Fukushima is a bad comparison to the rest of the world. Both plants I work at train on their SBO procedures, and it is well known how to handle the situation. If you read INPO's lessons learned, available here:http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstat...t-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-stationGlad that you are sure there are.
From where I sit, empirical evidence (Fuku) says that those procedures are not known to people operating NPPs, and when SBO occurred, they had no idea what to do.
you will see that it is very clear the Japanese deviated from several lessons learned by the US industry. And if you read the teleconference reports from the NRC website which were FOIAd from Fukushima, in the first one, it states very clearly that they were asking US plants (Exelon) to run simulator scenarios to figure out what was going on, and were asking GE for severe accident guidelines which are available at every US plant.
Japan really dropped the ball going into this, and the design of Daiichi didn't help it at all.
As for my comment about SBO, SBO is outside of design basis because it takes multiple accidents and failures, which is well beyond what you can realistically design for. To get to that point means something unpredictable happened, and as such, you need mitigation procedures, not blackout procedures.