Japan Earthquake: Political Aspects

[agapemom]

You guys and gals, of course, knew this all along. Right?

"The dangers of fukushima are greater than we think."

http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=b8e53c620300ae88791163048&id=68c85cc08a

http://www.chrismartenson.com/martensonreport/part-2-arnie-gundersen-interview-protecting-yourself-if-situation-worsens

Thank you for these links Andy - they are exactly what I've been looking for. An analysis of what has happened, what needs to be done, what to look for, and how to respond - all in Layman's terms.

THANKS again!

 

[Borek]

Thank you for these links Andy - they are exactly what I've been looking for. An analysis of what has happened, what needs to be done, what to look for, and how to respond - all in Layman's terms.

Problem is, not everyone agrees with this analysis, some see it as too alarmistic.

 

[robinson]

And we certainly don't want any alarms going off. Move along, nothing to see here.

 

[agapemom]

Problem is, not everyone agrees with this analysis, some see it as too alarmistic.

Thanks for that information too. What do you see as the most off-base or "alarmistic" portions of the message?

Do you think that the analysis of what has happened so far accurate?

 

[Borek]

And we certainly don't want any alarms going off. Move along, nothing to see here.

That's not the situation. If that would be the case, I would delete links.

 

[Borek]

Thanks for that information too. What do you see as the most off-base or "alarmistic" portions of the message?

Do you think that the analysis of what has happened so far accurate?

I haven't read this particular interview, my opinion is based on earlier Gundersen's comments. They were discussed in the main thread several times over the last two months, sorry, I don't remember enough details to locate them fast now.

 

[clancy688]

Thanks for that information too. What do you see as the most off-base or "alarmistic" portions of the message?

Do you think that the analysis of what has happened so far accurate?

There are certainly some aspects which are worthy of discussion.Recriticality: Gundersen mentioned that iodine levels in the SFPs measured one month after the accident indicate that there's been recriticality going on inside. NUCENG proved that wrong with simple math in the main thread.

Chernobyl contamination levels: What Arnie says is only half of the truth. There are zones with 1,5 MBq/m² disposition and more. It's in fact up to 30 MBq/m². But saying that that's more than Chernobyl is not correct. The truth is, land around Chernobyl became an exclusion zone if the disposition was over 1,5 MBq/m². But that's of course not the upper boundary. It is the lower one.

Possible Unit 4 collapse: Many people in this forum are questioning the "Unit 4 leaning theory".

 

[Dmytry]

There are certainly some aspects which are worthy of discussion.


Recriticality: Gundersen mentioned that iodine levels in the SFPs measured one month after the accident indicate that there's been recriticality going on inside. NUCENG proved that wrong with simple math in the main thread.

the hell he proved it. All he shown was that there is enough i-131 in the fuel, but not the mechanism that would be several thousands times more selective in transfer of I-131 vs cs-137 than anywhere else (which would be required to have such i-131 concentration without much higher than observed cs-137 concentration).

 

[htf]

All he shown was that there is enough i-131 in the fuel, but not the mechanism that would be several thousands times more selective in transfer of I-131 vs cs-137 than anywhere else

Sound to me like the ether theory and the Michelson-Morley-experiment.

It has neither been proofed that there is re-criticality nor has it been excluded. But re-criticality theory can perfectly explain the observations, whereas no plausible mechanism has been invented so far by those believing in non-criticality. This is a fact.

 

[clancy688]

Sound to me like the ether theory and the Michelson-Morley-experiment.

It has neither been proofed that there is re-criticality nor has it been excluded. But re-criticality theory can perfectly explain the observations, whereas no plausible mechanism has been invented so far by those believing in non-criticality. This is a fact.

Um, nope...?

He proved that even with very little fuel damage (~ 5%) and NO recriticality the iodine levels in the pool (~150 Bq/cm³ if I remember correct) could be explained.

Recriticality for Unit 4 explains in fact nothing. It was mathmatical proved (by NUCENG again) that radiolysis alone could be responsible for the hydrogen blast which killed the outer structure of Unit 4. Keep in mind that underwater videos of SFP 4 show intact fuel racks.

 

[htf]

Um, nope...?

He proved that even with very little fuel damage (~ 5%) and NO recriticality the iodine levels in the pool (~150 Bq/cm³ if I remember correct) could be explained.

You are etirely missing the point. The Cs vs. I ration has not been explained. No doubt about the absolute levels. But the ratio has to be explained. And I am not only talking about the SPF#4. The Cs/I ratio is not what you would expect in many cases. There have been speculations from the beginning of the crisis.

I am not saying that it is impossible to explain but I'd like to hear a plausible explanation. As long as there is none I consider Gunderson's re-criticality theory as very plausible.

 

[Luca Bevil]

And in any case, I would not say that Arnie Gundersen has lost credibility for offering a possible explanation.

 

[htf]

Gunderson has a bad reputation in this form because in his videos he was sometimes speculating too much. Of course, he wanted people to watch his videos. But in the Chris Martenson interview he makes some very important statement that I do not consider as speculations:

1. The worst case has happened in Fukushima. The RPVs have holes and the containments are leaking.

2. Massive inland contamination has only been prevented by fortunate winds.

3. The situation is still not under control and the reactors are still emitting massive amounts of radioactivity.

4. The stability of the buildings may be in danger when flooding the containments and massive aftershocks hit them.

5. The nightmare is not yet over.

You may think I am against nuclear power. But I personally never was. Not until Fukushima. And I still think nuclear power plants can be safely operated from a technical point of view. But I am now convinced that profit oriented companies have disqualified themselves for this job.

 

[jlduh]

"[...] experts on nuclear power generation are an enclosed group and they tend to avoid vigorous discussions and uncomfortable subjects"

I think this is maybe not the case only in nuclear business (I know many other occurences of this phenomenon), BUT in case of nuclear industry, this can have much more consequences than in many other fields. Lack of counter forces and alternative discussions INSIDE the business is what is happening, in other words. In other words again, you can get blind by shutting your eyes to much and too long.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/05_23.html

The chairperson of Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission, Haruki Madarame, has told NHK that the engineering guidelines for nuclear power plants should be thoroughly revised as they do not include the possibility of a long-term power failure.

[...]

The guidelines were last modified by the commission in 1990.They state that a long-term power failure can be ignored as emergency back-up systems are expected to supply electricity. The complacency about blackouts has been pointed out as one of the causes of the severe accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Madarame told NHK that the guidelines clearly state that a long-term power failure can be disregarded. He said he paid no attention to the explanation until the accidents and he regrets his lack of knowledge, adding that the guidelines should have included the worst-case scenario.

He said the guidelines were not revised because experts on nuclear power generation are an enclosed group and they tend to avoid vigorous discussions and uncomfortable subjects. He concluded that the Fukushima accidents were caused by human error.

 

[zapperzero]

Wow, if you applied that logic consistently you'd never do anything unless you did it yourself. Toilet backed up? Better call the carpenter, you know that plumber makes his living off broken pipes...

[EDIT} oh yeah, don't bother looking, I've been a 'shill' for the "nuke complex" for over 30 years.

Well I tend to do the routine maintenance work on my motorbikes myself, after having been ripped off by mechanics once too often. I even went so far as to acquire the skills needed to change lightbulbs in the house :D.

But other than that, I tend to trust those who have demonstrable expertise. I would certainly trust QuantumPion to understand a decay chain or a jet pump and be able to discuss such subjects in a reasonable and balanced manner.

Yet, I would not blindly trust him, or you, or anyone else in the industry when the talk turns to "is nuclear power really necessary?" just as I wouldn't trust my mechanic to answer truthfully if I ask "hey, do you think it would be an issue if I checked my spark plugs all by myself from now on?".

 

[Dmytry]

Um, nope...?

He proved that even with very little fuel damage (~ 5%) and NO recriticality the iodine levels in the pool (~150 Bq/cm³ if I remember correct) could be explained.

that little fuel damage would also release Cs-137 , with Cs to I ratio far in excess (factor of >1000) of what was observed (due to how Cs-137 did not decay appreciable whereas i-131 decayed by more than 10 half-lifes), or conversely requiring >1000x better selectivity in transfer of Cs than I versus *everything else*. It is not some puny factor of 10 or so you can see elsewhere. It is massive selectivity. [edit: and to anticipate some stuff, no it's not transfer as CsI because CsI has 1360:1 ratio of I-131 to Cs-137 in Bq and only a very small fraction of Cs there could have been in form of CsI]

Got to love how those with self interest provide stuff for the entire range of gullibility, from the reactor being in centre of Pripyat to simple math proof of Gundersen being wrong so that whatever Gundersen says can be dismissed (albeit that one might be non-deliberate, leaving the mis-interpretation as exercise of the reader). Sigh.
What can work as non-criticality explanation for the isotope ratio is contaminated cooling water.

Think critically guys, don't approach it with preconception that someone from nuke industry will always get it wrong (the inclination to get stuff wrong doesn't mean everyone necessarily will), don't approach it with preconception that someone from nuke industry will get it right (just coz they know some stuff doesn't mean they'd not make something misleading; deception is extremely common), just think yourself.

 

[Dmytry]

But other than that, I tend to trust those who have demonstrable expertise. I would certainly trust QuantumPion to understand a decay chain or a jet pump and be able to discuss such subjects in a reasonable and balanced manner.

in my opinion anyone who thinks that Chernobyl NPP was in middle of Pripyat and Pripyat was not evacuated for several days, could not be trusted at all. There is a plenty of balanced information on the Chernobyl. There is generally a very strong correlation between ignorance on different but related topics; I'm pretty sure that the people who manage to pick up such gross misconception about Chernobyl despite the availability of good data also managed to pick up more misconceptions about decay chains or jet pumps or what ever than average. Yes, in principle, if someone does not get right facts about Chernobyl, that does not preclude perfect knowledge of decay chains or the like, but in reality there's often a common cause to mistakes.

TL;DR: I'd not trust anyone there, it is a much better idea to check it yourself.

 

[robinson]

Those who make a living and depend on nuclear reactors for power can not be objective about the current disasters. It's just not possible. Those with a preexisting objection about the dangers may also suffer from bias. It's human nature.

An issue as complicated and connected to weapons and world governments and the military is often muddled by politics.

 

[NUCENG]

the hell he proved it. All he shown was that there is enough i-131 in the fuel, but not the mechanism that would be several thousands times more selective in transfer of I-131 vs cs-137 than anywhere else (which would be required to have such I-131 concentration without much higher than observed Cs-137 concentration).

Dmytry is correct. My calculations were only aimed at determining if the data could be explained without assuming recriticality. I determined that fuel damage equivalent to a 5% gap release could explain the levels at that time. I did not make any claim that there was or was not recriticality. There were several potential explanations being debated at that time and some were claiming that recriticality was evident. Others (TEPCO) were trying to float a lead baloon blaming deposition.

Further, I have repeatedly pointed out that the interpretation of I-131 to Cs-137 ratios is a very difficult nut to crack unless you know a lot more that we did about the transport path, temperatures, pH, and chemistry. In the case of the turbine building subdrain levels in one building I frankly admitted that the trends seemed to be backwards at that time with increasing I-131 and little or no change in Cs-137.

If you have a specific sample point in mind, I can look at this again, but please be careful in interpreting my results.

 

[clancy688]

If you have a specific sample point in mind, I can look at this again, but please be careful in interpreting my results.

Okay, I'm sorry. I did misinterpret your statements. Recriticality cannot ruled out. But I still think it's unlikely.

 

[Dmytry]

Dmytry is correct. My calculations were only aimed at determining if the data could be explained without assuming recriticality. I determined that fuel damage equivalent to a 5% gap release could explain the levels at that time. I did not make any claim that there was or was not recriticality. There were several potential explanations being debated at that time and some were claiming that recriticality was evident. Others (TEPCO) were trying to float a lead baloon blaming deposition.

Further, I have repeatedly pointed out that the interpretation of I-131 to Cs-137 ratios is a very difficult nut to crack unless you know a lot more that we did about the transport path, temperatures, pH, and chemistry. In the case of the turbine building subdrain levels in one building I frankly admitted that the trends seemed to be backwards at that time with increasing I-131 and little or no change in Cs-137.

If you have a specific sample point in mind, I can look at this again, but please be careful in interpreting my results.

well ya... anyways on the topic of the transport paths, temperatures, pH, and chemistry, the point is that it has to be over 1000 times more preferential for I versus Cs than any other transport we seen anywhere there so far, even for seriously long and complex paths. That makes it fairly implausible, don't you think? Extraordinary claims shouldn't be taken as default hypothesis. If something can get 99.9% of Cs out of the solution by accident, they should just use that miracle on basement water.
The simplest explanation IMO is use of contaminated water for cooling. The basements and such, well, what is really strange is that they are not testing for other isotopes, or not releasing results. If there was re-criticality they wouldn't publish those isotopes data, but its uncertain if they would if there is no re-criticality. In any case TEPCO can easily find out if there was recriticality or not.

BTW, do you think, based on photos, that the freshly spent fuel in #4 pool was damaged? It looks this way to me, the grid on top is distorted on some of the blocks... which does suggest damage to the boral plates and definitely to boraflex (which is plastic). Half-burnt fuel has the maximum reactivity. Of course what is not seen in #4 is any signs of re-criticality of any note, with any kaboom-type disassembly, so the re-criticality in the pool does seem quite implausible.

 

[NUCENG]

Okay, I'm sorry. I did misinterpret your statements. Recriticality cannot ruled out. But I still think it's unlikely.

It is natural to look for information that confirms our opinions. I don't know if there has been recriticality. I hope that it hasn't occurred because the Japanese already have enough troubles dealing with plants that are shut down. But I am watching for evidence that it has happened.

Despite what suspicions some posters have expressed here about "plant men", "shills", or several other negative references, most engineers that are successful in the nuclear industry are successful because they don't accept things at face value. They "pull the string" to find out what is really behind an event. Experience is the best teacher and an engineer (whatever his or her industry) who is afraid of being wrong is in the wrong occupation. You may never be able to prove WHAT happened, but by elimination of what did NOT happen you may actually learn more. I am learning a lot here, and not just techical stuff.

BTW CLANCY is my favorite author.

 

[clancy688]

BTW CLANCY is my favorite author.

Yeah. It's a shame that he doesn't write anymore - at least that's what I wanted to type, but I'm seeing now that he's back with two more novels. I thought he stopped after Teeth of the Tiger. At least I read reports about a nasty divorce involving character rights and health problems...
Apparently learning something about nuclear disaster engineering isn't the only thing one can experience in this forum - seeing my favourite author being back in business quite made my day.
Well and if that isn't a coincidence - his second newest book is about terrorists trying to bomb a nuclear waste facility in the USA...

Regarding recriticality in SFP #4

As already mentioned, there are videos showing the pool's interior. There seems to be outer damage at the fuel assemblies, but I would expect more if there was a criticality going on. If I'm informed right, there are three conditions to be met for recriticality:

1) enough uranium in the fuel
2) presence of a moderator (water)
3) geometry

We can't argue about one and two, there's undoubtly new fuel in the pool and of course there's water... but I'm not so sure for the third one. I would store fuel in water only if it's assured that the fuel doesn't get critical. So I'd store it in a way (geometry) which doesn't support recriticality. So for recriticality to occur, the fuel must've moved!
The videos now don't show the whole pool (or what's below) but the upper side of the assemblies doesn't look as if it's been moved.
Further we'd need force to move fuel. That could either've been the initial earthquake or the hydrogen explosion.
As for the first one, I don't think that TEPCO engineers wouldn't spot a recriticality in the SFP, even with a station blackout and three other units melting down around them. And for the second one - the explosion wasn't as violent as in Units 1 and 3. Would it be possible for a shock wave to move fuel assemblies several metres submerged? I don't know. Perhaps here's someone who can answer that question.

 

[NUCENG]

well ya... anyways on the topic of the transport paths, temperatures, pH, and chemistry, the point is that it has to be over 1000 times more preferential for I versus Cs than any other transport we seen anywhere there so far, even for seriously long and complex paths. That makes it fairly implausible, don't you think? Extraordinary claims shouldn't be taken as default hypothesis. If something can get 99.9% of Cs out of the solution by accident, they should just use that miracle on basement water.
The simplest explanation IMO is use of contaminated water for cooling. The basements and such, well, what is really strange is that they are not testing for other isotopes, or not releasing results. If there was re-criticality they wouldn't publish those isotopes data, but its uncertain if they would if there is no re-criticality. In any case TEPCO can easily find out if there was recriticality or not.

BTW, do you think, based on photos, that the freshly spent fuel in #4 pool was damaged? It looks this way to me, the grid on top is distorted on some of the blocks... which does suggest damage to the boral plates and definitely to boraflex (which is plastic). Half-burnt fuel has the maximum reactivity. Of course what is not seen in #4 is any signs of re-criticality of any note, with any kaboom-type disassembly, so the re-criticality in the pool does seem quite implausible.

Actually no, there are several characteristics of Cs and I that would make significant differences in their transport. Cs readily deposits of colder horizontal surfaces. An order (or three) of magnitude can easily occur depending on how it gets to the sample point.

One of the principles of release analysis is the use of the SBGT system filters. The HEPA filter efficiency for CsI is assumed to be 99.9%. For other isotopes such as noble gases there may be some filtration in the charcoal filter beds but basically most noble gases are directly released to the environment. I know those systems didn't work here, but the point is there are things that can make big defferences in transport. In the long run Cs deposition could become a significant problem that will remain embedded in concrete and debris long after all the water is processed.

Use of contaminated water to cool the pools early in the event would be expected to add both Cs and I, but in what ratio? That depends on the transport to the poin of cooling water suction. If that path was fairly slow and had a lot of cool horizontal surfaces the Cs getting to the suction could have been at a much lower concentration. Before you jump on me, I do not know if that explains it or not . There are way too many unknowns for me to make that call.

SFP4 is a tough call. I was surprised by how little evidence of damage was shown in the video and photos considering that the roof was so heavily damaged. Most of the debris was blown out or over the pool. There is some debris in the pool and it could have damaged rods releasing fission products from the gap. There was an extended loss of fuel pool cooling, but my calculations tell me that the fuel was not uncovered. Debris could have blocked natural circulation water flow in some channeled fuel bundles allowing localized heatup.

The Boral inserts are in the sides of each rack position As such the rack and fuel bundles in the cells will actually tend to protect the Boral. If the pool didn't uncover fuel the boral would not have been much over 100 degC depending on submergence pressure. Further if the boral had been extensively damaged and allowed recriticality I would have expected more radioactivity in the pool because there is no forced flow in the pool to cool a critical fuel assembly. Inside the reactor the recirculation system cools the rods with millions of pounds of recirculation flow per hour.

My best guess for SFP4 is that it experienced hydrogen evolution by radiolysis and pool boiling and some limited mechanical damage due to debris that released some fission products into the pool. Additional pool contamination from cooling water is a strong possibility as well based on the large leaks, feed and bleed addition of water to fuel pools, and the high concentrations measured in the shore area.

 

[NUCENG]

Yeah. It's a shame that he doesn't write anymore - at least that's what I wanted to type, but I'm seeing now that he's back with two more novels. I thought he stopped after Teeth of the Tiger. At least I read reports about a nasty divorce involving character rights and health problems...
Apparently learning something about nuclear disaster engineering isn't the only thing one can experience in this forum - seeing my favourite author being back in business quite made my day.
Well and if that isn't a coincidence - his second newest book is about terrorists trying to bomb a nuclear waste facility in the USA...

Regarding recriticality in SFP #4

As already mentioned, there are videos showing the pool's interior. There seems to be outer damage at the fuel assemblies, but I would expect more if there was a criticality going on. If I'm informed right, there are three conditions to be met for recriticality:

1) enough uranium in the fuel
2) presence of a moderator (water)
3) geometry

We can't argue about one and two, there's undoubtly new fuel in the pool and of course there's water... but I'm not so sure for the third one. I would store fuel in water only if it's assured that the fuel doesn't get critical. So I'd store it in a way (geometry) which doesn't support recriticality. So for recriticality to occur, the fuel must've moved!
The videos now don't show the whole pool (or what's below) but the upper side of the assemblies doesn't look as if it's been moved.
Further we'd need force to move fuel. That could either've been the initial earthquake or the hydrogen explosion.
As for the first one, I don't think that TEPCO engineers wouldn't spot a recriticality in the SFP, even with a station blackout and three other units melting down around them. And for the second one - the explosion wasn't as violent as in Units 1 and 3. Would it be possible for a shock wave to move fuel assemblies several metres submerged? I don't know. Perhaps here's someone who can answer that question.

Due to delays in the national commitment to accept spent fuel for geological storage US plants had to install dense pack fuel storage racks in spent fuel pools. That made the use of boral panels and inserts necessary to maintain the reactivity below criticality with the reqiuired margin. Later they had to begin installing dry fuel storage due to continued delays. If there is a criticism here it is that the lack of a go/no go decision on Yucca Mountain has led to the de facto risks of dense pack fuel pools and interim storage at over a hundred sites across the US. Nobody said, "STOP, we need to reevaluate this risk," instead of letting it force us into half measures to get through this short delay after that delay and so on. We are no closer to a solution today.

Back on topic, I don't know if Fukushima had dense pack storage or not. They have a common fuel storage pool on site and had fairly limited numbers of bundles in the units pools except for unit 4. Japan also sent their spent fuel to reprocessing. It is possible that the geometry was sufficient to prevent recriticality even in Unit 4, but I would have expected TEPCO to be shouting that from the rooftops if it were so. To be safe we have to assume that recriticality is a possibility and be alert to evidence that it is happening.

Because of the fresh fuel in Unit 4 the pool did boil in a little over a day after loss of fuel pool cooling. The steam would have introduced significant dilution and compressible vapor into the building. It is likely that helped mitigate the deflagration/detonation. It was also a significantly smaller production of hydrogen gas because there was little or no zirc-water reaction. As to the potential to move fuel racks, I am very doubtful that occurred. Incompressible Water level above the fuel would have actually spread the pressure pulse through the pool protecting the fuel and probably reflecting most of it back into the building. Fuel bundles are very fragile for side loading and I would expect to see evidence of broken fuel had there been much dislocation.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110607k0000e040078000c.html :

Disclosure of the main topics of the Japanese government's report to IAEA : in the future, the NISA is to become an independent body.

 

[jlduh]

Due to delays in the national commitment to accept spent fuel for geological storage US plants had to install dense pack fuel storage racks in spent fuel pools. That made the use of boral panels and inserts necessary to maintain the reactivity below criticality with the reqiuired margin. Later they had to begin installing dry fuel storage due to continued delays. If there is a criticism here it is that the lack of a go/no go decision on Yucca Mountain has led to the de facto risks of dense pack fuel pools and interim storage at over a hundred sites across the US. Nobody said, "STOP, we need to reevaluate this risk," instead of letting it force us into half measures to get through this short delay after that delay and so on. We are no closer to a solution today.

Back on topic, I don't know if Fukushima had dense pack storage or not. They have a common fuel storage pool on site and had fairly limited numbers of bundles in the units pools except for unit 4. Japan also sent their spent fuel to reprocessing. It is possible that the geometry was sufficient to prevent recriticality even in Unit 4, but I would have expected TEPCO to be shouting that from the rooftops if it were so. To be safe we have to assume that recriticality is a possibility and be alert to evidence that it is happening.

Because of the fresh fuel in Unit 4 the pool did boil in a little over a day after loss of fuel pool cooling. The steam would have introduced significant dilution and compressible vapor into the building. It is likely that helped mitigate the deflagration/detonation. It was also a significantly smaller production of hydrogen gas because there was little or no zirc-water reaction. As to the potential to move fuel racks, I am very doubtful that occurred. Incompressible Water level above the fuel would have actually spread the pressure pulse through the pool protecting the fuel and probably reflecting most of it back into the building. Fuel bundles are very fragile for side loading and I would expect to see evidence of broken fuel had there been much dislocation.

Wanted to mention here this interesting video:



Don't know this guy, but he seems to know what he is talking about concerning the high risk related to spent fuel pools in the US. As a french, with already much spend fuel on our territory because of the 58 reactors we have but with in addition a large amount stored at la Hague for treatment, I didn't know that the US had so many tons total (71 000 tons) and so many tons in average at each reactor in the SFP's (the guy says it's often 500 to 700 tons in the US reactors, so basically more than 5 times the average at Daichi plant, except gor N°4).

The reflexions about NRC's attitude on this subject (which acted to suppress the report made) are very much similar to the main conclusion that the chairperson of Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission, Haruki Madarame, has told NHK (see my post here: https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3341445&postcount=284 ): a closed world with too much co-dependency between NRC and nuke industry, in the selection process it seems (with one recent exception), and also in the fact that NRC is more and more relying on inspection programs from the industry instead of independant inspections, due to budget cuts.

Again I don't know this guy and the US situation, but I' would be glad to hear US citizens what they think on this matter. the guy states that an accident or terrorist attack in the US in one of this plants could because of this SFP storage lead to an exclusion zone 5 times the one in Chernobyl (the Chernobyl zone is half size the New Jersey, based on its words).

Nuclear spent fuel and waste treatment is, in my mind, one of the main reasons why nuclear power cannot be a long term and widely used technology.

When i was a kid, they were talking about the fact that in 10 or 15 years in the future they would do "transmutation" (that was kind of a magic word as it was presented!) and that's why they were storing spent fuel, in order in the short/mid term to convert it to safe stuff with this technology. Where is "transmutation" to convert danger to safe stuff? We are at the same state where we were 25 years ago: still going around the problem and just storing, storing storing...

All this seems to me a "dead end".

 

[Calvadosser]

I managed large engineering teams. You always have your analytical group that needs to think and re-thing everything 10 times until they propose something, those types are great for design work. But for crisis work I had the "drivers", they can think on their feet, they are able to elaborate complex plans in days, rather than months. When you use one group to do the task the other should do, you get a disaster. That is what seems to be happening here, they don't have the right type of people working on the problem. Contingency planning is a basic element of any plan.

Some time back, I read "Failure is not an Option" by Gene Kranz, the flight controller of the Apollo missions. They simulated and trained for combinations of failures that seemed to be ludicrously unlikely to occur. The result: when Apollo 13's command module lost its power on the way to the moon, they got the crew back.

I had (naively) assumed that all nuclear power organisations had a team who spent their time training for unlikely eventualities, using simulators to evaluate their plans. I'd believed there would be a pre-existing plan for just about everything - but clearly not.

Without pre-existing plans, you have to make your plans on the fly. If you have to make plans under pressure and in deteriorating conditions, you certainly don't need a group of procedure-oriented analysts debating all possibilities and suffering "analysis paralysis" while the situation continues to get worse. You also need people in charge who want to know what is the true situation, rather than bullgarbageting themselves that things are not really all that bad.

The Soviet military was heavily involved in the response to Chernobyl. I'm surprised that military involvement seems absent in the Fukushima crisis.

 

[zapperzero]

Despite what suspicions some posters have expressed here about "plant men", "shills", or several other negative references, most engineers that are successful in the nuclear industry are successful because they don't accept things at face value. They "pull the string" to find out what is really behind an event. Experience is the best teacher and an engineer (whatever his or her industry) who is afraid of being wrong is in the wrong occupation.

You have your basic hacker-engineer, the "let's see what we can see" type who tends to get very good at his chosen job simply because curiosity is egging him on. This kind of fellow may suffer from biases (such as, say, familiarity bias clouding his perception of risk or something).

But then there's the type of engineer that ends up in middle management. The one with the marginal skillset and the fearful outlook on life who ends up signing all the dodgy safety reports and gets promoted for it. You know a lot of guys like that. We all do.

 

[jlduh]

yes, we all know many examples everywhere, that's how things happen and that's why you need strong and REALLY independant counter forces to overcome this human tendancy. The independancy is also affected itself by this tendency so it's always on going process of equilibrium between "throttle and brakes" on this matter, the tendency being that an industry (and all the salaried people who earn the money for their families) will push as hard as possible to be heavy on the throttle to promote its interests.

A lot of engineers and scientist see this as a kind of "pollution" of pure science and tech by human problems and deviations, and consider that the science or the tech is not responible for it, so they don't want to care about these aspects (which they has for the most part difficulties with, they are unconfortable discussing this to take the words of Madarame above, even if in reality they are fullly part of the process everyday!).

But again, science and technology is made by humans for humans in a human's world, so this HAS to be discussed and considered, especially when that kind of disaster happen.

As Madarame says, this is a human caused accident, not only a "technical" accident. This doesn't mean that technology involved is not responsible, it means in my mind that ultimately, all have to recognize that whatever a technology is, you CANNOT throw away all the human aspects, which are also political in the large sense.