News Control of US ports: Bush selling out on US security?

[crazycalhoun]

A container is shipped from a furniture factory in Malaysia. With a forged routing code It is then sent to a warehouse in Indonesia. The container then ends up in the Port of Hongkong where it sets among tens of thousands of other containers for several weeks. BTW BP World "UAE" also controls the operation of the Port of HongKong. Now the continer is re-labeld again and sent on to the Port of Baltimore. From baltimore it goes by train to anywhere in the United states, oh sure you will need an exact city, so let's make it to a warehouse in Chicago.

Why would you need to relabel in Baltimore? That is, if you've already compromised the route in Hongkong or anywhere else in the world, what more do you gain by controlling the port of entry? The container has already passed beyond the realm of normal scrutiny before it even heads to the US.

 

[crazycalhoun]

Ah, but the can make sure a container is sent to whatever U.S. City is the target.

They already can, from overseas given your scenario. Unless we're going to start arguing that the original dispatcher just said "surprise me" when asked to list a final destination, any point along that chain once sufficiently compromised--along a path without additional scrutiny--would pretty much secure the desired routing. And that additional scrutiny is not P&O, PSA, or DP World's responsibility, as others have pointed out.

Side note on the 9/11 Commission closing commentary. The commission report is principally a policy document. It makes findings of fact, and draws conclusions--judgements, or what IC would call estimates--based on those facts. But as a policy instrument, the report aims to induce a set of desired events and uses language to that effect; the transition from judgement to held fact is a political process. In and of itself, declaring that the failure to prevent the attacks is principally a failure of imagination is as useless as dumping on inductive reasoning. I have a lot of problems with the report, particularly in how it justifies its recommendations for restructuring IC, but that bit about imagination is just a pet bone of mine.

 

[edward]

Edward, you argue a moot point. If I was a terrorist I would much rather set off that WMD at a large port, and shut down the entire US economy; rather than a major city Why? (1) If I can get a WMD into a ship at a foreign port, then I don't have to worry about clearing inspections and transporting the WMD all the way to a major city. (2) It works to my advantage to set it off right at the inspection site, shutting down the entire port and the entire US economy, because even if I have 100% inspections I can still pull it off. That's why I have said it matters most that the foreign ports have tight security so that WMD never get onto a ship headed to the US in the first place. I will post with more thought later I have a TON of work to do.

My point was that they can ship WMD anywhere they want. Having access, as DP World (UAE) now will, to ports on both ends of the system is the ideal situation to facilitate that. We do have some customs inspectors in foreign ports, but they can only inspect a very small number of the tens of thousnads containers. That is my repeated concern. Some countries do not allow U.S. inspectors, that is why I used a round about shipping scenario.

We know who would ship WMD. Where they might be shipped from and who has the access to do it is the big issue.



Get some work done CYRUS.

 

[edward]

They already can, from overseas given your scenario. Unless we're going to start arguing that the original dispatcher just said "surprise me" when asked to list a final destination, any point along that chain once sufficiently compromised--along a path without additional scrutiny--would pretty much secure the desired routing. And that additional scrutiny is not P&O, PSA, or DP World's responsibility, as others have pointed out.

The bad guys would want the desired routing to be done in a matter that would be the most confusing to track and the least suspicious in nature.
Only Port personel could do that.
Customs does have a method by which they decide which containers to inspect, even in foreign ports.

Ive got work to do to, Ill catch you later.

 

[crazycalhoun]

The bad guys would want the desired routing to be done in a matter that would be the most confusing to track and the least suspicious in nature.

We agree here.

Only Port personel could do that.

I don't agree here, but we can agree that port personnel in the pocket are definitely desirable.

Customs does have a method by which they decide which containers to inspect, even in foreign ports.

I won't touch this; it's not really relevant to the discussion. Suffices to say that we're talking about moving containers under normal scrutiny.

My problem with your scenario is that there is no explanation as to why it requires a measure of control over the receiving end point.

 

[Moonbear]

Yeah, but I think a number of people have pointed out that operations firms like P & O hire...well...operations people (OR, ILR, process engineers).

The stuff I've been talking about could be pulled off by a corrupt yard manager, according to the description of duties there, which is why I pulled up that specific job description out of all their current positions open. I specifically referred to managers involved in assigning work crews responsibilities and shifts as the people who can ensure an entire crew working together are all complicit in whatever illegal activity they may wish to undertake. It doesn't even need to be terrorism, but drug smuggling, or human smuggling (a.k.a., helping illegal immigrants get into the country, which may or may not be related to terrorism).

You can look through the other current job listings they have, but of course that won't give a full spectrum of what they do, just the positions they're currently hiring for through their website:
http://www.careerbuilder.com/JobSeeker/Companies/CompanyJobResults.aspx?Comp_DID=C8B4DQ5VRQ4NVZKL7M8&cbRecursionCnt=1&cbsid=bd65bf3c4fd84c37b4e7e985ecae0a07-193856571-XR-2

For example, they also are hiring Marine Superintendents, with the following listed among the job responsibilities:

Supervises advance-planning activities prior to the ship coming into port. Checks berth conditions for docking, work areas for safe operation of stevedores and checkers, and that all labor has been assembled for adequate and efficient operations.

Supervises the gangs for vessel loading and unloading, in accordance with the vessel plan. Ensures that each gang is organized, that each person knows what to do and when to do it, so that productivity levels are high.

http://www.careerbuilder.com/JobSeeker/Jobs/JobDetails.aspx?IPATH=CJR&dv=dv&strCrit=QID%3dA6653184763285%3bst%3da%3buse%3dALL%3bCID%3d%3bSID%3d%3bTID%3d0%3bENR%3dNO%3bDTP%3dDR3%3bYDI%3dYES%3bIND%3dALL%3bPDQ%3dAll%3bJN%3dAll%3bPAYL%3d0%3bPAYH%3dgt120%3bPOY%3dNO%3bETD%3dALL%3bRE%3dALL%3bMGT%3dDC%3bSUP%3dDC%3bFRE%3d30%3bHHName%3dPOPNA%3bCHL%3dAL%3bQS%3dsid_unknown%3bSS%3dNO%3bTITL%3d0%3bJQT%3dRAD&lpage=1&jobcount=20&sfascc=&CiBookMark=1&Job_DID=J3F4KN66YLGT4GLS388
Again, this gives them the opportunities to assemble the crews they want to have present when any particular ship comes in with cargo of interest. It only takes something like an accident involved in operating a crane or dropping a container to distract and divert attention away from other containers being moved where they shouldn't be going, and suicide bombers are enough evidence that terrorists won't hesitate at sacrificing a few of their own lives to accomplish their goals.

 

[jhe1984]

What is the benefit of helping the US with the war on terror - which is much more than a semantic ribbon - if our country is still going to be prejudiced against you?

The UAE since 9/11 has allowed the US to use its ports and military facilities to make the invasion of Iraq possible - which whether even they agreed with it or not was a huge concession in the Arab world and important militarily (Turkey and Iran were out) leaving Kuwait and KSA as our only entry points, meaning we needed routing stations.

Not to mention the fact that they most likely have allowed the US to operate in covert counterterrorism capacities since the war began and kept their mouths shut.

What difference does it make if Marwan al-Shehi was from the UAE? There was no command and control structure taking place in the UAE. No that was taking place in Afghanistan, Germany, Malaysia and most importantly the US. Should we cancel all German contracts since a majority of the hijackers lived, went to school, and were recruited in Hamburg? Have yall forgotten that fact (did you know it to begin with, even)?

There is no substantive argument to this anti-UAE proposal, except rooted in protectionist economics and politics (and I'll also whisper unconscious racism).

What security breach could happen then that can't occur now? Shipping containers come in each day from Morocco, Lebanon, Pakistan, all over. Their manifests are controlled by people many of whom are from countries with fairly hostile Muslim populations. Yet no one seems unduly concerned about that. Strange how in an election year this issue is being championed as a security threat, outsourcing, and administration secrecy issue all in one. These are all criticisms of the Bush administration and that's no problem. But what's happening on the other end is that we're telling countries who for better or worse are crucial strategic allies that we need helping us, when the time comes for us to hold up our end of the bargain, we'll lump you in with the rest of the Arabs.

I challenge anyone to name a reasonable scenario that is possible with a UAE-owned venture capital fund that is not possible with current foreign owned shipping companies, cargo ships, and the like that come into our ports each day.

These folks are international businessmen looking to do business in the very same manner that everyone else does business. They aren't living in a cave with mortar rounds, suicide vests, and Kalishnakovs.

A completely valid and compelling argument can be made that our ports are at risk, that they should be considered and protected on the same level as military installations, but trying to make this argument while at the same time overlooking the fact that, regardless of whether this deal goes through or not, only 5 to 20% of any cargo load on any given day will be inspected in the most cursory way is shortsighted and illogical. If people are really such champions of port security, where was this pressure in the 5 years since September 11, when multiple bills have been passed that only slightly prioritized this issue. I'm speaking to both Republicans and Democrats here, since only a handful of Congressman - almost all of which have been Democrats - have attempted to address this issue with any conviction. It's not like the UAE and by extension terrorist groups - a leap in itself - will suddenly have our coveted port security playbook. Give me a break. Hell, I'll give you the port security playbook right now - ready: Only 5 to 20 % of cargo containers are inspected before being cleared - even less ships are stopped while still at sea. Listen up terrorists, shipping companies all over the Arab world bring in ships daily, few if any are stopped on any given day. Most likely, these shipping companies would be able to alter any necessary manifest changes to launder in weapons, etc. And if you're a terrorist and are just now finding this out, go ahead and try and get a day job, because this fact has been in every publicly available GAO report and investigative journalism piece since after 9/11.

There's not much left to turn over to the terrorists, if they had the networking and supply means to carry out an attack like this. Thank goodness they currently don't.

I'm not interested in quotes, doomsday scenarios, and protectionist jargon, if you want to convince me that a great deal is changing besides election year CYA politics and upset cash-strapped American business, I'll need to hear 1) how such a scenario could unfold in a way that couldn't happen in the currently ridiculously porous security environment, 2) why you think that the 6 or so security and intel agencies that work for the USG ok'd this process (or why the media and heretofor quiet politicians are more adept at doing their job than they are) and 3) how reneging on the contract would be a good strategic move economically, politically, and in international security in the Arab world - where we're fighting this war. Anything less is just borderline racist, protectionist election year CYA political jingoism.

And a fourth point - a pragmatic solution or alternative to the entire problem - would be appreciated.

There's my diatribe for the day.

 

[Cyrus]

Nice post for a change jhe1984. Very well said.

And a fourth point - a pragmatic solution or alternative to the entire problem - would be appreciated.

Here is your solution, tighter inspections on all ships leaving foreign ports that are headed to the United States.

 

[crazycalhoun]

http://www.careerbuilder.com/JobSeeker/Jobs/JobDetails.aspx?IPATH=CJR&dv=dv&strCrit=QID%3dA6653184763285%3bst%3da%3buse%3dALL%3bCID%3d%3bSID%3d%3bTID%3d0%3bENR%3dNO%3bDTP%3dDR3%3bYDI%3dYES%3bIND%3dALL%3bPDQ%3dAll%3bJN%3dAll%3bPAYL%3d0%3bPAYH%3dgt120%3bPOY%3dNO%3bETD%3dALL%3bRE%3dALL%3bMGT%3dDC%3bSUP%3dDC%3bFRE%3d30%3bHHName%3dPOPNA%3bCHL%3dAL%3bQS%3dsid_unknown%3bSS%3dNO%3bTITL%3d0%3bJQT%3dRAD&lpage=1&jobcount=20&sfascc=&CiBookMark=1&Job_DID=J3F4KN66YLGT4GLS388
Again, this gives them the opportunities to assemble the crews they want to have present when any particular ship comes in with cargo of interest. It only takes something like an accident involved in operating a crane or dropping a container to distract and divert attention away from other containers being moved where they shouldn't be going, and suicide bombers are enough evidence that terrorists won't hesitate at sacrificing a few of their own lives to accomplish their goals.

But this still fails to answer the question asked of edwards. What do you have to gain by doing it in a US port? To put it another way, if DP World is such a threat as an operator, why not re-route overseas? Instead, you now have to get your longshoremen and stevedores hired in the US before you can even make use of them. And for what? To reroute a container to a particular 18-wheel rig? If you managed to get it to port in the first place without drawing additional scrutiny, what's to stop you from going the extra mile and slapping a "to Chicago" sticker on the order?

 

[Art]

Shipping containers are identified the same way as cars. They are assigned individual alpha-numeric registration codes. They identify the owner of the container and enable tracking. The shipping manifest lists the contents against each box number and the ship has a stow plan identifying the position of each container on board the vessel.

The ship may move from port to port dropping and picking up new cargo along the way and updating the stow plan accordingly.

If people in a suspect region wanted to move something illegal their problem is that shipments from suspect regions are most likely to garner the most interest from customs officials. So getting the stuff on board a ship may be easy but avoiding it's detection at the delivery port would be difficult. The customs officers check the ship's manifest and decide which boxes they are going to pull.

One way around this would be to ship two containers from different ports along the route; one with your contraband from the suspect region and one with genuine goods from a friendly port, with both listing the same contents.

Once the boxes are off loaded someone in the port needs only to switch the box numbers so if the 'suspect' container is pulled for customs examination the innocent one is looked at.

Doing this would require operatives in both the suspect shipping port and the receiving port.

Here's a quote from the US ambassador to Jamaica;

Indeed, vessels, or the cargo they carry, can be used in several ways by terrorists: for transportation, to raise money, through legal or illegal trade; or for destruction in much the same way that Al Qaeda planners used hijacked airliners to strike New York and Washington.

The fear that terrorists could exploit the container transport system was confirmed barely a month after the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. In October 2001, authorities in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro, a leading cargo trans-shipment hub for the Mediterranean, discovered an unusually well equipped and neatly dressed stowaway locked inside a shipping container. The container was furnished with a bed, water, supplies for a long journey and a bucket for a toilet. Italian police said Mr. Farid, the 43-year-old stowaway, was born in Egypt but carried a Canadian passport. Farid was smartly dressed, clean-shaven and rested as he emerged with two mobile phones, a satellite phone, a laptop computer, several cameras, batteries and, ominously, airport security passes and an airline mechanic's certificates valid for four major American airports. That container fitted out as a makeshift home had been loaded in Port Said, Egypt.

Last December, U.S. and allied forces on patrol in the Persian Gulf tracked and boarded several dhows, confiscating drug shipments worth more than US$15 million. Seven of the crewmen detained had links to Al Qaeda, which was using drug smuggling to help to finance its operations. While we know about these particular events because they actually occurred, we do not necessarily know what is now in the planning stages. According to the U.S. National Commission that has recently been investigating the 9/11 attacks - those attacks were several years in the making.

She was obviously concerned about the risk to America's nat'l security through her ports.

 

[SOS2008]

What security breach could happen then that can't occur now?

...I challenge anyone to name a reasonable scenario that is possible with a UAE-owned venture capital fund that is not possible with current foreign owned shipping companies, cargo ships, and the like that come into our ports each day.

...A completely valid and compelling argument can be made that our ports are at risk, that they should be considered and protected on the same level as military installations, but trying to make this argument while at the same time overlooking the fact that, regardless of whether this deal goes through or not, only 5 to 20% of any cargo load on any given day will be inspected in the most cursory way is shortsighted and illogical. If people are really such champions of port security, where was this pressure in the 5 years since September 11, when multiple bills have been passed that only slightly prioritized this issue. I'm speaking to both Republicans and Democrats here, since only a handful of Congressman - almost all of which have been Democrats - have attempted to address this issue with any conviction. It's not like the UAE and by extension terrorist groups - a leap in itself - will suddenly have our coveted port security playbook. Give me a break. Hell, I'll give you the port security playbook right now - ready: Only 5 to 20 % of cargo containers are inspected before being cleared - even less ships are stopped while still at sea. Listen up terrorists, shipping companies all over the Arab world bring in ships daily, few if any are stopped on any given day. Most likely, these shipping companies would be able to alter any necessary manifest changes to launder in weapons, etc. And if you're a terrorist and are just now finding this out, go ahead and try and get a day job, because this fact has been in every publicly available GAO report and investigative journalism piece since after 9/11.

...And a fourth point - a pragmatic solution or alternative to the entire problem - would be appreciated.

The scientific mind likes to drill down to the workings of the nuts and bolts, not a macro "big picture" view.

IMO the ports can't be secured without completely crippling our economy and adding more to the national debt. We need to do the best that is reasonable, like we do to secure our homes or to remain safe when driving--but accepting that there is still a risk.

My question is why can't our ports be managed domestically? I can't find any information to explain this, and I seem to be the only one wondering about this. I guess I should just be relieved the contract isn't going to Halliburton.

 

[crazycalhoun]

Shipping containers are identified the same way as cars. They are assigned individual alpha-numeric registration codes.

Yes, BIC codes.

One way around this would be to ship two containers from different ports along the route; one with your contraband from the suspect region and one with genuine goods from a friendly port, with both listing the same contents.

Once the boxes are off loaded someone in the port needs only to switch the box numbers so if the 'suspect' container is pulled for customs examination the innocent one is looked at.

Doing this would require operatives in both the suspect shipping port and the receiving port.

Now we're getting somewhere. But there's a problem switching the codes. Containers are marked--in big numbers and letters--according to ISO 6346, which specifies everything from height to thickness of paint and durability of the mark. Since we have to pull our "suspect" container, we've reduced customs countermeasure responsibility to ensuring the mark's validity. This is no mere matter of switching tags or stickers. And guess what? BIC lies outside of the ports' responsibility.

She was obviously concerned about the risk to America's nat'l security through her ports.

Lot's of people are, but not precisely for the reasons you guys are getting at--if for any reason at all.

 

[crazycalhoun]

IMO the ports can't be secured without completely crippling our economy and adding more to the national debt. We need to do the best that is reasonable, like we do to secure our homes or to remain safe when driving--but accepting that there is still a risk.

I disagree. What we have here is principally a process problem, one which we understand well enough from regular smuggling to do something about. We've got three big things going for us. Containers are huge, heavy, and require lots of people to handle. They can only be accepted across seas at limited points of entry. Unique, rapid, and relatively secure means of identification give us a headstart over smugglers and terrorists (who have to rely on getting lost in the volume--20 million TEUs and hundreds of millions of transactions--of commerce). And we can identify suspect countries. Art described an elaborate means to defeat Customs, and it is not impossible to pull off. And yes, if DP were sympathetic to al Qaeda it would be easier to get people in place to pull it off. But for to achieve any operationally acceptable rate of success, they'd need to compromise Customs as well to ensure that the markings are not closely scrutinized.

On the other hand, suspect countries ship thousands of containers a boatload. As elaborate a precaution as switching codes is, one wonders if it is absolutely necessary? Customs cannot possibly inspect one large cargo carrier--it can carry up to 5-7000 TEUs.

My question is why can't our ports be managed domestically?

Why should they? Doesn't really mitigate against the danger all that much. Operations is concerned almost entirely with routing. Security, customs, etc. are issues principally handled by port authorities. What you should really be concerned about is how to leverage operations to address security concerns. For one, we need to identify areas in a shipping process where contents can be confirmed accurately but expeditiously and without a great deal of human oversight. That's a process engineering problem.

 

[Art]

Yes, BIC codes.



Now we're getting somewhere. But there's a problem switching the codes. Containers are marked--in big numbers and letters--according to ISO 6346, which specifies everything from height to thickness of paint and durability of the mark. Since we have to pull our "suspect" container, we've reduced customs countermeasure responsibility to ensuring the mark's validity. This is no mere matter of switching tags or stickers. And guess what? BIC lies outside of the ports' responsibility.

Assigning BIC numbers legally is outside the port's responsibilty but an illegal switch is possible but only in the receiving port after the container has been unloaded. Earlier than that and it will be noticed by the error flagged in the stow plan. It takes on average 2 days after delivery for containers to be presented to customs and much longer if held on quay in a bonded warehouse giving plenty of time for the switch to be made.

This would greatly improve the odds for successfully smuggling contraband. It also helps prevent the customs from wrapping up the entire cell by following the suspect container to it's delivery address.

Perhaps every container should be tagged electronically to make switching far more difficult.

 

[crazycalhoun]

Assigning BIC numbers legally is outside the port's responsibilty but an illegal switch is possible but only in the receiving port after the container has been unloaded.

I specifically said an illegal switch is possible. I said that an illegal switch is hard to pull off, precisely because of what BIC codes are. And just to be clear, I didn't suggest switching the codes before they were offloaded.

This would greatly improve the odds for successfully smuggling contraband.

It also greatly increases the risk that Customs will detect tampering with the markings. We're at the last stop seawise. Wouldn't it at least raise some eyebrows that a container with a BIC code not listed in the manifest is sitting besides or atop or underneath containers from Hong Kong? Now all Customs need do is secure a container near its unloading point.

 

[Art]

I specifically said an illegal switch is possible. I said that an illegal switch is hard to pull off, precisely because of what BIC codes are. And just to be clear, I didn't suggest switching the codes before they were offloaded.

I didn't see your comment in response to SOS's mail until I'd posted mine. But anyway some people asked (you I thought) for an example of what advantage a terrorist group would have in controling a port in the US so I provided one example off the top of my head. I'm sure with a little thought there are many more.

It also greatly increases the risk that Customs will detect tampering with the markings.

I don't see why, I am sure they could use stencils and afterall if they prepare carefully they'll only need to change 1 digit.

It also greatly increases the risk that Customs will detect tampering with the markings. We're at the last stop seawise. Wouldn't it at least raise some eyebrows that a container with a BIC code not listed in the manifest is sitting besides or atop or underneath containers from Hong Kong? Now all Customs need do is secure a container near its unloading point.

The BIC code will be listed on the manifest. All they need to do is switch two genuine BIC numbers around. As for being in the wrong pile. Normally customs check containers when they are being released to the carrier at which point it is in a pile of 1 but even if that was not the case - it is easily solved either by routing both containers to the same bonded area or by shipping refrigerated units which need to be moved immediately after unloading and plugged in individually on quay.

 

[crazycalhoun]

I didn't see your comment in response to SOS's mail until I'd posted mine. But anyway some people asked (you I thought) for an example of what advantage a terrorist group would have in controling a port in the US so I provided one example off the top of my head. I'm sure with a little thought there are many more.

I specifically asked what advantage do they gain from a friendly firm taking over operations for an end point when that same firm already controls the dispatching port. I mean, that's the specific objection raised to DP World taking over operations. I've also made a point not to dismiss potential threats as impossible; for the most part, doing so would also mean dismissing those that obviously exist.

I don't see why, I am sure they could use stencils and afterall if they prepare carefully they'll only need to change 1 digit.

They'd have to first remove or cover the markings, and ISO 6346 covers the consistency, thickness and persistence of those markings. The point is you now increase the risk of Customs detecting a deviation in the paint given knowledge of the paint characteristics--if they actually pull the container as suspect in the first place. If they don't...well then, your guy on the inside can't really take the credit for that.

The BIC code will be listed on the manifest. All they need to do is switch two genuine BIC numbers around.

Which presents two problems, the one above and the fact that if they pull the BIC for switched container, they'll find BIC that was recently in a Hong Kong port buried amongst a bunch of ones from the UK.

As for being in the wrong pile. Normally customs check containers when they are being released to the carrier at which point it is in a pile of 1 but even if that was not the case...

Wait a second, are you saying that Customs checks when its released to the next mode of transport, not at the wharf or the terminal? That doesn't sound right.

- it is easily solved either by routing both containers to the same bonded area or by shipping refrigerated units which need to be moved immediately after unloading and plugged in individually on quay.

The container terminal is usually right there, so you'd expect lorries to move them within the order they arrived. You'd need a heterogenous group to avoid suspicion.

 

[Art]

I specifically asked what advantage do they gain from a friendly firm taking over operations for an end point when that same firm already controls the dispatching port. I mean, that's the specific objection raised to DP World taking over operations. I've also made a point not to dismiss potential threats as impossible; for the most part, doing so would also mean dismissing those that obviously exist.

And I provided you with an example. With operatives in both the shipping and receiving ports it becomes easier to smuggle contraband using the method I outlined.

They'd have to first remove or cover the markings, and ISO 6346 covers the consistency, thickness and persistence of those markings. The point is you now increase the risk of Customs detecting a deviation in the paint given knowledge of the paint characteristics--if they actually pull the container as suspect in the first place. If they don't...well then, your guy on the inside can't really take the credit for that.

Have you seen many shipping containers?? Most are in rag order. You're lucky if you can read the BIC ID at all half the time never mind worrying about the thickness of the paint. Plus as I mentioned part of the code identifies the owner of the container and as containers are sold between shipping companies the BIC codes are changed thus an over written code wouldn't be the red flag you think.

 

[crazycalhoun]

And I provided you with an example. With operatives in both the shipping and receiving ports it becomes easier to smuggle contraband using the method I outlined.

And I pointed out the increased risk inherent in those courses of action.

Have you seen many shipping containers??

Grew up around'em.

Most are in rag order. You're lucky if you can read the BIC ID at all half the time never mind worrying about the thickness of the paint.

Which gets us to the advantage of even controlling the receiving port. On the other hand, if Customs or USCG foul up that has less to do with the operational soundness of what you propose and more to do with their..well..foul up.

Plus as I mentioned part of the code identifies the owner of the container and as containers are sold between shipping companies the BIC codes are changed thus an over written code wouldn't be the red flag you think.

You wouldn't expect a BIC code to change at the point of receipt and before fulfillment.

 

[Moonbear]

I specifically said an illegal switch is possible. I said that an illegal switch is hard to pull off, precisely because of what BIC codes are. And just to be clear, I didn't suggest switching the codes before they were offloaded.

You don't need to change the BICs, you can pop the bolts off the hinges and switch the contents without breaking the seal.

Several people seem to be assuming the only thing they'd be smuggling in would be some sort of explosive, and are dismissing the claims because they think a large explosive would be better used right at the port. As Art has pointed out (thanks Art for providing solid evidence for my earlier comments on this), they can also smuggle in people to build up terrorist cells within the US, or drugs to fund their organizations.

However, there's no reason to think they might not want to slip in explosives either. We know from 9/11 that the terrorists involved were highly organized and had multiple, simultaneous targets. This could involve arrangements to store containers in specific locations of the yard to maximize the damage when detonated, or to ensure that multiple, in-bound ships are all coming to port at the same time at 6 different ports; detonate a container at one port, and the remaining ports are still open for business, with of course a temporary delay as everything coming in is scrutinized and the company managing operations is kicked out, and shipments are diverted...it slows things down and really mucks up everything, but doesn't completely shut down the economy, but have 6 ports hit at once, and some major damage has just been done to the supply chain.

What security breach could happen then that can't occur now? Shipping containers come in each day from Morocco, Lebanon, Pakistan, all over. Their manifests are controlled by people many of whom are from countries with fairly hostile Muslim populations. Yet no one seems unduly concerned about that. Strange how in an election year this issue is being championed as a security threat, outsourcing, and administration secrecy issue all in one. These are all criticisms of the Bush administration and that's no problem. But what's happening on the other end is that we're telling countries who for better or worse are crucial strategic allies that we need helping us, when the time comes for us to hold up our end of the bargain, we'll lump you in with the rest of the Arabs.

I challenge anyone to name a reasonable scenario that is possible with a UAE-owned venture capital fund that is not possible with current foreign owned shipping companies, cargo ships, and the like that come into our ports each day.

Quite a bit earlier in this thread, it was brought up that while some people are more concerned about the UAE specifically, many of us are just as concerned about any foreign managing of our ports. I was simply unaware such a thing happened until this story brought it to light. It's mind-boggling to me that ANY country would not want to retain control over their own ports.

And yes, I agree with everyone who is saying there are other big security holes that need to be plugged that have nothing to do with this take-over and perhaps even take priority, but that doesn't make foreign managment of ports a non-issue, just perhaps a lesser one in comparison to those other problems facing security at the ports. This issue just happens to be the one that's the topic of this thread, and the one that's the hot topic in the news now.

I would have no problem with folks starting up a second thread on other security issues as well so that discussion doesn't derail that thread or get ignored while folks focus on the topic of the UAE company managing port operations.

I also wonder what others outside the US think about foreign management with regard to their own ports. I sure as heck would expect the UAE to put up a fight (figuratively speaking) if a US company were to come in and start running their ports on a few behind-closed-doors handshakes.

I also had brought up earlier the subject of diplomatic relations; not just in trade, but in maintaining U.S. military bases in the UAE, and generally trying to persuade them to be more helpful to the U.S., I just don't know if this is the right way to do it.

 

[Art]

Just to clear up a couple of points;

Customs offices do a risk assessment to categorize containers. These are graded high, medium and low. Those with a high rating have a strong liklihood of being examined whereas those with a low rating have a correspondingly low chance of being examined. Hence the benefit in changing a containers BIC to put it in a low risk category.

Once the customs officer flags a container for exam he contacts the shippers shipping agent and they arrange for the container to be delivered to the customs hall for inspection. The customs officers do not examine them on the quays.

 

[crazycalhoun]

You don't need to change the BICs, you can pop the bolts off the hinges and switch the contents without breaking the seal.

And you need a logistician to do what?

Several people seem to be assuming the only thing they'd be smuggling in would be some sort of explosive, and are dismissing the claims because they think a large explosive would be better used right at the port. As Art has pointed out (thanks Art for providing solid evidence for my earlier comments on this), they can also smuggle in people to build up terrorist cells within the US, or drugs to fund their organizations.

The risk of which, of course, is not clearly increased with DP World acquiring P&O. And that's the issue. Not port security wholecloth, but the specific threat posed by transfering operations to a company with its headquarters and majority owner in Dubai and is buying out the operations side of US ports.

I was simply unaware such a thing happened until this story brought it to light. It's mind-boggling to me that ANY country would not want to retain control over their own ports.

"Control" is an overly broad word. Let's be clear. DP World is taking over Operations. Many of the tasks you've counted as "controlling" belong to the port authorities, customs, BIC or some other state, provincial or national entity. Let's not forget that a port itself is not a private entity.

And yes, I agree with everyone who is saying there are other big security holes that need to be plugged that have nothing to do with this take-over and perhaps even take priority, but that doesn't make foreign managment of ports a non-issue, just perhaps a lesser one in comparison to those other problems facing security at the ports.

Based entirely on the substance of this thread and what's been appearing in the news, it certainly seems like a non-issue.

 

[Moonbear]

They'd have to first remove or cover the markings, and ISO 6346 covers the consistency, thickness and persistence of those markings. The point is you now increase the risk of Customs detecting a deviation in the paint given knowledge of the paint characteristics--if they actually pull the container as suspect in the first place. If they don't...well then, your guy on the inside can't really take the credit for that.

I don't really know how quickly things are moved that aren't flagged by Customs compared to those that are being held for inspection, but my suspicion is that by the time Customs got close enough to that container to notice something was suspect about it, and depending on how obvious the changes are (yeah, fresh paint would probably be a tip-off), the other container with the contraband is already long gone. Nobody is saying this would be easy or wouldn't require a lot of coordination or involve a lot of risk, but you could imagine that container goes to a local warehouse, the contraband is off-loaded into another vehicle, and a few of the crew take the heat for smuggling and gaining employment with falsified work papers that the management company can claim they didn't recognize were falsified, while the contraband itself is out of the system and untraceable. Terrorists aren't exactly afraid of taking risks to achieve their objectives anyway.

Okay, now my imagination is probably running wild a bit, but I can even envision a scenario where the management company makes themselves look more trustworthy by "catching" a few of the switches or containers with contraband, and voluntarily cooperates and turns in some of their employees who they suspect were involved; now Customs doesn't watch as closely because the management company seems to be on-the-ball and very helpful with regard to security, while they help slip through the more dangerous shipments. Of course, no, this doesn't even require foreign ownership, just corrupt ownership.

 

[Moonbear]

"Control" is an overly broad word. Let's be clear. DP World is taking over Operations. Many of the tasks you've counted as "controlling" belong to the port authorities, customs, BIC or some other state, provincial or national entity. Let's not forget that a port itself is not a private entity.

Okay, let's be clear then. What tasks have I counted as "controlling" that belong to those other entities and not the company responsible for operations? I showed you job descriptions posted by P&O that cover the responsibilities I have been using in my arguments. That seems to be fairly clear-cut evidence that those jobs really are handled by the company in charge of port operations.

 

[Moonbear]

And you need a logistician to do what?

What logistician? You need a crew to do that.

 

[edward]

Once the customs officer flags a container for exam he contacts the shippers shipping agent and they arrange for the container to be delivered to the customs hall for inspection. The customs officers do not examine them on the quays.

The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo.

http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5730

This was as of 2003. I hope there has been a drastic increase in the number of inspectors, but I seriously doubt it.

I see that this thread has fone from UAE control to security, but to me they are one in the same.

 

[crazycalhoun]

http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5730

This was as of 2003. I hope there has been a drastic increase in the number of inspectors, but I seriously doubt it.

I see that this thread has fone from UAE control to security, but to me they are one in the same.

The aren't one in the same, precisely because the realm of security holes in the supply chain is massive compared to that prospectively assigned to DP's acquisition of P&O. We haven't even gotten into what P&O was running. For example, do we care about container security where the New York Cruise Terminal is concerned? No, no containers. What about NYCT? No, because NYCT Inc., runs operations there, not P&O (soon to be DP World).

Global freight is damned efficient because it breaks down tasks into comparatively small components managed by different firms. It's so insecure because our current inspection regime is based on and grows from a pre-20th century century model that predates intermodal cargo transport. And this thread is, quite frankly, unfair to DP World because we're not addressing the specifics of a pretty technical division of labor and responsibility--one that can stand to have more secure means of identifying cargo yet is frequently characterized as including what we've historically put on our customs officers and coast guards.

 

[SOS2008]

Quote:
My question is why can't our ports be managed domestically?

Why should they? Doesn't really mitigate against the danger all that much. Operations is concerned almost entirely with routing. Security, customs, etc. are issues principally handled by port authorities. What you should really be concerned about is how to leverage operations to address security concerns. For one, we need to identify areas in a shipping process where contents can be confirmed accurately but expeditiously and without a great deal of human oversight. That's a process engineering problem.

I'm not asking that question in regard to security. I just want to know why we can't manage our own ports. As a beginning point, I want to know if and what alternatives there are to this sale before I get all excited about "what if" scenarios.

In the process of trying to find out, here are some links I came across (in addition to those in my earler post):

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/22/AR2005102201437_3.html

http://www.worldtrademag.com/CDA/Articles/Ports/653d1e36d9af7010VgnVCM100000f932a8c0____

I still couldn't find any information about U.S. seaport management companies--Who is managing other ports in the U.S. now?

But what I did find out (aside from a lot of security information, such as how hinges on containers are being designed to lock if the seal is tampered with) is that the U.S. is way behind in port infrastructure, including technologically (communication, etc.). Infrastructure in general has been neglected, as seen in regard to the levees and the major port in New Orleans. Read the source via the last link above, which addresses other aspects of intermodal tranport such as the need for rail. Let's face it people, the U.S. doesn't have funds to modernize it's ports including security upgrades. So was any money in the transportation bill allotted to this? This sale is just a drop in the bucket on the spectrum of things to worry about.

 

[crazycalhoun]

I'm not asking that question in regard to security. I just want to know why we can't manage our own ports. As a beginning point, I want to know if and what alternatives there are to this sale before I get all excited about "what if" scenarios.

They do manage the ports. They contract out for certain services, like operations. Why? Well, who do you want at an important juncture of 50 million TEU a year network? An 80K operations specialist acquired for the lowest bid or a 40K a year state employee you can't fire without a years worth of hassle? If that works for you, we might as well nationalize telecommunication service providers, too.

But what I did find out (aside from a lot of security information, such as how hinges on containers are being designed to lock if the seal is tampered with) is that the U.S. is way behind in port infrastructure, including technologically (communication, etc.). Infrastructure in general has been neglected, as seen in regard to the levees and the major port in New Orleans.

Once again, you're taking a very general (and nebulous) criticism and connecting specific technical points in a dubious way. NO levee strength has nothing to do with the quay cranes, video surveillance around the quays, or the (extremely high) volume of traffic Port of NO and SL could handle. You know, other than the fact that water is at least tangentially involved in some way. This discussion, on the other hand, is narrowly focused on security risks due to port activity, specifically due to the acquisition of an operations contract by a UAE company that bought out the holder.

 

[Moonbear]

But what I did find out (aside from a lot of security information, such as how hinges on containers are being designed to lock if the seal is tampered with) is that the U.S. is way behind in port infrastructure, including technologically (communication, etc.). Infrastructure in general has been neglected, as seen in regard to the levees and the major port in New Orleans. Read the source via the last link above, which addresses other aspects of intermodal tranport such as the need for rail. Let's face it people, the U.S. doesn't have funds to modernize it's ports including security upgrades. So was any money in the transportation bill allotted to this? This sale is just a drop in the bucket on the spectrum of things to worry about.

P&O contributed the funds to expand Port Newark http://www.pnct.net/, so those new aquisition may have that benefit of bringing in funds to other ports that desperately need expansion.

Though, it seems DP World had some help greasing the wheels for their takeover:

Dubai, 24 January 2006: - Global ports operator DP World today welcomed news that one of its senior executives, Dave Sanborn, has been nominated by US President George W. Bush to serve as Maritime Administrator a key transportation appointment reporting directly to Norman Mineta the Secretary of Transportation and Cabinet Member.

http://dpiterminals.com/fullnews.asp?NewsID=39

That's right off DP World's website.

Their home page is here: http://dpiterminals.com/dpworld_main.asp
It's not terribly useful for learning anything though...you can tell it was a bunch of business types who wrote it...it's heavy on buzzwords and light on substance.