JesseM said:
Bell's theorem says, in effect, "under conditions X,Y,Z it is impossible for a local realist theory to reproduce the Bell inequalities". All you have shown is a statement to the effect of "if I am allowed to set up an experiment which does not respect condition Y, then I can violate the Bell inequalities with a local realist theory." But this is completely obvious--it's the whole reason they bothered to stipulate those conditions!
wm said:
OK. So while you're working to classically rebut CHSH or a similar Bellian Inequality, it would be good to get those X, Y, and Z clearly expressed in your terms. That will certainly help us to understand which of them are breached.
Sure. I'm not a great expert on all the technical details of Bell's theorem, but these are the conditions I'm aware of, with #2 being the one violated in your example:
1. spacelike separation between the two measurement-events
2. source has no foreknowledge of either of the measurement choices on each trial; state of signals/objects sent out by source is statistically independent of measurement settings. In a universe obeying local realism, this condition can be guaranteed by setting things up so that the time between randomly choosing a measurement setting for a given trial and finishing the measurement period for that trial is smaller than the time it would take for a signal moving at the speed of light to travel from the measurement apparatus to the source and back.
3. only a single definite outcome to each measurement--this rules out "many-worlds" type solutions
There may also be additional conditions for specific inequalities derived for specific types of experiments--for example, some inequalities depend on the assumption that Alice and Bob are both choosing between an identical set of binary measurements, and that whenever they choose the same measurement, they always get identical (or opposite, depending on the experiment) results. The CHSH inequality is the most generally-applicable one I've seen, since it doesn't depend on this sort of assumption.
JesseM said:
All I am pointing out with my examples is how trivial it is that you can violate the Bell inequalities classically if you (the 'source') are aware of what questions you'll be asked ('measurements') before you have to give answers (the 'results' of each measurement). But suppose me and a friend have to travel at close to the speed of light in opposite directions, and then the events of our each being asked a question have a spacelike separation, with the two experimenters picking their questions at random at that moment. In this case, there is no prearranged strategy me and the friend can use to come up with answers that are always the same (or opposite) when asked the same question, but which violate the Bell inequalities when asked different questions, unless we have some kind of faster-than-light psychic connection, or have precognitive abilities that allow us to know what the experimenters will ask in advance, or are able to split ourselves and the experimenters into multiple copies and decide which copies of experimenter 1 are matched with which copies of experimeter 2 later. That's what Bell's theorem is telling you, it doesn't say a thing about there being a problem with violating the Bell inequalities in circumstances where the source can be informed in advance what one or both of the measurements will be. No, the strategy of just calculating what quantum mechanics would predict for the probabilities, and basing your answers on these probabilities, can only work if you know what both of the measurements are before making your calculation.
wm said:
What specifically are you asking about?
wm said:
Because my simple example appears to BEAT this both requirement. The source in my example has no knowledge of (nor access to) Bob's setting at any stage.
But what I said was
"it doesn't say a thing about there being a problem with violating the Bell inequalities in circumstances where the source can be informed in advance what one or both of the measurements will be." It's true that in your experiment the source does not have foreknowledge of both measurements, but foreknowledge of "one or both" of the measurements is violating a condition of Bell's theorem.
JesseM said:
Anyway, it's still not hard to violate this inequality in a question-and-answer game where I know both questions before I have to give an answer. All I have to do is make sure to always give the same answer in cases (a,b), (a',b'), and (a',b), so the expectation value for these is 1, and always give different answers in case (a,b'), so the expectation value for this case is -1.
wm said:
This not quite clear to me: You say it's quite easy to breach CHSH in ...
Have you yet done that?
Yes, that's what I just did in the quoted paragraph. Alice can ask me question a or a', Bob can ask me b or b'; so my strategy is that if the questions they ask are (a,b) or (a',b') or (a',b), then I give the same answer to both questions ('yes, yes' or 'no, no'), but if they ask me the questions (a,b') then I give different answers to both questions ('yes, no' or 'no, yes'). With "yes" assigned value +1 and "no" assigned value -1, and the result of each trial being the product of the two answers, this means E(a,b) = 1, E(a',b') = 1, E(a',b) = 1, and E(a,b') = -1. So, |E(a,b) - E(a,b')| + |E(a',b') + E(a', b)| = |1 - (-1)| + |1 + 1| = |2| + |2| = 4, violating the CHSH inequality which says that |E(a,b) - E(a,b')| + |E(a',b') + E(a', b)| <= 2.
wm said:
The XYZ elements that you mention will help us here. Especially if they are in your own words. And I don't mean that extremes like FTL, psychic, magic etc have to be included in such a specification. Just common-sense boundary conditions.
Well, see above. Also, it's not actually necessary for me to have no-FTL as one of the "X,Y,Z conditions" since I summarized Bell's theorem as "under conditions X,Y,Z it is impossible for a local realist theory to reproduce the Bell inequalities", and "impossible for a local realist theory" already presupposes we are talking only about theories that say FTL is impossible.
wm said:
PS: It is still not clear to me that the paper you cited helps on this. ''The events of type C+-/ii are not supposed to be influenced by the measuring operations Li and Rj. ...''.
In my model C+- is not so influenced, is it? The +- there being random and beyond the control of Alice and Bob?
wm
In http://www.citebase.org/fulltext?format=application%2Fpdf&identifier=oai%3AarXiv.org%3Aquant-ph%2F0312176 , the i's are variables whose value can be anyone of the three orientation settings, which are labeled 1,2,3. As mentioned on p.4, C is a "common cause" which is put forth to explain the correlations you see when Bob and Alice both pick the same orientation setting. And as they say, "in the case of a perfect correlation no generality is achieved by allowing for a more than two-valued common cause variable"--for example, if Bob and Alice
always get opposite results when they both choose axis 2, then the signals/objects emitted by the source must
either be of type C+-/22 (meaning the properties of the object/signal are such that it is predetermined that if Bob and Alice both choose setting 2, Alice gets a + and Bob gets a -) or of type ~C+-/22 (the properties of the object/signal are such that it is predetermined that if Bob and Alice both choose setting 2, Alice gets a - and Bob gets a +) on the subset of trials where they both pick setting 2. Likewise, every pair of objects/signals emitted by the source must either be of type C+-/11 or ~C+-/11 (predetermined to get either Alice +/Bob - or Alice -/Bob + if they both choose setting 1) on the subset of trials where they both pick setting 1, and every pair must either be of type C+-/33 or ~C+-/33 (predetermined to get either Alice +/Bob - or Alice -/Bob + if they both choose setting 3) on the subset of trials where they both pick setting 3.
If the source has no prior knowledge of
either one's settings before it emits the signals/objects, then if every pair of signals/objects is of type C+-/22 or ~C+-/22 on the subset of trials where they both pick 2, then it must also be true that every pair is of one type or the other on
all trials. Your example is more complicated, because the source has foreknowledge of Alice's setting; if she picks 2, then the polarized light emitted by the source is at one of two possible angles such that if they are both on setting 2, then they're guaranteed to get either +- or -+ (I realize that in your example, they were originally guaranteed to get either ++ or -- on the same setting, but I hope you don't that I'm modifying your example to match the convention of the paper, which could be done practically by having the polarizer on the end of the source pointing at Bob always be at a 90 degree angle from the one on the end of the source pointing at Alice). However, if polarized light at either one of these same two angles were measured when they were both on setting 1 or 3, there would be some nonzero probability of getting all four results +-, -+, ++ and --, so in the case where Alice picks 2 we can't say the signal must either be of type C+-/11 or ~C+-/11, and likewise we can't say the signal must either be of type C+-/33 or ~C+-/33.
So I guess you're right that it's not exactly the no-conspiracy condition you're violating, since they state the no-conspiracy condition in a way that assumes some prior conditions which you've already violated. In particular, you're violating the condition that the "common cause variable" that they introduce on p. 2, whose value represents all the properties of the signal/object emitted by the source that are relevant to the probabilities of different outcomes (in your case, the common cause is the polarized light emitted at Alice and Bob by the source, and the possible values of q for the common cause variable V_q would just be the possible polarization angles of the light emitted by the source), "should not be correlated with the measurement choices" as they say in the second paragraph on p. 3. If this condition is respected, then if it's true that the common cause variable is always of type C+-/22 or ~C+-/22 on trials where they both choose setting 2, then it must be of one of these two types on
all trials; but if you violate this condition then it won't necessarily work that way any more, as your example shows.
This paragraph also has a reference to
this paper on common causes as an explanation for EPR-type results, and note that it includes the same sort of condition on p. 5:
6) Also, because the choices of the measurements are free in the sense that there is no mysterious conspiracy between the things that determine the choices of the measurements and those that determine the outcomes, one can assume that the measurement choices are independent of the common cause. ... These findings are partly read off from the empirical data (6) or they are straightforward consequences of the prohibition of superluminal causation.
And again, one consequence of the "prohibition of superluminal causation" is that if the time between randomly choosing a measurement setting and completing the measurement with that setting is smaller than the time it would take a light signal to travel from the measurement apparatus to the source and back, then the choice of setting on a given trial must (assuming a local classical theory) be statistically independent of the properties of whatever signals/objects the measurement apparatus is receiving from the source for the duration of that trial.