Chernobyl Chernobyl Reactors 1-3: Fuel Removal After 2000 Shutdown

[zapperzero]

Rockets are not cars. A failure rate of 1% is below that of most (all?) other rocket systems.

Point is it could have been literally orders of magnitude better, with small and (relative to the cost of failure) inexpensive changes to the development process.

 

[russ_watters]

The shuttles had a catastrophic failure rate about on par with that of commercial nuclear reactors (1%).

No, it is better than that but not much better only if we assume nuclear reactors haven't improved since they were invented and all reactors are the same technology and have the same limitations. Ie, the type of reactor used at Chernobyl isn't being used anymore, so the type of failure that happened there isn't possible anymore. And Fukushima was one incident that destroyed 4 reactors, but it isn't possible for reactors that aren't near the ocean.

 

[russ_watters]

Point is it could have been literally orders of magnitude better, with small and (relative to the cost of failure) inexpensive changes to the development process.

You already said it was too expensive.

 

[zapperzero]

You already said it was too expensive.

Mmmm... where? Please quote me. I might have.

 

[zapperzero]

Ie, the type of reactor used at Chernobyl isn't being used anymore, so the type of failure that happened there isn't possible anymore.

Kursk, Smolensk, Leningrad (Piter). Multiple units at each site.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RBMK#Status

And Fukushima was one incident that destroyed 4 reactors, but it isn't possible for reactors that aren't near the ocean.

Every accident is unique. How about earthquake+landslide? That should do it...

 

[nikkkom]

There is this report by Feynman that you should read. But I'm not sure you have the patience, so here's something you can listen to instead.

I read full Challenger accident report, not only Feyman's part of it. Twice. (Same for Columbia report.) I like to know facts instead of forming half-assed opinions.

SRB segment joints design flaw is neither unexpected thing to occur in a large cutting-edge aerospace project, nor it is the only design flaw. For one, SSME engines had many problems.
It by itself is not an indication that Shuttle was badly designed.

SRB segment joints were being redesigned by Thiokol. There was a budget and schedule for it before Challenger.

However, this and other such work was making Shuttle program even more expensive. So NASA stretched the work out into more years.

And meanwhile, NASA was pushing for higher flight rate. That's why NASA insisted on launching Challenger in cold ambient temps despite Thiokol engineers' objections. Thiokol managers caved in.

IOW: NASA pushed Shuttle flight rate beyond what it was capable of doing safely, while "saving" money on fixes.

Which boils down to: Shuttle's main problems are enormous cost of operation and low achievable flight rate.

 

[nikkkom]

A failure rate of 1% is below that of most (all?) other rocket systems.

Not all. Atlas has an outstanding flight record.
Atals II had 63 launches, all successful. First flight 1991.
then Atlas V had 38 launches, all successful.

Some call flight in 2007 a "partial failure" because of hydrogel leak on the second stage which resulted in the second burn cut short four seconds early. However, it appears payload was able to compensate with maneuvering thrusters. Whether this is a failure or not is a matter of debate.

IOW: unbroken string of successful launches for 22 years. Wow.

 

[zapperzero]

IOW: NASA pushed Shuttle flight rate beyond what it was capable of doing safely, while "saving" money on fixes.

Which boils down to: Shuttle's main problems are enormous cost of operation and low achievable flight rate.

It actually boils down to cutting too many corners... Funny how we can look at the same facts and understand them in such wildly different ways.

 

[mfb]

Not all. Atlas has an outstanding flight record.
Atals II had 63 launches, all successful. First flight 1991.
then Atlas V had 38 launches, all successful.

Okay, there is one better system. And this is true only if you do not add the Atlas systems (before Atlas II), they had multiple failures.

 

[Solon]

The Most Dangerous (Man-Made) Lava Flow

"I was doing some research for my class on Fukushima Dai’ichi and Chernobyl when I ran into some references to lava. “Lava?” I thought, “Why are they talking about lava when I thought I was trying to find out about nuclear accidents?” Lo and behold, what do I find but an entire research field that has been making manmade lava for decades."

http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/04/the-most-dangerous-manmade-lava-flow/

 

[zapperzero]

The Most Dangerous (Man-Made) Lava Flow

"I was doing some research for my class on Fukushima Dai’ichi and Chernobyl when I ran into some references to lava. “Lava?” I thought, “Why are they talking about lava when I thought I was trying to find out about nuclear accidents?” Lo and behold, what do I find but an entire research field that has been making manmade lava for decades."

http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/04/the-most-dangerous-manmade-lava-flow/

search term of interest: MASCA Project

 

[a.ua.]

Construction of a temporary wall.
To protect construction workers in the assembly arch.


and another
http://www.chnpp.gov.ua/images/nsc_3/080813_4.jpg

 

[a.ua.]

The second week of rains, resulting in increased's a mushroom.

Beginning of the third climb.

More photoshttp://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=107136835&postcount=210
Author photo, a worker plant . Lead Engineer for control the reactor.

 

[HowlerMonkey]

The first firemen showing up first saw chunks of graphite with round channels on the ground in the parking lot.

Those were part of the core in which fuel and control rods were inserted.

I doubt fukushima has approached this but it may have leached more contaminants into the envrionment over time...not really sure.

That first picture on page 1 is a good one especially when you read of the guy who saw all those "squares" jumping from the boiling water right before it went off.

I think each square weighs 700 pounds or so.

 

[a.ua.]

when you read of the guy who saw all those "squares" jumping from the boiling water right before it went off.

I think each square weighs 700 pounds or so.

This is literary fiction.
There is no more evidence of such an effect.
There is no witnesses, only fantasy Medvedev.
The staff that works on these reactors, said it was impossible.

 

[HowlerMonkey]

So the staff you refer to were there to see the reactor explode and noted that the blocks weren't jumping?

 

[a.ua.]

no.
They say people who are working on the same reactors in our time.
Medvedev is simply invented.
it's just an analogy,
He presented the pan in which the cover is closed.
Here she begins to tremble (cover).
And the film is effectively demonstrated.

But he generally writes about the caps (headwear)
--------------------------------
a few photos from acting in the reactor
Smolensk NPP


Kursk NPP

 

[nikkkom]

So the staff you refer to were there to see the reactor explode and noted that the blocks weren't jumping?

According to Medvedev's reconstruction, the shift supervisor, Perevozchenko Valerii was on the reactor building's floor about 30 seconds before reactor exploded.

He witnessed (again, according to Medvedev) the beginning of excessive vibration of reactor's top piping and those metal cubes on top; jumped on the ladder going down to other rooms and corridors and eventually ran into control room - which he reached several tens of seconds after the explosion.

He died on 13 May 1986.

Presumably, Medvedev's description is based on Perevozchenko testimonies - station workers were discussing the accident while they were in the hospital and weren't incapacitated by radiation sickness yet, and Medvedev collected testimonies of many of these people.

However, his book does not contain literal quotes of how Perevozchenko described what he saw.

 

[a.ua.]

The problem is that almost all of the testimony of people who have died (real witnesses), has yet to be made public.
They are in a criminal case, but the case is closed from the public.
Those people who are alive do not want to say anything.
Perhaps they are under written non-disclosure, or maybe just do not want to think about that terrible night.

 

[etudiant]

The problem is that almost all of the testimony of people who have died (real witnesses), has yet to be made public.
They are in a criminal case, but the case is closed from the public.
Those people who are alive do not want to say anything.
Perhaps they are under written non-disclosure, or maybe just do not want to think about that terrible night.

What case and what crime?
Hard to believe that a criminal case could survive over 25 years and the fall of all the governments involved.
I feel a tremendous amount could/must be learned from the Chernobyl disaster, yet the opportunity is being squandered and the event is disappearing into the mist of legend rather than serving as a beacon for making good decisions about nuclear power.

 

[a.ua.]

Criminal investigation into the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was considered a matter of fact, from 7 to 29 July 1987.
The hearing was "open" but took place in the town of Chernobyl, in the restricted area.
Such is the cynicism of the Soviet regime
Peoples were tried under Article 220 ​​of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR - of incorrect handling of hazardous enterprises.
Received prison sentences Director,
chief engineer, deputy chief engineer (A. Dyatlov)
and others involved. Those who survived that night.
With regards to the technical lessons.
Modernization of the reactor was done in six months.
Changed the design of the control rods, put additional absorbers (if they were in a reactor, accident would not have) changed the fuel enrichment, reduced the void coefficient of reactivity.
wrote a new regulation.

 

[etudiant]

Criminal investigation into the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was considered a matter of fact, from 7 to 29 July 1987.
Peoples were tried under Article 220 ​​of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR - of incorrect handling of hazardous enterprises.
With regards to the technical lessons.
Modernization of the reactor was done in six months.
Changed the design of the control rods, put additional absorbers (if they were in a reactor, accident would not have) changed the fuel enrichment, reduced the void coefficient of reactivity.
wrote a new regulation.

Very interesting, thank you for this additional information.
Were the case transcripts ever made public?

Separately, it is impressive that the Soviets developed and presumably implemented substantial fixes to their design in six months, whereas we are still struggling with the task of reducing the lessons learned at Fukushima to regulation thirty months later. The nuclear industry is losing the public's confidence and support because of this lack of coherent leadership in the face of danger.

 

[nikkkom]

Separately, it is impressive that the Soviets developed and presumably implemented substantial fixes to their design in six months,

Knowing Soviets first-hand, I wouldn't be so quick to believe their fixes are good enough. IIRC, the desing fixes apply only to the design of the hollow tips of the control rods. I'm pretty sure they weren't implemented that quickly.
The rest were operational fixes.

we are still struggling with the task of reducing the lessons learned at Fukushima to regulation thirty months later. The nuclear industry is losing the public's confidence and support because of this lack of coherent leadership in the face of danger.

Agree 100%.

 

[a.ua.]

nikkkom

Presumably, Medvedev's description is based on Perevozchenko testimonies - station workers were discussing the accident while they were in the hospital and weren't incapacitated by radiation sickness yet, and Medvedev collected testimonies of many of these people.

There are some memories
with Google translation

Between the MCR -3 and MCR - 4, I met a shift supervisor of the reactor department Valery Perevozchenko .
In response to my questions , he briefly said that there are large areas of damage and destruction of the equipment on Reactor shop. Wet and tired , he excused himself and hurried on .
The next and last time I saw Valery Perevozchenko in the Moscow hospital ward number 6 in May. With the shift supervisor of the reactor department Vladimir pelts we decided to come to him , and happy birthday .
It is at this time did not get up , was weak , nose and ears to reduce the bleeding was laid with cotton , but he was willing to talk . We tore the bag of fruit juice drink for his recovery , and did everything to convince him that he is sure to get better. To this he replied that he is unlikely to rise , "I know what it is ." Apparently, he really appreciates the gravity of his situation.

A week later, when my condition worsened , I went to the doctor Philippovich Sergei Severin and announced his decision to transfer me to another room where sterile conditions are created , calling the room number where he lay Valery .
I get it , but nevertheless asked, " What about Perevozchenko ? * Severin declined to answer , but said the words which, for me , lying exhausted in a single chamber, with hair fell out , and already knowing how our comrades die were the most appropriate.

He said, " Yes, you're sick, you still may be worse for some time : the hair will fall out completely , will be bleeding from the nose , weakness will increase, but it is a disease , it must have been ill . But it will be easier , especially after a blood transfusion . I 'll get you out , I do not for the first time. " These words were to me the most effective remedy and a stimulus to recovery. After that I was transferred to the ward , where he died Valery Perevozchenko .
Severin kept his word - the reader a witness.

such an unusual fact, but it does not say ( Perevozchenko)

in addition

technically, it is difficult to imagine.
under the cubes is located air.
And then another cube which passes the fuel channel.

etudiant

Were the case transcripts ever made public?

In full view of them is not published.
There are some parts.
In the archives of the court should be.
Here you can read a lot more interesting.

 

[etudiant]

nikkkom


etudiant


In full view of them is not published.
There are some parts.
In the archives of the court should be.
Here you can read a lot more interesting.

Thank you for the link.
It is news to me that there had in fact been precursor incidents which should have alerted the Soviet nuclear community to the dangers lurking in their design.
Apparently regulatory capture is not just a US specific phenomenon. Bureaucracies everywhere have a hard time admitting problems, capitalist or communist, European or Japanese, it matters not. Makes one wonder what else we are missing, in the financial regulatory apparatus for instance.

 

[nikkkom]

It is news to me that there had in fact been precursor incidents which should have alerted the Soviet nuclear community to the dangers lurking in their design.

Leningrad NPP in 1975,
Chernobyl NPP in 1982 on Unit 1.

Apparently regulatory capture is not just a US specific phenomenon.

IIRC in Soviet Union there was no independent regulator *per se*.

 

[etudiant]

Leningrad NPP in 1975,
Chernobyl NPP in 1982 on Unit 1.



IIRC in Soviet Union there was no independent regulator *per se*.

Exactly, the 'regulatory functions' get subsumed into their sector in short order, either officially or de facto.

 

[a.ua.]

After the Chernobyl NPP was fully and permanently shut down in 2000, did they remove the fuel from reactors 1-3 as well as from the spent fuel pools?

Here is the answer to the question

The Chernobyl NPP Units completely released from undamaged nuclear fuel

On September 28, 2013, the ChNPP personnel completed the works on removing conditioned spent nuclear fuel from Chernobyl NPP Unit 1.
The works were commenced on December 22, 2011. During this period, 1,333 spent fuel assemblies (SFA) were transferred from Unit 1 to Compartment 5 of Interim Storage Facility 1 cooling pool.
The works on releasing Chernobyl NPP Unit 2 from conditioned spent nuclear fuel were completed in November 2012 and in September 2010 for Unit 3. Prior to work performance on SNF discharge, the plant personnel developed and implemented ISF-1 modernization design aimed at improving safety of this facility in accordance with the requirements of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine.
Manufacturing of separate types of equipment required for SNF discharge by ChNPP personnel efforts ensured essential time and budget savings. Particularly, the plant departments produced 3,294 “short” canisters.
Nowadays, the ChNPP personnel work together to address an issue on handling damaged nuclear fuel remained at Units 1 and 2.
http://www.chnpp.gov.ua/index.php?o...adernogo-paliva-en&catid=29&Itemid=11&lang=en

 

[African Rover]

How dangerous is ( was) the area adjacent to the damaged reactor? Were the reactors 1, 2 and 3 shut down during the accident or did they carry on running? They were still used after the accident and the last one was only shut down in 2000. How was the personnel operating the reactors kept safe? Do they show radiation caused health effects? We know there are people working there now, what exposure are they subjected to?

 

[nikkkom]

How dangerous is ( was) the area adjacent to the damaged reactor? Were the reactors 1, 2 and 3 shut down during the accident or did they carry on running? They were still used after the accident and the last one was only shut down in 2000. How was the personnel operating the reactors kept safe? Do they show radiation caused health effects?

How badly do you think of Ukraine? I mean, it is not Western Europe, yes, but it isn't a rathole like North Korea either!

Do you really think the reactors would be operated if operating personnel would "show radiation caused health effects"?