Can Idealism Be Falsified Without External Consciousness?

[Canute]

Is there any way of falsifying idealism?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Formally, I don't think so.

Empirically, it seems to be the case that schools of idealistic philosophy don't go beyond three generations. Of course new ones are always being formed, but any individual idealistic doctrine seems to peter out among the students of the students.

 

[Eh]

No, there is no way of falsifying any metaphysics that make no specific statements about the observable universe. Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The only way I can imagine exposes my pragmatist leanings. I'd ask the idealist to agree to subject himself to, or be part of, everything he proposes to be true, and not to propose anything with which he cannot do that.

With that approach, although we'd never convince a room full of idealists that a reality outside their minds exists (because there is no way to do that), at least we'd get rid of an idealist when reality smashes him for ignoring it ( . . . Greg, we need an evil smile).

 

[Canute]

Formally, I don't think so.

Empirically, it seems to be the case that schools of idealistic philosophy don't go beyond three generations. Of course new ones are always being formed, but any individual idealistic doctrine seems to peter out among the students of the students.

I didn't mean to start arguing but .. is there any evidence for this? Most 'western' philosophers have been idealists, and Buddhism, Taoism etc seem to have kept going ok.

 

[Canute]

No, there is no way of falsifying any metaphysics that make no specific statements about the observable universe. Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified.

That isn't quite true. If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness, as seems to be the case.

 

[Canute]

The only way I can imagine exposes my pragmatist leanings. I'd ask the idealist to agree to subject himself to, or be part of, everything he proposes to be true, and not to propose anything with which he cannot do that.

With that approach, although we'd never convince a room full of idealists that a reality outside their minds exists (because there is no way to do that), at least we'd get rid of an idealist when reality smashes him for ignoring it ( . . . Greg, we need an evil smile).

Idealists do not argue that the universe does not exist, merely that it is epiphenomenal.

 

[selfAdjoint]

But the classical objection to epiphenomenon is that is has no causal results. But the universe, seen from inside, does have causal results inside. If I see a stone hurling toward my face, I can reliably expect to suffer pain.

 

[Canute]

That isn't quite right. 'Epihenominalism' only raises causality issues when consciousness is assumed to be epiphenomenal. I mean epiphenomenal in the same sense that steam is epiphenomenal from a whistle, and steam is causal.

 

[Les Sleeth]

That isn't quite right. 'Epihenominalism' only raises causality issues when consciousness is assumed to be epiphenomenal. I mean epiphenomenal in the same sense that steam is epiphenomenal from a whistle, and steam is causal.

I must not understand what you mean. I thought you meant, in general, the belief that reality is what takes place in our minds, along the lines of Berkeley's concept (and in contrast to, say, Mill's phenomenalism), and so in this empirical age is criticized for failing to give proper due to aspects of reality existing outside the mind (thus my little joke, but I suppose I was really talking about a solipsist). In some ways I've thought of most philosophy as solipsist in the sense that philosophers have been notorious for thinking they are going to understand reality through rationalization alone. I wonder, would you say I am an idealist if I am a monist?

Getting back to what are you asking, your statement "If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness . . ." is interesting but I think I need to understand why seeing consciousness as epiphenomenal makes one an idealist.

 

[Eh]

Most 'western' philosophers have been idealists, and .

Hardly. I think you're confusing ontological idealism with epistemological idealism. It's a very bad idea to use the terms interchangeably since they have different meanings.

That isn't quite true. If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness, as seems to be the case.

No. Ontological idealism claims that the world is mental. That means that no matter what observation we make, idealists will claim it is just a mental experience. Thus there is absolutely no observation we could make that would ever disprove this concept.

Science is limited to making predictions about observable phenomena. It is not ontology, and so your remark about science being unable to account for consciousness is vacuous. As well, claiming we won't be able to explain something is not a testible prediction, because only falsification can close the matter. Consider an ontological idea from which I can predict that particle X will never be found. At no time can this ever be confirmed. After all, particle X hasn't been found today, but there is always the possibility of it being discovered in the future. A prediction that can falsified, can be settled as soon as the experiment is performed. Either the prediction is conclusively falsified, or it passes. Only a prediction that can be do so actually amounts to something testible.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Science is limited to making predictions about observable phenomena. It is not ontology, and so your remark about science being unable to account for consciousness is vacuous.

You are correct to say that the actual practice of science is not ontological, but there is a science philosophy many empirical-minded derive from science ideals and discoveries that is fully ontological -- one might call it empirical physicalism (i.e., physicalistic theory based strictly on empirical evidence). What does that have to do with consciousness . . . more below.

As well, claiming we won't be able to explain something is not a testible prediction, because only falsification can close the matter. Consider an ontological idea from which I can predict that particle X will never be found. At no time can this ever be confirmed. After all, particle X hasn't been found today, but there is always the possibility of it being discovered in the future. A prediction that can falsified, can be settled as soon as the experiment is performed. Either the prediction is conclusively falsified, or it passes. Only a prediction that can be do so actually amounts to something testible.

When it comes to consciousness, much of the debate is now about if consciousness is purely physical or if there is something more basic which is interacting with the body. This brings into question the role of scientific investigation and what it is capable of revealing about existence.

Using your example, you might not be able to tell anying about the predicted particle X, but if science consistently fails to produce an answer about something, how do we interpret that? If there are areas where you are content to say "it's beyond the realm of scientific investigation" then there's no ontological implications in that. In that statement one acknowledges the possibility that science cannot reveal everything that exists. But if one concludes, as is the case with empirical physicalistic philosophy, that only what science indicates is to be used in consciousness models, then built into that is an ontological assumption.

 

[Eh]

You are correct to say that the actual practice of science is not ontological, but there is a science philosophy many empirical-minded derive from science ideals and discoveries that is fully ontological -- one might call it empirical physicalism (i.e., physicalistic theory based strictly on empirical evidence).

Indeed, there are philosophies that claim to be based on empirical data alone. Just as long as physicalism is not confused with actual science, then I don't have a problem with it. However, I would argue that physicalism is actually based on more assumptions than empirical evidence. That is just because empirical knowledge is limited to the observable (IOW the experienced) world alone. To say anything additional is just an assumption that can never be tested.

When it comes to consciousness, much of the debate is now about if consciousness is purely physical or if there is something more basic which is interacting with the body. This brings into question the role of scientific investigation and what it is capable of revealing about existence.

Science could very well solve the scientific problem of consciousness (how the brain functions) while we are still left with the old philosophical questions (ie. how the hell do those processes in the brain translate into qualia?) intact. Science can never go beyond observable phenomena, so the ontological questions are off limits.

Using your example, you might not be able to tell anying about the predicted particle X, but if science consistently fails to produce an answer about something, how do we interpret that?

We interpret that to mean particle X has never been detected, nothing more. However, a model that makes good predictions will predict a situation or specific experiment where we should expect to find said particle X. If we don't, then the model is falsified. Keep in mind that particle X or other phenomena itself can never be falsified - only the models that predict their existence can.

If there are areas where you are content to say "it's beyond the realm of scientific investigation" then there's no ontological implications in that. In that statement one acknowledges the possibility that science cannot reveal everything that exists. But if one concludes, as is the case with empirical physicalistic philosophy, that only what science indicates is to be used in consciousness models, then built into that is an ontological assumption.

As I said, ontology is mere assumptions when you go beyond the experienced world. While this means physicalism is founded on assumption, ontological idealism is as well. It is one thing to claim we can only know mental states, and another (and unfounded) entirely to claim that the mental is all that exists.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Indeed, there are philosophies that claim to be based on empirical data alone. Just as long as physicalism is not confused with actual science, then I don't have a problem with it. However, I would argue that physicalism is actually based on more assumptions than empirical evidence. That is just because empirical knowledge is limited to the observable (IOW the experienced) world alone. To say anything additional is just an assumption that can never be tested. . . . As I said, ontology is mere assumptions when you go beyond the experienced world. While this means physicalism is founded on assumption, ontological idealism is as well. It is one thing to claim we can only know mental states, and another (and unfounded) entirely to claim that the mental is all that exists.

It might be that ontology is entirely beyond the reach of science, but not necessarily experience. Here's a hypothetical.

What if I said I'd developed the ability to experience the "essence" of my own consciousness? I report that while in this ground state experience, it appears that my individual consciousness is derived from a general, undifferentiated universal pool of consciousness. Also while in that experience, it appears what the brain is doing is individualizing me from the generality of the universal pool of ground state consciousness.

Now, that is an experience which you cannot test empirically, but you could learn what I learned and try it yourself. If it turned out to match what I reported, then there would be two people reporting the same thing. Still, the millions of empiricists around the world need more than that. So we teach them all how to experience the ground state of their own consciousness, and now millions agree!

I'm kidding some, but I am serious too. Part of this problem with ontology is the generally accepted standard to externalize the verification process. We say, if it's "out there" it can be verified experientially because we can all get at it. That's true, but it might also be true there is an experience we can only reach individually, inside us, yet which also would be an experience we could all agree reveals certain things. In fact, the idea of experience is exactly like that in the sense that we cannot tell what another person's experience is. That is why at least one variety of idealism (the one you've cited) is impossible to prove or disprove.

As you know, there really are people who've claimed they have mastered experiencing a "ground state" as I call it, and who really do say consciousness is part of a larger, preexistant realm. Obviously my solution for having everybody taught how to experience that has the problem of getting people to learn it. It is not yet an ideal of humanity. If so, and if experience is the standard for verification (as we both agree), then IMO right now there isn't much hope of convincing empiricists of anything ontological that's non-physical.

 

[Canute]

I must not understand what you mean. I thought you meant, in general, the belief that reality is what takes place in our minds, along the lines of Berkeley's concept (and in contrast to, say, Mill's phenomenalism), and so in this empirical age is criticized for failing to give proper due to aspects of reality existing outside the mind (thus my little joke, but I suppose I was really talking about a solipsist). In some ways I've thought of most philosophy as solipsist in the sense that philosophers have been notorious for thinking they are going to understand reality through rationalization alone. I wonder, would you say I am an idealist if I am a monist?

Getting back to what are you asking, your statement "If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness . . ." is interesting but I think I need to understand why seeing consciousness as epiphenomenal makes one an idealist.

There are a few variations on Idealism but basically it is the view that consciousness is more fundamental than matter, or that only minds and mental representations exist.

Solipsism is the view that only 'I' (in your case you) exist. I'm not sure what that's got to do with rationalisation. Whether being a monist makes you an idealist depends on what sort of monism your talking about. (E.g. Taoism is idealist but not monist).

I didn't suggest that seeing consciousness as epiphenomenal makes one an idealist, that's the opposite of the truth. If you think consciousness is epiphenomenal then you are a materialist.

BTW I agree with what you just said about experience. It is perfectly possible to empirically verify facts which lie beyond science or logic, and this is well known from philosophy and mathematics. The argument is only over the importance of those kinds of facts.

 

[Canute]

Hardly. I think you're confusing ontological idealism with epistemological idealism. It's a very bad idea to use the terms interchangeably since they have different meanings.

Please explain. I've never heard of epistemilogical idealism.

No. Ontological idealism claims that the world is mental. That means that no matter what observation we make, idealists will claim it is just a mental experience. Thus there is absolutely no observation we could make that would ever disprove this concept.

Well yes, that's what I said. If Idealism is unfalsifiable we can predict that we cannot prove that consciousness arises from brain, and never will. But it's a big 'if'.

Science is limited to making predictions about observable phenomena. It is not ontology, and so your remark about science being unable to account for consciousness is vacuous.

Why is it vacuous? What do you mean 'it is not ontology'? I don't understand what you're saying here.

As well, claiming we won't be able to explain something is not a testible prediction, because only falsification can close the matter.

You miss the point here I think. If Idealism is provably unfalsifiable in principle then we cannot falsify it, i.e. no observation, experiment or logical analysis can falsify it. There is no parallel with the 'particle X' situation.

 

[Eh]

It might be that ontology is entirely beyond the reach of science, but not necessarily experience. Here's a hypothetical.

What if I said I'd developed the ability to experience the "essence" of my own consciousness? I report that while in this ground state experience, it appears that my individual consciousness is derived from a general, undifferentiated universal pool of consciousness. Also while in that experience, it appears what the brain is doing is individualizing me from the generality of the universal pool of ground state consciousness.

Well here's the crux of it. You can certainly have the experience you're talking about, but you can never know the source of it. In other words, you can't be sure of what outside world (if any) is actually involved in the process, which in this case would be a "universal pool of ground state consciousness". There is always a countless number of possible explanations for any given experience. Take the sight of an object like a tree for example. The experience leads us to believe there really is a tree outside reflecting light which strikes the retina which in turn is converted into an electric signal and processed in the brain as an image. Is this really the case? Would the experience be any different if we were just brains in a vat?

As you know, there really are people who've claimed they have mastered experiencing a "ground state" as I call it, and who really do say consciousness is part of a larger, preexistant realm.

They do, and I'd say they certainly have the experience, but there is no justification in claiming this experience is a result of any "larger, preexistent relam". That simply cannot be known.

 

[Eh]

Please explain. I've never heard of epistemilogical idealism.

The simplest way to describe is as follows: Metaphysical idealism asserts the ideality of reality; epistemological idealism holds that in the knowledge process the mind can grasp only its own contents

IOW, the outside world, if it exists, is not knowable. Different shades of this kind of idealism show up in the works of various philosophers, and they are often labeled as an idealist. However, this is not metaphysical idealism. As such, I would like to know where you get the claim that most western philosphers have been metaphysical idealists.

Well yes, that's what I said. If Idealism is unfalsifiable we can predict that we cannot prove that consciousness arises from brain, and never will. But it's a big 'if'.

Idealism is unfalsifiable because it merely states that the world is mental. Since we only experience the mental world, no experience could ever contradict this form of idealism. There is no if here. Yes, from that obvious conclusion we can also conclude that science cannot deal with the metaphysics of consciousness. That however is not a testible prediction as I explained with the example above in the thread.

Why is it vacuous? What do you mean 'it is not ontology'? I don't understand what you're saying here.

Science is not ontology, that's why. Saying that science cannot solve a metaphysical question is meaningless, because metaphysics is completely irrelevant to science. Science will only account for observable phenomena, ie. events experienced through the senses. Observers cannot observe themselves.

You miss the point here I think. If Idealism is provably unfalsifiable in principle then we cannot falsify it, i.e. no observation, experiment or logical analysis can falsify it. There is no parallel with the 'particle X' situation.

The particle X example is quite relevant because you've attempted to argue that the fact that idealism cannot be falsified somehow makes a testible prediction about the observable world. In response to my statement that idealism makes no specific claims about the observable world, you wrote: That isn't quite true. If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness, as seems to be the case.

That is incorrect, because as I demonstrated, a prediction about what we won't find is not a testible prediction. I should have been more clear on that point - a specific prediction needs to be testible to be of any use. And to clarify, only a prediction that can be falsified is testible. In other words, a test is subjecting a prediction to an experiment that it will either pass or fail. If it passes, it has been successfully tested. If it fails, it has been falsified. If there is never the chance of failure, there is never a chance of passing either.

 

[Canute]

The simplest way to describe is as follows: Metaphysical idealism asserts the ideality of reality; epistemological idealism holds that in the knowledge process the mind can grasp only its own contents

IOW, the outside world, if it exists, is not knowable.

Ah, I've never heard that called epistemilogical idealism, thanks. Its both of these I'm referring to. (Underneath the detail they are pretty inseperable. If E-Idealism were not true then M-Idealism wouldn't be unfalsifiable).

Different shades of this kind of idealism show up in the works of various philosophers, and they are often labeled as an idealist. However, this is not metaphysical idealism. As such, I would like to know where you get the claim that most western philosphers have been metaphysical idealists.

I think it's fairly clear. For instance.

“This impregnability to disproof, plus its philosophical advantages, has attracted many philosophers to idealism. Indeed, nearly every significant philosopher from the late 18th century to the early 20th century has been a paid up idealist.” (David Papineau and Howard Selina ‘Introducing Consciousness’ Icon Books 2000)

They note that that among the most eminent have been Georg Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson, John Stuart Mill, and Bertrand Russell.) There are numerous others, Spinoza, Heidegger, Sartre ...

Idealism is unfalsifiable because it merely states that the world is mental. Since we only experience the mental world, no experience could ever contradict this form of idealism. There is no if here. Yes, from that obvious conclusion we can also conclude that science cannot deal with the metaphysics of consciousness. That however is not a testible prediction as I explained with the example above in the thread.

But if Idealism is unfalsifiable, as you say, then my prediction doesn't have to tested. It's a logically deducible fact.

Science is not ontology, that's why. Saying that science cannot solve a metaphysical question is meaningless, because metaphysics is completely irrelevant to science.

I think I know what you mean, but it is not true except in an idealised sort of way. Science is derived from metaphysics and inextricably tangled up with it.

Science will only account for observable phenomena, ie. events experienced through the senses. Observers cannot observe themselves.

Agreed.

The particle X example is quite relevant because you've attempted to argue that the fact that idealism cannot be falsified somehow makes a testible prediction about the observable world. In response to my statement that idealism makes no specific claims about the observable world, you wrote: That isn't quite true. If idealism is unfalsifiable then we can predict that science will be unable to account for consciousness, as seems to be the case.

That is incorrect, because as I demonstrated, a prediction about what we won't find is not a testible prediction.

It does not have to tested. If idealism is unfalsifiable then this has logical consequences. No experiments are necessary to prove the truth of mathematical theorems, and my prediciton was mathematical in character, reached by mathematical/logical induction. I think you mistook my reference to 'prediction' as if it were a scientific prediction, a hypothesis to be tested. No testing is required. If Idealism is unfasifiable then we can predict with complete confidence that science will never explain consciousness scientifically. (BTW I didn't start this thread to have this argument, it was just a straighforward question).

I should have been more clear on that point - a specific prediction needs to be testible to be of any use.

You're talking about a specific type of prediction. Look at it this way. If idealism is unfalsifiable then the inability of science to explain consciousness is logically entailed and provable. From this we can predict that it won't ever succeed in doing so. This sort of prediction does not have to be testable. If 2+2=4 we can predict that 2x2 will never equal five (within the same system) That isn't testable either. A logical entailment is a prediction, but not the same kind as a scientific prediction.

And to clarify, only a prediction that can be falsified is testible.

I agree. It's a tautology.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well here's the crux of it. You can certainly have the experience you're talking about, but you can never know the source of it. In other words, you can't be sure of what outside world (if any) is actually involved in the process, which in this case would be a "universal pool of ground state consciousness". There is always a countless number of possible explanations for any given experience. Take the sight of an object like a tree for example. The experience leads us to believe there really is a tree outside reflecting light which strikes the retina which in turn is converted into an electric signal and processed in the brain as an image. Is this really the case? Would the experience be any different if we were just brains in a vat?

No, you are right, there would be no way to tell which is the case. However, what's interesting about that, which you just made me realize, is that for me inside my brain, I am the constant. Yes you can manipulate how information reaches me, but I am experiencing exactly the same thing. If we were to be accurate about what I experience with either the EM pattern reflecting from a tree, or that same EM pattern created by some device, we would say my experience is that of a particular EM pattern.

This leads to an interesting conclusion about consciousness. An empirical argument I often hear is about the unreliability of subjectiveness. The truth is, the most internal aspect of subjectiveness, experience, is what is the most constant and the most reliable because every bit of the objective world can be manipulated. My intellect can be wrong, my emotions can be toyed with , but my experiential nature cannot be other than what it is. It experiences and has no other skill than that.

Les: As you know, there really are people who've claimed they have mastered experiencing a "ground state" as I call it, and who really do say consciousness is part of a larger, preexistant realm.

They do, and I'd say they certainly have the experience, but there is no justification in claiming this experience is a result of any "larger, preexistent relam". That simply cannot be known.

But see, we can say that about everything we experience, as you just pointed out. Yes, we can call into question every bit it, but it seems pointless to constantly question the experiential system we rely on everyday. Our solution is to accept as real those experiences which we can repeat. With repeatability we reach a point where we say we are certain, we are convinced, we know.

You seem to say . . . well, if it's experience from information reaching me from the "outside," and I can get others to agree it's there, then I am willing to allow the label "known" to be applied. But if it's an experience originating "inside," which only the individual can verify, then it must be stamped "unknowable." Why must that be so?

So I fall back on the repeatability issue. If I can repeatedly experience the ground state of my own consciousness, and if it repeatedly reveals itself to be connected to a vast ground state continuum, why must your statement "That simply cannot be known" necessarily be true?

 

[Canute]

Originally Posted by Eh
Well here's the crux of it. You can certainly have the experience you're talking about, but you can never know the source of it. In other words, you can't be sure of what outside world (if any) is actually involved in the process, which in this case would be a "universal pool of ground state consciousness". There is always a countless number of possible explanations for any given experience.

I'd go along with Leeth on this, but there is one other point. What you say is true for all conceptions, perceptions and thoughts, since these are the 'outside world' that you refer to. You're right that certain knowledge cannot be gained in this way, only relative knowledge. However people who experience deep states of consciousness with implications for the nature of their existence do not claim that this is an experience of something outside themselves, but rather a knowledge of what is inside, a knowledge of self and the nature of consciousness. Such experiences can (in theory at least) be unambiguous and bring certain knowledge. Whether they do or not only you can decide, but there are no logical objections to this assertion.

 

[Eh]

Ah, I've never heard that called epistemilogical idealism, thanks. Its both of these I'm referring to. (Underneath the detail they are pretty inseperable. If E-Idealism were not true then M-Idealism wouldn't be unfalsifiable).

Yes, metaphysical idealism could be testible if we could somehow know anything about the unexperienced world. But they are still seperable. As I said, we clearly can't know anything about the world except the part of the world we experience. Yet, that in no way lends support to the idea that the mind is all that exists in reality. One can easily take the postition of epistemological idealism while not giving the metaphysical any serious consideration.

“This impregnability to disproof, plus its philosophical advantages, has attracted many philosophers to idealism. Indeed, nearly every significant philosopher from the late 18th century to the early 20th century has been a paid up idealist.” (David Papineau and Howard Selina ‘Introducing Consciousness’ Icon Books 2000)

They note that that among the most eminent have been Georg Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson, John Stuart Mill, and Bertrand Russell.) There are numerous others, Spinoza, Heidegger, Sartre ...

This isn't saying much about metaphysical idealism. Take the metaphysics of the atheistic existentialists Heidegger and Sartre for example. Here is a perfect example of where inprecise use of the term idealism can lead to a lot of confusion.

But if Idealism is unfalsifiable, as you say, then my prediction doesn't have to tested. It's a logically deducible fact.

Correct, but this cannot be used as a refutation to the claim that: Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified. In this context, we are looking for a prediction or specific statement about the world that can be falsified. Because it doesn't say anything about the world, it cannot be tested.

I think I know what you mean, but it is not true except in an idealised sort of way. Science is derived from metaphysics and inextricably tangled up with it.

Science developed as a method of obtaining knowledge more than anything, putting it in the realm of epistemology more than metaphysics. Ontology is about everything that exists, why the scientific method is limited to the existence of observable phenomena. That is the big difference.

It does not have to tested. If idealism is unfalsifiable then this has logical consequences...(BTW I didn't start this thread to have this argument, it was just a straighforward question).

Right, but this prediction itself does not make idealism falsifiable. You responded to my statement that idealism is not falsifiable because it doesn't make any (testible) statements about the world with the notion that if idealism is unfalsifiable, then science cannot solve the metaphysical problem of consciousness. I just wanted to clarify that this does not contradict my earlier statement that idealism cannot be falsified because it doesn't make any specific statements about the world that could be tested. If we're in agreement about that, then there is nothing to argue about.

 

[Eh]

This leads to an interesting conclusion about consciousness. An empirical argument I often hear is about the unreliability of subjectiveness. The truth is, the most internal aspect of subjectiveness, experience, is what is the most constant and the most reliable because every bit of the objective world can be manipulated. My intellect can be wrong, my emotions can be toyed with , but my experiential nature cannot be other than what it is. It experiences and has no other skill than that.

And indeed this experience is the foundation for science. Now you mentioned the problem of subjectivity in empiricism. I don't this is a problem because experience is ever invalid. However, memory can be false, and we will often interpret an experience differently depending on the situation. For example, a different emotional state can effect how we view and remember a certain visual experience. In science, an important aspect is that an observation must be repeatable. Do we get the same visual everytime we run the experiment, or is it did happen only in the context of a specific state of mind?

But see, we can say that about everything we experience, as you just pointed out. Yes, we can call into question every bit it, but it seems pointless to constantly question the experiential system we rely on everyday. Our solution is to accept as real those experiences which we can repeat. With repeatability we reach a point where we say we are certain, we are convinced, we know.

I agree, we can be certain of experience. But we can't be certain of any ideas about the outside world.

You seem to say . . . well, if it's experience from information reaching me from the "outside," and I can get others to agree it's there, then I am willing to allow the label "known" to be applied. But if it's an experience originating "inside," which only the individual can verify, then it must be stamped "unknowable." Why must that be so?

I wouldn't claim any physicalist assumptions are any more known than idealist. The beauty of science is that no such metaphysical assumptions are required. All we need is the experience of the tree and any other objects to come up with testible hypothesis's.

So I fall back on the repeatability issue. If I can repeatedly experience the ground state of my own consciousness, and if it repeatedly reveals itself to be connected to a vast ground state continuum, why must your statement "That simply cannot be known" necessarily be true?

How do you know the "ground state" is connected to anything larger than the experience you have? Certainly, you cannot experience other minds (who would be the one experiencing it?) directly so we are restricted to knowledge about our own.

 

[Canute]

One can easily take the postition of epistemological idealism while not giving the metaphysical any serious consideration.

I don't know where were going here. Both forms of idealism are unfalsifiable, end of story.

This isn't saying much about metaphysical idealism. Take the metaphysics of the atheistic existentialists Heidegger and Sartre for example. Here is a perfect example of where inprecise use of the term idealism can lead to a lot of confusion.

I'm sure it can yes. However idealism of both kinds are unfalsifiable so we needn't worry here, and the evidence suggests that my comment about philosophers favouring (ontological) idealism, as did Sartre and Heidegger, is true.

Correct, but this cannot be used as a refutation to the claim that: Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified. In this context, we are looking for a prediction or specific statement about the world that can be falsified. Because it doesn't say anything about the world, it cannot be tested.

If you mean that it can't be scientifically tested then you're correct. That's precisely what I've been saying.

Science developed as a method of obtaining knowledge more than anything, putting it in the realm of epistemology more than metaphysics. Ontology is about everything that exists, why the scientific method is limited to the existence of observable phenomena. That is the big difference.

Exactly.

Right, but this prediction itself does not make idealism falsifiable.

Idealism is unfalsifiable in principle, and of course a prediction cannot make it falsifiable. I have not argued otherwise. Nevertheless one can predict by deduction that science will not solve the problem of consiousness if idealism is unfalsifiable. Of course it's not a testable prediction, if it were testable then idealism would be falsifiable.

You responded to my statement that idealism is not falsifiable because it doesn't make any (testible) statements about the world with the notion that if idealism is unfalsifiable, then science cannot solve the metaphysical problem of consciousness. I just wanted to clarify that this does not contradict my earlier statement that idealism cannot be falsified because it doesn't make any specific statements about the world that could be tested. If we're in agreement about that, then there is nothing to argue about.

I don't disagree, given that you are using 'testable' in a restricted scientific sense. Epistemilogical Idealism is provable, (depending on how you define 'mind') for it is the old problem of infinite self-reference in disguise, and ontological Idealism is verifiable in theory, unfalsifiable in principle and scientifically untestable. I'm not saying anything about idealism that contradicts what is already agreed within science or philosophy.

 

[Eh]

I don't know where were going here. Both forms of idealism are unfalsifiable, end of story.

But they are not inseperable, as you've said. There are 2 different philosophies here.

I'm sure it can yes. However idealism of both kinds are unfalsifiable so we needn't worry here, and the evidence suggests that my comment about philosophers favouring (ontological) idealism, as did Sartre and Heidegger, is true.

What in the world are you basing that claim on? Also, based on what are you claiming Sartre, Heidegger was an ontological idealist? I think that once you clarify the difference between the 2 kinds of idealism we discussed, you'll find that a much smaller group of philosophers took the metaphysical position of idealism.

Idealism is unfalsifiable in principle, and of course a prediction cannot make it falsifiable. I have not argued otherwise. Nevertheless one can predict by deduction that science will not solve the problem of consiousness if idealism is unfalsifiable. Of course it's not a testable prediction, if it were testable then idealism would be falsifiable.

Let's clarify here. You seemed to be disagreeing with the fact that: Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified. In fact, you claimed this wasn't true. That is the whole argument here. If you agree on this point, then there is nothing to argue, right?

 

[Canute]

But they are not inseperable, as you've said. There are 2 different philosophies here.

I didn't say that they were the same thing. I said there was a logical relationship between them.

What in the world are you basing that claim on? Also, based on what are you claiming Sartre, Heidegger was an ontological idealist? I think that once you clarify the difference between the 2 kinds of idealism we discussed, you'll find that a much smaller group of philosophers took the metaphysical position of idealism.

Sartre is tricky and I could be wrong. Existentialism has different interpretions. I suppose it depends how you interpret 'existence preceeds essence'. Heidegger is pretty clear however. My original quote by the way, from Pepineau, referred to ontological idealism. I believe that you'll find that the majority of major philosophers have been ontological idealists. I'm not sure how I could prove though.

Let's clarify here. You seemed to be disagreeing with the fact that: Since ontological idealism says nothing specific about how the observable world should be, it cannot be falsified. In fact, you claimed this wasn't true. That is the whole argument here. If you agree on this point, then there is nothing to argue, right?

Ah. Maybe I see the problem. I wasn't suggesting that idealism could be falsified. I was saying that idealism makes predictions about the observable world.

Idealism predicts that the world should be just as it is, as one would expect if it is true or unfalsifiable. However these are not scientifically testable predictions. If they were then idealism would be falsifiable.

My point was that IF idealism is unfalsifiable (or true) then we can predict (deduce if you like, which is ultimately the same thing) from that fact that science cannot explain consciousness. Of course it can be argued that science will explain it in the future, but this doesn't alter anything. It just means that I was wrong to assume that idealism was unfalsifiable - and I acknowledged that this was a conjecture with the 'IF' at the beginning.

 

[Eh]

I didn't say that they were the same thing. I said there was a logical relationship between them.

Well you did say they are insperable, so I was clarifying the matter.

Sartre is tricky and I could be wrong. Existentialism has different interpretions. I suppose it depends how you interpret 'existence preceeds essence'. Heidegger is pretty clear however. My original quote by the way, from Pepineau, referred to ontological idealism. I believe that you'll find that the majority of major philosophers have been ontological idealists.

You must be mistaken. Bertrand Russell was on the list, as was Spinoza. Along with the Sartre reference, the author must have been referring to epistemology. I don't have the book, but it would help to know the context.

I'm not sure how I could prove though.

We could always make a list and see how many actual "great" philosophers could be considered ontological idealists.

My point was that IF idealism is unfalsifiable (or true) then we can predict (deduce if you like, which is ultimately the same thing) from that fact that science cannot explain consciousness. Of course it can be argued that science will explain it in the future, but this doesn't alter anything. It just means that I was wrong to assume that idealism was unfalsifiable - and I acknowledged that this was a conjecture with the 'IF' at the beginning.

Then you agree that the answer to your initial question is yes? If you're looking for something to be falsified, you're also looking for a testible prediction. IOW, a test that can be failed and falsify the hypothesis. Since idealism does not do this, it can never be proven wrong.

 

[Canute]

Well you did say they are insperable, so I was clarifying the matter.

I did say that but I didn;t mean it quite the way you took it. They are inseperable because they are logically related, but not the same thing.

You must be mistaken. Bertrand Russell was on the list, as was Spinoza. Along with the Sartre reference, the author must have been referring to epistemology. I don't have the book, but it would help to know the context.

The context was a discussion of consciousness, mind and matter, in which the authors were pointing out that one possible solution popular with philosophers is that that idealism is true.

We could always make a list and see how many actual "great" philosophers could be considered ontological idealists.

Ok. How about posting it as a question on its own thread and consulting our colleagues.

Then you agree that the answer to your initial question is yes?

I've always assumed that idealism is unfalsifiable so I posted the question to see if there are any counterarguments. However it seems that everybody agrees.

If you're looking for something to be falsified, you're also looking for a testible prediction. IOW, a test that can be failed and falsify the hypothesis. Since idealism does not do this, it can never be proven wrong.

We already agree that idealism cannot be proved. My point was that this does not mean it is false, or that we cannot know it to be true. After all materialism is unprovable and unknowable, so its even lesslikely to be true by your argument.

I feel you are making a mistake to assume that proof is the only route to knowledge. We know that this is not the case. In fact it's the opposite of what is true according to mathematicians.

 

[Eh]

I did say that but I didn;t mean it quite the way you took it. They are inseperable because they are logically related, but not the same thing.


The context was a discussion of consciousness, mind and matter, in which the authors were pointing out that one possible solution popular with philosophers is that that idealism is true.

I'd have to read the part leading up to the quote, but from the individuals on the list posted I'm certain it's not ontological idealism.

Ok. How about posting it as a question on its own thread and consulting our colleagues.

Will do.

We already agree that idealism cannot be proved. My point was that this does not mean it is false, or that we cannot know it to be true. After all materialism is unprovable and unknowable, so its even lesslikely to be true by your argument.

I would argue that we can only know experience, but that is an epistemological claim off the original topic here. As well, I would argue that all metaphysical models are equally as likely. Since we cannot experience the outside world, any preference of one consistent ontology over another is completely arbitrary. IOW, one ontology may feel correct, or may seem simpler, but this cannot amount to any precise way of determining which is correct.

I feel you are making a mistake to assume that proof is the only route to knowledge. We know that this is not the case. In fact it's the opposite of what is true according to mathematicians.

If proof were the only source of knowledge, then mathematicians would have a monopoly on truth. But my position is that experience is the only source of knowledge and I include math and logic because they are dependent on the mind. I know, more epistemology.

 

[Canute]

I'd have to read the part leading up to the quote, but from the individuals on the list posted I'm certain it's not ontological idealism.

Sorry but it was library book. However if you're interested it is about the best book on consciousness that there is IMO. It's high school level, very very short and mostly pictures (!) yet it covers all the main philosophical issues on the scientific 'problem of consciousness'. It's far better than most more 'expert' books of the subject. It was certainly talking about ontology, because the ontology of consciousness is why the topic of idealism was relevant to the book.

I would argue that we can only know experience, but that is an epistemological claim off the original topic here.

There wasn't a topic, just a question. Still, these issues came up and they're interesting. I agree that we can only know experience. This is the other side of the fact that 'knowing' can only be achieved through experience. I suspect that we don't disagree as much as you think.

As well, I would argue that all metaphysical models are equally as likely.

Not equally likely, since some are intrinsically illogical (I find 'Creator Gods' illogical for instance). However I agree that metaphysics does not deal with absolute truths. Martin Heideggers lecture 'What is Metaphysics' deals with this issue brilliantly. (It's online).

Since we cannot experience the outside world, any preference of one consistent ontology over another is completely arbitrary.

This is where we disagree. If consciousness is fundamental, which as far as we know is at least an even probability, then ontology is the study of self, not the outside world. This is what Plato, Aristotle, Popper, Heidegger, Spinoza, and (in a roundabout way) Kant argued. Even Colin Mcginn argues that consiousness originates in a 'pre-Big Bang non-spatial reality'. He calls this 'mysterianism' because he doesn't think it's his consciousness that he's talking about, but it's only in western philosophy that there is any need to appeal to mysticism and 'ignoramibuses'.

IOW, one ontology may feel correct, or may seem simpler, but this cannot amount to any precise way of determining which is correct.

I think this depends what you mean by 'feeling', and 'simple' is an impossible concept to define properly. However it is possible to know the truth of our origins, it just isn't possible to prove that it is. (I'll come back to that if you want).

If proof were the only source of knowledge, then mathematicians would have a monopoly on truth. But my position is that experience is the only source of knowledge and I include math and logic because they are dependent on the mind. I know, more epistemology.

Proof is not a source of certain knowledge, we know this because anything that can be proved in one system can be disproved in another. This entails that anything that is provable (or disprovable) cannot be absolutely true.

To avoid this problem it would be necessary to systematically prove that one's axioms are true, but we can't do this in principle (unless the system is trivial). So again I agree, experience is the only source of certain knowledge (although the relative kind is not to be sneered at - we wouldn't get through the day without it).

But this is no reason not to trust our rationality. We just have to be careful about how we use systems of proof, and what we conclude from them. It is worth noting that Taoists etc assert that ultimate truth cannot be known through reasoning. If this was not true then we'd know they did not know the truth, because their 'truth' would be just relative.

It's an assertion philosophers have been making in one way or another ever since Plato. More recently mathematicians have been saying the same, for this is the problem that Hilbert, Frege, Russell, Goedel etc were trying to solve (without success).

 

[Les Sleeth]

If proof were the only source of knowledge, then mathematicians would have a monopoly on truth. But my position is that experience is the only source of knowledge and I include math and logic because they are dependent on the mind. I know, more epistemology.

I am not sure why "being dependent on the mind" qualifies them as knowledge givers. I am guessing you mean that if the premises are correct, and the logic is correct, then the conclusion must be correct.

Of course, you'd probably agree that even after you achieve a math/logic proof, and assuming the proof represents some aspect of reality, what one "knows" about reality through that representation is still a matter of faith (in the logic/math process and its results) until one has experienced it.

 

[Canute]

Of course, you'd probably agree that even after you achieve a math/logic proof, and assuming the proof represents some aspect of reality, what one "knows" about reality through that representation is still a matter of faith (in the logic/math process and its results) until one has experienced it.

I agree but would put it more strongly. It is impossible to prove anything about reality, one can only know it. This is provable. Therefore there is no contest between reason and experience. Experience has greater 'explanatory reach' than reason, and all proofs are relative and depend on having faith in ones axioms. It follows that anything that can be proved is not certain knowledge. This is why idealism is unprovable. If it was provable then it immediately become disprovable.

 

[heusdens]

Idealism is the opposite of Materialism.
The difference between Idealism and materialism is that they disagree on what is primary: matter or consciousness.

If Idealism were true then some or other form of consciousness would exist, which would be independend of matter.
But how could that be falsified?

The point is of course that it is impossible to define any form of consciousness, where there is no material existence. How can there be consciousness when there is not something to be consciouss of?

 

[Canute]

The point is of course that it is impossible to define any form of consciousness, where there is no material existence. How can there be consciousness when there is not something to be consciouss of?

What we are conscious of is the contents of consciousness. So your question is really the 'set of all sets/empty set' problem in disguise.

If you take away all the contents of consciousness then what becomes of the container? If the container is not the contents of the container then does it exist separately to the contents or not? Does the set of all sets contain itself? Does the empty set exist? You're asking a deep question here, awash with problems of self-reference and infinities.

Some people would phrase it as 'how can there be something to be conscious of when there is nothing to be conscious of it?'. David Bohm, for instance, asks it this way around.

 

[heusdens]

What we are conscious of is the contents of consciousness. So your question is really the 'set of all sets/empty set' problem in disguise.

If you take away all the contents of consciousness then what becomes of the container? If the container is not the contents of the container then does it exist separately to the contents or not? Does the set of all sets contain itself? Does the empty set exist? You're asking a deep question here, awash with problems of self-reference and infinities.

Some people would phrase it as 'how can there be something to be conscious of when there is nothing to be conscious of it?'. David Bohm, for instance, asks it this way around.

The content of our consciousness has been formed by expererience based o the outside material world.