Ken G
Gold Member
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OK, a lot of good points are being made. A particularly important one would seem to be that electric forces are only mediated by virtual photons in some gauges-- this was interpreted above as indications they are "not real." There are several problems with using this to dismiss taking virtual particles seriously as ontological constructs:
1) virtual particles are not claimed to be real, they are claimed to be virtual. This means they seek a new ontological status that normal standards of "realness" cannot be applied to. That seems obvious, but is getting overlooked.
2) virtual particles that mediate forces like the one corresponding to the Coulomb potential are gauge bosons, so it is perhaps not surprising they are not present in all gauges. The purpose of a gauge is not to make a claim on reality, it is to make a calculation simpler. It might well be argued the same can be said about physics in its entirety (echoing qsa above). So although it is useful to establish that virtual photons can be done away with in certain gauges, the question that remains is whether or not we gain access to certain forms of computational convenience by choosing a gauge that supports such gauge boson activity, at the conceptual level. Is anything in physics theory not at the conceptual level, after all?
So anyway, I'm not advocating for the reality of virtual particles, we shouldn't even call them virtual were that the attitude. I'm merely questioning whether or not it really makes consistent logical sense to imagine that physics supports a clear line between what is real and what is just a mathematical trick in some theory. We use any foothold we can get when trying to interpret and understand reality, and we cannot be burdened by the need to make the case that any ontological entity we invoke is "actually real."
1) virtual particles are not claimed to be real, they are claimed to be virtual. This means they seek a new ontological status that normal standards of "realness" cannot be applied to. That seems obvious, but is getting overlooked.
2) virtual particles that mediate forces like the one corresponding to the Coulomb potential are gauge bosons, so it is perhaps not surprising they are not present in all gauges. The purpose of a gauge is not to make a claim on reality, it is to make a calculation simpler. It might well be argued the same can be said about physics in its entirety (echoing qsa above). So although it is useful to establish that virtual photons can be done away with in certain gauges, the question that remains is whether or not we gain access to certain forms of computational convenience by choosing a gauge that supports such gauge boson activity, at the conceptual level. Is anything in physics theory not at the conceptual level, after all?
So anyway, I'm not advocating for the reality of virtual particles, we shouldn't even call them virtual were that the attitude. I'm merely questioning whether or not it really makes consistent logical sense to imagine that physics supports a clear line between what is real and what is just a mathematical trick in some theory. We use any foothold we can get when trying to interpret and understand reality, and we cannot be burdened by the need to make the case that any ontological entity we invoke is "actually real."
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