Before the discussion in the thread "
Do particles have well-defined positions at all times?", I thought what Bohr said in that quote was the only possibility. But it seems that QM is neutral on the issue of whether particles have positions. So now I think the right way to think isn't what Bohr said there, but rather "Since QM doesn't
say that particles have positions, there's no reason to think that they do".
There's still hope if you want to believe that there's something else. For example, it seems that the assumption that particles
do have positions can be added to QM without causing any inconsistencies or changing the theory's predictions. This would have some weird implications about the ways particles move (see the discussion in the positions thread), and we would need something like Bohmian mechanics to provide the details. In my opinion, that's what an interpretation should be: A set of statements that provide ontological details that QM doesn't.
Also, my analysis of the situation is heavily influenced by the specific list of axioms that I think of as the definition of "QM". If someone can come up with a different set of axioms that give us the same predictions about results of experiments, and that set doesn't include any axioms that can be removed without changing the predictions, then we have another theory that has just as much right to be called "QM" as the theory
I call QM. For example, suppose that we replace the Born rule with a rule ("the ABL rule") that tells us the probability of each possible result of a measurement at time t, given the state of the system at
two times t
1 and t
2, with t
1<t<t
2. This is probably the simplest change we can make to the theory. This version of QM can of course be "just a set of rules" too, but now it looks like the main alternative to the ensemble interpretation would be a version of consistent histories, rather than a version of the MWI.
My point here is that different sets of axioms suggest different ways to interpret QM as a description of what actually happens. Of course, I still have to point out that there's no good reason to think any of them is correct, but there's also no really convincing reason to think that they're all wrong. The best reason I have is just that QM
looks so much like a toy theory that someone invented just to show that it's possible to assign non-trivial probabilities to possible results of experiments. It looks like it should be the simplest possible theory of that kind actually.