Receptivity: gainst epiphenomenalism and manifestation of levels of nature
Hi TakLoufer, thank you for joining the forum and for your interesting response to my post. (I also like to think of properties like objects :smile:)
I agree and disagree that the need of receptivity is no more than...
Hi moving finger,
the second premise of your argument will not work, because there is no argument for your second premise using "bare differences". Each physical theory is a mathematical theory and thus describes only bare differences. But p-consciousness is something more ore other than bare...
There is some discussion of Rosenbergs „A Place for Consciousness“ (APFC) in the December issue of Psyche. All articles are available in the World Wide Web. See
http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/"
1) William S. Robinson has some „Doubts on Receptivity“. It may be only a trivially truth that...
Hi you all, thanks for the discussion.
I think we agree in our innocence of the exact meaning of Amy Kind’s incoherent experience without consciousness in Rosenberg’s book.
I want to summarize the necessary aspects of experience, i.e. p-consciousness:
phenomenal content (phenomenal...
Amy Kind: Panexperientialism is incoherent
Amy Kind wrote an essay responding the theses of Rosenberg in this chapter.
http://phil-rlst.claremontmckenna.edu/akind/
“Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience”, forthcoming in Psyche
She finishes her essay with this criticism...
Hi antfm, nice to hear from you,
Perhaps you are right and there is only a small difference between the two positions I discuss. I excluded some interesting models from the beginning. Catute’s proposal that the self is not existing and the proposal that the self is primarily the cognitive self...
Hi saltydog and nameta9 and all others,
thank you for your interesting posts. Your discussion about size inversion seems to me very speculative. You made the following proposal:
This reciprocal definition could also be implemented in some other places of the universe that do not have any...
nameta9, do you think that all entities and everything that you can address exist? That would be a metaphysical thesis that is controversial.
Second: Granted that infinity exists. Does infinity exist in nature and does it exist as something concrete? Are there some infinite things?
In what sense a singularity is infinite? Is it infinite because it is incountable? I do not think so. Is it infinite because there is an asymptotic function to some value in space but the function itself does not reach this point (e.g. 1/x and the y-axis)? Do you mean something like this by a...
Nobody knows whether there is ontological emergence in the case of the mind. The problem is how ontological emergence would be compatible with the causal closure of the world and the fact that the physical laws are never broken. Hence ontological emergence seems only possible when physics does...
I suppose that I'm also missing something. But I think your question is very good (like many other simple questions).
Nature is finite insofar it is concrete. Insofar the connection of some properties involves mathematical derivations (particularly infinitesimal calculus) these relations are...
Hi canute, thank you for proposing a third proposition that there is no self but only a (cognitive?) self-construct.
I have some problems with your thesis. Who does your actions (regarding the PC screen, typing a post...) - if it is not the self? Do actions exist?
Thank you, Canute, for your questions. Regrettably, I cannot argue for all my assumptions because the main issue here is to clarify my question.
I assume this is possible. I suppose that at least non human animals and human babies experience something without cognition. A further example...
An unusual proposal for the concept of a human subject is proposed in the thread about Gregg Rosenberg’s book (chapter 12 and chapter 13). I want to discuss it independent of the context of Rosenberg. It is proposed that a (human) subject is: “a thing that experiences a bounded unit of...
Do you have empirical evidence that properties exist? I do not have more evidence for the existence of objects as I have for the existence of properties.
I think "object" is a primitive concept and accept loseyourname's argument
The question is how to characterize this object. Object can be...