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I just want to say that I completely agree with statements like this. I just don't think global self-consistency in a special relativistic universe with tachyons is consistent with the illusion of free will, and I don't see why you think it is.Demystifier said:Nevertheless, the true nature of the event is neither random nor free. Instead, it is determined by the principle of global self-consistency.
So from my point of view, you went insane enough to kill your own child while trying to set up an experiment that can't possibly be completed because of global self-consistency. That proves to me that you didn't actually have free will, and that's it for the illusion of free will as far as I'm concerned. What could we possibly mean by illusion of free will other than that there's nothing we can do to prove that we don't have actual free will? (I think this is the definition of "illusion of free will" that I've been saying we need).Demystifier said:I don't know how exactly my brain will behave in this situation (except that I know that its behavior will be consistent with all other circumstances). Perhaps I will feel as a schizophrenic person who feels that he must do something, despite of knowing that it is wrong. So yes, in this case my (illusion of) free will may be intact, in the same sense the (illusion of) free will of a mentally ill person may be intact.
You could argue that one experiment doesn't prove it conclusively, but if we repeat the experiment a thousand times with different people, and they all choose to kill their children over the alternative, which is to not press a button for a few seconds, I would say that we have proved it as conclusively as anything can be proved in a universe where quantum effects are sometimes relevant.
(Suppose e.g. that an alternative theory competing with QM predicts that an experiment must have result R with probability P(R). Such a theory isn't falsifiable in the absolute sense, but if we do the experiment over and over, and the fraction of results that have been R so far is getting closer and closer to P(R)/2, we would eventually consider the theory to have been "falsified", even though technically it never will be. A theory that only predicts probabilities 0 or 1 doesn't have this problem, since it can be falsified with a single experiment. A theory that predicts non-trivial probabilies is never strictly falsifiable. Instead they satisfy a weaker requirement that I think of as "statistical falsifiability". So we can never really prove that an alternative quantum theory is false. That's what I had in mind when I said that "we have proved it as conclusively as anything can be proved in a universe where quantum effects are sometimes relevant").
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