Chapter 1: A Place for Consciousness

[hypnagogue]

In this opening chapter, Rosenberg touches on what phenomenal consciousness is and the philosophical problems it poses, and proceeds to develop a sketch of how his conceptual framework will place it within the natural order.

What is phenomenal consciousness (also known as p-consciousness, subjective experience, raw feels, and qualia)? Rosenberg gives various ways for understanding what is meant by the term, including Thomas Nagel's dictum of "what it is like," the method of introspectively cataloguing the qualities apparent in one's own immediate experiences, and conceptually isolating phenomenal consciousness from other senses of the word consciousness (e.g. Ned Block's "access consciousness").

P-consciousness presents us with the mind-body problem. What is the ontology of the mind, what is the ontology of the physical world, and how are they related? Can we create a coherent paradigm in which both can be seen to be the natural consequences of the same fundamental building blocks?

Rosenberg poses Liberal Naturalism as the paradigm from which he will address the problem. This view demands that we come to a coherent and complete account of subjective experience without making ad hoc claims that jut discontinuously from what we otherwise know about the world. Interactionist substance dualist acounts are almost universally considered to violate the second criterion; Rosenberg argues that physicalist accounts violate the first; and it is arguable that views such as epiphenomenalism violate both. Thus, when Rosenberg comes to satisfy both conditions, he will have arrived at a truly unique and novel theory in that it will neither suppose that subjective experience is physical, nor that it interacts with the physical.

Rosenberg sets out to achieve a non-ad hoc account by motivating the case, on grounds independent from the mind-body problem, that the physicalist understanding of the world is incomplete. In particular, he argues that our understanding of causality is conceptually deficient, and proceeds to create a new account of causality that is not. This new account of causality rests upon three bases: effective properties, receptive properties, and carriers. Of this triumvirate, physical theory includes only effective properties, and the two aspects it omits will prove to be crucial in establishing Rosenberg's Liberal Naturalist account of subjective experience.

 

[Fliption]

I'll start with a few questions/clarifications. When the different philosophical positions are introduced in this chapter I found myself still searching for what it really means to be a physicalist and therefore what it really means to be physical. Since there will be substantial material here arguing why physicalism is wrong, I found myself searching for what it really means. At first I find comments like this:

"Physicalism, which holds that everything is physical in some sense." (Page 6)

Other comments similarly seem to be circular. It isn't until I get to page 9 where the 3 distinctions of aspects of consciousness are listed that I see a possible way for the author to distinguish non-physical things from physical things. But I can't be sure if that's where this will lead since this is just an introductory chapter and he doesn't ever directly make it clear what the definitions are. I just don't want to get into the later chapters and find out that once again we are all talking about different things when we say "physical".

Also, the concept of "causation" is never directly described. I know what this word means but I can't be sure I know what the author means when he uses the word. What is meant by this word and what philosophical issues of causation is he talking about here in this quote from the preface?:

" This may seem like an unlikely project because the two problems of consciouness and causation are each tough philosophical checstnuts individually."

Any thoughts?

 

[hypnagogue]

I'll start with a few questions/clarifications. When the different philosophical positions are introduced in this chapter I found myself still searching for what it really means to be a physicalist and therefore what it really means to be physical. Since there will be substantial material here arguing why physicalism is wrong, I found myself searching for what it really means. At first I find comments like this:

"Physicalism, which holds that everything is physical in some sense." (Page 6)

Other comments similarly seem to be circular.

There is a lot that's left ambiguous in this chapter, necessarily so, as it's only intended as a sweeping overview of the rest of the book. Rest assured, we'll going into these things in quite some detail in the coming chapters.

The meanings of "physical" and "physicalism" are discussed at length in chapters 2 and 3. We'll discuss this in more detail later, but briefly, physical properties are understood to be the types of properties included in the fundamental ontology of physics. (As physics is not yet complete, its ontology is bound to change, but the types of things in its ontology will share some basic similarities with the ones it has now.)

Physicalism is the view that all facts about the world are either facts about physical properties, or are directly entailed by these physical facts. Once we specify what we mean by "physical," it is not circular to define physicalism in this way.

It isn't until I get to page 9 where the 3 distinctions of aspects of consciousness are listed that I see a possible way for the author to distinguish non-physical things from physical things. But I can't be sure if that's where this will lead since this is just an introductory chapter and he doesn't ever directly make it clear what the definitions are. I just don't want to get into the later chapters and find out that once again we are all talking about different things when we say "physical".

It should be clear after chapter 2 what counts as physical. When we get into the second half of the book, we'll see that physical theory is essentially a theory of what Rosenberg calls effective properties. Physics is not a theory of receptive properties or carriers, because neither of these is included in its fundamental ontology, and neither of these is entailed by its fundamental ontology. Thus, only one of the proposed three aspects of causation can rightfully be called 'physical,' and so the others are non-physical. Again, this will make more sense later on.

Also, the concept of "causation" is never directly described. I know what this word means but I can't be sure I know what the author means when he uses the word. What is meant by this word and what philosophical issues of causation is he talking about here in this quote from the preface?:

" This may seem like an unlikely project because the two problems of consciouness and causation are each tough philosophical checstnuts individually."

We'll be going into causation extensively in part II of the book, which is still a ways off. For now, if you're interested, you can skip ahead and read sections 9.1 - 9.6 for a discussion about causation.

 

[Fliption]

There is a lot that's left ambiguous in this chapter, necessarily so, as it's only intended as a sweeping overview of the rest of the book. Rest assured, we'll going into these things in quite some detail in the coming chapters.

OK, I suspected ths might be the case but just wanted to be sure.

We'll be going into causation extensively in part II of the book, which is still a ways off. For now, if you're interested, you can skip ahead and read sections 9.1 - 9.6 for a discussion about causation.

I'm ok with waiting and following along as the argument builds. I just didnt want anyone to assume that I knew what causation means in this context and then start building an argument on it.

 

[Rader]

For those who might have second thoughts about reading this and participating. This is a quote from the first chapter that gives a general indication where this will all lead.

Like physicalism, Liberal naturalism holds that the world is probably composed from single fundamental kind of thing. This fundamental kind of thing, if it exists, probably has a set of fundamental properties that are mutually related in a coherent and natural way by a single set of fundamental laws. However, like substance dualism, Liberal Naturalism hold that some of these properties and laws are not physical properties and laws. What ties the physical and nonphysical together is a deeper kind of thing of which they are both aspects.

 

[Canute]

Reading the beginning of the book there were one or two comments which caught my attention. It is probably not worth getting too deeply into the issues they raise until they reappear later and are covered in more detail, but these are just some first reactions.

"What ties the physical and nonphysical together is a deeper kind of thing of which they are both aspects."

This encouraged me to read the rest. The author suggests, or seems to suggest, that it is not correct to characterise what is fundamental to our existence as either physical or non-physical. This makes much sense to me. However it is not clear to me that he gets to grips with what it implies as the book unfolds. But then, quite a lot of his argument went over my head, so this discussion may help clarify this.

I was a little discouraged by this:

"Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything. For example, when I close my eyes I see diffuse shapes... These are experiences and thus elements of phenomenal consciousness, even though they do not represent anything."

I suppose this could be just a poorly chosen example, but it seems to me a mistake pure and simple. Consciousness of a diffuse shape is consciousness of something, whether it represents something else or not. Perhaps he sorts this out later, but I felt it to be an unfortunate comment coming so early in the book. I would argue that distinguishing between consciousness and its contents is of fundamental importance in any detailed discussion of it.

I am also worried, on the basis of the preface and Ch.I, that he is arguing for monism. This will come out in the wash, but if he is arguing for this then I feel he's flogging a dead horse. (Of course it's too early to start picking his ideas apart, but this is just first reactions.)

It worries me that his metaphysic is a little shaky when he says:

"Effective and causal properties must be carried by fundamental intrinsic properties."

What is an 'intrinsic property'? It seems to be an oxymoron. It simply begs the ontological question that he is purporting to answer to say that properties are epiphenomenal on properties and so on ad infinitum, with no ultimate 'thing' to underly them or have them. If he is suggesting this then we are back with the old problem of attributes and have not moved forward. But again, perhaps he sorts this out later. (Presumably his argument is that properties are dependent on his ultimate 'substance', which is neither physical nor non-physical.)

My metaphysical suspicions were also aroused by his question - "How can the world have both physical and phenomenal aspects?" The assumption built into this question, which is that what is physical is 'real' as opposed to phenomenal, needs some unpacking. Because he asks this question I wonder if he ever does this. We'll see.

That's about all I have to say about the beginning.

 

[cyberdiction]

I'll start with a few questions/clarifications. When the different philosophical positions are introduced in this chapter I found myself still searching for what it really means to be a physicalist and therefore what it really means to be physical. Since there will be substantial material here arguing why physicalism is wrong, I found myself searching for what it really means. At first I find comments like this: Any thoughts?

Actually, I was a confirmed physicalist before starting Gregg's book. My
interest was in AI and I rejected any kind of dualism. In terms of the
philosophy of mind, physicalism means that the mind is created/generated
by the brain and that consciousness has a physical basis and that there
is no other source. Another source means two, and is called dualistic.
This is an involved area of philosophy and the word "supervenience" arises.
I think causality is at the core of reality and philosophy which enticed me
to start reading "A Place For Consciousness" abbreviated APFG I guess.
I think current physicalism does not provide a complete answer.

I think a book discussion might be fun!
Regards, Stephen

 

[cyberdiction]

I was a little discouraged by this:

"Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything. For example, when I close my eyes I see diffuse shapes... These are experiences and thus elements of phenomenal consciousness, even though they do not represent anything."

I suppose this could be just a poorly chosen example, but it seems to me a mistake pure and simple. Consciousness of a diffuse shape is consciousness of something, whether it represents something else or not.

Consciousness and mind are both rather poorly defined. Perhaps Gregg was
trying to distinguish between the two types of consciousness:

(1) "Philosophical meaning: the context of consciousness—i.e. the capacity for any particular mental content to exist in the world at all—in other words, the fact that any such “thing” as a mind exists in the first place.

(2) Psychological meaning: the contents of consciousness—such as thoughts, beliefs, images, types of feeling—in other words, what goes on in the mind.

Philosophically, consciousness is a state or quality of being, the fact of consciousness characterized by having a capacity for sentience and subjectivity. It is contrasted with being “non-conscious,” a state of affairs wholly without sentience or subjectivity. For example, a person (awake or asleep), a dog, or a worm exemplify consciousness in this sense; a rock, a cloud, or a computer do not."

Then I went to Wikipedia which said:

"Philosophers distinguish between phenomenal consciousness
and psychological consciousness. In a philosophical context,
the word "consciousness" means something like awareness, or
that a mind is directed at something."

SH: Do you notice that Wikipedia provides the philosophical context
meaning as what is given as the Psychological meaning in the first
set of definitions. Seems like a conflict. Wike also said:
"There is, in the view of very many philosophers, one mental function that accompanies some, or perhaps all, mental events, namely, consciousness."

Now you are speaking of a mental event, being aware of diffuse shapes.
And you are using consciousness to mean 'conscious of something' not
purely possessing consciousness, like a worm, which might not have a mind.

Well, I tend to agree with you his example was imprecise, unless he is using
some standard definition that is not commonly in use; but still not so good.

Maybe somebody else will have a better justification for his example.

Regards, Stephen

 

[hypnagogue]

I was a little discouraged by this:

"Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything. For example, when I close my eyes I see diffuse shapes... These are experiences and thus elements of phenomenal consciousness, even though they do not represent anything."

I suppose this could be just a poorly chosen example, but it seems to me a mistake pure and simple. Consciousness of a diffuse shape is consciousness of something, whether it represents something else or not. Perhaps he sorts this out later, but I felt it to be an unfortunate comment coming so early in the book. I would argue that distinguishing between consciousness and its contents is of fundamental importance in any detailed discussion of it.

The actual quote is "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else." (In the text, "else" is not in boldface, but it is italicized.) What he intends to say here is that qualia are not necessarily representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. edit: In another words, even though some qualia can be taken to be representations of phenomena existing outside of the mind (e.g. one's visual experience of a chair is a representation of an objective chair), we cannot entirely characterize p-consciousness in representational terms. The contents of consciousness can play the role of representations in the proper cognitive context, but they cannot be most fundamentally characterized as representational.

The distinction between experiential consciousness and its phenomenal contents is actually quite explicitly expressed in Rosenberg's theory of consciousness, as we'll see later on.

I am also worried, on the basis of the preface and Ch.I, that he is arguing for monism. This will come out in the wash, but if he is arguing for this then I feel he's flogging a dead horse. (Of course it's too early to start picking his ideas apart, but this is just first reactions.)

He is arguing for a form of monism, but I don't know why you'd find that troubling. (Would you prefer substance dualism?) In fact, earlier in your post, you expressed enthusiasm for the statement "What ties the physical and nonphysical together is a deeper kind of thing of which they are both aspects"; what could this point to other than a kind of monism?

Perhaps you feel other monist philosophies have failed, but I wouldn't feel confident that they've worked out all the permutations. In any case, if monism leaves a bad taste in your mouth for whatever reason, you can consider Rosenberg's framework as a kind of aspect dualism instead.

As for the rest of your post, I think you may be taking us a little too far afield. Now isn't the time to get into questions about intrinsic properties and the like in very much detail; let's save the detailed discussion of those issues for when we arrive at the point where they are discussed in detail in the book.

 

[hypnagogue]

By the way, everyone, if you quote text from the book, please include the number of the page it was taken from to make it easier for the rest of us to find the quotations in the book. Thanks.

 

[honestrosewater]

The actual quote is "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else." (In the text, "else" is not in boldface, but it is italicized.) What he intends to say here is that qualia are not necessarily representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. edit: In another words, even though some qualia can be taken to be representations of phenomena existing outside of the mind (e.g. one's visual experience of a chair is a representation of an objective chair), we cannot entirely characterize p-consciousness in representational terms. The contents of consciousness can play the role of representations in the proper cognitive context, but they cannot be most fundamentally characterized as representational.

I, too, have a problem with this example. What he describes are called "phosphenes"; From "The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective"(PDF)* by Petra Stoerig:

...veridical vision—the situation in which light falling onto the retina is transduced into nerve impulses, and eventually transformed into visual qualia. But there are other means [called "nonveridical vision"] to evoke phenomenal vision. Afterimages are seen although the stimulus that induced them has disappeared. Phosphenes are phenomenal events, caused by mechanical, electrical, or magnetic stimulation of the retina or the visual cortex. Visual dreams are phenomenal, and result from involuntary intrinsic neuronal activation, as do hallucinations, while visual imagery may also be phenomenal, and is caused by voluntary intrinsic activation.[/color]

So one difference between veridical visions and phosphenes is that phosphenes can result from direct stimulation of the visual cortex, bypassing the retina, while, by definition, veridical vision must include the retina. But this is not the case in the example.
In the example, the difference is the kind of stimulus which stimulates the retina. I don't see how this difference leads to the conclusion that phenomenal events caused by veridical visions (photic stimuli) are (or can be?) representations of phenomena outside of consciousness while phenomenal events caused by phosphenes (mechanical stimuli) aren't (or can't be) representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. The detection of both light and pressure (or changes in pressure) can be accomplished by unconscious instruments, no? Aren't both light and pressure something else?
If I ran a phosphene program (which simulates all those diffuse shapes) on a virtual reality visor, er, I don't know enough to describe this properly, but I think you get the idea- if wearing the visor and putting pressure on my eyes produce identical visual experiences for me, how can one and only one of those visual experiences be representational?

How is your "phenomena existing outside of the mind" different from "phenomena existing independently of the brain"?

Edit:*(http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:...rtex%20papers/awareness/stoerigawareV1.pdf=en)

 

[Canute]

The actual quote is "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else."

Well, that's a great start. The first thing I do is misquote the author. My apologies, and well spotted.

I can see now that my post might have given the impression of jumping to conclusions and nitpicking, or of being overly crititical before the author has had a chance to lay out his ideas properly. This was not my intention. However I find that in most books on this topic significant assumptions are made right at the beginning which remain unexamined and forgotten to the end. Perhaps we shouldn't start being critical of GR's assumptions yet, but I do feel that it's important that they do not go unnoticed, since they will be important all the way through, and in the end they will need to be justified.

What he intends to say here is that qualia are not necessarily representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. edit: In another words, even though some qualia can be taken to be representations of phenomena existing outside of the mind (e.g. one's visual experience of a chair is a representation of an objective chair), we cannot entirely characterize p-consciousness in representational terms. The contents of consciousness can play the role of representations in the proper cognitive context, but they cannot be most fundamentally characterized as representational.

Hmm, perhaps you're right and this is what he intends to say. However it is not what he says. He says that consciousness need not be consciousness of anything else, and then gives an example in which he is conscious of something else. This is misleading. If it is not just a slip of the pen and he really does think that consciousness of visual after images etc. is not consciousness of something else then this is going to affect his entire thesis.

Whether or not this 'something else' is representational of something outside consciousness is not the issue here. Qualia are by definition intentional objects (or so I thought, am I wrong about this?), so of course qualia are 'something else'.

This will all sort itself out later. But I wanted to draw attention to it now because I have a feeling that it will turn out to be a central issue later on.

He is arguing for a form of monism, but I don't know why you'd find that troubling. (Would you prefer substance dualism?) In fact, earlier in your post, you expressed enthusiasm for the statement "What ties the physical and nonphysical together is a deeper kind of thing of which they are both aspects"; what could this point to other than a kind of monism?

I see what you mean, but this sentence of his does not suggest monism to me. (That's one for later). My objection to monism are various, and of course not everyone will agree with them, but it must be worrying at least that so far no philosopher has constructed a monist (or strictly dual-aspect) cosmology or metaphysic that does not give rise to all the same metaphysical contradictions as dualism. Perhaps, as you suggest, there is a way around these contradictions, but I don't share your confidence in GR's (or anyone else's) ability to solve problems that no other philosopher in history has been able to solve. But who knows. I'm happy to wait an see. Again, I just wanted to put this issue on the list for later examination rather than just let it slide by.

As for the rest of your post, I think you may be taking us a little too far afield. Now isn't the time to get into questions about intrinsic properties and the like in very much detail; let's save the detailed discussion of those issues for when we arrive at the point where they are discussed in detail in the book.

That's a fair point, and I'm happy to wait. However the author makes some clear statements in these introductory pages and he presumably meant them. Perhaps he clears up this particular matter later, but here he says very clearly that ontologically speaking extrinsic properties are dependent on intrinsic properties. I don't think we can or should ignore such statements. They are important statements which affect the plausibility of his overall hypothesis, since presumably they are not contradicted by anything that comes later. We don't need to sort this out yet, but we do need to note that if he sticks to this view of properties then this will become an important issue as he moves on to the ontology of consciousness and matter. For now I'm quite happy to move on. I know that I do not understand some of his ideas yet, so I'm keeping an open mind on them.

PS Thanks for your excellent and clear opening summary.

 

[cyberdiction]

honestrosewater wrote:
How is your "phenomena existing outside of the mind"
different from "phenomena existing independently of the brain"?

Rosenberg collaborated with Chalmers and I think they have similar
meanings for their technical terms. "Phenomenal consciousness" is
a technical term, and together with "psychological consciousness"
attempt to define different aspects of consciousness, what you
feel, like sadness, rather than the thinking about of events which
make you feel sad. This feeling aspect, is called qualia, and it is
the hard part in explaining the mind-body problem. Gregg, I think,
is trying to introduce and distinguish two internal conditions or
properties of consciousness at his point. I don't think his focus
applies to your question. I think perceiving some part of external
reality is different that storing that perception as a representation
of reality that is categorized, which I think falls under psychological
consciousness. I think Gregg is talking about stimuli being received,
experiencing, is different than the process of interpretation which
analyzes/processes the experienced data. I think the error in his
example is that he could have given a more practical/usual one, that
wouldn't have sidetracked discussion onto the novelty of his example.
I researched this and made some notes below on P-Consciousness.

"Chalmers distinguishes between a phenomenal concept of mind
(the way it feels) and a psychological concept of mind
(what it does). Every mental property is either a phenomenal
property, a psychological one or a combination of the two.
The mind-body problem is therefore made of two parts, one
that deals with the mental faculties and one that deals with
how/why those mental faculties also give rise to awareness
of them. The same distinction applies to consciousness, with
psychological consciousness being commonly referred to as
"awareness"; but phenomenal consciousness always comes with
psychological consciousness. Awareness is having access to
information that may affect behavior. There two ways of being
conscious of something: by sensing it, or by thinking about it.

Ned Block introduced the technical sense of the term
"phenomenal consciousness" (or P-consciousness) in the course
of contrasting it with what he called "access consciousness".

P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are
experiential ones. P-conscious states are experiential, that
is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties.
The totality of the experiential properties of a state are
"what it is like" to have it. Moving from synonyms to examples,
we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste,
and have pains.

Chalmers:
A mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel-
an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels
are also known as phenomenal properties, or qualia for short.
The problem of explaining these phenomenal properties is just
the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really
hard part of the mind-body problem. (Chalmers 1996, 4)

Regards,
Stephen

 

[hypnagogue]

I find that in most books on this topic significant assumptions are made right at the beginning which remain unexamined and forgotten to the end. Perhaps we shouldn't start being critical of GR's assumptions yet, but I do feel that it's important that they do not go unnoticed, since they will be important all the way through, and in the end they will need to be justified.

Sure, and that's great; being critical of assumptions and putting the material through the wringer, so to speak, will only benefit everyone here. However, having read the book (albeit in pre-published form), I can attest that pretty much everything said in this chapter is examined explicitly in much greater detail down the line. Perhaps the only exception is the discussion on what is meant by "phenomenal consciousness," which is more a matter of defining terms than making arguments. You should treat this chapter as a broad overview of the discussion to come rather than as actually constitutive of that discussion.

Hmm, perhaps you're right and this is what he intends to say. However it is not what he says. He says that consciousness need not be consciousness of anything else, and then gives an example in which he is conscious of something else. This is misleading. If it is not just a slip of the pen and he really does think that consciousness of visual after images etc. is not consciousness of something else then this is going to affect his entire thesis.

Whether or not this 'something else' is representational of something outside consciousness is not the issue here. Qualia are by definition intentional objects (or so I thought, am I wrong about this?), so of course qualia are 'something else'.

I don't think qualia are intentional objects by definition (by the most bare definition, they are just those qualities that can make themselves apparent in conscious experience), although one might make an argument that they are intentional.

In any case, Rosenberg makes it pretty clear that when he says "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else" (p. 3), their status as representations is precisely what is at issue. He goes on to say, "These are experiences and are thus elements of phenomenal consciousness, even though they do not seem to represent anything" (p. 3). Clearly what he means by the first statement, then, is that phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily representational, i.e. qualia need not play a representational role in any given cognitive context. Pointing this out serves to establish qualia as mental objects that can be employed to play a representaional role in the proper context, as opposed to supposing that qualia are nothing more than the actual carrying out of a representational role itself.

I see what you mean, but this sentence of his does not suggest monism to me. (That's one for later). My objection to monism are various, and of course not everyone will agree with them, but it must be worrying at least that so far no philosopher has constructed a monist (or strictly dual-aspect) cosmology or metaphysic that does not give rise to all the same metaphysical contradictions as dualism. Perhaps, as you suggest, there is a way around these contradictions, but I don't share your confidence in GR's (or anyone else's) ability to solve problems that no other philosopher in history has been able to solve. But who knows. I'm happy to wait an see. Again, I just wanted to put this issue on the list for later examination rather than just let it slide by.

I'm glad to see that you're willing to suspend your disbelief (so to speak) and give the book the benefit of the doubt. I think you might be pleasantly surprised.

I'm not familiar with the kind of general critique against monism that you're alluding to here. If you feel so inclined, perhaps you might start a thread about it in Metaphysics & Epistemology?

 

[hypnagogue]

I don't see how this difference leads to the conclusion that phenomenal events caused by veridical visions (photic stimuli) are (or can be?) representations of phenomena outside of consciousness while phenomenal events caused by phosphenes (mechanical stimuli) aren't (or can't be) representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. The detection of both light and pressure (or changes in pressure) can be accomplished by unconscious instruments, no? Aren't both light and pressure something else?

This gets into issues of what it means to be representational. For instance, one might argue that in order for X to represent Y, X has to systematically co-vary with Y. The phenomenal content of veridical vision satisfies this requirement, but phosphenes do not; if they did, placing constant pressure on the eyes should lead to a constant phenomenal percept, but phosphenes are in a constant state of flux even when pressure is constant (try it). Other various characterizations of representation will probably yield the same sort of result.

In any case, I think this paragraph was meant to appeal to immediate intuition more than it was to actually assert something conclusively with argumentation, and shouldn't be taken for anything much more than that. Rosenberg argues for essentially the same proposition-- qualia are not fundamentally representational-- in section 5.4 at some length, so we can address the issue properly when we get that far.

 

[Canute]

... having read the book (albeit in pre-published form), I can attest that pretty much everything said in this chapter is examined explicitly in much greater detail down the line. Perhaps the only exception is the discussion on what is meant by "phenomenal consciousness," which is more a matter of defining terms than making arguments. You should treat this chapter as a broad overview of the discussion to come rather than as actually constitutive of that discussion.

Fine. I'm trying to get the the bottom of what he is calling consciousness, that's all.

In any case, Rosenberg makes it pretty clear that when he says "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else"

Yes that's very clear. However his example immediately muddies the waters. "Anything else" than what? Can you clarify this point? If he meant to say that qualia are not necessarily representations then fair enough, if he meant, for this is what his sentence says, that consciousness is not necessarily anything other than consciousness of consciousness then that's a far more interesting and deep point, with implications for the whole book.

I'm not familiar with the kind of general critique against monism that you're alluding to here. If you feel so inclined, perhaps you might start a thread about it in Metaphysics & Epistemology?

Bit off topic, although it might not be so later, but it hardly needs me to make a critique of it after Parmeneides, Leibnitz, Spinoza et al.

But I'll shut up now until Ch.2. Promise.

 

[honestrosewater]

This gets into issues of what it means to be representational. For instance, one might argue that in order for X to represent Y, X has to systematically co-vary with Y. The phenomenal content of veridical vision satisfies this requirement, but phosphenes do not; if they did, placing constant pressure on the eyes should lead to a constant phenomenal percept, but phosphenes are in a constant state of flux even when pressure is constant (try it). Other various characterizations of representation will probably yield the same sort of result.

If, with my eyes open, I press my finger against the left corner of my eye (indirectly, through the skin surrounding my eye, of course), I see a dark spot appear. The characterisitcs of this dark spot (X) systematically co-vary with the location and amount of pressure applied (Y); The size of the spot increases with an increase in pressure, decreases with a decrease in pressure, and the location of the spot remains roughly diametrically opposed to the location of the pressure being applied. Ditto for two spots (beyond that, my fingers get in the way). Ditto for both eyes at once. Ditto with the eyes closed. In all cases tried, this type of phosphene behaves predictably. You can try it for yourself.
Do you know that the changes in phosphenes occurring when pressure is applied across the whole front of the eye are not caused by unconscious eye movements or an actual but consciously undetectible variance in pressure you're applying or the movement of the fluid (aqueous humor) in the eyes or the circulation of blood or the overlapping of several of those predicatable dark spots or a combination of these or other explicable physical phenomena?
I would ask similar questions of similar examples. Perhaps I'm missing the point.

In any case, I think this paragraph was meant to appeal to immediate intuition more than it was to actually assert something conclusively with argumentation, and shouldn't be taken for anything much more than that. Rosenberg argues for essentially the same proposition-- qualia are not fundamentally representational-- in section 5.4 at some length, so we can address the issue properly when we get that far.

Canute started it. Er, I mean, what I've read about Rosenberg makes me think he chose this example more carefully than you suggest, but, even if it's worth arguing about this, I can't see myself winning that argument anyway.
Canute has already asked my other questions.

 

[selfAdjoint]

There is a lot that's left ambiguous in this chapter, necessarily so, as it's only intended as a sweeping overview of the rest of the book. Rest assured, we'll going into these things in quite some detail in the coming chapters.

The meanings of "physical" and "physicalism" are discussed at length in chapters 2 and 3. We'll discuss this in more detail later, but briefly, physical properties are understood to be the types of properties included in the fundamental ontology of physics. (As physics is not yet complete, its ontology is bound to change, but the types of things in its ontology will share some basic similarities with the ones it has now.)

Physicalism is the view that all facts about the world are either facts about physical properties, or are directly entailed by these physical facts. Once we specify what we mean by "physical," it is not circular to define physicalism in this way.



It should be clear after chapter 2 what counts as physical. When we get into the second half of the book, we'll see that physical theory is essentially a theory of what Rosenberg calls effective properties. Physics is not a theory of receptive properties or carriers, because neither of these is included in its fundamental ontology, and neither of these is entailed by its fundamental ontology. Thus, only one of the proposed three aspects of causation can rightfully be called 'physical,' and so the others are non-physical. Again, this will make more sense later on.



We'll be going into causation extensively in part II of the book, which is still a ways off. For now, if you're interested, you can skip ahead and read sections 9.1 - 9.6 for a discussion about causation.

Perhaps it's rude of me, as an outsider to this seminar, to comment, but I do have this question. Why is it considered OK for the author to be vague and use circular definitions in the introductory chapter of a book aimed at a professional audience? Can you imagine a corresponding book on quantum theory that said something like "Superposition is the property of states which are superposed" in its introductory chapter?

 

[Rader]

Dreaming is a way of experiencing, and, therefore, in a sense that needs placement, we are conscious during sleep. p1

Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else. For example when we close our eyes ect…p1

Phenomenal consciousness does not necessarily involve language or self-understanding, for example when a newborn infant cries ect. p1

When we stare at the Necker cube, our phenomenal experience changed depending on whether we perceive it as facing upward or downward. p2

Purple subjectivity appears different from pink. P2

These subjective experiences are quite different from one another, is it for that reason he uses them to suggest that, other minds on other levels could have experience, or is there something else?

Phenomenal consciousness does not have a scientific definition yet, I mean phenomenal consciousness when I use the word consciousness in this book. If we need a definition, the best we can do is to create an operational definition by calling attention to it in increasing levels. p1

What is his definition? Is it simply his theory put forth in this book?

The actual quote is "Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else." (In the text, "else" is not in boldface, but it is italicized.) What he intends to say here is that qualia are not necessarily representations of phenomena outside of consciousness. edit: In another words, even though some qualia can be taken to be representations of phenomena existing outside of the mind (e.g. one's visual experience of a chair is a representation of an objective chair), we cannot entirely characterize p-consciousness in representational terms. The contents of consciousness can play the role of representations in the proper cognitive context, but they cannot be most fundamentally characterized as representational.

Put in another way then, is the meaning of subjective experience, is consciousness?

Whether or not this 'something else' is representational of something outside consciousness is not the issue here. Qualia are by definition intentional objects (or so I thought, am I wrong about this?), so of course qualia are 'something else'.

Where is the qualia of intentional objects, when a baby cries or dreaming or rubbing your eyes? What is an intentional object?

 

[Canute]

The term 'intentional' has a strange meaning in philosophy of consciousness. This is confusing because it has a well established and clear meaning in English, but it's too late to do anything about it now that Brentano has redefined it.

It's also easy to be confused about what the word means (in the details I am) because, like so many terms relating to consciousness, different writers use it in different ways. Basically, it seems to me, if something is an intentional object it is a mental object, an object of our consciousness, a thing we are conscious of. A more colloquial term is 'aboutness', as in - what our experiences are about. I hope this is close.

 

[Canute]

Perhaps it's rude of me, as an outsider to this seminar, to comment, but I do have this question. Why is it considered OK for the author to be vague and use circular definitions in the introductory chapter of a book aimed at a professional audience? Can you imagine a corresponding book on quantum theory that said something like "Superposition is the property of states which are superposed" in its introductory chapter?

I'm not sure you're right in saying that Rosenberg has defined anything in a circular way, despite my other quibbles. Can you be specific?

As a general comment I think you'll be disappointed if you expect to find the rigour normally required of books on QM in most books on consciousness. But, I hasten to say, this is in no way intended as a comment on the book we are discussing. In fact if I remember right the author himself complains of a lack of rigour in the literature.

Still, I must admit that at the end of the first chapter I'm still not entirely clear how consciousness is being defined. I get the impression that it is defined as phenomenal consciousness, which I'm not very comfortable with. However I promised to wait to Ch.II before raising any more issues.

 

[hypnagogue]

Perhaps it's rude of me, as an outsider to this seminar, to comment, but I do have this question. Why is it considered OK for the author to be vague and use circular definitions in the introductory chapter of a book aimed at a professional audience?

It's vague because it's an overview of the material to come. If it were not vague, it would just be a replication of the following 284 pages. Can you imagine a book that summarized what quantum theory is all about in 10 pages without being 'vague' on some points?

As for circular definitions, there are none. Earlier, I said "Once we specify what we mean by 'physical,' it is not circular to define physicalism in this way." Actually, even defining physicalism as the view that all facts are physical facts, without a further definition of physical, is not circular. A circular definition is one that either uses the defined word in the definition (ex: A lawyer is one who works with other lawyers) or defines a word in terms of another word that is defined in terms of the original word (ex: A lawyer is an attorney. An attorney is a lawyer). Clearly, in the above definition, physicalism is not defined in terms of physicalism, and common understanding of English should be sufficient to know that 'physical' is not defined in terms of physicalism. Defining physicalism as the view that all facts are physical facts is more like defining lawyer as one who practices law. They share the same root, but they are not synonymous words, nor are they defined in terms of each other.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Actually, even defining physicalism as the view that all facts are physical facts, without a further definition of physical, is not circular. A circular definition is one that either uses the defined word in the definition (ex: A lawyer is one who works with other lawyers) or defines a word in terms of another word that is defined in terms of the original word (ex: A lawyer is an attorney. An attorney is a lawyer). Clearly, in the above definition, physicalism is not defined in terms of physicalism, and common understanding of English should be sufficient to know that 'physical' is not defined in terms of physicalism. Defining physicalism as the view that all facts are physical facts is more like defining lawyer as one who practices law. They share the same root, but they are not synonymous words, nor are they defined in terms of each other.

I am still not persuaded; even your example of the lawyer seems an unfortunate definition to me. A physicist writing for physicists, or even students, would never use such a handwaving definition. Often they will say things like, "We haven't fully defined this concept yet, but it includes this, this, and this facts, which we can explain and use now." But the habit of defining ignotum per ignota, if I have the cases right, seems to be endemic in philosophy. I will shut up now on this issue.

 

[loseyourname]

I am still not persuaded; even your example of the lawyer seems an unfortunate definition to me. A physicist writing for physicists, or even students, would never use such a handwaving definition. Often they will say things like, "We haven't fully defined this concept yet, but it includes this, this, and this facts, which we can explain and use now." But the habit of defining ignotum per ignota, if I have the cases right, seems to be endemic in philosophy. I will shut up now on this issue.

Hyp's point in that the word "physical" is very rigorously defined in chapter two, so at that point, the definition of physicalism won't be so roughshod. I think the author doesn't bother to rigorously define all of his words in the first chapter simply because it would take up so much space. Rigorous definitions come later when they become more important.

 

[hypnagogue]

I apologize if I'm doing a poor job trying to get certain things across. Here are some words from Gregg that hopefully should clarify things for us a bit.

In chapter 1 all I am trying to do is set expectations of what the book is going to be about and why. I assume readers are coming to the book with some personal understanding of words like "physical" and I am happy to rely on that. It doesn't matter to me at this point in the book if different readers have different personal understandings even of key terms since I'm not relying on these words to do any inferential or explanatory work. I just want to convey a sense of the scope and direction of the project.

As for phosphenes: With all the examples I am trying to factor out one sense of "consciousness" from the many senses the word has. It is pretty easy for most people to simply relax and experience phosphenes as kind of cool elements of consciousness, simply being experienced, without regarding them as being about anything else.

Even if on some views phosphenes are *in fact* about something else, I felt it was an example where people easily enough "bracket" any underlying aboutness to focus on them as elements of experience proper. I could have used the feeling of orgasm to make the same point. I hoped the example would help people zone in on the concept of experience as distinct from the concept of representation or "aboutness" and apologize if it instead just distracts.

As I say in the chapter, I will not define "consciousness" other than trying to create this kind of operational definition. It's the best anyone can do, I think.

 

[honestrosewater]

Well, I don't want to hold up the discussion. As far as I'm concerned, everyone can move on to the next chapter.

It is pretty easy for most people to simply relax and experience phosphenes as kind of cool elements of consciousness, simply being experienced, without regarding them as being about anything else.

Yeah, mother always said I was special.

Even if on some views phosphenes are *in fact* about something else, I felt it was an example where people easily enough "bracket" any underlying aboutness to focus on them as elements of experience proper. I could have used the feeling of orgasm to make the same point. I hoped the example would help people zone in on the concept of experience as distinct from the concept of representation or "aboutness" and apologize if it instead just distracts.

As I say in the chapter, I will not define "consciousness" other than trying to create this kind of operational definition. It's the best anyone can do, I think.

Apologies all around. Granted, it's only the first chapter, and Rosenberg clearly stated what he intended to accomplish in it. I still don't understand what aspect of consciousness is being focused on here. If I should take this elsewhere, just say the word.
Would my thinking of the number "1" (and only of the number "1"- not of any symbols, be they written, verbal, tactile, inner voicings, etc. used to represent the number "1" nor of "1"'s relations to any other numbers or other objects- period) work as an example? Would my thinking of any other mathematical or logical object work as well? What about thinking about a panfobletizer?

 

[loseyourname]

One quick question here: When Gregg refers to consciousness that is not consciousness of anything else, is he referring to intentional objects that do not represent external objects, or is he referring to raw experience completely divorced from all intentional objects? It seems like Canute is talking about the latter, but the rest of you are talking about the former.

 

[hypnagogue]

One quick question here: When Gregg refers to consciousness that is not consciousness of anything else, is he referring to intentional objects that do not represent external objects, or is he referring to raw experience completely divorced from all intentional objects? It seems like Canute is talking about the latter, but the rest of you are talking about the former.

I think Rosenberg refers to phenomenal consciousness in the sense of raw experience, divorced from any notion of representational content. (I profess that I'm not entirely comfortable with the word 'intentional,' and it appears as if different people are using the word differently, so I'll try to avoid using it without sacrificing any meaning from the discussion.) Admittedly, this can be difficult to conceptualize. One way to think of this might be to imagine how a newborn baby would see a visual image of a chair, as opposed to how us grown-ups do so. When we look at certain combinations of phenomenal percepts that resemble what we think of as a chair, it's second nature to 'see' our visual experience as being or as embodying our concept of what a chair is, in a very direct and literal sense; we automatically interpret our visual image to be an external object that is built with the intention of having people sit down on it, and so on. A newborn baby has not had time to develop the concept of chair, and so when it gazes upon one, it presumably does so free of conceptualization, or at least with a radically stripped down conceptualization. Presumably, it doesn't see an object that is supposed to be used for sitting, but rather, all it directly sees is a particular combination of phenomenal percepts-- brown cylinder here, blue rectangle there, etc. If this is right, then the baby just sees a particular constellation of raw qualitative 'stuff.' The experience of this raw qualitative 'stuff' is what is meant by phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience.

With some effort, one can perhaps experience visual images in this raw, uninterpreted form for one's self and so get a better idea of what is meant by phenomenal consciousness. I have managed to do this (if not completely, then to a significant extent) once or twice in my life, and the experience is rather awe inducing. It seems to occur more as a function of serendipity than pure effort, however.

An easier route might be to use a ganzfeld setup. (To pre-empt any potential confusion, ganzfeld setups have been used in parapsychology experiments, but the following has nothing to do with parapsychology-- it's just a way to create a certain visual experience for yourself.) Cut a colored ping pong ball in half, place each of the halves over your eyes, and sit in a well lit room. Your entire visual experience should then consist of a uniformly colored field that is otherwise featureless. You can take this experiment to demonstrate an isolation of subjective experience from representational content-- you are just experiencing a raw qualitative state of color, rather than automatically interpreting this qualitative state to pick out some conceptual event or object, such as 'chair.' (Of course, upon some reflection, you can still interpret this experience as representational-- for instance, as representing the properties of light waves striking your retina. But the idea here is to try to develop a concept of subjective experience separate from representational content. If you open yourself up to the simple experience rather than performing some post hoc intellectual exercises, this experiment should hopefully suffice to demonstrate what is meant by 'subjective experience.')

Having said all that, it's still a difficult task to disentangle the notion of subjective experience and that of representational content from each other. As Rosenberg notes in the last paragraph of page 4, conceptualization and subjective experience appear to be interdependent. For instance, conceptualizing a Necker cube as facing up or down literally entails subjectively experiencing it differently, and the two different ways of experiencing it entail different conceptualizations. Rosenberg says, "For a particular creature, the facts concerning what it is like to be that creature (my note: i.e., the facts about a creature's phenomenal consciousness / subjective experience) are constituted by (1) its capacities for experiencing phenomenal qualities in the first person and (2) its way of conceptualizing the world. (Rosenberg's footnote: I do not mean to suggest in any way at all that these are independent capacities.)" So our understanding should be that subjective experience and conceptualization are interdependent capacities, each conditioning the other in perhaps inextricable ways in human cognition. However, although they are intimately related to each other in human cognition, they are not identical, so it makes sense to speak of subjective experience as a separate phenomenon from conceptualization / intetional content.

As for Canute's thoughts, to me it seems that Canute is primarily concerned about whether qualia are considered to be objects or contents of experience in Rosenberg's book.

Basically, it seems to me, if something is an intentional object it is a mental object, an object of our consciousness, a thing we are conscious of. A more colloquial term is 'aboutness', as in - what our experiences are about. I hope this is close.

Rosenberg's framework will end up with a picture very much like this one in the later chapters, where experience and qualia are thought of as distinct essences, with experience performing the function of binding various qualia together into a single experiential manifold. On this view, you could consider qualia to be what experiences are 'about' in some sense, or you could consider qualia as being the 'contents' of experience in some sense, etc. If I'm understanding what you mean here correctly, your view will find a voice later on in the book.

 

[Canute]

Thanks for that, it clarified a few things. (You've somewhat mischaracterised my position, but that doesn't matter for now).

 

[honestrosewater]

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to disagree with Rosenberg or point out something wrong with his definition or anything like that; I'm just trying to understand him.
So he says all phenomenal states have a nonconceptual (or raw feel or sensory) part. So when I am thinking about a number, I am not in a phenomenal state? I ask because there is something it is like for me to be thinking about a number (stripped of all its representational or relational or conceptual qualities); If I had to describe it, it's like thinking about nothing. (Thinking about nothing is not not thinking.) I don't want to confuse the nonconceptual raw feels with awareness or reflexivity.

 

[hypnagogue]

So he says all phenomenal states have a nonconceptual (or raw feel or sensory) part. So when I am thinking about a number, I am not in a phenomenal state? I ask because there is something it is like for me to be thinking about a number (stripped of all its representational or relational or conceptual qualities); If I had to describe it, it's like thinking about nothing. (Thinking about nothing is not not thinking.) I don't want to confuse the nonconceptual raw feels with awareness or reflexivity.

When you think of a number, there is an experiential aspect to your thinking of it to the extent that it is like something to be thinking of the number. This might include various auditory or visual phenomenal qualities presenting themselves in your mind's eye (hearing yourself say 'two' in your mind, or seeing '2' or 'two').

There might also be a much subtler kind of experiential aspect analogous to what it's like to have thoughts without explicitly 'hearing' or 'seeing' anything in your mind's eye. For example, take the situation where you have a word on the tip of your tongue, but you can't quite retrieve it. This is accompanied by a very definite phenomenal quality (the so-called 'feeling of knowledge'), although this quality is not properly characterized as being expressed via sensory modalities.

As a general rule, anything you are a-conscious of is almost definitely accompanied by some sort of subjective experience. (There very well may be exceptions to that rule of thumb, but none occur to me at the moment.) If we go by verbal reports, we see that the tight correlation between a-consciousness and p-consciousness can be at least partially broken with the proper brain lesions (e.g. as in blindsight), but as far as I can tell, a normally functioning brain will never be a-conscious of something without also having some corresponding element of p-consciousness.

 

[honestrosewater]

When you think of a number, there is an experiential aspect to your thinking of it to the extent that it is like something to be thinking of the number. This might include various auditory or visual phenomenal qualities presenting themselves in your mind's eye (hearing yourself say 'two' in your mind, or seeing '2' or 'two').

No, I have intentionally excluded those aspects from the experience. If I think about red (or redness) without thinking about the word "red" or red's relation to other colors or properties or objects, I still, according to you et al, have something to think about because red has nonconceptual aspects. If I do the same for a number (think about the number two without thinking about the word "two" or two's relation to other numbers or properties or objects), I will not have anything left to think about because a number has no nonconceptual aspects. Numbers and other mathematical objects are purely abstract, purely relational, purely conceptual, purely whatever you want to call it, no? Maybe it would be clearer if I said mathematical objects have no intrinsic qualities or no qualia, but that may just confuse things.

There might also be a much subtler kind of experiential aspect analogous to what it's like to have thoughts without explicitly 'hearing' or 'seeing' anything in your mind's eye. For example, take the situation where you have a word on the tip of your tongue, but you can't quite retrieve it. This is accompanied by a very definite phenomenal quality (the so-called 'feeling of knowledge'), although this quality is not properly characterized as being expressed via sensory modalities.

Yes, I was actually going to mention this as a similar experience. So what kind of state is a person in while thinking about nothing? I mean "nothing" as a void or the absence of something that is usually present. Thinking about a rose and thinking about nothing have something in common: I recognize what I'm doing as thinking (or imagining). They differ in that my thoughts have some content while thinking about a rose, but, while thinking about nothing, my thoughts have no content. How could you explain this without admitting some aware or reflexive aspect of consciousness? Well, perhaps that is asking too much. I really just want to know if Rosenberg considers thinking about nothing, as I have described it, to be a phenomenal state.
BTW, I really appreciate your help and patience.

 

[hypnagogue]

No, I have intentionally excluded those aspects from the experience. If I think about red (or redness) without thinking about the word "red" or red's relation to other colors or properties or objects, I still, according to you et al, have something to think about because red has nonconceptual aspects. If I do the same for a number (think about the number two without thinking about the word "two" or two's relation to other numbers or properties or objects), I will not have anything left to think about because a number has no nonconceptual aspects. Numbers and other mathematical objects are purely abstract, purely relational, purely conceptual, purely whatever you want to call it, no? Maybe it would be clearer if I said mathematical objects have no intrinsic qualities or no qualia, but that may just confuse things.

Well, it's important to recognize that we're not talking just about numbers in the purely abstract sense; we're talking about numbers being thought about by human beings. Any particular pattern of the right kind of brain activity is going to be associated with some sort of subjective experience, regardless of the ideal properties of the concept those patterns of information happen to represent.

Here's another way to think of it. It's true that the definition of number is a purely abstract, quantitative one, but arguably the same is true of all of our physical concepts-- they are just a collection of mathematical relations, after all-- but that doesn't stop subjective experience from entering the picture somehow. Physics describes the event of light striking a retina and causing certain brain activity as a purely abstract, quantitative process, but we still wind up with a subjective experience of something like this[/color]; why could the same general sort of thing not occur when thinking about a number? In fact, if this argument about number had any bite, it should follow that there shouldn't be any subjective experience at all.

At bottom, though, this is an empirical question. Try to think of some number without reciting it to yourself or visualizing it. Is there still something it is like to be in this state, above and beyond what it's like to awake, breathing, etc.? Can you differentiate what it is like to be in this state from a control state, say, what it is like to not be thinking of anything in particular? Can you even be sure that you really are thinking of a number without some sort of experienced auditory or visual qualia affirming as much? If so, how?

Yes, I was actually going to mention this as a similar experience. So what kind of state is a person in while thinking about nothing? I mean "nothing" as a void or the absence of something that is usually present. Thinking about a rose and thinking about nothing have something in common: I recognize what I'm doing as thinking (or imagining). They differ in that my thoughts have some content while thinking about a rose, but, while thinking about nothing, my thoughts have no content.

What do you mean by thinking about nothing? Unless you are reifying the word, i.e. if you mean thinking about some sort of concept you have formed of what 'nothingness' is, then saying you're thinking about nothing is equivalent to saying you're not thinking about anything. If you're not thinking about anything, in what sense can you be said to really be thinking at all?

If you mean thinking about nothing in the sense of thinking about a reified concept of nothingness, then your thoughts do have content: the concept of nothingness.

How could you explain this without admitting some aware or reflexive aspect of consciousness?

I don't know what you mean to get at with this question, but on any reading of it, I don't think anyone is denying that consciousness has aware or reflexive aspects. It might help if you explain how the above considerations lead you to ask this question, and also if you specify what you mean by consciousness here (p-consciousness? a-consciousness? both?).

I really just want to know if Rosenberg considers thinking about nothing, as I have described it, to be a phenomenal state.

Following Rosenberg's endorsement of Nagel, I'm sure he'd say that the litmus test here is just to do it for yourself and introspectively determine whether it is like something to perform the mental activity in question. Does doing the activity in question lead to a change in what it feels like to be you at that particular instant? If so, then it must have made some sort of phenomenal contribution to your experience.

BTW, I really appreciate your help and patience.

Thanks, I appreciate your persistence.

 

[honestrosewater]

At bottom, though, this is an empirical question. Try to think of some number without reciting it to yourself or visualizing it. Is there still something it is like to be in this state, above and beyond what it's like to awake, breathing, etc.?

Yes, being in the state requires conscious effort.

Can you differentiate what it is like to be in this state from a control state, say, what it is like to not be thinking of anything in particular?

What, my examples of thinking of red and a rose don't count? Fine, if you mean to not be thinking, yes, it's different, again, because thinking requires conscious effort, concentration, focus of attention, etc. ("Imagining" would be a better word than "thinking", but as long as you understand what I mean...) If you mean to be thinking of nothing in particular, as in spacing out, that doesn't feel the same as thinking does; When thinking about nothing in particular, I'm not really paying attention to anything; The state lacks the concentration, effort, the literal intensity of feeling which is present when (actively) thinking. Actually, that would be a good way to describe the difference: passive and active. Just as one can passively and actively observe their environment. I would exclude another experience: rather automatically recalling facts, like how to spell your name or giving someone your phone number.

Can you even be sure that you really are thinking of a number without some sort of experienced auditory or visual qualia affirming as much? If so, how?

Well, that is why I say it is like thinking of nothing. It begins by thinking of some relational or representational aspects, then filtering them out. But the same level of concentration is maintained throughout. You can start by telling yourself to think of whatever- the number two. This may bring up several images: the image of 2 as a point on a number line or in some sequence or expression or equation or a collection of 2 things or the visual image "2" by itself. These are all rejected as not being the number two, and eventually, there is nothing left; no more images are supplied. If I then ask myself if I am thinking, I can definitely say yes. If I ask myself what I am thinking about, I can only say that I am thinking about nothing; It's wrong to say I am thinking about the number two because there is nothing left that resembles the number two in any way. So once I'm finally in the state of thinking about nothing, that state is the same as the state I entered by thinking about the number "one" and by thinking about a dimensionless point and by thinking about a meaningless word like panfobletizer or jerd and so on. Of course, I can tell them apart because I remember how I got into the state, but that isn't part of the state anymore than my passive awareness of my environment. Once the images stop, I can stop asking for them (if that makes sense) and, with effort, maintain the state of thinking without thinking about anything. Sorry, it's difficult to describe. It is very similar to searching for some memory, then forgetting what you were searching for.
I'm actually trying something else now: Just picturing an image then removing it. I can distill colors this way (which I otherwise couldn't do). I picture an object as the foreground, say, a black "2" shape, color in the background, then remove the foreground object. That's maybe more than you care to know, but you did mention trying to do this.
It may be that I am thinking about something after all. I'll continue testing things out (don't worry, I won't give you daily updates or anything).

What do you mean by thinking about nothing? Unless you are reifying the word, i.e. if you mean thinking about some sort of concept you have formed of what 'nothingness' is, then saying you're thinking about nothing is equivalent to saying you're not thinking about anything. If you're not thinking about anything, in what sense can you be said to really be thinking at all?

That recognizable concentration, focus, intense feeling, etc. that is present when (actively) thinking is present, but the content that is usually present when thinking is absent.

If you mean thinking about nothing in the sense of thinking about a reified concept of nothingness, then your thoughts do have content: the concept of nothingness.

Well, you may be onto something because I was going to say that nothing, to me, only has meaning relative to something else, namely something. So when I'm thinking about nothing, am I really thinking about nothing as relative to something? So far, the experiences are different, but I'll try it some more.

I don't know what you mean to get at with this question, but on any reading of it, I don't think anyone is denying that consciousness has aware or reflexive aspects. It might help if you explain how the above considerations lead you to ask this question, and also if you specify what you mean by consciousness here (p-consciousness? a-consciousness? both?).

I mean p-consciousness. I'm wondering if awareness or reflexivity would be considered conceptual, nonconceptual, or- if conceptual and nonconceptual are too broad- something else. That is, if awareness is special enough to deserve its own category (ignoring that the words "conceptual" and "nonconceptual" should logically cover everything). Perhaps I'm mistaken on this point, but it seems both the conceptual and nonconceptual aspects of a phenomenal state can be filtered out so that all is left is, in the case of thinking about nothing, the awareness, belief, feeling, or thought that one is thinking about nothing.

Following Rosenberg's endorsement of Nagel, I'm sure he'd say that the litmus test here is just to do it for yourself and introspectively determine whether it is like something to perform the mental activity in question. Does doing the activity in question lead to a change in what it feels like to be you at that particular instant? If so, then it must have made some sort of phenomenal contribution to your experience.

Great, I just need to figure out what sort of contribution is made.

 

[hypnagogue]

Chapter 2 discussion coming up

It seems that we're ready to move on to chapter 2, so a new thread will be forthcoming shortly.

honestrosewater, I'll be happy to continue our discussion here even as we move on to the next part of the book.

 

[hypnagogue]

You can start by telling yourself to think of whatever- the number two. This may bring up several images: the image of 2 as a point on a number line or in some sequence or expression or equation or a collection of 2 things or the visual image "2" by itself. These are all rejected as not being the number two, and eventually, there is nothing left; no more images are supplied. If I then ask myself if I am thinking, I can definitely say yes. If I ask myself what I am thinking about, I can only say that I am thinking about nothing; It's wrong to say I am thinking about the number two because there is nothing left that resembles the number two in any way. So once I'm finally in the state of thinking about nothing, that state is the same as the state I entered by thinking about the number "one" and by thinking about a dimensionless point and by thinking about a meaningless word like panfobletizer or jerd and so on.

Initially you said, "there is something it is like for me to be thinking about a number (stripped of all its representational or relational or conceptual qualities)." In the above you say that in this way of thinking about a number, there is nothing in the experience that distinguishes thinking about "one" from thinking about "two." Going one step further, how can you distinguish that you're thinking about a number as opposed to not thinking about a number?

Your basis for saying that you're still thinking of a number seems to be that your experience of conscious effort remains throughout the process. But I don't know if that's sufficient. Suppose by rough analogy that you are holding aloft a platter with a brick on it; as you do this, you are aware of the effort it takes to hold the platter and brick against gravity. Now suppose you close your eyes, so your only remaining way of knowing that you're still holding the brick is by the conscious effort you still must continually expend. The question is, once you close your eyes, can you really be sure you're still holding what you know you were holding a moment ago? How do you know that, while your eyes were closed, someone didn't replace the brick with an object of the same weight?

I mean p-consciousness. I'm wondering if awareness or reflexivity would be considered conceptual, nonconceptual, or- if conceptual and nonconceptual are too broad- something else. That is, if awareness is special enough to deserve its own category (ignoring that the words "conceptual" and "nonconceptual" should logically cover everything). Perhaps I'm mistaken on this point, but it seems both the conceptual and nonconceptual aspects of a phenomenal state can be filtered out so that all is left is, in the case of thinking about nothing, the awareness, belief, feeling, or thought that one is thinking about nothing.

I'm still not sure exactly what you're getting at here. But in your example of 'filtering out' various aspects of experience, you are still left with some sort of qualitative feeling, are you not? It may seem subtle or somewhat alien, but is there not still something it is like to be you in this case?

 

[honestrosewater]

Initially you said, "there is something it is like for me to be thinking about a number (stripped of all its representational or relational or conceptual qualities)." In the above you say that in this way of thinking about a number, there is nothing in the experience that distinguishes thinking about "one" from thinking about "two." Going one step further, how can you distinguish that you're thinking about a number as opposed to not thinking about a number?

Yes, I wasn't being clear enough initially. As I said later, I can't say that I am thinking about a number. I can't say I am thinking about anything- in the normal way. Even saying that I am thinking about nothing isn't correct, but it's the closest I can come to a description. The distinctions I'm making rest on familiaritry. Thinking is a familiar process to me (believe it or not ). Thinking usually includes what you could call conscious effort and content. Thinking about nothing includes the conscious effort but not the content. I am not mistaken about the conscious effort part, if that is your question. I could be mistaken about the content part, but, if I am, the experience still differs markedly from the norm in that the content is so elusive (IF it is even there). I normally know what I'm thinking about.

Your basis for saying that you're still thinking of a number seems to be that your experience of conscious effort remains throughout the process.

I'm not still thinking of a number.

But I don't know if that's sufficient. Suppose by rough analogy that you are holding aloft a platter with a brick on it; as you do this, you are aware of the effort it takes to hold the platter and brick against gravity. Now suppose you close your eyes, so your only remaining way of knowing that you're still holding the brick is by the conscious effort you still must continually expend. The question is, once you close your eyes, can you really be sure you're still holding what you know you were holding a moment ago? How do you know that, while your eyes were closed, someone didn't replace the brick with an object of the same weight?

I don't know. I'm not saying that I'm experiencing the true nature of numbers or anything like that. It doesn't even matter that I started the process by thinking about a number; Numbers just gave me the idea to try this little exercise. Now that I've done it, I can do it with other objects.
As for the analogy, it isn't necessary that I know against what object I'm expending energy in order to know I'm expending energy. I can sense the tension in my muscles and feel them tire. Heck, you surely know I can sense a limb I don't even have anymore. Apparently it isn't necessary that I know what I'm thinking about in order to know I'm thinking.
The heart of the matter here is that, for at least some experiences, there is more to the experience than its content (in the narrow sense of "content", as used above). If Rosenberg agrees, how does his model (or definitons) incorporate this content-free aspect?

I'm still not sure exactly what you're getting at here. But in your example of 'filtering out' various aspects of experience, you are still left with some sort of qualitative feeling, are you not? It may seem subtle or somewhat alien, but is there not still something it is like to be you in this case?

Yes, that's what I've been saying. How does that content-free aspect fit into Rosenberg's model? Is it conceptual, nonconceptual, reflexive, representational, nonrepresentational, what? We seem to have clarified that his phosphenes example meant to focus on the nonconceptual, nonrepresentational aspect of an experience, especially as opposed to the conceptual, representational aspect. But the "thinking about nothing" experience I've described doesn't seem to have a nonconceptual, nonrepresentational aspect. A nonconceptual, nonrepresentational aspect is still a content, yes? It may not be possible to see nothing in the same way it is possible to think about nothing. I don't think vision has a "conscious effort" analogue. Seeing does have a "content" analogue: the conscious visual field (or whatever). And the content is what is missing when thinking about nothing.
There also doesn't seem to be a conceptual, representational aspect; Thinking about nothing doesn't involve any mental manipulation of objects, it isn't like thinking about anything else, it lacks meaning and utility, and just makes me tired.
If Rosenberg doesn't have something like a two-level model, where the higher level is aware of the lower level, how does he fit in a "thinking about nothing" experience? In a two-level model, I could easily say that the content of my "thinking about nothing" experience was "thinking about nothing".

 

[cyberdiction]

Honestrosewater wrote: "If Rosenberg doesn't have something like a two-level model, where the higher level is aware of the lower level, how does he fit in a "thinking about nothing" experience? In a two-level model, I could easily say that the content of my "thinking about nothing" experience was "thinking about nothing"."

SH replied: Consciousness is frequently described in terms of two subsets,
phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness: Suppose you are tired and you muscles ache. You get
into a hot shower and often for a few seconds one just luxuriates in the hot water,
not thinking about anything, just aware of the sensation.

Psychological consciousness: I think this thread crossed into "thinking about" which
is usually described under mind rather than consciousness. Or maybe psychological
consciousness rather than phenomenal consciousness. Suppose after a few moments
under the shower, it occurs to you to wonder if the water heater has been fixed, if
you are going to run out of hot water, and you might direct your focus of awareness
(intention) to your skin to sense if the water seems to be getting colder. I don't think this type of activity comes under _phenomenal consciousness_ which Gregg is trying
to describe.

Another case in which I'm not thinking about something is when I first wake up in
the morning. Sometimes I'm just aware of being awake without any thinking going on,
and this IMO, is phenomenal consciousness. Nearly all the time both aspects of
consciousness are functioning. The original assumptions and definitions/descriptions
of consciousness are of course arbitrary. It is impossible to avoid that. A discussion is
a matter of mutual consensus about agreed meanings of words to describe our shared
reality. We don't know what it is really like to be a bat, or to exactly know the content
of another person's mind. That content is approximated by description until there is an
agreement where we say 'I know what you mean'.

I think Gregg is operating in an existing cogsci philosophical framework and attempts
to clarify his meaning, in a fairly standard way. Surely, there could be other foundation
premises used for making definitions of our perceptions. Also, it is not possible to make
a categorization scheme that infallibly divides inner conscious experiences into one
category or another, there are bound to be fuzzy areas, as well as uncertainty as to
when more than one function is operating. Gregg is using words and so are we to talk
about our reality in language which is symbolic and abstract (non-physical).

I might be going to Sears to get a new coffee pot. I might glance at a tie with
some unique combination of colors that "catches my eye" and then I think that
tie will go good with a certain shirt I have. So there is combination of two aspects
of consciousness, distinguished primarily by temporal sequence.

Or I might be going to my closet to find a shirt the matches the pants I'm going
to wear. I might not have an exact color in mind. So first I receive the sensory
input of the colors and then a more mentative function arises and I select a
matching colored shirt. I think it is unlikely that all such subjective experiences
can be cataloged so neatly. Nor, later in the book, subjective time compared to
intersubjective time. There are, of course, algorithms or effective procedures,
which enable a computer to produce activities of a human mind, that the human
mind can perform with pencil, paper, and eraser, by rote or repetition, that require
no ingenuity to compute. -- Gregg is going to be making an inductive argument,
not a deductive argument, so it will not have a perfectly precise formulation.

Philosophically,
Stephen

 

[cyberdiction]

If Rosenberg doesn't have something like a two-level model, where the higher level is aware of the lower level, how does he fit in a "thinking about nothing" experience? In a two-level model, I could easily say that the content of my "thinking about nothing" experience was "thinking about nothing".

SH: It occurred to me after I wrote my other post that you might
not be talking about whether consciousness=mind=self=ego=awareness
as synonamous and where non-mutual dichotimies appeared.

The basic dichotomy (dualism) , or premise of the book is between
physicalism and I think it is called 'protoexperientalism'. Gregg also found
it necessary to analyze causality but this is later in the book (page 160).

"How can we become accustomed to thinking in terms of the determination
problem? Imagine a neural cluster NC, that is one of sixteen such clusters
NC_1 to NC_16 densely connected in the brain. How might we understand
their causal relations if the determination problem has not already been
resolved at a lower level of nature? Before we can say much to answer this
question, we first need a clearer way of thinking about what it asks, so
before describing the relations between these clusters I define two new
concepts." [SH: The ideas connect in my mind, but maybe not to others.]

Also thinking about nothing means nothing is a lack of experience, not the
experience of thinking about a something which happens to be nothing.
Your comment/argument is close to the logical fallacy of equivocation.

Plausibility not Provability,
Stephen

 

[honestrosewater]

Also thinking about nothing means nothing is a lack of experience, not the experience of thinking about a something which happens to be nothing. Your comment/argument is close to the logical fallacy of equivocation.

I've explained several times what I mean by "thinking about nothing", making several distinctions. I've distinguished thinking about nothing from not thinking:

What, my examples of thinking of red and a rose don't count? Fine, if you mean to not be thinking, yes, it's different, again, because thinking requires conscious effort, concentration, focus of attention, etc. ("Imagining" would be a better word than "thinking", but as long as you understand what I mean...)

I've distinguished thinking about nothing from thinking about nothing in particular:

If you mean to be thinking of nothing in particular, as in spacing out, that doesn't feel the same as thinking does; When thinking about nothing in particular, I'm not really paying attention to anything; The state lacks the concentration, effort, the literal intensity of feeling which is present when (actively) thinking. Actually, that would be a good way to describe the difference: passive and active. Just as one can passively and actively observe their environment.

I've distinguished thinking about nothing from automatic recall:

I would exclude another experience: rather automatically recalling facts, like how to spell your name or giving someone your phone number.

I've distinguished two meanings of "nothing".

Well, you may be onto something because I was going to say that nothing, to me, only has meaning relative to something else, namely something. So when I'm thinking about nothing, am I really thinking about nothing as relative to something? So far, the experiences are different, but I'll try it some more.

The experiences are still different.
I've explained how I justify the distinctions, acknowledged the inaccuracy of my use of "nothing", and admitted again that I may be mistaken about the absence of any content:

I can't say I am thinking about anything- in the normal way. Even saying that I am thinking about nothing isn't correct, but it's the closest I can come to a description. The distinctions I'm making rest on familiaritry. Thinking is a familiar process to me (believe it or not ). Thinking usually includes what you could call conscious effort and content. Thinking about nothing includes the conscious effort but not the content. I am not mistaken about the conscious effort part, if that is your question. I could be mistaken about the content part, but, if I am, the experience still differs markedly from the norm in that the content is so elusive (IF it is even there). I normally know what I'm thinking about.

When thinking about nothing as relative to something, IOW, thinking about the relationship between something and nothing, my thoughts have obvious content: the relationship between something and nothing. When thinking about nothing, in the way I have described it, my thoughts have no obvious content. How is my comment/argument close to the logical fallacy of equivocation?
If thinking about nothing doesn't make sense to anyone, I won't use it.

There are similarities and differences between my visual image of my father's face and my visual image of my mother's face. The two visual images are different in that my mother's face is visually different from my father's face; The two images differ in their visual content. The two visual images are similar in that they are both visual images. In fact, all visual images have something in common apart from my referring to them all as "visual images": There is something it is like for me to form (and maintain and inspect and experience and...) a visual image. For me, forming visual images is accompanied by a feeling, a focus of attention, some conscious effort distinct from the visual content of the image. The conscious effort is even directed towards the same "place": my "mind's eye". Whether or not my forming of visual images is accompanied by conscious effort is not up for debate. I just want to know where conscious effort fits in Rosenberg's scheme of things. If no one knows what I mean by conscious effort or visual content, I will attempt a better explanation or find other people's explanations of them.

 

[cyberdiction]

If no one knows what I mean by conscious effort or visual content, I will attempt a better explanation or find other people's explanations of them.

It still seems to me this is a matter of definitions. This is not an introductory
book. So in the literature "consciousness" is divided into two aspects though
there is dispute about this and qualia. Consciousness is made up of the
psychological aspect and the phenomenal aspect which has qualia associated
with it. Gregg intends to use phenomenal consciousness and qualia to defeat
physicalism. He says, "I mean phenomenal consciousness when I use the
word "consciousness". He means that is what he is referring to, not that
this is the only type of consciousness or all of consciousness. He also
says 'the central problem consciousness poses is where in nature to place
subjective experience, which is responsible for the subjective quality of
our existence. "Philosophers call this sense of consciousness
_phenomenal_ consciousness.

In the first chapter, I don't see that he definies the other sense or
aspect of consciousness which is called psychological; both senses
can be invoked to describe some experiences of consciousness.

Chalmers, Ronsenberg's zombie twin says,

"Conscious experience is not all there is to mind. At the
root of all this lie two quite distinct concepts of mind.
The first is what we may call the phenomenal concept of
mind. This is the concept of mind as conscious experience,
and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental
state. This is the aspect of mind which is most perplexing
and with which we will be most concerned, but it does not
exhaust the mental.

The second is the psychological concept of mind. This is
the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for
behavior. A state is mental in this sense if it plays a
certain kind of causal role in the production of behavior,
or at least if plays some appropriate role in the explanation
of behavior. On the psychological concept, it matters little
whether a mental state has a conscious feel or not. What
matters is the role it plays in our cognitive economy.

We might say that on the phenomenal concept, mind is
characterized by the way it feels, and on the psychological
concept, mind is characterized by what it does."

Gregg says, Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness
_of_ anything _else_. Suppose you notice your pet canary is not
singing. You go to her cage and notice her on the floor of the cage
with her feet up. Your reaction might very well be to close your eyes,
begin to cry, and experience only grief or sorrow, without any other
thinking involved. Emotions are usually counted as qualia. But then
after awhile, you might start thinking about what to do next which
would be covered by the psychological aspect of consciosness.

So if you can somehow actively think of nothing, that would be
characterized by what it does, not by what you are experiencing.
Under anathesia, you would not be thinking, thus not thinking
of anything. I wouldn't call this thinking of nothing though
because it is a lack of experience. Page 4 goes into visual qualia.

"Daniel Dennett identifies four properties which are commonly
ascribed to qualia; that is, qualia are:

ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or
apprehended by any other means than direct experience.

intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which
do not change depending on the experience's relation to other
things.

private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are
systematically impossible.

directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that
is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale,
and to know all there is to know about that quale."

SH: Again, I think Gregg's focus is on qualia and phenomenal consciousness
because that is what he wants to use to argue against physicalism.

Regards,
Stephen

 

[hypnagogue]

Again, I think Gregg's focus is on qualia and phenomenal consciousness because that is what he wants to use to argue against physicalism.

That's backwards. He doesn't talk about phenomenal consciousness because he wants to defeat physicalism. Rather, he's interested in coming up with a framework that can account for p-consciousness, and argues against physicalism along the way because he doesn't believe it can do the job of being that framework.

 

[honestrosewater]

It still seems to me this is a matter of definitions.

Of course it's a matter of definitions- I want to know where conscious effort fits into Rosenberg's definitions. Conscious effort is an aspect of phenomenal consciousness. Is it qualitative content or not? If not, what is it?

From the rest of your post, it sounds like you didn't even read my last post, so I don't know what else to say.

Edit: Stephen, Rereading this post, it sounds very rude. I apologize. I appreciate you trying to help.

 

[hypnagogue]

I want to know where conscious effort fits into Rosenberg's definitions.

Conscious effort has a p-conscious aspect; it subjectively feels like something to expend conscious effort. It also has what cyberdiction called a psychological aspect; when we feel conscious effort, there is a certain type of mental function that is being performed.

 

[honestrosewater]

Conscious effort has a p-conscious aspect; it subjectively feels like something to expend conscious effort. It also has what cyberdiction called a psychological aspect; when we feel conscious effort, there is a certain type of mental function that is being performed.

Okay, so conscious effort (CE) is not a qualitative content or quale. CE is not a bare difference. Phenomenal consciousness includes facts about CE. CE is a "phenomenal quality", "phenomenal concept", "phenomenal content" (all p.5), or awareness. Does anyone know which one(s)?

 

[hypnagogue]

Okay, so conscious effort (CE) is not a qualitative content or quale. CE is not a bare difference. Phenomenal consciousness includes facts about CE. CE is a "phenomenal quality", "phenomenal concept", "phenomenal content" (all p.5), or awareness. Does anyone know which one(s)?

Think of it like this. The space of phenomenal qualities for a human includes certain kinds of experience that are described as "conscious effort." The space of mental capacities for a human includes certain kinds of mental functions, or certain kinds of properties of various mental functions, called "conscious effort." Let's call the former p-CE and the latter a-CE and see how the items on your list apply to these terms.

"CE is not a qualitative content or quale."
p-CE is a quale; a-CE is not.

"CE is not a bare difference."
According to Rosenberg, p-CE is not composed of bare difference because it is a quale. In the view Rosenberg will develop later on in the book, a-CE is not composed of bare differences either. According to physicalism, both a-CE and p-CE are composed of bare differences.

"Phenomenal consciousness includes facts about CE."
The facts about p-consciousness include facts about p-CE. The facts about p-consciousness do not include facts about a-CE (or, if they do, it is only in an indirect way).

"CE is a "phenomenal quality", "phenomenal concept", "phenomenal content" (all p.5), or awareness."

p-CE is a phenomenal quality and phenomenal content (these terms are interchangeable). I'm not sure about 'phenomenal concept' right now; I couldn't track down that term down on a quick scan. Neither p-CE nor a-CE are awareness, but both could be said to be objects of awareness.

 

[honestrosewater]

Think of it like this. The space of phenomenal qualities for a human includes certain kinds of experience that are described as "conscious effort." The space of mental capacities for a human includes certain kinds of mental functions, or certain kinds of properties of various mental functions, called "conscious effort." Let's call the former p-CE and the latter a-CE and see how the items on your list apply to these terms.

"CE is not a qualitative content or quale."
p-CE is a quale; a-CE is not.

"CE is not a bare difference."
According to Rosenberg, p-CE is not composed of bare difference because it is a quale. In the view Rosenberg will develop later on in the book, a-CE is not composed of bare differences either. According to physicalism, both a-CE and p-CE are composed of bare differences.

"Phenomenal consciousness includes facts about CE."
The facts about p-consciousness include facts about p-CE. The facts about p-consciousness do not include facts about a-CE (or, if they do, it is only in an indirect way).

"CE is a "phenomenal quality", "phenomenal concept", "phenomenal content" (all p.5), or awareness."

p-CE is a phenomenal quality and phenomenal content (these terms are interchangeable). I'm not sure about 'phenomenal concept' right now; I couldn't track down that term down on a quick scan. Neither p-CE nor a-CE are awareness, but both could be said to be objects of awareness.

Fabtabulous. Thank you.

Phenomenal concepts appear in his Loar quote (p.5). I think p-concepts and p-qualities are representational and nonrepresentational, respectively.?

 

[honestrosewater]

BTW, I mentioned this in another thread a few days ago, but no one responded. I'm mentioning it here because it seems like such a great example for this discussion. Plus, it's been rolling around my head for at least a month, and I can't let it go. Everyone can ignore it, of course, but I wanted to share.

A classic example of the use-mention confusion in paintings is the occurence of a palette in a painting. Whereas the palette is an illusion created by the representational skill of the painter, the paints on the painted palette are literal daubs of paint from the artist's palette. The paint plays itself- it does not symbolize anything else.

What if Rosenberg used this example instead of phospenes? Such a painting has both representational (an artist's palette) and nonrepresentational (literal daubs of paint) aspects. Additionally, the paints on the painted artist's palette seem to blur the representational and nonrepresentational aspects; The representation contains, in some way, the nonrepresentational aspects, and this seems to make those aspects representational. And the "nonrepresentation" contains, in some way, the representational aspects, but I don't think this makes those aspects nonrepresentational. Clarifying in what way they contain each other would be most helpful.

 

[cyberdiction]

Originally Posted by Gödel, Escher, Bach
A classic example of the use-mention confusion in paintings is the occurence of a palette in a painting. Whereas the palette is an illusion created by the representational skill of the painter, the paints on the painted palette are literal daubs of paint from the artist's palette. The paint plays itself- it does not symbolize anything else.

BTW, I mentioned this in another thread a few days ago, but no one responded. I'm mentioning it here because it seems like such a great example for this discussion. Plus, it's been rolling around my head for at least a month, and I can't let it go. Everyone can ignore it, of course, but I wanted to share.

Hi, I love GEB, it inspired 20 years curiosity into AI. One of the reasons I
am responding to your thread is because I want to be sure that I understand
the concept. So maybe I will be corrected also.

In my view, the wrong examples are being placed into the two categories
built by the two definitions for phenomenal consciousness and psychological
consciousness. Gregg says... "I see diffuse shapes floating in the blackness
and jumpy patches of diluted color. These are experiences and thus are
elements of phenomenal consciousness, even though they do not seem to
_represent_ anything." (page 1) The other quote which was close to this was
"Phenomenal consciousness is not necessarily consciousness of anything else."

Let us take Mona Lisa. Everybody recognizes some external visual image as
the painting of "Mona Lisa". But I think phenomenal consciousness refers to
the unique, very personal perception of that objective painting that differs
from everybody else's perception. Also that painting seems to evoke a
universal feeling of appreciation, the painting is very popular. But the very
personal way you feel about it, the quale, and the very personal way
someone everybody else feels about Mona Lisa, falls under phenomenal
consciousness, and everybody's qualia are unique from everybody elses.
That everybody has in common the ability to perceive an objective
phenomena, the Mona Lisa, if fundamentally different than everybody has
their own unique, subjective experience of that visual image. Like many
people might recognize the face of your grandfather, but it will mean
something else special to them which is different than the specialness to you.
Everybody will see a shade of brown in the picture, but not the same shade
of brown, that belongs to your own special personal experience.

I went out on a limb and exposed my possible-->likely misunderstanding of
qualia and phenomenal consciousness. I read your other post twice. I
thought that your post dwelt on examples which were not instances of
phenomenal consciousness or qualia but the more cognitive aspect/function
of psychological consciousness, which it doesn't seem Gregg goes into, at
least not early in the book.

Gregg also writes (4,5) "What is the place of consciousness in our world?
From where does phenomenal information come? Are phenomenal facts
ordinary physical facts? Are they the kind of facts that ordinary facts can
form a basis for? And, if so, in what way can physical facts provide a basis
for them? *We do not have good answers to these questions yet*."

I admit that the following is subjective impression: I thought you were
asking questions that were not going to be answerable in terms of the above
quote and that you might have had an expectation that the philosophical
position Gregg was offereing went beyond plausibility with some major
unanswered gaps or areas left in uncertainty so not at all like a Physics
theory which has a lot of experimental evidence to convince a person.

I have read about this. There are major conflicts between philosophers
about what constitutes phenomenal consciousness and what are
qualia and even if they exist. So I think Gregg's framework is going to
have fuzziness.
I did think Dennett's description of qualia seemed reasonable.

I have been learning in this thread and maybe something I write today
will contradict an earlier post and I will lose my philosophy merit badge.

Edit: I have been reading some Christof Koch, a neurobiologist about qualia.
http://klab.caltech.edu/cns120/videos.html (lecture 18 maybe 14)
He seems to indicate looking at the ground is a phenomenological aspect of
consciousness, so I could likely be wrong about what I wrote in this regard.

In the spirit of the quest for truth,
Stephen

 

[honestrosewater]

Stephen,
I think qualia are unique only in that they are a part of your experience, and you are unique as an experiencer (but what do I know? ). It could be that red looks the same to you as it does to me and toothaches feel the same to you as they do to me and so on.

Your descriptions of qualia seem to all include representations. I've been told that qualia are defined by Rosenberg as being nonrepresentational. Apparently, representational and nonrepresentational aspects of our experience are both meaningful to us. But, allegedly, they are meaningful in different ways (I really don't understand the difference).
Your experience of the Mona Lisa probably has several levels of qualia and several levels of interpretation (by "interpretation" I mean the process of forming representations or a system consisting of representations). Just as a rough example, if you could see the Mona Lisa in the way I imagine a painter easily could, the first level of qualia may consist of just patches of various hues, values, and saturations. To this level of qualia, you can apply an interpretation; You may interpret some patch of hues, values, and saturations as representing a 3D shape and that shape as a smiling mouth, another as representing an eye, another as a dirt road, etc. Another level of qualia can arise from this interpretation. This level of qualia may consist of the feeling of being looked at and smiled at, of smiling or posing for a portrait, of traveling down a winding dirt road, etc. To this level of qualia, you can apply an interpretation; You may interpret your feeling of shyness and uneasiness arising from being smiled at as representing, well, I don't know, something about your personality. You may also bring other things to the painting, such as some knowledge or suspicion about the relationship between the painter and his subject or admiration for the painter's skill. You may be listening to some music and interpret the flow of the music as corresponding to the flow of the lines of the painting, the pitch to the colors, the timbre to the texture, and so on, qualia of the music and qualia of the painting representing each other. Another level of qualia can arise from these interpretations, and other interpretations can be applied to this level of qualia.
The point is that there are several types of qualia, and qualia themselves are not representations though they may arise from representations and representations may arise from them. That's my understanding of things anyway. I think Rosenberg makes the same point with the Necker Cube, but he speaks of conceptualization instead of interpretation (they mean the same thing to me).
There certainly were representational aspects to my examples, but I was focusing (or trying to focus) on the nonrepresentational aspects.