Can we truly define what is an abstraction?

[CaptainQuasar]

So, our discussion is based on the idea that colour exists only in thought or is an abstract idea.

This is not my interpretation of what we're discussing. "Exists only in thought" and "is an abstraction" do not mean the same thing. If you're talking only about the experience of seeing red in your head, rather than the property or nature that red objects or environments have in common, this was my response to that from my first post in the thread:

You could try to say that redness is only in the experience, and hence be trying to advance the notion that red things aren't red when no one is looking, but that does seem like semantics to me - like you'd be intentionally misunderstanding your interlocutor to gird your own position in the discussion.

So, what I have been talking about above is the property or nature that red objects or environments have in common and whether or not that absolutely must be regarded as an abstraction.

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[baywax]

This is not my interpretation of what we're discussing. "Exists only in thought" and "is an abstraction" do not mean the same thing. If you're talking only about the experience of seeing red in your head, rather than the property or nature that red objects or environments have in common, this was my response to that from my first post in the thread:



So, what I have been talking about above is the property or nature that red objects or environments have in common and whether or not that absolutely must be regarded as an abstraction.

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That's a relief. Logically, if abstraction is the product of physical, cognitive interpretation of other physical events then abstractions, illusions and concepts are physical in nature themselves.

Our brains interpret the physical events that stimulate it. The events can be internal stimulus or external stimulus. Our interpretations may be wrong or anthropocentric to assign certain values, symbols or qualities to certain events, but that doesn't disqualify the event as being physical and actually taking place.

 

[Werg22]

Well there's a reason why it's a classic and that's because it's pretty frequently true.

If you want to believe that your 21st century English vocabulary somehow determines reality, go ahead. (And feel free to ignore phrases such as "like an apple" or "like a flower" as you're already doing, of course.) But if all you've got is "it's conventional" or "it's traditional" or utilitarian arguments I have to maintain that you're being pretty arbitrary if you want to use that to insist that you're in possession of some absolute and correct definition of what is an abstraction and what is concrete.

Like I said, it's perfectly fine to talk about redness as an abstraction if you're doing so in a particular context. But when you yourself are saying things like a sabre is a knife when you're using it in your kitchen, and there are plastic knives and stone knives and scalpels and Crocodile Dundee buck knives, it seems ludicrous to me to insist that in some absolute or non-contextual sense "knife" is a concrete concept but "color" is a total abstraction.

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From post #40:

At the basic level, we get a sense of a relationship; a red flower and a red apple have a similar property, at the next level there is usually an adjective: a red apple, a red flower. Finally there is the complete abstraction of the property in question, namely "red".

Where did I say that "knife" is a concrete concept? Are ghosts and unicorns concrete concepts? I hold them on the same pedestal as knife.

 

[baywax]

Where did I say that "knife" is a concrete concept? Are ghosts and unicorns concrete concepts? I hold them on the same pedestal as knife.

Concepts are concrete events so they do exist on an equal footing whether they are concepts of ghosts or concepts of colour.

The difference is in the fact that the stimulus your brain has received concerning unicorns has come from word of mouth or by written word or by illustrations. All of which are abstractions of what may or may not be a real, physical phenomenon. With a colour however, your brain is stimulated by a colourful event and it creates an interpretive concept of an actual, physical event. Through the physical process of abstraction, your brain assigns a term like "red" to the physical event.

[edit] this assignment of terminology (or what many are calling abstraction) is a survival trait. It not only works toward the survival of the individual but also helps a communicating group of individuals to survive. So that, when I say "red sky in the morning, sailor's warning" the next person preparing to sail checks the sky for a condition that has been termed a "red" sky.

extra edit: If the brain had to say... "the quality of light that has a blah dee blah absorption rate, or is such and such a wavelength of light" instead of "red"... I doubt we would be talking about this today... because there'd be no human species left to make quick, abbreviated abstractions about natural, physical events.

 

[WaveJumper]

"Matter" is merely vacuum fluctuations

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16095-its-confirmed-matter-is-merely-vacuum-fluctuations.html

Thought this qualified under the "abstraction" argument; the comments after the article are pretty interesting too.

Don't read if you have a weak heart.

 

[baywax]

"Matter" is merely vacuum fluctuations

At least their not saying matter is a result of mass hypnosis or some grand hologram that's projected by people's existential abstractions.

 

[Pythagorean]

At least their not saying matter is a result of mass hypnosis or some grand hologram that's projected by people's existential abstractions.

yeah, that's pretty much the kind of view I find useless.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

From post #40:

At the basic level, we get a sense of a relationship; a red flower and a red apple have a similar property, at the next level there is usually an adjective: a red apple, a red flower. Finally there is the complete abstraction of the property in question, namely "red".

Where did I say that "knife" is a concrete concept? Are ghosts and unicorns concrete concepts? I hold them on the same pedestal as knife.

Okay, so if there are no concrete concepts, if "knife" and "red" and everything else are as insubstantial to you as "unicorn", then as your roommate was saying "everything in your world is an abstraction". That's what I have been agreeing with all along. As I said from the very beginning, your approach could be used to declare anything at all to be an abstraction.

And furthermore, if "knife" is as insubstantial and non-concrete as a unicorn, I don't get why the heck you were accusing me of being dishonest for saying that knifeness could be regarded as an abstraction. The way you're behaving doesn't make sense to me.

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[jambaugh]

Much has already been said but given I have an inflated estimate of my own opinion's value... here's my $0.02 worth.

From the perspective of science all "things" are abstractions since the epistemological atom of science is the observed phenomenon. A coherent system of phenomena (e.g. we see a bright light in the sky every night which correlates with tides and werewolf bites) which is sufficiently consistent is abstracted to an ontological object (e.g. the moon).

Now color is less so since it is a stimulatory phenomenon instead of an object. It is a relative phenomenon in that it depends on our physiological sensory make-up as opposed to say a broad spectrum spectrometer.

Finally the meta-concept of abstraction is really itself better used in a relative context as a comparative. "number" is an abstraction on "5" which is an abstraction on "5 ducks" which is an abstraction on "I see many phenomena which resolve into 5 sets of 'ducklike' perceptions.' ... ad infinitum.

You'll never successfully find the primary atoms from which all is abstracted. Rather you just dive in with tentative "object" definitions and abstract or modify definitions on the fly until things stabilize within the context in which you are working. Be aware of this fluid aspect of language and then beware of shifts in context which alter semantic meaning.