Can we truly define what is an abstraction?

[octelcogopod]

This doesn't answer the question I've asked...

How is it that we can assign a word like "abstract" to colour or any other condition without using a universal comparison that isn't "abstract"?

We have brains and we base our assumptions on the interpretations our brains make of nature. In fact we assume nature is "nature" based on what we are able to decipher with these brains.

There is no other way to do otherwise. We build computers to do some interpretation for us but it is inevitably our brains that process that information.

So, are there some "things" in nature that are more "abstract" than others, thus providing benchmarks for a reality of "less abstract" phenomena...?

In theory if our consciousness had been projected into a dreamworld, that consciousness would have built a reality that IT found 'concrete' (namely what it perceives), and since it already had abstraction capability before the world was even created, a separation between the concrete abstractions and the mental abstractions happen all inside one big abstraction.
The comparable is in fact just an illusion of the mind..

But that's bordering on silly even. I would have to say I do not believe this to be the case, but the point is the mind could in theory create both the concrete and the abstract, even when everything is abstract.. It's all how the mind defines it.

Of course, all these problems will be gone if we could one day create consciousness ourselves, and we had a complete understanding of ourselves, but that doesn't seem to happen anytime soon.

 

[baywax]

In theory if our consciousness had been projected into a dreamworld, that consciousness would have built a reality that IT found 'concrete' (namely what it perceives), and since it already had abstraction capability before the world was even created, a separation between the concrete abstractions and the mental abstractions happen all inside one big abstraction.
The comparable is in fact just an illusion of the mind..

But that's bordering on silly even. I would have to say I do not believe this to be the case, but the point is the mind could in theory create both the concrete and the abstract, even when everything is abstract.. It's all how the mind defines it.

Of course, all these problems will be gone if we could one day create consciousness ourselves, and we had a complete understanding of ourselves, but that doesn't seem to happen anytime soon.

Cool. But humans would not have survived 3 million years without building concrete abstractions out of the sensory data collected by their cognitive processes. That's why we trust what we perceive so much. It might be a mistake in certain cases... such as drinking sand that once was the mirage of water, etc...

 

[baywax]

Hi werg. Calling color an “abstraction” is not as far as I have ever read, a term of the art. That is, I believe what you mean by “abstraction” is the commonly accepted view that color is a phenomenal property of the mind. As http://books.google.com/books?id=0f...hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result"points out: So by that, Chalmers points out that phenomenal properties are such things as the experience of pain or color. In contrast, psychological properties are behavioral or emperically measurable. When you say: “Maybe I'm wrong to say that "object" is less abstract than color.” You should probably reword that to say that “Maybe I’m wrong to say that an “object” is less of a phenomenal property of the mind than is color.” Is that what you mean? If so, you are not wrong. You should state that objects (and wavelengths of light) are most certainly not phenomenal properties, but that color is. Color is not a property of the wavelength of light, it is a phenomena which you experience when your brain has a certain input from the light receptors in your eyes. The wavelength of light and the shape of an object on the other hand, are independent of any experience one has of it such as the color red. The color red is not a property of light, it is a phenomena produced by the brain. The experience of 'red' is independant of the wavelength of light. We could experience 'green' instead, and we might go through life calling it red (this is called inverted qualia) because there is no way to determine that one person's 'red' isn't another person's 'green'.

Because there has been no statistical data collected regarding the empirical measurements of the psychological effects of colour (specific wavelengths of light) on the brain does not mean there are none to collect.

Because specific wavelengths of light (which 97 percent of humans will label the same 'colour') do have (and have been recorded to have had) a physiological effect on plants, animals and photosensitive chemicals it becomes obvious to me that specific wavelengths of light are in no way exclusively abstracted or cognitively constructed by our brains and not nature.

And there is one more point to the discussion about abstraction... the very concept... the very "qualia" that is "abstract" is actually a very concrete and measurable phenomenon. That's because it only takes place when a specific combination of neurons fire in a human brain. How much more concrete can you get? Abstraction is sullied by the very fact that it, as a phenomenon, is a concrete/material state.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

I have to agree with werg's roommate. This seems like an issue of semantics. Or, not really semantics, but it's an arbitrary aspect of how you choose to apply the notions of concreteness and abstractness. I would expect that when she said that everything in your world is an abstraction, what she really meant is that your approach to the discussion could be used to designate anything as an abstraction.

It's like, on one occasion I was having a discussion with someone and they were making an argument framed around the notion that a knife is an object and sharpness is merely a property of the knife - in essence that for an object to be a knife is a more fundamental aspect of its existence than for it to be sharp. My counterargument was that you could just as well say that you've got a sharp object with the property of knifeness.

So are the common aspects between the phenomena that produce an experience of redness the abstraction, and the other aspects like wavelength the more concrete ones, or is the thing that is common amongst everything - which we're designating "redness" whatever might produce that experience - more concrete and the dissimilar aspects more abstract? Meh.

You could try to say that redness is only in the experience, and hence be trying to advance the notion that red things aren't red when no one is looking, but that does seem like semantics to me - like you'd be intentionally misunderstanding your interlocutor to gird your own position in the discussion.

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[baywax]

You could try to say that redness is only in the experience, and hence be trying to advance the notion that red things aren't red when no one is looking, but that does seem like semantics to me - like you'd be intentionally misunderstanding your interlocutor to gird your own position in the discussion.

⚛​

Knifeness

I'd agree except for one thing... when no one is looking, the wave length of light that is redness is acting to initiate flowering in plants, changing chemical properties and so on.

One would have to say light is an abstraction to say colour is an abstraction because in the absence of light, colour is at best, ill defined.

I once worked with a scenic artist who at one time worked for the first shows on CBC television. He told me about the difficulties involved in painting a set for black and white TV. For the most part he spent his time mixing colours in a bathroom with the lights out. In this sense he had to work, abstractly, backwards from colour to black and white. The black and white television most certainly offered an abstraction of colour in the form of various grays.

 

[Pythagorean]

Wrong; it is an extraordinarily useful point of view. For example, it serves to soundly refute many naïve philosophical positions.

That doesn't sound very useful to me, especially since it's unfalsifiable. It sounds more like something for being persuasive rather than informative. You also seem to have implied that it's free of naivety itself.

I think a better argument is to get straight to the point and show examples where people are habitually wrong about the world that is detectable, rather than show how they might be wrong about something that we can't sense (how do you show that anyway? How does that "soundly refute" a philosophical position?)

Of course, we could both admit that it's usefulness is a matter of opinion, but that would be boring I guess.

 

[WaveJumper]

Compared to what? Is there some other way to experience these things?

Compared to a hypothetical being that could see the whole picture of reality - all the EMR spectrum, the quantum world, time at the Planck scale. We are NOwhere near being that, our existence is marred by the few percent of the whole picture that we can see. But even if we had all those capabilities, everything would still be abstraction.

Now for some reason, you know that quantum reality is the "true real nature of the universe"... when physicists have always maintained that the microcosm and macrocosm are separate states and incomparable.

Everyone should know this. If life dies out on this planet, the classical world would disappear and the only thing left will be the quantum reality. There is no classical, Newtonian world without living things. So yes, the fundamental, true universe is that of phase space and quantum reality.

As I've said, the two states, micro and macrocosms are not comparable and do not offer material for analogies of each other. As far as metaphors go... they are truly abstract in nature...

This i believe is partly true... physicists would not try to unite those 2 worlds in a theory of everything if they thought the worlds ruled by QM and GR were incomparable. I don't think they are wasting their time and billions of tax payers' dollars.

Quantum mechanically you are a collection of "dead" 14 billion years old atoms.

That isn't a quantum reality. Its just a macrocosmic reality.

When we are talking about atoms and/or about the particle zoo, we are leaving what you call the macrocosmic reality and entering the quantum world. Even at the level of the size of your human body, talking about the charges that make up your body still takes us at the quantum level where there are no dead or alive entities, but constant movement of waves/zero-volume point particles. And this has been so for a good 14 billion years.

 

[WaveJumper]

That doesn't sound very useful to me, especially since it's unfalsifiable. It sounds more like something for being persuasive rather than informative. You also seem to have implied that it's free of naivety itself.

I think a better argument is to get straight to the point and show examples where people are habitually wrong about the world that is detectable, rather than show how they might be wrong about something that we can't sense (how do you show that anyway? How does that "soundly refute" a philosophical position?)

I'll get straight to the point about the examples - people think objects are at rest when every particle they are made of is in constant motion at immense speeds. People think objects are made of "stuff", when solid objects feel solid because of a force called electromagnetism. Switch off electromagnetism and the strong nuclear force and the otherwise "solid" looking objects will disappear. People think solid objects are solid and physical when even the biggest physical thing they have ever seen in their lives - the Sun will disappear into a zero dimensional "point" without a trace if it hits a black hole. This event seems mind boggling only because people usually think of "solid" matter from the perspective of their everyday lives at the Newtonian level. But that's an abstraction created by the mind and the inputs of our "coarse" sensory apparatuses at our level of existence.
People think the universe is lit when in reality it's fundamentally dark. We've "picked" one wavelength of the EMR spectrum and "learned" to use it to find our way in the dark, but fundamentally there is no light and the universe is dark. It's lit only to us, who have this peculiar humany sensory apparatus(and to the animals).
At the fundamental level, the universe is much different to what we think of it, due to the way we see it. Had we used neutrinos instead of photons for our vision, we'd see only extreme light and empty space. Neutrinos can pass through your body, then go on on their journey and pass right through the Earth and exit on other side and head for the sun and pass straigth through it like nothing ever happened and go on on their journey.
So in a sentence, everything we experience at our level of existence is an abstraction - a viewpoint at the universe that is limited, incomplete and rather bizzare.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'll get straight to the point about the examples - people think objects are at rest when every particle they are made of is in constant motion at immense speeds. People think objects are made of "stuff", when solid objects feel solid because of a force called electromagnetism. Switch off electromagnetism and the strong nuclear force and "solid" objects will disappear. People think the universe is lit when in reality it's fundamentally dark. We've "picked" one wavelength of the EMR spectrum and "learned" to use it to find our way in the dark, but fundamentally there is no light and the universe is dark. It's lit only to us, who have this peculiar humany sensory apparatus(and to the animals).
At the fundamental level, the universe is much different to what we think of it, due to the way we see it. Had we used neutrinos instead of photons for our vision, we'd see only dark empty space. Neutrinos can pass through your body, then go on on their journey and pass right through the Earth and exit on other side and head for the sun and pass straigth through it like nothing ever happened and go on on their journey.
So in a sentence, everything we experience at our level of existence is an abstraction - a viewpoint at the universe that is limited, incomplete rather bizzare.

Your arguments seem to support my conclusion; that there's a tangible reality that we can measure (otherwise, your previous arguments are meaningless)

For instance, when you make arguments like "people think objects are at rest when every particle they are made of is in constant motion at immense speeds" you're saying one view is right and one is wrong, so you're admitting that you have access to what is the correct perspective (i.e. more attuned to the actual reality behind our abstractions).

It's just a matter of intuition vs. empirical data.

What I'm refuting here is the hint of solipsism: "everything is an abstraction". This implies that I may as well not pursue science because it could all be wrong anyway. In this regard, it's useless to me, because I make predictions based on initial conditions and physical laws (as a scientist).

Instead, I think it's more relevant to point out (as you did) where we've had concrete misconceptions about the way things work and actually show how we were wrong (cause, unlike the philosophical argument, it can actually be shown).

 

[Werg22]

I have to agree with werg's roommate. This seems like an issue of semantics. Or, not really semantics, but it's an arbitrary aspect of how you choose to apply the notions of concreteness and abstractness. I would expect that when she said that everything in your world is an abstraction, what she really meant is that your approach to the discussion could be used to designate anything as an abstraction.

It's like, on one occasion I was having a discussion with someone and they were making an argument framed around the notion that a knife is an object and sharpness is merely a property of the knife - in essence that for an object to be a knife is a more fundamental aspect of its existence than for it to be sharp. My counterargument was that you could just as well say that you've got a sharp object with the property of knifeness.

So are the common aspects between the phenomena that produce an experience of redness the abstraction, and the other aspects like wavelength the more concrete ones, or is the thing that is common amongst everything - which we're designating "redness" whatever might produce that experience - more concrete and the dissimilar aspects more abstract? Meh.

You could try to say that redness is only in the experience, and hence be trying to advance the notion that red things aren't red when no one is looking, but that does seem like semantics to me - like you'd be intentionally misunderstanding your interlocutor to gird your own position in the discussion.

⚛​

Is a blurry picture still a picture? Some defining properties of objects include what they used to be and what they serve for. We call a knife a knife because of what it serves for. A knife doesn't have to be of a certain shape, color, smell or texture to be called a knife. I could use a saber in my kitchen and it would be called a knife. A dull knife is still a knife. Is a knife that has been recycled and used to make a fork still a knife? We seem to have some sense of a what can be done to an object before we identify it as something else.

Indeed a sharp object would be a knife it were to be used as a knife. In all cases, "sharpness" is a property that an object called knife must have had at some point, it's not enough to define it though. I'm not really interested in the question "red things aren't red when no one is looking". What I'm interested in is the question of properties of objects that we retain and consider all by themselves. At the basic level, we get a sense of a relationship; a red flower and a red apple have a similar property, at the next level there is usually an adjective: a red apple, a red flower. Finally there is the complete abstraction of the property in question, namely "red".

 

[baywax]

physicists would not try to unite those 2 worlds in a theory of everything if they thought the worlds ruled by QM and GR were incomparable. I don't think they are wasting their time and billions of tax payers' dollars.

A US President would not spend a trillion dollars invading a country that he thought had WMDs if it didn't have WMDs. But the country didn't have them and he did invade it.

When we are talking about atoms and/or about the particle zoo, we are leaving what you call the macrocosmic reality and entering the quantum world. Even at the level of the size of your human body, talking about the charges that make up your body still takes us at the quantum level where there are no dead or alive entities, but constant movement of waves/zero-volume point particles. And this has been so for a good 14 billion years.

I think you'll find that the macrocosm ends at the atom and the quantum level starts with electrons, photons and other "sub-atomic particles".

http://www.thebigview.com/spacetime/quantumtheory.html

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Is a blurry picture still a picture? Some defining properties of objects include what they used to be and what they serve for. We call a knife a knife because of what it serves for. A knife doesn't have to be of a certain shape, color, smell or texture to be called a knife. I could use a saber in my kitchen and it would be called a knife. A dull knife is still a knife. Is a knife that has been recycled and used to make a fork still a knife? We seem to have some sense of a what can be done to an object before we identify it as something else.

Is a blurry picture that has been framed still blurry? We call a sharp object a sharp object because it can cut or pierce. A sharp object doesn't have to be of a certain shape, color, smell or texture to be called a sharp object. I could use a sharp object in my kitchen to spread peanut butter on bread, rather than cut anything, and it would be called a sharp object. A rusty sharp object is still a sharp object. Is a sharp object that has been recycled and used to make a smooth, round ball still a sharp object?

(I'm not mocking you, just demonstrating that you can pick any property of an object and treat it the same way you treated the identification of something as a knife.)

Indeed a sharp object would be a knife it were to be used as a knife. In all cases, "sharpness" is a property that an object called knife must have had at some point, it's not enough to define it though. I'm not really interested in the question "red things aren't red when no one is looking". What I'm interested in is the question of properties of objects that we retain and consider all by themselves. At the basic level, we get a sense of a relationship; a red flower and a red apple have a similar property, at the next level there is usually an adjective: a red apple, a red flower. Finally there is the complete abstraction of the property in question, namely "red".

What I'm saying is that your designation of redness as the abstract aspect of these phenomena, as opposed to designating it as a concrete aspect, is arbitrary. We could just as well say that there are two red objects and the facts that one of them has appleness and the other has flowerness are the abstractions, the "properties of objects that we retain and consider all by themselves."

Declaring "what that object really, fundamentally is is a knife, and sharpness is just a property of it" or "what that object really, fundamentally is is an apple, and redness is just a property of it" is arbitrary.

⚛​

 

[baywax]

Declaring "what that object really, fundamentally is is a knife, and sharpness is just a property of it" or "what that object really, fundamentally is is an apple, and redness is just a property of it" is arbitrary.

⚛​

Are properties such as sharpness and redness arbitrary if they are actually inherent functions of an object? For instance, the colours displayed by flowers are often determined by the time of year during which the flower blooms. By way of evolution this sort of arrangement has come to pass in that the colour corresponds to and acts as an attractor to the specific insects that are present during a season (edit:enabling efficient pollination).

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Are properties such as sharpness and redness arbitrary if they are actually inherent functions of an object? For instance, the colours displayed by flowers are often determined by the time of year during which the flower blooms. By way of evolution this sort of arrangement has come to pass in that the colour corresponds to and acts as an attractor to the specific insects that are present during a season (edit:enabling efficient pollination).

Function is arbitrary too. You can use just about anything to hammer a nail into a piece of wood. Some things might work really well, be well-fit for that purpose: a steel meat tenderizer or the medieval weapon called a mace for example, and while they're being used to hammer in nails that's their function even if it was not the intention of the craftsman who made them.

⚛​

 

[baywax]

Function is arbitrary too. You can use just about anything to hammer a nail into a piece of wood. Some things might work really well, be well-fit for that purpose: a steel meat tenderizer or the medieval weapon called a mace for example, and while they're being used to hammer in nails that's their function even if it was not the intention of the craftsman who made them.

⚛​

And so assigning abstract or concrete qualities to any function or other property is arbitrary. Or, to put it another way... its all relative.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

And so assigning abstract or concrete qualities to any function or other property is arbitrary. Or, to put it another way... its all relative.

I would go even further and say that assigning abstract qualities, concrete qualities, or even function to any phenomenon is arbitrary.

⚛​

 

[baywax]

I would go even further and say that assigning abstract qualities, concrete qualities, or even function to any phenomenon is arbitrary.

⚛​

OK then, what is the framework... what's the benchmark... what do we compare all phenomenon to in order to deem it "arbitrary"? In other words you can't label everything arbitrary without having an opposite as a comparison.

Edit: Perhaps it is the individual's opinion that everything is arbitrary that renders all phenomenon arbitrary.
Like an overall, blanketing bias on the individual's part. Especially since the only benchmark I can find to compare
all phenomenon against is the person who decides all phenomenon is arbitrary.

This could be illustrated by a hypothetical person thinking that all phenomenon has arms and legs like they do.

So, in the end perhaps it is the construct of "arbitrariness" that's the only arbitrary phenomenon.

 

[Werg22]

Is a blurry picture that has been framed still blurry? We call a sharp object a sharp object because it can cut or pierce. A sharp object doesn't have to be of a certain shape, color, smell or texture to be called a sharp object. I could use a sharp object in my kitchen to spread peanut butter on bread, rather than cut anything, and it would be called a sharp object. A rusty sharp object is still a sharp object. Is a sharp object that has been recycled and used to make a smooth, round ball still a sharp object?

(I'm not mocking you, just demonstrating that you can pick any property of an object and treat it the same way you treated the identification of something as a knife.)

This is a dishonest strawman. " A rusty sharp object is still a sharp object.", no. As soon as the object in question starts losing the property sharpness, it is no longer a sharp object. When a knife loses the property sharpness, it may still qualify as a knife. The difference here is that one is described through a number of properties including use and, to a certain extent, what it used to be, while the other is described on the basis of a single property.

What I'm saying is that your designation of redness as the abstract aspect of these phenomena, as opposed to designating it as a concrete aspect, is arbitrary. We could just as well say that there are two red objects and the facts that one of them has appleness and the other has flowerness are the abstractions, the "properties of objects that we retain and consider all by themselves."

Declaring "what that object really, fundamentally is is a knife, and sharpness is just a property of it" or "what that object really, fundamentally is is an apple, and redness is just a property of it" is arbitrary.

⚛​

The abstractions are not arbitrary. They are the abstractions that serve us the most and by which most definitions of objects can be decomposed. I could abstract "appleness" but that would have little use, aside from describing a relatively small class of objects. On the other hand, "redness", "roundness", "sharpness" and the likes are much more commonly found and can be combined to describe many classes of objects. When we retain abstractions, they should have the desirable property that they are almost if not entirely irreducible in terms of others, and that they can be found in many classes of objects.

 

[jreelawg]

This is a dishonest strawman. " A rusty sharp object is still a sharp object.", no. As soon as the object in question starts losing the property sharpness, it is no longer a sharp object. When a knife loses the property sharpness, it may still qualify as a knife. The difference here is that one is described through a number of properties including use and, to a certain extent, what it used to be, while the other is described on the basis of a single property.

I agree, but in a sense could say the color red be a property as well in the sense that our perception is an effect of that object. For example, a knife may be sharp, and it can cut your finger. But it is also a specific material which can reflect certain wavelengths of light into your eyes causing the sensation of color. The property "sharp" cuts things, the property we call red causes a specific sensation. True that only a mind perceives the color as a sensation, but a plastic knife can't cut a diamond. So the plastic knife is only sharp when cutting things like butter, and the object is only "red" when it hits our eyes and causes a perception.

The catch is that an objects properties are many, and based on what that object can do, and how it can effect other objects. You could break an object up into atoms, and then even more fundamental particles, and their properties would be associated with what they do, but as a knife, or as a rock, in those terms, they are to us, what they do.

 

[baywax]

The comparable for determining the arbitrariness of an object or property seems to be whether or not the object or property serves the individual that is making the determination.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

OK then, what is the framework... what's the benchmark...

That's what I'm saying, there isn't anyone framework or benchmark that's "correct". There's no divinely ordained set of attributes that is the single axis which can be labeled "concrete" which all other attributes must be regarded as abstract in relation to. You can always come up with different frameworks and different benchmarks.

It's perfectly okay to label something as an abstraction, you just have to be cognizant of and communicate which framework and benchmark you're speaking within. Werg and the roommate couldn't agree because they were using different frameworks.

This is a dishonest strawman.

Dishonest? Seriously? Why the hell would I lie to you about anything of this sort?

Also, I don't think you understand what a strawman is. A straw man would be if I was setting up a fake version of your argument that I could knock down easily. The sharpness-as-concrete-property thing is my argument and I'm not knocking it down, I'm arguing in favor of it being equally as possible as knifeness being a concrete property.

" A rusty sharp object is still a sharp object.", no. As soon as the object in question starts losing the property sharpness, it is no longer a sharp object.

Rusty and sharp do not exclude each other. If you made a knife out of wrought iron and honed the blade to razor sharpness, then dipped it in water, by the time it dried off it would have a film of rust on it but it would still be razor-sharp.

When a knife loses the property sharpness, it may still qualify as a knife.

And similarly a sharp object could lose its property knifeness and still be a sharp object. You could take a steel knife and forge it into a flanged spearhead and attach it to a spear and it would still be a sharp object although it was no longer a knife.

Or you could take a knapped flint stone knife and smash it and you'd have a handful of small sharp objects that are not knives.

The difference here is that one is described through a number of properties including use and, to a certain extent, what it used to be, while the other is described on the basis of a single property.

I would concede that the description or definition of a sharp object is a simpler definition that that of a knife. But that doesn't mean that "sharp object" is an abstraction and "knife" is a totally concrete concept. Complexity of definition is not related to whether something can be an abstraction or not. You could have an abstraction with an extremely complex definition or an abstraction with an extremely simple definition.

The abstractions are not arbitrary. They are the abstractions that serve us the most and by which most definitions of objects can be decomposed. I could abstract "appleness" but that would have little use, aside from describing a relatively small class of objects. On the other hand, "redness", "roundness", "sharpness" and the likes are much more commonly found and can be combined to describe many classes of objects. When we retain abstractions, they should have the desirable property that they are almost if not entirely irreducible in terms of others, and that they can be found in many classes of objects.

Okay, this is just silly. Now you're admitting that any aspect of an object can be framed as the abstraction, and any as the concrete aspects. But you're insisting that your abstractions are right and my abstractions or your roommate's abstractions are wrong because yours are the best and most special - they have "desireable properties" and cover large classes of objects, eh? - and ours lack utility or something? Whatever.

You must realize that you're now no longer arguing that the color red is an abstraction but rather that it's a good abstraction, or that it's better to think of it as an abstraction than to think of it as concrete. Here's a gold star sticker, go ahead and put it on your abstractions which are the only valid ones because they're the bestest ever.

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[CaptainQuasar]

Another point - you guys know about Plato's concept of "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms#The_pure_land", right? Plato basically said that objects themselves are abstractions or shadows of more real things, the Forms.

(Though I don't personally think that's really workable. But the point is, this argument has been going on for several thousand years.)

⚛​

 

[baywax]

You can always come up with different frameworks and different benchmarks.

Only if you're thinking in an abstract manner.

In order to establish concrete frameworks, benchmarks and compliments to abstraction, one can only rely on the empirical, predictive and quantitative powers of the sciences. We can't go around, willy nilly, deciding something is abstract because of this different framework I've come up with. That sort of blasphemy is the fodder of religion.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Only if you're thinking in an abstract manner.

In order to establish concrete frameworks, benchmarks and compliments to abstraction, one can only rely on the empirical, predictive and quantitative powers of the sciences. We can't go around, willy nilly, deciding something is abstract because of this different framework I've come up with. That sort of blasphemy is the fodder of religion.

Okay, so you're saying there's One True Framework that science hands down to us? Where does it derive from? And why is it that every few decades the scientific community says "oh, crap, we got everything wrong" and rewrites everything? Like the way physics and chemistry were completely re-structured due to the discoveries of quantum phenomena, or the way that the taxonomy of species in botany has been completely rearranged on a genetic basis during just the last few decades.

An empirical approach is to not assume that there's this one obvious framework that everyone just "knows".

Hey, if you think you can scientifically or empirically prove that redness is absolutely an abstraction and knifeness absolutely is concrete, go ahead and do so. I don't think you'll be able to do any better than Werg there; all you'll be able to say is that for some particular purpose of analysis there's more utility in labeling one or the other as the abstraction.

It is not scientific to make up authority out of thin air where there is none and claim that you know the "true" concrete aspects of the world and which things are "truly" abstractions. That sort of blasphemy is the fodder of religion.

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[Hurkyl]

That sort of blasphemy is the fodder of religion.

⚛​

Religion has nothing to do with it. That sort of blasphemy appears in all walks of life.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Just to point out, that "blasphemy" line isn't mine, I was simply repeating baywax's use of it. (sarcastically.)

⚛​

 

[Hurkyl]

Just to point out, that "blasphemy" line isn't mine, I was simply repeating baywax's use of it. (sarcastically.)

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Good point. Shame on baywax, then.

 

[Werg22]

That's what I'm saying, there isn't anyone framework or benchmark that's "correct". There's no divinely ordained set of attributes that is the single axis which can be labeled "concrete" which all other attributes must be regarded as abstract in relation to. You can always come up with different frameworks and different benchmarks.

It's perfectly okay to label something as an abstraction, you just have to be cognizant of and communicate which framework and benchmark you're speaking within. Werg and the roommate couldn't agree because they were using different frameworks.
Dishonest? Seriously? Why the hell would I lie to you about anything of this sort?

Also, I don't think you understand what a strawman is. A straw man would be if I was setting up a fake version of your argument that I could knock down easily. The sharpness-as-concrete-property thing is my argument and I'm not knocking it down, I'm arguing in favor of it being equally as possible as knifeness being a concrete property.
Rusty and sharp do not exclude each other. If you made a knife out of wrought iron and honed the blade to razor sharpness, then dipped it in water, by the time it dried off it would have a film of rust on it but it would still be razor-sharp.
And similarly a sharp object could lose its property knifeness and still be a sharp object. You could take a steel knife and forge it into a flanged spearhead and attach it to a spear and it would still be a sharp object although it was no longer a knife.

Or you could take a knapped flint stone knife and smash it and you'd have a handful of small sharp objects that are not knives.
I would concede that the description or definition of a sharp object is a simpler definition that that of a knife. But that doesn't mean that "sharp object" is an abstraction and "knife" is a totally concrete concept. Complexity of definition is not related to whether something can be an abstraction or not. You could have an abstraction with an extremely complex definition or an abstraction with an extremely simple definition.
Okay, this is just silly. Now you're admitting that any aspect of an object can be framed as the abstraction, and any as the concrete aspects. But you're insisting that your abstractions are right and my abstractions or your roommate's abstractions are wrong because yours are the best and most special - they have "desireable properties" and cover large classes of objects, eh? - and ours lack utility or something? Whatever.

You must realize that you're now no longer arguing that the color red is an abstraction but rather that it's a good abstraction, or that it's better to think of it as an abstraction than to think of it as concrete. Here's a gold star sticker, go ahead and put it on your abstractions which are the only valid ones because they're the bestest ever.

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Hey, they're not just my abstractions. That's why redness, roundness and sharpness are actual words, while "appleness" and "flowerness" aren't.

All you have basically done is throw the classic "everything is relative".

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Hey, they're not just my abstractions. That's why redness, roundness and sharpness are actual words, while "appleness" and "flowerness" aren't.

All you have basically done is throw the classic "everything is relative".

Well there's a reason why it's a classic and that's because it's pretty frequently true.

If you want to believe that your 21st century English vocabulary somehow determines reality, go ahead. (And feel free to ignore phrases such as "like an apple" or "like a flower" as you're already doing, of course.) But if all you've got is "it's conventional" or "it's traditional" or utilitarian arguments I have to maintain that you're being pretty arbitrary if you want to use that to insist that you're in possession of some absolute and correct definition of what is an abstraction and what is concrete.

Like I said, it's perfectly fine to talk about redness as an abstraction if you're doing so in a particular context. But when you yourself are saying things like a sabre is a knife when you're using it in your kitchen, and there are plastic knives and stone knives and scalpels and Crocodile Dundee buck knives, it seems ludicrous to me to insist that in some absolute or non-contextual sense "knife" is a concrete concept but "color" is a total abstraction.

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[baywax]

Okay, so you're saying there's One True Framework that science hands down to us? Where does it derive from? And why is it that every few decades the scientific community says "oh, crap, we got everything wrong" and rewrites everything? Like the way physics and chemistry were completely re-structured due to the discoveries of quantum phenomena, or the way that the taxonomy of species in botany has been completely rearranged on a genetic basis during just the last few decades.

An empirical approach is to not assume that there's this one obvious framework that everyone just "knows".

Hey, if you think you can scientifically or empirically prove that redness is absolutely an abstraction and knifeness absolutely is concrete, go ahead and do so. I don't think you'll be able to do any better than Werg there; all you'll be able to say is that for some particular purpose of analysis there's more utility in labeling one or the other as the abstraction.

It is not scientific to make up authority out of thin air where there is none and claim that you know the "true" concrete aspects of the world and which things are "truly" abstractions. That sort of blasphemy is the fodder of religion.

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Here's some definitions of our pivotal terminology.

Abstract

abstract
adjective |abˈstrakt; ˈabˌstrakt|
existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence : abstract concepts such as love or beauty.
• dealing with ideas rather than events : the novel was too abstract and esoteric to sustain much attention.
• not based on a particular instance; theoretical : we have been discussing the problem in a very abstract manner.
• (of a word, esp. a noun) denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object : abstract words like truth or equality.
• of or relating to abstract art : abstract pictures that look like commercial color charts.
verb |abˈstrakt| [ trans. ]
1 consider (something) theoretically or separately from something else : to abstract science and religion from their historical context can lead to anachronism.
• [ intrans. ] form a general idea in this way : he cannot form a general notion by abstracting from particulars.
2 extract or remove (something) : applications to abstract more water from streams.
• used euphemistically to say that someone has stolen something : his pockets contained all he had been able to abstract from the apartment.
• ( abstract oneself) withdraw : as our relationship deepened you seemed to abstract yourself.
3 make a written summary of (an article or book) : staff who index and abstract material for an online database.
noun |ˈabˌstrakt|
1 a summary or statement of the contents of a book, article, or formal speech : the abstracts must be as concise as possible.
2 an abstract work of art : a big unframed abstract.
3 ( the abstract) that which is abstract; the theoretical consideration of something : the abstract must be made concrete by examples.
PHRASES
in the abstract in a general way; without reference to specific instances : there's a fine line between promoting U.S. business interests in the abstract and promoting specific companies.
DERIVATIVES
abstractly adverb
abstractor |-tər| noun ( in sense 3 of the verb ).
ORIGIN Middle English : from Latin abstractus, literally ‘drawn away,’ past participle of abstrahere, from ab- ‘from’ + trahere ‘draw off.’

Thesaurus
abstract
adjective
1 abstract concepts theoretical, conceptual, notional, intellectual, metaphysical, ideal, philosophical, academic; rare ideational. antonym actual, concrete.
2 abstract art nonrepresentational, nonpictorial. antonym representational.
verb
1 we'll be abstracting material for an online database summarize, précis, abridge, condense, compress, shorten, cut down, abbreviate, synopsize; rare epitomize.
2 he abstracted the art of tragedy from its context extract, isolate, separate, detach.
noun
an abstract of her speech summary, synopsis, précis, résumé, outline, abridgment, digest, summation; wrap-up.

Arbitary

arbitrary |ˈärbiˌtrerē|
adjective
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system : his mealtimes were entirely arbitrary.
• (of power or a ruling body) unrestrained and autocratic in the use of authority : arbitrary rule by King and bishops has been made impossible.
• Mathematics (of a constant or other quantity) of unspecified value.
DERIVATIVES
arbitrarily |ˌärbiˈtre(ə)rəlē| adverb
arbitrariness noun
ORIGIN late Middle English (in the sense [dependent on one's will or pleasure, discretionary] ): from Latin arbitrarius, from arbiter ‘judge, supreme ruler,’ perhaps influenced by French arbitraire.

Thesaurus
arbitrary
adjective
1 an arbitrary decision capricious, whimsical, random, chance, unpredictable; casual, wanton, unmotivated, motiveless, unreasoned, unsupported, irrational, illogical, groundless, unjustified; personal, discretionary, subjective. antonym reasoned, rational.
2 the arbitrary power of the prince autocratic, dictatorial, autarchic, undemocratic, despotic, tyrannical, authoritarian, high-handed; absolute, uncontrolled, unlimited, unrestrained. antonym democratic.

Oxford's English Dictionary

So, our discussion is based on the idea that colour exists only in thought or is an abstract idea. That must mean that the absorption rate of the colour red is just an idea in our heads and not a physical property. This lead to the abstraction that physical properties are abstract because we can only evaluate them by delineating the idea of a property as abstract.

What everyone is forgetting is that there is an process taking place that produces the idea or the abstraction of colour and all macrocosmic and physical properties. Its the physical event of neuronal interaction that gives us the idea or the abstraction of all properties.

This neurological event that creates an idea, a decision and even a metaphor is superior to all abstraction and generation of ideas. This is because, as has been demonstrated for eons, when you take away the neurological processes of the brain, suddenly there are no more abstractions taking place. So here it is plain to see that a concrete function is the root of all abstract ideas and is therefore proof that there is a concrete, comparable and complementary state to the state of abstraction. And this phenomenon that dictates how and where ideas and abstractions arise offers a glimpse into the true reality of nature and its many, separate states... particularly the microcosmic and macrocosmic states.