Recent content by Ferris_bg

I want to use this post to thank all the people who followed and wrote in this forum. Thank you for the time spend here, we had some very nice discussions and it was always a pleasure to me to read your posts and share my thoughts with you. I wish you all the best guys, and always remember to...

You can check this thread out.

pftest, as I wrote before in this thread, supervenience does not entail emergence, which your examples illustrate. Supervenience is not emergence. They are not the same thing.

pftest, no one knows if mind supervene on brain, that's just the physicalist position. So when one attempts to defend it, one assumes this as true and goes on from there. I can say mind supervene on legs then you can say "yeah, but people with no legs still have minds". Then I can say prove it...

I think your example illustrates emergence. And supervenience does not always entail emergence. Supervenience condition: Two systems engaged in the same physical activity will produce identical mentality (if they produce any at all). And, yes, I completely agree that emergence is a...

How does it feel to be entropy? I suppose good. :)

The difference between the hard problem of consciousness and the other hard problems for science is in the way the questions "why" have arisen. If we have only our cognitive type of experience, we wouldn't ask questions like "how it feels", but we would still ask questions like "why is there...

Functionalism falls in the property dualism category (aka non-reductive physicalism). As you can see from the picture in wiki, the mental is considered a "property" of the physical substance. The problem with these types of theories is that they can't account for mental causation aka the mental...

There is a difference (psychological vs phenomenal) for sure and the Knowledge Argument is still a serious challenge for physicalism.

Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events...

We don't know if there are any mental states, which are the same for different individuals. We can only guess. That's why I gave the example with the same person at different ages. What I know from introspection is that the same chemicals can cause me different qualia, but I am also able to...

Yes, you are right it's not, but its part of what non-reductive physicalism is. [Mind-body supervenience] The mental supervenes on the physical in that any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental...

Just a quick example clarifying supervenience: We have 2 different brains - B1 and B2. If the mind is identical with the brain these will always produce different mentality (M1 != M2 where B1 = M1 and B2 = M2). // reductive physicalism If the mind supervene on the brain these can...

That sounds like the Zombie argument from Chalmers, but I don't like it and to be more precise, the word "conceive" in it.

Here are the four standard models of mind-body interaction. If we accept that the mind is a property of the whole, then as you say at first it seems logical that the mind influences the whole. There is a however one problem with this assumption and its well illustrated by the Supervenience...