour A over B.

Then winding up for his conclusion...

"According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely
happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view."

Which is the Peircean approach I've argued but which you clearly don't get.

Parfit continues...

"Suppose, for example, that reality is as full as it could be. On
the Brute Fact View, this fact would have no explanation. On
the Maximalist View, reality would be this way because the
highest law is that what is possible is actual. If reality were as
full as it could be, this Maximalist View would be better than
the Brute Fact View, since it would explain reality’s being this
way. And this view would provide that explanation even if it
merely happened to be true. It makes a difference where the
brute fact comes."

So Parfit, as far as he goes, generally is following my path closely. But he does not continue on down the line to even deeper ideas about the true nature of "everythingness" - the better ontic possibility of vagueness. Nor does he have a story on the selector itself, which I argue is the dichotomy.

But that is by the by. My point here is you don't appear even to understand your own sources. Or maybe you filter out all the dangerous "new age" aspects of what appears in your course work.

 

[apeiron]

Then what Nozick actually argues in the cite you pick...

"Nozick concludes by linking explanatory self-subsumption to reflexive self-reference, in order to explain why one version of LF holds rather than others that might hold. The apparent insufficiency of its holding in virtue of its holding, which would have been true of any of the others if they had held, marks the fundamental principle as reflexive: A reflexive fundamental principle will hold merely in virtue of holding, it holds true 'from the inside'."

Again, the only path is bootstrapping internalism. A teological approach where the ends explain the means.

Nothingness is considered and then rejected as some version of everythingness + selection must be the case. A case for fact C is at least roughed out in these two philosophers' view.

Nozick actually comes much closer to my arguments in Invariances p163. Treating everythingness as infinite dimensionality. Then extracting the actual world by some kind of averaging or a sum over histories.

Real new age stuff I guess.

 

[vectorcube]

Weasel away. You either are talking about mere somethingness or you attempt some clear and honest definition of everythingness. This is not a race where you are allowed to back both horses.

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

For example, the Parfit cite you supplied...

"Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every
possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis..."

So Parfit is rightly attempting to distinguish mere somethings from some true conception of everything..

"Merely something from some true conception of everything"? What the hell? Does this statement make any sense at all? What is "mere somethings" and "true conception of everything..."?

And your concrete contingent things would have to be a subset of even a many worlds view

Can you say this in a sentence? Are you saying the set of all concrete contingent things are a subset of the set of all possible universes in the many world view? If this is what you are saying then, then the answer is no.


Then...

This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained."

So here Parfitt is treating everything and nothing as limit states of possibility. Then the actual, that which obtains, is taken as gaining support from being aligned with one limit rather than the other. The maximal is serving as fact C to favour A over B

Unlike you, i actually read the whole paper. What is "limit states of possibility" suppose to mean anyway? Parfit never at all say the "alll world hypothesis" is true, nor does he draw from it your conclusion.

"According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely
happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view."

Which is the Peircean approach I've argued but which you clearly don't get.

Give me references that shows this is what peirce say, ok?

So Parfit, as far as he goes, generally is following my path closely. But he does not continue on down the line to even deeper ideas about the true nature of "everythingness" - the better ontic possibility of vagueness. Nor does he have a story on the selector itself, which I argue is the dichotomy.

I don ` t believe you, but you can believe whatever you want. I suggest if you want to make this productive. You should list the properties of partfit` s selectors by yourself. Just a thought.

But that is by the by. My point here is you don't appear even to understand your own sources. Or maybe you filter out all the dangerous "new age" aspects of what appears in your course work.

Honestly, i know the source well, and you don` t know anything at all about what you are saying. You draw superficial similars, and think the author support your view. Sadly, i think you believe it.

 

[vectorcube]

Then what Nozick actually argues in the cite you pick...

"Nozick concludes by linking explanatory self-subsumption to reflexive self-reference, in order to explain why one version of LF holds rather than others that might hold. The apparent insufficiency of its holding in virtue of its holding, which would have been true of any of the others if they had held, marks the fundamental principle as reflexive: A reflexive fundamental principle will hold merely in virtue of holding, it holds true 'from the inside'."

Again, the only path is bootstrapping internalism. A teological approach where the ends explain the means.
.

This is funny. LF stands for limited fecundity. Refexive is a relation between explanations.

What the hell does this have to do with "bootstrapping internalism"( whatever this means)? teological approach? ?

Nothingness is considered and then rejected as some version of everythingness + selection must be the case. A case for fact C is at least roughed out in these two philosophers' view.

Nozick actually comes much closer to my arguments in Invariances p163. Treating everythingness as infinite dimensionality. Then extracting the actual world by some kind of averaging or a sum over histories.

Real new age stuff I guess

Honestly, you are not fooling me. Most of what you say here don` t even make sense.

 

[apeiron]

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit. Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things". Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

The fact that everything is being denoted is an extra fact about the state of affairs. It is a fact that we have many things, and then a further fact that this is definitely "everything" - either via limits or set approaches.

Some things must exist in a global context. Everything would have to include even the global context.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

But then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

 

[vectorcube]

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

reference for what?

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit.

?

Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things".

What do you think the original question "why something...?" mean? This something is the set of all contingent concrete things. Do you know what that means? i bet you don`t.

Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories

When people ask "why something...?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

Sure, you can imagine anything you want that is not concrete objects, but the existence of those other things would not be in question here.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

?

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

The word "Nothing" means the same as "there is no state of affair". If all possible worlds exist, then this means " All state of affair that is logically possible, exist". You see the problem?

 

[qraal]

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

 

[apeiron]

When people ask "why something...?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

 

[qraal]

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

 

[vectorcube]

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

Don` t beat yourself up for it.

 

[vectorcube]

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

No! Abstract objects is not in question at all. Their existence is "necessary". In the sense that they would be what they are even if there was no concrete things at all.

 

[vectorcube]

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

Does it matter in this case? If possible world is real, then they are all concrete worlds. This means each concrete worlds are made/composed of concrete things/objects. Thus, the set S of all concrete objects would include all concrete worlds for each such world are made of concrete objects. Obviously, if S includes all concretes, then it includes all the worlds. QDE

 

[apeiron]

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

 

[qsa]

existence is about facts. only numbers and relations between them give rise to reality. sit in a dark room and ask yourself what is the only thing that is real and has no choice but to exist and nothing else can.NUMBERS.

 

[apeiron]

existence is about facts. only numbers and relations between them give rise to reality. sit in a dark room and ask yourself what is the only thing that is real and has no choice but to exist and nothing else can.NUMBERS.

Or is it the NUMBER-LINE?

Then if that, the number-plane (complex number)?

And we can skip trionions because division algebras - arithmetic as we know and love it - breaks down in three dimensions. The concrete objects no longer relate in the abstract space with such neat geometrical resonance.

But then, what about QUARTERNIONS? Now we have 4D numbers and the relations they give rise to (but hey, what gave rise to the 4D realm in which they are embedded).

Then we continue onwards in search of the embedding context in which point-like numbers, simple integers, are only the most local possible seeming events. Do we stop at octonions, at exceptional lie algebras?

These are island of regularity for sure, but the very fact they are tracking some kind of emergent path proves there is also a larger multidimension realm from which they emerge. A space of infinite dimensional numbers if we take a max limit approach, the most natural philosophical presumption.

Then, extrapolating from what we can already observe, it would be arguable that infinite-D numbers would have no arithmetically regular relationships. Division would long have gone out the window. InfiniteD nine-ness would no longer divide by infiniteD three-ness. But perhaps - interesting question - even addition, subtraction and multiplication would no longer be possible relationships.

If so, once you have everything (in the limit), you would also be getting nothing (in the limit). Or more properly, we have arrived at vagueness again.

One of the tactical questions I'm considering is whether to use vagueness to prove the loss of arithmetic at infinity, or whether an argument can be worked the other way round.

But anyway, yes, the case of numbers has been carefully considered here. And it is 21st century mathematics. To update Kronecker in a post-category theory age, we would have to say god made the integers and the "infinite-ion" - the total system of an infinite dimensional algebraic space that could have its internal resonance-based features.

Baez offers a wonderful introduction to the basics of division algebras and their regularities for the intrigued...
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/octonions/

 

[qraal]

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

A World has elements, a space, time and rules governing how it develops. A world is kind of like a cellular automaton at its simplest. But I think a world also needs an origin even if its future might be endless.

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

Yes. A world evolves, by my definition. States endlessly change, else the world halts/ends. We can't have a billiard ball universe if there's not some means for them to appear in the first place. Thus a flow from "simplest" to more complex

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Quite so. I think even our sparring partner would agree.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

Regress is the preferred option (escape?) for some. They don't know how to handle space-time or the Void. I have an idea I'm working on which you might like, but need more information (ironically) before I can articulate it fully.

 

[apeiron]

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

 

[Galteeth]

I think this question reflects a fundamental limit of human understanding.

Let's go back to Descartes' famous Cogito.

It is certainly impossible to deny that one thinks. But contained in the structure of the cogito are other fudamental elements of human conscioussness that are intrinsic to experience. "I think therefore I am" or the more basic "It thinks" imply a linear structure to thought. In order to even form this basic undeniable thought there is an implicit linear order. Even without direct causality, the linear order remains. No matter how many times we reduce things to simpler components, there remains a follow up "well why that?" or a "what is before x?" even as we reach the limits of what is knowable.

Apply this to the big bang. There remains the question "why the big bang?" or "what came before?" There have been proposed speculative answers, but these have the same problem. This is a fundamental irresolvable paradox of human thinking. It seems to me the only conclusion one can reach at this present time is that human understanding of the nature of existence, being bound by thoughts requiring a linear structure, is inherently limited.

 

[vectorcube]

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

<< personal insult deleted by Mentors >>

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

Another impression. Great!

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements?

 

[vectorcube]

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

I guess the word "ontological" is too big for me.

 

[vectorcube]

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

Unrelated to the topic!

 

[apeiron]

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements?

Yes. I already said that from a systems perspective, the local elements are what would contruct the global forms. And the global forms are what create the local elements by constraint. Then the two sources of action together are "the system".