Of course I refer to the minimal interpretation. There's no contradiction between the probabilities you get from either using the pure state including Wigner's friend's pointer states and the reduced density matrices that describe the spin alone.
Of course, choosing subensembles according to Wigner's friend measurement outcomes changes the statistics due to entanglement. It's the same thing we discuss again and again concerning measurements on photon-Bell states, including "teleportation", "entanglement swapping", "delayed choice", and all that.
In short: Everywhere, where the collapse interpreters say "the state is collapsed" you have to concretely state what's measured: The "collapse" usually is just the selection of a subensemble depending on a measurement. In the minimal interpretation all these issues resolve in looking at the right ensembles and subensembles prepared and measured in the concrete experiments.
In the above example you say
Wigner has prepared his system in the state
$$|\psi \rangle=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0 \rangle +|1 \rangle).$$
At the same time you say, Wigner's friend has prepared the system in the state
$$|\Psi \rangle =\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0 \rangle \otimes |0 \rangle + |1 \rangle \otimes |1 \rangle).$$
That's a contradiction in adjecto, because if the latter preparation procedure is done, for Wigner's system the state is the reduce density matrix, tracing out the friend's pointer state, i.e.,
$$\hat{\rho}_W=\frac{1}{2} \hat{1}.$$
As long as W measured only the observable given by the corresponding basis, i.e., the observable described by $$\hat{O}=|1 \rangle \langle 1|,$$
of course both descriptions are compatible, because both predict for W's outcome of a measurement of ##O## that he gets with 50% probability 0 and with 50% probability 1.
However, both states are of course not the same, and W could figure out that his system was not prepared in the pure state but in the mixture, if F had in fact prepared the system in the state ##|\Psi \rangle##.
The point is that F cannot prepare the system+pointer state without disturbing the system itself. According to QT she cannot be a godlike creature that can determine the state of the system + pointer without disturbing the system.
I'm not so sure, where the resolution of this Frauchiger et al example really is, because I find their paper very confusing, but I'm pretty sure that there cannot be insconsistencies of the QT formalism within the minimal interpretation. I'm pretty inclined to believe in the argument by Aaronson. At least this was my first suspicion when reading the Frauchiger paper, but not being able to point my finger on the specific point of the argument without taking a lot of efford to translate the writing into math ;-)):
But I reject an assumption that Frauchiger and Renner never formalize. That assumption is, basically: “it makes sense to chain together statements that involve superposed agents measuring each other’s brains in different incompatible bases, as if the statements still referred to a world where these measurements weren’t being done.” I say: in QM, even statements that look “certain” in isolation might really mean something like “if measurement X is performed, then Y will certainly be a property of the outcome.” The trouble arises when we have multiple such statements, involving different measurements X1, X2, …, and (let’s say) performing X1 destroys the original situation in which we were talking about performing X2.
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?m=201809
He rightfully quotes Peres with his famous dictum: "Unperformed measurements have no results."