Paradigma11 said:
in my opinion quine comes pretty close to the desired attributes. so does wittgenstein. if you want more clarity and exactness of thought you propably won't find it in humans :)
Would you please summarize Quine's and/or Wittgenstein's position(s) on exactly what can clearly be said in language? I suspect that you are correct in that these two thinkers have probably gotten as close to an understanding of how thought can be expressed in language as anyone has who has ever tried to describe it.
While we are waiting for Dick's answer to Rade's question, I'll toss in my two cents worth. I have only a fleeting understanding of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the question, and even less of Quine's, and I am no expert in anything in my own right, but I have tried to understand Dick's work, and I have a modest education in mathematics so two cents is probably about right as an estimate of what these opinions are worth. Here goes anyway.
I think Wittgenstein might have agreed that no word, or language construction, has any intrinsic meaning; that all meaning is a complex result of myriad instances of language usage among a communicating and interacting population of people; that definitions are an attempt to reduce ambiguity by specific denotation in other terms presumed to be less ambiguous than the defined term; and that the most rigorous examples of definition occur in the communities of mathematicians and logicians in their formal work.
I think Dick would agree that mathematical formalism offers the least ambiguous language we have available to us in which to express our ideas. This is primarily a result of the cardinal rule in mathematics that no statement is accepted into the body of a formal mathematical system which is not consistent with all other statements in that system. In particular, mathematics is much better than English in this respect.
So, I suspect that when Dick outlines his "Design Blueprint for Creating an Exact Science", he will advocate using mathematics almost exclusively, and that the blueprint will pretty much follow the lines of his theorem development which can be found in his work today. What that theorem says is that regardless of what explanation you come up with to explain X, if that explanation is internally consistent, then the explanation will be consistent with, and can be interpreted as following or obeying, the known laws of physics. So an exact science would amount to using Dick's Theorem to deduce extensions or refinements to the known laws of physics, and then use these extensions and refinements to suggest experiments which could be used to support belief in the results.
If the previous paragraph is wrong, I'll let Dick point out the errors and we can continue from there. But right or wrong, I would like to spend what remains of my two cents on some observations.
Dick's theorem is derived in the system of Mathematical Analysis, AKA the Calculus of Real and Complex numbers. As we know from the history of Geometry, systems that were thought, literally for millennia, to be inescapably and indubitably true, may in fact be arbitrary. For example, Euclidean Geometry was thought to be absolutely true from the time of Euclid up almost until the 20th century. Now we know that there are non-Euclidean alternatives which have an equal standing in "truth" and yet are inconsistent with Euclidean Geometry. The question of which, if any, of these alternative geometries, is consistent with "reality", or "physical reality", or "space", or any other such notion, remains open. So, the basis of Dick's Theorem is similarly open to question.
I maintain that it is possible to define and adopt a set of mathematical axioms, which I have called the Practical Number System (PNS), and which does not contain the Real numbers, but which nonetheless contains a sufficient, finite, set of rational numbers such that all important theorems of Mathematical Analysis needed to make any possible measurement of anything accessible to experiment can be proved in the PNS.
Thus, I believe that Dick's Theorem can also be proved in the PNS.
The important difference between PNS and classical Mathematical Analysis, is that in PNS there are no infinities, and no continuity. PNS is grainy rather than smooth; finite rather than infinite.
Since we don't really know whether "reality" is finite or infinite, or whether it is smooth or grainy, we don't really know which mathematical system would be better suited to express statements about it. There are many indications that reality is discrete and grainy (i.e. it seems to be quantized) and there is no evidence for anything real to be infinite. In fact the appearance of infinities in the mathematics confounds interpretations of the theories expressed in that mathematics. (Physicists win Nobel prizes for figuring out how to eliminate some of these infinities.)
So, to Dick I would say, "Don't worry about this problem, because as I have said, your theorem holds in PNS so your result would apply equally well in a finite grainy world as it would in an infinite continuous world. You have said as much yourself many times."
But, wait...there's more. The very foundations of mathematics are also questionable. As we have learned from Euclid's legacy, we can't be sure of the absolute truth of any proposed axiom on which we might base our mathematical system. Here we enter the murky world of Aristotle, Quine, Wittgenstein, Whitehead, and Russell. Can we perhaps build our mathematical system on the basis of logic alone? Was Aristotle correct in thinking that there are rules of logic that are indubitable and trustworthy? With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the rules of logic are about as arbitrary as the axioms of mathematics. And, as Whitehead and Russell discovered to their dismay, foundations laid on logic might as well have been laid on quicksand.
So it seems to me that the problem comes down to the question of whether we can say anything trustworthy in language at all. And, so, I will repeat my request to Paradigma11, to sketch out for us what Quine and Wittgenstein had to say on this question. If those two can't help us find some solid footing, then even this attempt at developing an Exact Science may be just another "mock battle".
Warm regards,
Paul