Everything is done within a model

[pivoxa15]

I think I have realized something fundalmental although simplistic as well.

Anything we do is done within a model or system in the most general sense of the word. For example, we communicate with other people via a language which is a model. We describe nature in a quantitative way by using mathematics which is a model. Even our senses are capturing only a part of the universe. So what I am trying to say is that whenever we try to talk about what is real or fake in the absolute sense such as ontology and all that as if to claim what is really, really ... really true, independent of everytyhing else, is actually nonsense. What we can do is either define things within a model to be absolutely true (i.e. 1+1=2) or use models to describe and predict the world we live in such as measuring the speed of light and so on. But whatever model we use to measure these empirical quantities, we can never say what is really going on in nature because to do so would recquire a model and so you would be describing what is absolutely true in the model, not the empirical world. Even what I am writing now is done within a model but that does not matter its not like I have transended any model by stating this, its an intellectual observation although difficult to state and probably incomplete because I am restricted to the model I am using which is English although this model is general enough for me to talk about this.

To sum up, any thinking is done in a model and you can't escape that. The type of model is arbitary, none is more special than another. One can only move from one model to another and so any claim is restricted to the model you are using. Any talk of transcendence, ultimate reality, God's thoughts, 'outside the model' etc. is communicated or thought about in a system such as English. This intrinsic feature rules out the plausibility of the above words.

 

[selfAdjoint]

This is a good insight. Rather than saying "everything is done" through a model, you seem to be saying "everything is perceived" through a model.

This goes to Kant's insight about the need for what he called an a priori in perception. His a priori (logical structure) is very much like your model. But it is much better to have realized this for yourself than to have learned it by reading about it.

 

[pivoxa15]

Yes I think that would be more accurate. I actually wanted to change the title after I posted it but couldn't.

I haven't read about Kant but the first sentence on this site matches my idea to some extent.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendental_idealism

Although I have read about Wittgenstein. I got the idea for this topic from when W raised the (surprisingly difficult) issue about how we come to understand the meaning of a word in the Investigations.

 

[Rader]

I think I have realized something fundalmental although simplistic as well.

Something like knowing that you can only know what is in your model?

Anything we do is done within a model or system in the most general sense of the word. For example, we communicate with other people via a language which is a model. We describe nature in a quantitative way by using mathematics which is a model. Even our senses are capturing only a part of the universe. So what I am trying to say is that whenever we try to talk about what is real or fake in the absolute sense such as ontology and all that as if to claim what is really, really ... really true, independent of everytyhing else, is actually nonsense.

You mean nonsense to other models but not within your model?

What we can do is either define things within a model to be absolutely true (i.e. 1+1=2) or use models to describe and predict the world we live in such as measuring the speed of light and so on. But whatever model we use to measure these empirical quantities, we can never say what is really going on in nature because to do so would recquire a model and so you would be describing what is absolutely true in the model, not the empirical world.

Then it would not be attainable a unique model that describes what actually might be?

Even what I am writing now is done within a model but that does not matter its not like I have transended any model by stating this, its an intellectual observation although difficult to state and probably incomplete because I am restricted to the model I am using which is English although this model is general enough for me to talk about this.

Why do you think there is a limit on what your model can know and why could you not have a model to model models?

To sum up, any thinking is done in a model and you can't escape that. The type of model is arbitrary, none is more special than another.

So then your use of the word arbitrary is whimsical?

One can only move from one model to another and so any claim is restricted to the model you are using. Any talk of transcendence, ultimate reality, God's thoughts, 'outside the model' etc. is communicated or thought about in a system such as English. This intrinsic feature rules out the plausibility of the above words.

Does this mean that models do not become more coherent even within other models?

Would be interesting to fully understand your model.

 

[pivoxa15]

Something like knowing that you can only know what is in your model?

I can only know what my model allows. This may not all be obvious when
dealing with such huge models like Enlgish or math. Although models does
not have to be perfect nor complete for they are a product of the human
mind as well. All our thoughts must operate or be contained in at least
one model at all times.

You mean nonsense to other models but not within your model?

No. Whenever one talk about the metaphysical, one must do so within a model, any model (although some models may not allow for this type of thinking). This fact defeats their purpose.

Then it would not be attainable a unique model that describes what actually might be?

We can only approximate what actually might be with models. One model might approximate a situation better than another. For example, math is a better model to objectively describe nature than English.

Why do you think there is a limit on what your model can know and why could you not have a model to model models?

One can always refine and improve their models but they will always be
a model. This is their limitation. You could have models that model models and so on. But in the end they are all models - this is their ultimate limit.

So then your use of the word arbitrary is whimsical?

All I am trying to say is that one can come up with any model they
wish. So the point is that its not the case that there is a special finite
number of models that can be used by people. Its not like all models have been fixed by God since the beginning of time, so to speak.

Does this mean that models do not become more coherent even within other models?

Many good models can be coherent by themselves. Models have definitions contained in them and the user uses them in a coherent fashion when possible. But the key again is that the user must always remember that their thoughts are always within a model. Have you read Wittgenstein? In his Tractatus, he tried to write what he claimed was unwritable and nonsensical. I feel like I am doing something similar here because like him, I am bordering between what can and can't be thought about. Although I can use a model like English to approximate what can't be thought.

Would be interesting to fully understand your model.

I haven't created any models. The model I use to convey these thoughts is obviously English. I have to admit that my command of English is not all that great and so I too would like to understand English more.

 

[GreenApple]

I got 2 bulletes and 2 his
I don't think a question involving God could be answered by "yes"or"no".
Maybe,it is a quiz on logic or language involving the word "God"

 

[Rader]

I can only know what my model allows. This may not all be obvious when dealing with such huge models like Enlgish or math. Although models doe snot have to be perfect nor complete for they are a product of the human mind as well. All our thoughts must operate or be contained in at least one model at all times.

Whenever one talk about the metaphysical, one must do so within a model, any model (although some models may not allow for this type of thinking). This fact defeats their purpose.

We can only approximate what actually might be with models.

One can always refine and improve their models but they will always be
a model. This is their limitation. You could have models that model models and so on. But in the end they are all models - this is their ultimate limit.

All I am trying to say is that one can come up with any model they
wish. So the point is that its not the case that there is a special finite
number of models that can be used by people. Its not like all models have been fixed by God since the beginning of time, so to speak.

Many good models can be coherent by themselves. Models have definitions contained in them and the user uses them in a coherent fashion when possible. But the key again is that the user must always remember that their thoughts are always within a model. Have you read Wittgenstein?

Yes

In his Tractatus, he tried to write what he claimed was unwritable and nonsensical. I feel like I am doing something similar here because like him, I am bordering between what can and can't be thought about. Although I can use a model like English to approximate what can't be thought.

I haven't created any models.

Are you sure you seem to be making sense. Although you are using a model in this case English to express an idea, there is a model inside your model which is a model of limitations on what can be known. The words and propositions inside this model each have there own model within a model “ad infinitum” It makes one wonder how anyone can know what anyone is really saying about anything, actually I am of the opinion that we do not know what anyone is really saying, we just think so because that is the way we model what they are saying.

So is your model of limitations, what my model of its interpretation or is it correct what I said?

 

[pivoxa15]

I got 2 bulletes and 2 his
I don't think a question involving God could be answered by "yes"or"no".
Maybe,it is a quiz on logic or language involving the word "God"

I don't understand. please explain.

 

[pivoxa15]

Yes



Are you sure you seem to be making sense. Although you are using a model in this case English to express an idea, there is a model inside your model which is a model of limitations on what can be known. The words and propositions inside this model each have there own model within a model “ad infinitum” It makes one wonder how anyone can know what anyone is really saying about anything, actually I am of the opinion that we do not know what anyone is really saying, we just think so because that is the way we model what they are saying.

So is your model of limitations, what my model of its interpretation or is it correct what I said?

I think that when we deal with models within a model and all that, it is not necessilary the case that later on models are approximations hence worse than the prior one. It could be the case that things become clearer within the 5th model for instance. Although the definition of a model may need clarifying here. That is why using a highly technical language could be advantangeous. The main point is all our thoughts must be contained in at least one model at a time. After that, i.e. models within models is pretty much the same thing in that its all models from then on.

 

[Rader]

I think that when we deal with models within a model and all that, it is not necessilary the case that later on models are approximations hence worse than the prior one. It could be the case that things become clearer within the 5th model for instance.

That might be the case when you’re talking in first person but I was not referring to that. From what you have answered, that is what precisely I was trying to tell you. No one knows what anyone else is really saying because they have no access to any of the meanings that are being set to words and prepositions outside of your own model. Your meaning = I, my or mine when talking in first tense.

So then your model of limitations, was not my model of its interpretation and I was correct what I said, neither of us actually understands what the other models thoughts are.

Although the definition of a model may need clarifying here.

Yes, my definition is: Models are conceptual relationships of knowing about things. If you have a different one, we should decide on which one to use.

That is why using a highly technical language could be advantageous.

Like math?, well what happens when one knows more symbols or has quicker memory or more years of study, we are back to the same dilemma, the model might be clearer in first person tense but what happens to the model that is so clear looking from outside the model. It seems that nothing can be known except what is in the modellers head.

The main point is all our thoughts must be contained in at least one model at a time. After that, i.e. models within models is pretty much the same thing in that its all models from then on.

I have to be missing something here, what is it?

What I am trying to convey to you in simple English is that neither you nor I fully understand each others model the way we know it in our own heads, we can only just think that we do by certain words and prepositions that appear to have a logical correlation to what we are discussing. I have been wanting to discuss this with someone for a long time and now that I have the chance I just realized that it is all in vein. I do not have any way of conveying what I want you to understand except my words and prepositions that have absolutely no meaning except however you wish to interpret them.

 

[pivoxa15]

So then your model of limitations, was not my model of its interpretation and I was correct what I said, neither of us actually understands what the other models thoughts are.

Could you explain this sentence? What is model of limitations?

my definition is: Models are conceptual relationships of knowing about things. If you have a different one, we should decide on which one to use.

Your definition of a model is like what I would give. It is a very general definition so why do you think models within models and so on is so important? I'd count english as one model, math another.

 

[Rader]

Could you explain this sentence? What is model of limitations?

You originally in your first post came up with a thought which was an idea. “Everything is done within a model”. You further said that, I think I have realized something fundamental although simplistic as well. I will agree with that. You further set out to explain how we model ideas as a function of thought. I added that we think in models and sometimes in models “ad infinitum” that is models within models. Your thought of thinking in a model is a limitation on what can be known. Words and strings of words and prepositions are made into models by our thoughts. Why because we set meaning to the words. The meaning that we set to the words sets the limitation to what can be known. As you said some models are better than others for specific purposes and the first line of models that we use like math might be a more precise and better way of describing the world we live in. Eventually there might be a model to describe epistemological events to a very high degree. Buttt….

What I am trying to explain to you is that there is a limitation of my interpretation of what your thoughts are. I can never be sure of what you are really thinking nor can you be sure of what I am, we just think we understand each other. Can you comprehend the implications of what I am saying? We do not know anything escept what we think we know that we do not know. I am totally convinced of this because although I enjoy speaking my thoughts, it is even more appetizing to listen to another one thoughts. In effect we are a model of what is known through our thoughts. Each model is defective outside of other models. Why? because no one knows what is really thought outside of its own model.

Your definition of a model is like what I would give. It is a very general definition so why do you think models within models and so on is so important?

The importance lies in the fact that nothing can be known except in the model. No modeller seems to know anything except what it knows. What is known is increasing but what is that?

 

[Tsunami]

Yes I think that would be more accurate. I actually wanted to change the title after I posted it but couldn't.

I haven't read about Kant but the first sentence on this site matches my idea to some extent.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendental_idealism

Although I have read about Wittgenstein. I got the idea for this topic from when W raised the (surprisingly difficult) issue about how we come to understand the meaning of a word in the Investigations.

That's something I've discovered a couple of times: that I 'invent' an idea, after reading a philosopher, only to discover that this philosopher was influenced by an older philosopher, who had the same idea as me.

First time was after I had a course on Philosophy and Science, talking about the relative, contextual basis of theories, which inspired to talk about relative certainties and how to negotiate communication about our certainties with other parties. What I 'invented' ressembled part of Habermas' Theorie des Kommunicativen Handelns.

Second time was quite similar to you: I was reading Ernst Gombrichs Art and Illusion, and this led me to a conceptual model of what I call 'analogies and differences', which I also found in Kant, and later, Plato. (I agree with Plato, not with Kant though.)

I think it's interesting that such rediscoveries occur. I would be surprised if this were a coincidence.

Anyway, On topic:

-Kant indeed said that our thinking is based on the capacity of what we can experience, in the broad sense, that is, not only what we perceive through our senses, but also how our mind is able to logically link these experiences. For Kant, math was a mind's constructor of representations, which could then be linked to experience. (I don't know if I use the right English terms, Kant has a lot of terms and I haven't read him in English.)

-However, Kant also said that the fact we have to jump outside our model to think about God, doesn't make it so that we shouldn't think about God. There's no certainty about it: believing in God or not, are in principle equal options in itself. However, Kant tried to show that believing in God enables you to make more sense of the world. I'm going to pass the cup of explaining that to someone else, as I'm an atheist Kant couldn't convince.

 

[Tsunami]

As for the rest of the discussion between you two:


this is not a standard argument, just my own but: surely, I think there's a difference between communicating with another person and communicating with the dead. The difference between the two is: feedback.

The feedback of living interaction comes in two ways. One is: the feedback through the utterances of the other. Of course, there's no way you can tell for certain whether this person is lying or not. This is why people talk about the principle of charity: your first assumption should always be that the other person has no reason to lie to you (unless of course there's reason to suspect he/she does).

Another source of feedback is the shared world. This is what Davidson talks about. When we both point to something red and say: red, then we at least know what we're pointing at. Subsequent experiments will help us understand whether we are talking about something red, or something with a certain shape, scent, stiffness, ...

As you can see, both sources of feedback are not sources of necessary truth. I'm even reluctant to claim them sources of real, effective truth. But surely, they are some form of problematic truth, and because of the feedback, I think they're different from other forms, such as speaking to the dead.

 

[Rader]

That's something I've discovered a couple of times: that I 'invent' an idea, after reading a philosopher, only to discover that this philosopher was influenced by an older philosopher, who had the same idea as me.

Cool I am not alone in the world.

I think it's interesting that such rediscoveries occur. I would be surprised if this were a coincidence.

What would be your best hypothesis? What we are claiming is that something can be known "A priori".

Also your statement is a fine example of what I am trying to define.

I think there's a difference between communicating with another person and communicating with the dead.

So what could that possible mean, depends on who is interpreting it?

A- You can speak with the dead.
B- You can not speak to the dead.
C- Everyone is lying.
D- No one is lying.
E- We all understand what we are talking about.
F- No one understands anything we just think we do.

Yet we seem to have an experience of knowing something before it is known only to discover we never discovered it.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Very interesting discussion! I have had this experience too, and I note the presence of multiple discoveries in mathematics (calculus by Newton and Leibniz, non-Euclidean geometry by Gauss, Lobatchevski, and Bolyai, for example). I was burned by this in grad school; my first thesis topic was published by somebody else, although I wouldn't have thought it was very obvious.

It does look like "a prepared mind" can know things a priori. Preparation means learning the background facts first.

 

[pivoxa15]

You originally in your first post came up with a thought which was an idea. “Everything is done within a model”. You further said that, I think I have realized something fundamental although simplistic as well. I will agree with that. You further set out to explain how we model ideas as a function of thought. I added that we think in models and sometimes in models “ad infinitum” that is models within models. Your thought of thinking in a model is a limitation on what can be known. Words and strings of words and prepositions are made into models by our thoughts. Why because we set meaning to the words. The meaning that we set to the words sets the limitation to what can be known. As you said some models are better than others for specific purposes and the first line of models that we use like math might be a more precise and better way of describing the world we live in. Eventually there might be a model to describe epistemological events to a very high degree. Buttt….

What I am trying to explain to you is that there is a limitation of my interpretation of what your thoughts are. I can never be sure of what you are really thinking nor can you be sure of what I am, we just think we understand each other. Can you comprehend the implications of what I am saying? We do not know anything escept what we think we know that we do not know. I am totally convinced of this because although I enjoy speaking my thoughts, it is even more appetizing to listen to another one thoughts. In effect we are a model of what is known through our thoughts. Each model is defective outside of other models. Why? because no one knows what is really thought outside of its own model.



The importance lies in the fact that nothing can be known except in the model. No modeller seems to know anything except what it knows. What is known is increasing but what is that?

So models within models come in when one is listening, reading, communicating etc with another? In that you use a model to communicate your thoughts to me and I need to use a model to understand what you are saying. Therefore I am modelling your model? This fact may lead me to misunderstand you.

 

[Rader]

So models within models come in when one is listening, reading, communicating etc with another? In that you use a model to communicate your thoughts to me and I need to use a model to understand what you are saying. Therefore I am modelling your model? This fact may lead me to misunderstand you.

I have read over several times what you have said and with a 99.9% accuracy I would say using my model of interpretation of what your model of what my interpretation was is correct to a very high degree but we can never know for sure what each others interpretation of thoughts might be. I guess that is what it means when we say I understand you. So that is what I asked what is increasing? An interpretation of other thoughts?

I have thought a lot about why we never understand each other when debating and this discussion has helped me to understand it a little deeper. I think the key is listening to other thoughts and looking for new interpretations. Although thoughts are not mine and in this case yours either because most likely someone has thought of all this before. Which leads us to what the post above states:

Self Adjoint brought up that:

It does look like "a prepared mind" can know things a priori. Preparation means learning the background facts first.

Now as I go through my journey reading book after book and leaning new facts, I discover that WOW I thought that I thought that first, how can that be someone wrote it, before I thought it. As far as I can remember the only thing that I can really say about math is that when I was a teenager I discovered that the sum of the squares of the side A+B triangle equal C squared. Do you want to laugh; you know how you figure that out before you know anything about squares? You take the triangle apart any triangle lay it on the table and look at it, connect the ends of the lines and you will notice it is a strait line which when you compare it to a circle, is its diameter. Since I already new the fact that a circle is
360º, all triangles had to be 180º. Nothing more, yet the more I read, the more I find that my personal thoughts are not confined to me, at least that is the interpretation of my model of there thoughts. I am not talking about math now but about history philosophy physics and metaphysics.

So it seems that a mind can know something “a priori” that is an interpretation of knowing something that in effect seems to have been known already.

I think SA may have found the answer a mathematician thinks with the facts of a mathematician. I think with the facts that I have learned. I have never got a sufficient answer to my question does a mathematician think in a way that is somehow distinct from say English. I understand that it is a more accurate way of describing nature say verses English. But what is that really suppose to mean? From my model of interpretation of Gödel, is that mathematics is fallible, just that to a very high degree, it is not. I have also asked this question of many Chinese friends of mine about there language of symbols and my model of interpretation of what they say is that: Our symbols are like your prepositions in other words one symbol can have many meanings and within each of there symbols which are prepositions are any number of models within models depending on how complex the interpretation of the symbol might be.

So with all the ways that we know things, with all the ways that we know what we think we know that we do not know. It seems that we can only know what we know in our heads which is only an interpretation of thoughts. It would be intriguing to know what its like to know outside of a model outside of our head. How would you think outside of a model?

 

[Tsunami]

So with all the ways that we know things, with all the ways that we know what we think we know that we do not know. It seems that we can only know what we know in our heads which is only an interpretation of thoughts. It would be intriguing to know what its like to know outside of a model outside of our head. How would you think outside of a model?

Well, this is something I keep thinking about. Try the following steps:

1) How do we think about 4 dimensional worlds? We think of 3 dimensional worlds, and use 'n+1'-topology.
Or: we project a 4-topologic world on a 3d-plane.

2) In other words, we use analogies from within our models, to inductively predict something without our models, in the language from within our models.

3) I still wonder if we can do something more than this. I think not. I fail to see how we can think about something that's without our models. Maybe by talking in a negative way? Like, do the following experiment:
Imagine two concepts. These are two different things which you differ from each other. You can also imagine the relation between those two concepts. Now, next, you can imagine what is outside of this relation... this outside: I wonder if we could think about this...

 

[pivoxa15]

I have read over several times what you have said and with a 99.9% accuracy I would say using my model of interpretation of what your model of what my interpretation was is correct to a very high degree but we can never know for sure what each others interpretation of thoughts might be. I guess that is what it means when we say I understand you. So that is what I asked what is increasing? An interpretation of other thoughts?

I have thought a lot about why we never understand each other when debating and this discussion has helped me to understand it a little deeper. I think the key is listening to other thoughts and looking for new interpretations. Although thoughts are not mine and in this case yours either because most likely someone has thought of all this before. Which leads us to what the post above states:

Self Adjoint brought up that:
Now as I go through my journey reading book after book and leaning new facts, I discover that WOW I thought that I thought that first, how can that be someone wrote it, before I thought it. As far as I can remember the only thing that I can really say about math is that when I was a teenager I discovered that the sum of the squares of the side A+B triangle equal C squared. Do you want to laugh; you know how you figure that out before you know anything about squares? You take the triangle apart any triangle lay it on the table and look at it, connect the ends of the lines and you will notice it is a strait line which when you compare it to a circle, is its diameter. Since I already new the fact that a circle is
360º, all triangles had to be 180º. Nothing more, yet the more I read, the more I find that my personal thoughts are not confined to me, at least that is the interpretation of my model of there thoughts. I am not talking about math now but about history philosophy physics and metaphysics.

So it seems that a mind can know something “a priori” that is an interpretation of knowing something that in effect seems to have been known already.

I think SA may have found the answer a mathematician thinks with the facts of a mathematician. I think with the facts that I have learned. I have never got a sufficient answer to my question does a mathematician think in a way that is somehow distinct from say English. I understand that it is a more accurate way of describing nature say verses English. But what is that really suppose to mean? From my model of interpretation of Gödel, is that mathematics is fallible, just that to a very high degree, it is not. I have also asked this question of many Chinese friends of mine about there language of symbols and my model of interpretation of what they say is that: Our symbols are like your prepositions in other words one symbol can have many meanings and within each of there symbols which are prepositions are any number of models within models depending on how complex the interpretation of the symbol might be.

So with all the ways that we know things, with all the ways that we know what we think we know that we do not know. It seems that we can only know what we know in our heads which is only an interpretation of thoughts. It would be intriguing to know what its like to know outside of a model outside of our head. How would you think outside of a model?

Thinking outside of a model would only make sense if the outside is another model in which your thoughts are contained. So any thinking is done inside a model. That was one of my main conclusions. Although would you call this a definition, tautology, propositition or what?

With the interpretation issue, that was the question that first led me to the idea of this thread so its all tied together.

I.e. How is it that we understand the meaning of a word that is elements in the model? I came to the conclusion (with Wittgenstein's influence) that the answer is deeply tied to our biological nature and training. We have sensations like ‘understanding’ and ‘knowing’. The first people had to create words to model such feelings. After them, we were taught to match specific feelings with each word. Our feelings such as ‘understanding’ change throughout life because we are biological animals but the (often vague) definitions of words in comparison won’t have changed as much. So it is the words that model our feelings or thoughts and order them in such a way that (biologically) 'normal' people who have gone through similar training can all reasonably agree on what has been said. That is how we come to understand the meaning of a word. It could be the case that new words induce new feelings in us that we have never had. As we become more accustomed to our model, we use it to order our thoughts to the extent that we rely on it.

Back to the issue you raised about interpretation. Given that we all have received different training, experience and possesses different brain states, the models we construct for our own thinking and our interpretations of other’s models will as a result be different. However, fortunately or is it because of it, the definitions of most words in a natural language such as English, is vague enough for people to orderly communicate and transfer ideas without much catastrophic misunderstanding.

This is obviously a deep topic but what I have done is present a model of how we understand and interpret others.

 

[moving finger]

This is a good insight. Rather than saying "everything is done" through a model, you seem to be saying "everything is perceived" through a model.

I like this, I think it cuts right to the heart of the issue and debate on "understanding" (cf Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment).

The problem with debating whether any given agent "understands" or not is that (a) it is very difficult to reach agreement on just what we mean by the word "understanding", and (b) because of this difficulty in reaching agreement on meaning, it is impossible to agree a "test of understanding".

I think we can "understand" the problem of "understanding the meaning of understanding" much better if we think of the process of understanding as a model. What do we do when we try to, or claim to, "understand" something? All we are doing is internally making a model which (hopefully coherently and consistently) relates different concepts with each other in various ways. The more "basic" concepts that we can include within our model, and the greater the complexity, consistency and coherency of the inter-relatedness of the concepts within our model, the more we claim to "understand" something. This, ultimately, is all that "understanding" entails (imho).

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

The more "basic" concepts that we can include within our model, and the greater the complexity, consistency and coherency of the inter-relatedness of the concepts within our model, the more we claim to "understand" something. This, ultimately, is all that "understanding" entails (imho).

It's the way all science progresses. On another site I have become aware that the "gene" model, which has been so productive since Mendel, is under threat from the newly discovered complexities of what actually goes on with interacting DNA, RNA, and proteins. But it's just a model, we can shed tear, but when the chips are down we have to "sit down before a fact like a little child". (retroactive mixed metaphor alert!)

Edit: Here's a link to that discussion. http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2006/05/what-is-gene.php. The original article is at the Nature site, behind a pay wall.

 

[Rader]

Thinking outside of a model would only make sense if the outside is another model in which your thoughts are contained. So any thinking is done inside a model. That was one of my main conclusions. Although would you call this a definition, tautology, propositition or what?

I think it is a fact, you stated it correctly in the beginning, this is fundamental and yet simple but a fact is also a tautology and is a statement true by virtue of its logical form that in my opinion, can be falsified eventually. Why because we keep coming up with new facts for better models. Knowing new ideas is always new interpretations of old models. Now this seems to be a paradox, solely in the fact that if we could come up with a way to think outside of a model it would be true. I have no idea what thinking ouside of models might be like but then why can we even contemplate it?, maybe that is what is missing to understand metaphysical ideas.

With the interpretation issue, that was the question that first led me to the idea of this thread so its all tied together.

I.e. How is it that we understand the meaning of a word that is elements in the model? I came to the conclusion (with Wittgenstein's influence) that the answer is deeply tied to our biological nature and training. We have sensations like ‘understanding’ and ‘knowing’. The first people had to create words to model such feelings. After them, we were taught to match specific feelings with each word. Our feelings such as ‘understanding’ change throughout life because we are biological animals but the (often vague) definitions of words in comparison won’t have changed as much. So it is the words that model our feelings or thoughts and order them in such a way that (biologically) 'normal' people who have gone through similar training can all reasonably agree on what has been said. That is how we come to understand the meaning of a word. It could be the case that new words induce new feelings in us that we have never had. As we become more accustomed to our model, we use it to order our thoughts to the extent that we rely on it.

I will discuss my opinion on this later.

I found this: http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~richardson/docs/SpiveyRichardsonFitneva.pdf

Thinking Outside the Brain: Spatial Indices to Visual and Linguistic Information

It’s a paper that would fall into a model on how we come to know the facts. It considers even facts we may not have considered.

As one traces back the causal forces of the environment’s role in determining the set of mental contents, one must include—with some nonzero degree of membership—social influences accrued over days, parental influences accrued over decades, cultural influences accrued over centuries, and evolutionary influences accrued over many millennia.

Except that externalism itself is agnostic as to whether an organic nervous system is required as part of the conglomeration in order for the system to be considered “a mind.”

Back to the issue you raised about interpretation. Given that we all have received different training, experience and possesses different brain states, the models we construct for our own thinking and our interpretations of other’s models will as a result be different. However, fortunately or is it because of it, the definitions of most words in a natural language such as English, is vague enough for people to orderly communicate and transfer ideas without much catastrophic misunderstanding.

Agreed we have done well so far.

There is something missing. Interpretations of ideas inside models entails the facts. What are the facts? To be continued:

 

[moving finger]

There is something missing. Interpretations of ideas inside models entails the facts. What are the facts? To be continued:

I disagree.
Interpretation of ideas inside models entails information.
Whether that information is deemed factual or not is part of the subjective interpretation.

Best Regards

MF

 

[pivoxa15]

I like this, I think it cuts right to the heart of the issue and debate on "understanding" (cf Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment).

The problem with debating whether any given agent "understands" or not is that (a) it is very difficult to reach agreement on just what we mean by the word "understanding", and (b) because of this difficulty in reaching agreement on meaning, it is impossible to agree a "test of understanding".

I think we can "understand" the problem of "understanding the meaning of understanding" much better if we think of the process of understanding as a model. What do we do when we try to, or claim to, "understand" something? All we are doing is internally making a model which (hopefully coherently and consistently) relates different concepts with each other in various ways. The more "basic" concepts that we can include within our model, and the greater the complexity, consistency and coherency of the inter-relatedness of the concepts within our model, the more we claim to "understand" something. This, ultimately, is all that "understanding" entails (imho).

Best Regards

MF

Understanding is normally a word only reserved for living things mostly because of the qualia attached to it. So a computer might give outputs that are elaborate but to say it understands what its doing would be overstretching the word. So maybe in your description of understanding, you might also like to add the sensation of understanding which is vague but I am pretty sure only things made out of cells can have.

 

[Rader]

I disagree.
Interpretation of ideas inside models entails information.

I do not disagree, interpretation of models entails the facts and the facts are information. I will try and understand you if you will me. This is the meaning I give to facts, facts in the crude sense, are information.

Whether that information is deemed factual or not is part of the subjective interpretation.

Then you mean there are no facts before human experience? Could you explain your meaning?

 

[moving finger]

Understanding is normally a word only reserved for living things mostly because of the qualia attached to it.

Just as consciousness is conventionally "reserved only for living things". But it does not follow from this mere convention that machines cannot be either conscious or understand.

So a computer might give outputs that are elaborate but to say it understands what its doing would be overstretching the word.

Would it? I don't see how you can justify such a sweeping generalisation. Perhaps if we could define "understanding" we might be able to discuss whether a machine could understand or not.

So maybe in your description of understanding, you might also like to add the sensation of understanding which is vague but I am pretty sure only things made out of cells can have.

It depends on how one defines understanding. I suspect that you have an intuitive idea of what you think "understanding" is, which is shared by Searle for example, which intuition assumes that only living things can understand. But I'm not sure what rational basis you have for believing such an intuition.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

interpretation of models entails the facts and the facts are information. I will try and understand you if you will me. This is the meaning I give to facts, facts in the crude sense, are information.

A “fact” (to me) is a “true proposition”. Would you agree?
Now, interpretation requires information to be interpreted, but there is no a priori reason why that information must necessarily represent a “true proposition” (ie a fact). The information could indeed represent a “false proposition”, and we can still make interpretations based on false propositions.

In other words, interpretations entail information; information is not necessarily factual; interpretations do not entail facts.

Whether that information is deemed factual or not is part of the subjective interpretation.

Then you mean there are no facts before human experience? Could you explain your meaning?

I said “whether that information is deemed factual”.
In order for something to be “deemed factual” (ie to be judged factual) requires an agent to do the judging. Something cannot be “judged to be factual” if there is no agent around to do the judging.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Rader]

A “fact” (to me) is a “true proposition”. Would you agree?

Yes if you slide in temporal before proposition.

Now, interpretation requires information to be interpreted, but there is no a priori reason why that information must necessarily represent a “true proposition” (ie a fact).

Agreed only if interpretations of information are temporal facts.

The information could indeed represent a “false proposition”, and we can still make interpretations based on false propositions.

True and false propositions are relative to when they are thought about. That’s what knowing is, that is precisely how we come to know what the world is. We make interpretations of facts which contain the information of which are only temporal propositions. If they were not we would see no change in the way we think.

In other words, interpretations entail information; information is not necessarily factual; interpretations do not entail facts.

They would have to if they contained information. How can you explain that we seem to know more about anything?

I said “whether that information is deemed factual”.
In order for something to be “deemed factual” (ie to be judged factual) requires an agent to do the judging. Something cannot be “judged to be factual” if there is no agent around to do the judging.

OK what is an agent? Can an agent be non-human?

 

[moving finger]

A “fact” (to me) is a “true proposition”. Would you agree?

Yes if you slide in temporal before proposition.

Why temporal?
Example proposition : “All bachelors are unmarried”
If the above proposition is true, then it represents a fact. If the above proposition is false, then it does not represent a fact.

Even (non-indexical) propositions about events in time are either true or false. The temporal aspect of the events does not make any difference.
Example proposition : “On Wednesday May 31st it rains in Boston”
The above proposition is either true or false. We simply do not know which it is at this point in time. Therefore the proposition is (ontically) today either a fact or it is not, but we simply do not know (epistemically) whether it is a fact or not at this point in time.

The information could indeed represent a “false proposition”, and we can still make interpretations based on false propositions.

True and false propositions are relative to when they are thought about.

I disagree. Most propositions are timelessly either true or false, their truth values do not change with time. I do agree that there is a special class of indexical propositions with truth-values that change over time, such as “it is raining in Boston today” (the “today” is the indexical part), but most propositions are not of this form.

That’s what knowing is, that is precisely how we come to know what the world is.

Be careful not to confuse the truth value of a proposition (an ontic value) with what we know about that proposition (an epistemic value). A proposition can be true (or false) without an agent knowing whether it is true (or false).

In other words, interpretations entail information; information is not necessarily factual; interpretations do not entail facts.

They would have to if they contained information.

Follow the simple logic :
(1) All interpretations entail information
(2) All facts are true propositions
(3) Information, including information used in interpretations, can be false
(4) Not all information entails facts (from (2) and (3))
(5) Therefore not all interpretations entail facts (from (1) and (4))

Which step do you not agree with?

How can you explain that we seem to know more about anything?

“more” than what?
Do you mean “it seems like we know more than we knew last year”?
Simply because belief in knowledge tends to be cumulative.
Knowledge is usually defined as “justified true belief”. As we learn more and more about the world, we form more and more beliefs and we find more and more justifications for those beliefs. Thus we have the impression (the belief) that we are increasing our knowledge over time.

In order for something to be “deemed factual” (ie to be judged factual) requires an agent to do the judging. Something cannot be “judged to be factual” if there is no agent around to do the judging.

OK what is an agent?

An agent is something which has the power to act. An agent usually has some internalised objectives or intentions or tendencies which influence it to act in a certain way.

Can an agent be non-human?

Certainly. Animals are agents. An agent can even be non-living. A machine can be an agent. (an agent does not necessarily have “free will” – whatever that might be )

Best Regards

MF

 

[Rader]

Why temporal?
Example proposition : “All bachelors are unmarried”
If the above proposition is true, then it represents a fact. If the above proposition is false, then it does not represent a fact.

Even (non-indexical) propositions about events in time are either true or false. The temporal aspect of the events does not make any difference.
Example proposition : “On Wednesday May 31st it rains in Boston”
The above proposition is either true or false. We simply do not know which it is at this point in time. Therefore the proposition is (ontically) today either a fact or it is not, but we simply do not know (epistemically) whether it is a fact or not at this point in time.

I agree with your last sentence because that is what I am referring to as temporal. The model we are discussing is based on epistemological facts; those facts are true or false based on when we know them.

I disagree. Most propositions are timelessly either true or false, their truth values do not change with time. I do agree that there is a special class of indexical propositions with truth-values that change over time, such as “it is raining in Boston today” (the “today” is the indexical part), but most propositions are not of this form.

It’s not a matter of agreeing or not agreeing it’s a matter of understanding that the facts which are epistemological knowledge, change over time. We have new models because we understand old facts in a new way.

Be careful not to confuse the truth value of a proposition (an ontic value) with what we know about that proposition (an epistemic value). A proposition can be true (or false) without an agent knowing whether it is true (or false).

I am referring to epistemological values. Something like your agent has to know facts in the model, it has to know whether they are true or false and it has to know when, when it knows new facts to modify its model.

Follow the simple logic :
(1) All interpretations entail information
(2) All facts are true propositions
(3) Information, including information used in interpretations, can be false
(4) Not all information entails facts (from (2) and (3))
(5) Therefore not all interpretations entail facts (from (1) and (4))

Which step do you not agree with?

Two is nosense, facts change over time.
2-3-4-5

“more” than what?
Do you mean “it seems like we know more than we knew last year”?
Simply because belief in knowledge tends to be cumulative.
Knowledge is usually defined as “justified true belief”. As we learn more and more about the world, we form more and more beliefs and we find more and more justifications for those beliefs. Thus we have the impression (the belief) that we are increasing our knowledge over time.

We know more epistemological facts that’s, all I am claiming. It comes from our models. What we do with facts makes logical sense, that’s all.

An agent is something which has the power to act. An agent usually has some internalised objectives or intentions or tendencies which influence it to act in a certain way.

Your agents seem to be very general group of entities.

Certainly. Animals are agents. An agent can even be non-living. A machine can be an agent. (an agent does not necessarily have “free will” – whatever that might be )

Are you referring to agents as observers and computers might somehow know something someday like living things?

 

[moving finger]

I agree with your last sentence because that is what I am referring to as temporal. The model we are discussing is based on epistemological facts; those facts are true or false based on when we know them.

Let us say (for the sake of argument) that it rains in Boston on May 31st.
Then the proposition R = “On Wednesday May 31st it rains in Boston” is a true proposition, which makes R a fact.
It makes no difference whether we know that R, or not. R is a fact, independently of our knowledge about R.

The only fact about R which depends on our knowledge is the “fact of our knowledge about R”.
Prior to knowing that R, it is a fact that we do not know that R.
After we know that R, it is a fact that we do know that R.
But none of this alters the fact that R always was and always will be a fact.

Follow the simple logic :
(1) All interpretations entail information
(2) All facts are true propositions
(3) Information, including information used in interpretations, can be false
(4) Not all information entails facts (from (2) and (3))
(5) Therefore not all interpretations entail facts (from (1) and (4))

Which step do you not agree with?

Two is nosense, facts change over time.

(2) Does not say anything about facts “not changing over time”, hence I fail to see on what basis you think it is nonsense?
A fact is defined as a true proposition.
At any given point in time, anything that we call a fact must, by definition, be a true proposition.
If you disagree, can you give an example of a proposition which at one given point in time is both a fact and yet not a true proposition?

Your agents seem to be very general group of entities.

They are not “my agents”. Look up the definition of an “agent” in behavioural psychology or artificial intelligence.

Are you referring to agents as observers and computers might somehow know something someday like living things?

Yes. Knowledge is simply justified true belief. I see no a priori reason why a machine cannot in principle have justified beliefs.

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Let us say (for the sake of argument) that it rains in Boston on May 31st.
Then the proposition R = “On Wednesday May 31st it rains in Boston” is a true proposition, which makes R a fact.
It makes no difference whether we know that R, or not. R is a fact, independently of our knowledge about R.

The only fact about R which depends on our knowledge is the “fact of our knowledge about R”.
Prior to knowing that R, it is a fact that we do not know that R.
After we know that R, it is a fact that we do know that R.
But none of this alters the fact that R always was and always will be a fact.

As long as time figures in our equations epistemological facts are mutable. You stick to your gun that facts are true propositions. I agree only if we determine in our models that they are. Although facts can be true propositions they can also be proven to be false. Our difference of opinion simply stems in the fact of what meaning we each give to the meaning of a fact. Facts are not only nuts and bolts they are nuts and bolts with meanings that we give them by judging them through epistemological tests before placing them in our models. Our difference seems to stem from you not giving facts any meaning except that they just are facts. Have I misinterpreted you? The meaning that I give to facts is that they are knowledge of knowing something that was not known before those facts were interpreted.

(2) Does not say anything about facts “not changing over time”, hence I fail to see on what basis you think it is nonsense?
A fact is defined as a true proposition.
At any given point in time, anything that we call a fact must, by definition, be a true proposition.
If you disagree, can you give an example of a proposition which at one given point in time is both a fact and yet not a true proposition?

Number two should state what the facts are: those propositions can be true or false. All facts are not true propositions. For the very reason that we do not experience the world we live in one point in time. Facts are not physical things they are knowledge of relationships of physical things.

Example: Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army. This is a fact that is a false preposition. Why because of what I said above we give different meanings to facts, its that simple.

They are not “my agents”. Look up the definition of an “agent” in behavioural psychology or artificial intelligence.

Understood

Yes. Knowledge is simply justified true belief. I see no a priori reason why a machine cannot in principle have justified beliefs.

We might never know since we can not even determine that of each other yet.

Could I just explain a few things that were said on this thread?

Everything is done in models, which means we think in models. Our models of thinking have models within models. We misinterpret other models because we set meaning to words that are not always the same in other models. Although if we make a great enough effort, we can understand any model. Models contain information of which we make interpretations to the words within them; our way of doing that is understanding the facts. To understand the facts is to determine if they are true or false propositions. I posted a link: way back when and hoped to discuss this but we got side tracked on determining what is the meaning of a fact.

http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~richa...sonFitneva.pdf

There is some new research that seems to indicate something new about how we come to know facts. It seems that the modeller besides its brain and database inside it for memory recall uses what is called pointers. Information that is gathered in a local environment by scanning local relationships in space. Its seems that cognitive brains like the ones we humans have use local environment as what they call a world database which is larger than the brain itself. The point is that my interpretation of this model is that, that is all there was, not long after background radiation. It seems to be a remnant of what was the only way of exchange of information, until human cognitive brains appeared on the scene. So that is what I meant by what are the facts. It seems that knowing is not only in your head but also outside of it by the modeller scanning its environment for change.

 

[moving finger]

Although facts can be true propositions they can also be proven to be false.

This is logically impossible.
A true proposition simply cannot be proven to be false.
Can you provide an example to illustrate what you mean?

Our difference of opinion simply stems in the fact of what meaning we each give to the meaning of a fact. Facts are not only nuts and bolts they are nuts and bolts with meanings that we give them by judging them through epistemological tests before placing them in our models. Our difference seems to stem from you not giving facts any meaning except that they just are facts.

I define a fact as a true proposition. All of the meaning in the fact is then contained within the meaning of the proposition. I agree that to derive meaning we need to perform an interpretation, and interpretations can be subjective hence meanings can be subjective. This is precisely why it is important to agree fundamental definitions before wasting time on argument.
Apart from the above, what “additional meaning” do you think there is in a fact?
Can you provide some examples to illustrate what it is you are trying to say?

The meaning that I give to facts is that they are knowledge of knowing something that was not known before those facts were interpreted.

I disagree. A fact is an ontic property of the world.
Whether the proposition “it rains in Boston on May 31st, 2006” is a true proposition (ie whether it is a fact) is quite independent of anyone’s knowledge of that fact.

Example: Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army. This is a fact that is a false preposition.

If the proposition is false, it cannot be a fact.
Are you saying “it is a fact that Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army, but at the same time the proposition Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army is false”?.
This seems contradictory to me.
If you think it is not contradictory, you will need please to define very clearly what you mean by a “fact”.

Everything is done in models, which means we think in models. Our models of thinking have models within models. We misinterpret other models because we set meaning to words that are not always the same in other models. Although if we make a great enough effort, we can understand any model. Models contain information of which we make interpretations to the words within them; our way of doing that is understanding the facts. To understand the facts is to determine if they are true or false propositions. I posted a link: way back when and hoped to discuss this but we got side tracked on determining what is the meaning of a fact.

Sorry, but I don’t see that agreeing the “meaning of a fact” is any kind of side-track. It seems to me that you have a “meaning” of the term “fact” which is very different to my “meaning” of the term “fact”, and unless we can resolve this there isn’t much point in going deeper.

What, exactly, is your definition of the term “fact”?

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

This is logically impossible.
A true proposition simply cannot be proven to be false.
Can you provide an example to illustrate what you mean?

I define a fact as a true proposition. All of the meaning in the fact is then contained within the meaning of the proposition. I agree that to derive meaning we need to perform an interpretation, and interpretations can be subjective hence meanings can be subjective. This is precisely why it is important to agree fundamental definitions before wasting time on argument.
Apart from the above, what “additional meaning” do you think there is in a fact?
Can you provide some examples to illustrate what it is you are trying to say?

I disagree. A fact is an ontic property of the world.
Whether the proposition “it rains in Boston on May 31st, 2006” is a true proposition (ie whether it is a fact) is quite independent of anyone’s knowledge of that fact.

If the proposition is false, it cannot be a fact.
Are you saying “it is a fact that Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army, but at the same time the proposition Washington crossed the Delaware today at high noon with his weary army is false”?.
This seems contradictory to me.
If you think it is not contradictory, you will need please to define very clearly what you mean by a “fact”.

Sorry, but I don’t see that agreeing the “meaning of a fact” is any kind of side-track. It seems to me that you have a “meaning” of the term “fact” which is very different to my “meaning” of the term “fact”, and unless we can resolve this there isn’t much point in going deeper.

What, exactly, is your definition of the term “fact”?

Best Regards

I would hope that my expnation below helps.

Although we can go to a dictionary and learn words, its not basically done that way we learn through experience the use and meaning of the words and there use and meaning in this case is nothing but simple, due to the fact that our models of interpretation are full of words that need meaning and intrepretation “ad infinitum”. We think in models within models. For the sake of trying to give you are clear explanaiton of what is my meaning of a fact its necessary to know the meaning of many meanings, not only the word fact but all the relationships that that word has with all the other words inside the model that pivoxa15 has explain to us. Everything is done in models. (ie We think in models. Although I give a meaning to that word it is not necessarily the meaning that either you or he might have for it. The meaning of the word fact is contained within my meaning of the model of interpretation that I have given to his model. So here is a series of words from Wiki that have meanings and each time that I give a meaning to a word which has a meaning derived from other words that have a meaning eventually I know in my head, what is a fact. This meaning has nothing to due with the meaning of a fact no matter what meaning you give because yours can never be what mine is. You should be able to trace my thought on what are the meanings of the words by just browsing. Let's start here:

In philosophy, a fact is the state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language. The relationship between non-trivially true statements (i.e. not tautologies) and facts is one of the provinces of epistemology.

In science 'fact' is an objective and verifiable observation.

Science uses facts. Due to subjective nature of human senses science prefers the use of instruments to measure observations (=gathering objective informations) rather than using human senses. Science uses measuring tools (like clock, meter stick and other standards), as well as recording devices (like spectrometers, cameras, oscilloscopes, etc). Science also uses deductive and inductive logic (usually in form of mathematics) to derive reliable and statisically important conclusions through the process of measured data with the goal of forming or confirming laws of nature and theories - like relativity theory, theory of evolution, etc. Science fundamentally means "Let me tell you HOW I believe I LOGICALLY THINK I know."

Proposition is a term used in logic and philosophy to describe the content of assertions. Assertions are non-linguistic abstractions from sentences and can be evaluated as either true or false.
The term assertion has several meanings:
• Assertion -- a computing programming technique
• Logical assertion -- logical assertion of a statement
• Assertions are also a kind of speech act.
• Assertion is the verbal skill of saying something so others can hear you clearly
• To state as true that which has yet to be proved

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies the origin, nature, and scope of knowledge. The word "epistemology" originated from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) and logos (word/speech).
Historically, epistemology has been one of the most investigated and debated of all philosophical subjects. Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, and belief. Much of this discussion concerns justification. Epistemologists analyze the standards of justification for knowledge claims, that is, the grounds on which one can claim to know a particular fact. In a nutshell, epistemology addresses the question, "How do you know what you know?"

Knowledge is information of which someone is aware. Knowledge is also used to mean the confident understanding of a subject, potentially with the ability to use it for a specific purpose.
Information as a concept bears a diversity of meanings, from everyday usage to technical settings. Generally speaking, the concept of information is closely related to notions of communication, constraint, control, data, form, instruction, knowledge, meaning, mental stimulus, pattern, perception, and representation.

Understanding is a psychological process related to an abstract or physical object, such as, person, situation and message whereby one is able to think about it and use concepts to deal adequately with that object.

A concept is an abstract idea or a mental symbol, typically associated with a corresponding representation in language or symbology, that denotes all of the objects in a given category or class of entities, events, phenomena, or relationships between them. Concepts are abstract in that they omit the differences of the things in their extension, treating them as if they were identical. They are universal in that they apply equally to every thing in their extension. Concepts are also the basic elements of propositions, much the same way a word is the basic semantic element of a sentence.

Thus my explanation of what is a fact:

• A fact is the state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language. The type of facts and the meaning set to them would be governed by what is known as epistemology. Propositions describe the content of assertions. The meaning for assertions is to state as true that which has yet to be proved. Now since Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies the origin, nature, and scope of knowledge. We need to know what knowledge is of which we denote as understanding whos meaing is that one is able to think about it and use concepts.
Now if you will notice there is a very strange loop that we have made from models to concepts in which facts are fundamentally very important. Why because they determine what I know, that I think that I know, that I do not know. Which means that facts are knowing knowledge that changes over time. This is my meaning. The relationship of all these words determine the meaning of a fact not one of the meanings but the relatonship of all of them together give fact its meaning which is my meaning.

Thus the Earth is flat is a fact and a true or false proposition depending on when you know that knowledge.

 

[moving finger]

Sorry, Rader, your last post made very little sense to me. Perhaps we are not speaking the same language.

Let’s try to keep this very simple, and see if we can make some progress.

Thus the Earth is flat is a fact and a true or false proposition depending on when you know that knowledge.

Are you saying here that the proposition “the Earth is flat” can simultaneously be both a fact and a false proposition?

If you are, how does this square with :

A fact is the state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language.

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Sorry, Rader, your last post made very little sense to me. Perhaps we are not speaking the same language.

Let’s try to keep this very simple, and see if we can make some progress.

Are you saying here that the proposition “the Earth is flat” can simultaneously be both a fact and a false proposition?

If you are, how does this square with :

Originally Posted by Rader: A fact is the state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language.

Best Regards

Facts are not absolute truths. They are true propositions that can be falsified. Which means that they would have a truth value relative to what is known and when it is known. Yes the Earth is not flat to one who would know it is a sphere.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Rader

I cannot make sense out of your posts, they seem to be inconsistent.

Facts are not absolute truths.

A fact is the state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language.

Above you have said that a fact is a true proposition, and also you have said that a fact is not an absolute truth. This seems like a contradiction to me.

What do you mean by an “absolute truth”? In logic, something is either true or false, there is no distinction between “truth” and "absolute truth”.

They are true propositions that can be falsified.

A true proposition is a true proposition. Period. A true proposition cannot be falsified.
(If you think it can, then please give me an example of a proposition which is both true and can be falsified).

Which means that they would have a truth value relative to what is known and when it is known. Yes the Earth is not flat to one who would know it is a sphere.

One cannot “know the Earth is flat” if the proposition “the Earth is a sphere” is a true proposition. Knowledge entails truth.

If “the Earth is a sphere” is true, then it follows that one can know the Earth is a sphere, but one cannot know that the Earth is flat. One might believe the Earth is flat, but believing the Earth is flat is not knowing the Earth is flat.

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Hi Rader

I cannot make sense out of your posts, they seem to be inconsistent.

MF, that has been my main point of interpretation of this whole thread. We think in models and interpret other models through our own models of interpretation of the facts. Thus no one really understands each other, only sometimes we say that we think we do and in this case we do not.

Above you have said that a fact is a true proposition, and also you have said that a fact is not an absolute truth. This seems like a contradiction to me.

What do you mean by an “absolute truth”? In logic, something is either true or false, there is no distinction between “truth” and "absolute truth”.

The contradiction lies in the interpretation that you do not think that facts are not absolute truths. Absolute truths are what epistemology can not define. It defines absolute values of which are true facts which can be falsified. Yes in logic something is true or false and why is it true or false? It is true because we have no other knowledge or facts to contradict it and when we have other new knowledge or facts those old facts which were true are now false. We do this by interpreting facts in a logically way in which the world makes sense.

A true proposition is a true proposition. Period. A true proposition cannot be falsified.
(If you think it can, then please give me an example of a proposition which is both true and can be falsified).

I did below. Why do you insist that you do not understand this? I understand that you believe that facts are absolutely true or false. You have not given me any reasons why you believe that and I have given you plenty why I do not. What makes you think we can know anything absolute?

One cannot “know the Earth is flat” if the proposition “the Earth is a sphere” is a true proposition. Knowledge entails truth.

If “the Earth is a sphere” is true, then it follows that one can know the Earth is a sphere, but one cannot know that the Earth is flat. One might believe the Earth is flat, but believing the Earth is flat is not knowing the Earth is flat.

Best Regards

Well I think I am getting closer to why I do not understand you, to understanding you. You now have given me a few clues. You say knowledge entails truths and true or false there is not distinction, so then the answer is an absolute value. You make a distinction between believing and knowing yet do not say what it is. Although belief and knowledge are two different words and you can give each your own meaning but you can also give them the same meaning. Is there a difference or do we just like to think so?

 

[moving finger]

The contradiction lies in the interpretation that you do not think that facts are not absolute truths.

Why on Earth use double negatives? Not to obfuscate, I hope?
But to humour you, I define a “fact” as a “true proposition”
It follows from this that it is not the case that a fact is not a true proposition.

Absolute truths are what epistemology can not define. It defines absolute values of which are true facts which can be falsified.

The above makes no sense to me.
What is a “true fact” as opposed to a “fact”? What is the difference? Are there such things as “false facts”?

Yes in logic something is true or false and why is it true or false? It is true because we have no other knowledge or facts to contradict it and when we have other new knowledge or facts those old facts which were true are now false.

If we acquire “new knowledge” as you put it, what this might do is to reveal to us that something we believed was true is not in fact true.

If it turns out that a proposition P which we thought at one time was true is now judged false because we have uncovered new information which shows that P is false, what this means is that P always was false (but we just did not know that). It is not the case (as you seem to be suggesting) that “P was at one time true, and now that we have new information, P is no longer true and it is instead false”.

It never was true that the Earth was flat, hence it never was a fact that the Earth was flat. People may have believed at one time that the Earth was flat, but belief does not entail truth, and a belief does not make something which is not true into a fact.

What makes you think we can know anything absolute? .

I have never said that we can “know anything absolute”, I am not even sure what you mean by this phrase.
Throughout this discussion, you are confusing epistemology with ontology.

You say knowledge entails truths

It is not that “I say” this. This is entailed by the accepted definition of knowledge. Of course, if you wish to have your private definition of knowledge such that one can know something which is false, that’s fine (but don’t expect others to understand what you are talking about).

You make a distinction between believing and knowing yet do not say what it is.

I have done exactly that. I have pointed out already that knowledge entails truth (one cannot know something which is false), whereas belief does not entail truth (one can believe something which is false). Therein lies the difference.

Although belief and knowledge are two different words and you can give each your own meaning but you can also give them the same meaning. Is there a difference or do we just like to think so? .

The meaning of a word is defined by the ways the word is used in a language. Meaning is convention, pure and simple. You may define words to mean something different to convention, but as pointed out above please do not expect other people to understand you if you do.

Best Regards

 

[Chronos]

There are no facts. Opinions, however, are rampant.

 

[Rader]

Why on Earth use double negatives? Not to obfuscate, I hope?
But to humour you, I define a “fact” as a “true proposition”
It follows from this that it is not the case that a fact is not a true proposition.

No just being colorful did not want to rattle your jeans. Let’s try and make some progress to understand each other

The above makes no sense to me.
What is a “true fact” as opposed to a “fact”? What is the difference? Are there such things as “false facts”?

I have come to believe that absolute concepts would have to entail “the facts”. Although we can not know what absolute actually is we can have an idea by knowing that what we know is in affect belief in this by a greater knowing of facts. A fact is true when you believe that it is. When we discover the newer facts its not that the old facts are totally false although we could interpret things in that way, it would be more correct to say that we know things in a more true way which is approaching an absolute knowing. So in answer to your question in a way that maybe you would interpret this, is that false facts are only less true facts in our way of knowing things.

If we acquire “new knowledge” as you put it, what this might do is to reveal to us that something we believed was true is not in fact true.

If it turns out that a proposition P which we thought at one time was true is now judged false because we have uncovered new information which shows that P is false, what this means is that P always was false (but we just did not know that). It is not the case (as you seem to be suggesting) that “P was at one time true, and now that we have new information, P is no longer true and it is instead false”.

It never was true that the Earth was flat, hence it never was a fact that the Earth was flat. People may have believed at one time that the Earth was flat, but belief does not entail truth, and a belief does not make something which is not true into a fact.

You can interpret this, the way you wrote it and its not that different from the way that I understand it but you must understand that when the Earth was believed to be flat they knew it was because that is all the knowledge that was available at that time. So true or false is only relative the way we know things not absolute. Our difference of interpretation lies only in that we do not know what absolute is.

I have never said that we can “know anything absolute”, I am not even sure what you mean by this phrase.
Throughout this discussion, you are confusing epistemology with ontology.

You have said that facts are true propositions, true propositions can not be falsified, what else can that mean except absolute? There is no confusion except the way you interpret my model of how we come to know things.

It is not that “I say” this. This is entailed by the accepted definition of knowledge. Of course, if you wish to have your private definition of knowledge such that one can know something which is false, that’s fine (but don’t expect others to understand what you are talking about).

MF, there is no accepted definition of anything, that’s what this whole thread is about. There are only meanings that we give to words that are packed "ad infinitum" inside of a model of anything that we want to interpret.

I have done exactly that. I have pointed out already that knowledge entails truth (one cannot know something which is false), whereas belief does not entail truth (one can believe something which is false). Therein lies the difference.

The only way that I can interpret this unless you can help me understand better, is that you know absolute truths. I maintain that there is no way of knowing anything absolute except that we have a hint of what it is because we seem to know more not less about nature.

The meaning of a word is defined by the ways the word is used in a language. Meaning is convention, pure and simple. You may define words to mean something different to convention, but as pointed out above please do not expect other people to understand you if you do.

Best Regards

Then you agree that no one knows what they are talking about just sometimes they say they do because they think they do.

 

[moving finger]

A fact is true when you believe that it is. .

Thus (according to you), if I believe that pixies live at the bottom of my garden, it then becomes a “true fact” that pixies live at the bottom of my garden?

When we discover the newer facts its not that the old facts are totally false although we could interpret things in that way, it would be more correct to say that we know things in a more true way which is approaching an absolute knowing.
We know things in a “more true way”? .

Are you sugggesting there are degrees of truth, that some things can be “more true” than other things?

false facts are only less true facts in our way of knowing things. .

Sorry, I don’t mean any offence, but this just seems totally absurd and nonsensical.

How “less true” does a fact need to become before it becomes a false fact? Are there totally neutral facts which are neither true nor false?

you must understand that when the Earth was believed to be flat they knew it was because that is all the knowledge that was available at that time. .

Nobody has ever “known” that the Earth is flat. If you refer to any good philsophical text on the subject of “knowledge” you will find that knowledge entails truth. People may have “believed that they knew the Earth was flat”, but they were mistaken. All they possessed was belief, not knowledge.

You may choose to define “knowledge” differently to the conventional meaning in philosophy, but having your own private language will make it very difficult for others to understand what you are talking about.

You have said that facts are true propositions, true propositions can not be falsified, what else can that mean except absolute? .

The word “absolute” is redundant in this context. A true proposition is simply that – a true proposition. Adding the qualifier “absolute” does not make it any more true.

there is no accepted definition of anything.

For two people to communicate to any significant degree, they must share a common language. To share a common language, it follows that they must also share common definitions of the words used in that language. Those shared common definitions are the “accepted definitions”. The whole reason why you and I are having trouble communicating is (with respect) because you seem to use some very strange (unconventional) definitions of words such as “fact”, “truth” and “knowledge”.

The only way that I can interpret this unless you can help me understand better, is that you know absolute truths. .

The word “absolute” is redundant in this context, because a proposition P is either true, or it is false. Adding the qualifier “absolute” does not make it any more true, or any more false.

Then you agree that no one knows what they are talking about just sometimes they say they do because they think they do.

Following the conventional philosophical definition of knowledge, if one justifiably believes that P, and P is true, then it follows that one knows that P.
Thus, if I justifiably believe what I am talking about, and it is also the case that what I am talking about is true, then it follows that I know what I am talking about.
If, however, what I am talking about is false, then it follows that I do not know what I am talking about.

According to your private definition of knowledge, it would seem that one could know what one was talking about simply by believing what one was talking about, even if what one was talking about was false. This perhaps applies in your own case in this thread, but it clearly leads to nonsensical situations.

Rader, I strongly recommend that you study some elementary epistemology, to give yourself a better grounding in these concepts, before we continue any further in this. Wikipedia is a good place to start :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology


Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Thus (according to you), if I believe that pixies live at the bottom of my garden, it then becomes a “true fact” that pixies live at the bottom of my garden?

Why clip and paste only part of my post, it only confuses anyone who is reading this thread. I told you before that meanings, that we give to words are only useful when they are examined in the context of every word that is used to try and explain anything. The answer to your pixies in your garden, whatever they are is: No matter whatever you or I believe is in your garden is irrelevant until you or I examine the facts what is in your garden and we know what is in it. Understand that even the knowing that we both now possesses tells us nothing more than what we think we know is in your garden. If we assume anything more we are badly mistaken into believing, we know something more that what we think we know.

Are you sugggesting there are degrees of truth, that some things can be “more true” than other things?

I am suggesting that nothing is true we just think it is temporarily. That is precisely what knowing is, anything more would be to claim to know absolute truths.

Sorry, I don’t mean any offence, but this just seems totally absurd and nonsensical.

How “less true” does a fact need to become before it becomes a false fact? Are there totally neutral facts which are neither true nor false?

All facts are true until proven false in which case those are just words to describe old facts in new ways. Knowing facts can not be neutral at least the way I interpret them. We can not think in between the facts only about the facts.

Nobody has ever “known” that the Earth is flat. If you refer to any good philsophical text on the subject of “knowledge” you will find that knowledge entails truth. People may have “believed that they knew the Earth was flat”, but they were mistaken. All they possessed was belief, not knowledge.

You may choose to define “knowledge” differently to the conventional meaning in philosophy, but having your own private language will make it very difficult for others to understand what you are talking about.

You think I have my own private language! I do not disagree that knowledge entails truth. What it does not entail is that knowledge is absolute truth. That’s why you can believe a fact and know it as a fact and latter discover that the interpretation was erroneous. I am not trying to be difficult, are you trying to tell me that all philosophers interpret the meanings of all words in the small way, come on.

The word “absolute” is redundant in this context. A true proposition is simply that – a true proposition. Adding the qualifier “absolute” does not make it any more true.

A true proposition is simply true because the time line of our interpretations of propositions points to a logical world if it did not all propositions would be false and we would live in a totally illogical world.

For two people to communicate to any significant degree, they must share a common language. To share a common language, it follows that they must also share common definitions of the words used in that language. Those shared common definitions are the “accepted definitions”. The whole reason why you and I are having trouble communicating is (with respect) because you seem to use some very strange (unconventional) definitions of words such as “fact”, “truth” and “knowledge”.

I understand this but do you not see that I could make the same claim. Who is the judge of these common shared definitions? The dictionary, yes I would not rewrite it, but add new meanings to it.
01- A fact is a true proposition that can be falsified only when we have new knowledge of old facts, which lead us to another true proposition.
02- Truth is what you think you know not what is absolutely true.
03- Knowledge is true facts about what you believe you know.

The word “absolute” is redundant in this context, because a proposition P is either true, or it is false. Adding the qualifier “absolute” does not make it any more true, or any more false.

So what is true and false to you, if it is neither absolute nor relative?

Following the conventional philosophical definition of knowledge, if one justifiably believes that P, and P is true, then it follows that one knows that P.
Thus, if I justifiably believe what I am talking about, and it is also the case that what I am talking about is true, then it follows that I know what I am talking about.
If, however, what I am talking about is false, then it follows that I do not know what I am talking about.

Who’s is the judge of that?

According to your private definition of knowledge, it would seem that one could know what one was talking about simply by believing what one was talking about, even if what one was talking about was false. This perhaps applies in your own case in this thread, but it clearly leads to nonsensical situations.

Rader, I strongly recommend that you study some elementary epistemology, to give yourself a better grounding in these concepts, before we continue any further in this. Wikipedia is a good place to start :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

Best Regards

I am getting a little perplexed, so maybe you should follow your own advice.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with fact or reality. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. There are many other issues about which scholars disagree. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we know something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute? Does truth, as a concept, have a rigorous definition, or is it unavoidably imprecise?

 

[moving finger]

I do not disagree that knowledge entails truth. What it does not entail is that knowledge is absolute truth.

Please define the difference between “truth” and “absolute truth”.

(before you do, read the Wikipedia reference on “truth” that you pasted into your last post – then tell me that “absolute truth” is meaningful)

For two people to communicate to any significant degree, they must share a common language. To share a common language, it follows that they must also share common definitions of the words used in that language. Those shared common definitions are the “accepted definitions”. The whole reason why you and I are having trouble communicating is (with respect) because you seem to use some very strange (unconventional) definitions of words such as “fact”, “truth” and “knowledge”.

Who is the judge of these common shared definitions? The dictionary, yes I would not rewrite it, but add new meanings to it.

No, not the dictionary. The “dictionary” is simply a book which tries to reflect the meaning of words, the “dictionary” does not “judge” the meaning of words. Words derive their meaning from convention.

01- A fact is a true proposition that can be falsified only when we have new knowledge of old facts, which lead us to another true proposition.

Which to me is nonsensical. A true proposition cannot be falsified. If a proposition is false then it is false, it cannot be true. Again you are mixing epistemology with ontology.

02- Truth is what you think you know not what is absolutely true.

You are mixing epistemology with ontology.
Truth does not entail knowledge (but knowledge entails truth).
I do not understand what you mean by “absolute truth” – can you explain?

03- Knowledge is true facts about what you believe you know.

Knowledge is justified true belief, which is relatively close to your above (but not quite the same).

What is a “true fact” as opposed to a “false fact”?

So what is true and false to you, if it is neither absolute nor relative?

All “truths” are either assumed (premises), or are inferred (by deductive or inductive argument). You have used the phrase “absolute truth”, but I do not know what you mean by this phrase.

Who’s is the judge of that?

Convention. As I have said several times already, meaing is convention, pure and simple. There is no “law” which says a word must be defined in a certain way, you are free to invent your own private language. But to have a meaningful conversation with someone requires shared meanings.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Common dictionary definitions of truth mention some form of accord with fact or reality. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth continue to be widely debated. There are many other issues about which scholars disagree. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we know something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute? Does truth, as a concept, have a rigorous definition, or is it unavoidably imprecise?

Doesn’t this agree with what I have said above?

All “truths” are either assumed (premises), or are inferred (by deductive or inductive argument).

You are the one who keeps referring to “absolute truth”, but what do you mean by this?

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Please define the difference between “truth” and “absolute truth”.

(before you do, read the Wikipedia reference on “truth” that you pasted into your last post – then tell me that “absolute truth” is meaningful)

Some forms of accord is convention? OK math is the most conventional. Well let’s do it this way, first. “Absolute truth” is a complete set A of all knowledge. What is known “truth” is a subset B of this complete set of all knowledge. Within the subset of B “known truths” are contained the sets of “subjective, relative, objective truths”. What is not in these sets is belief sets, when we test beliefs sets, they can enter the knowledge sets.

For two people to communicate to any significant degree, they must share a common language. To share a common language, it follows that they must also share common definitions of the words used in that language. Those shared common definitions are the “accepted definitions”. The whole reason why you and I are having trouble communicating is (with respect) because you seem to use some very strange (unconventional) definitions of words such as “fact”, “truth” and “knowledge”.

I do not disagree with you but understand that, while we share a common language English, conventional definitions change over time. My intention is to be dialectic. Look at the conventional definition of gravity for example over the centuries. Do you see what has happened to their conventional definitions they have now become unconventional. Do you now see what happens to the words belief and knowing? Its now nosnsensical the meanings of belief and knowing, do you not think?

No, not the dictionary. The “dictionary” is simply a book which tries to reflect the meaning of words, the “dictionary” does not “judge” the meaning of words. Words derive their meaning from convention.

And who is the convention except a consensus group of “I think I believe I know”? Do I need to give you a better example maybe a word that we do not have one of your conventional meanings for yet? The word consciousness, what is it? To claim that conventional thinking knows anything more than non-conventional thinking is naïve at best. Where do you think the knowing of new knowledge comes from then?
Non-conventional thinking is derived from non-conventional meanings which eventually become as you say conventional.

Which to me is nonsensical. A true proposition cannot be falsified. If a proposition is false then it is false, it cannot be true. Again you are mixing epistemology with ontology.

Why epistemology lays within ontology any truths that lies with the other lies within itself. Why is it nonsensical?

You are mixing epistemology with ontology.
Truth does not entail knowledge (but knowledge entails truth).
I do not understand what you mean by “absolute truth” – can you explain?

Then how can facts be true propositions always if nothing is known about them? You keep saying that tell me why?

Knowledge is justified true belief, which is relatively close to your above (but not quite the same).

What is a “true fact” as opposed to a “false fact”?

Mary lives on 911th street is a true fact. No it’s not, Mary lives on 116th street you looked at the number upside down, it is a false fact.

All “truths” are either assumed (premises), or are inferred (by deductive or inductive argument). You have used the phrase “absolute truth”, but I do not know what you mean by this phrase.

You said before that facts were true propositions. If the truth is now assumed not known this would seem to me, to be more like faith. What is it that true and false is to you? Subjective relative objective absolute? “Absolute truth” is all that is known of which we only have a hint of what it is, by what we know.

Convention. As I have said several times already, meaing is convention, pure and simple. There is no “law” which says a word must be defined in a certain way, you are free to invent your own private language. But to have a meaningful conversation with someone requires shared meanings.

You use this conventional knowing as if it was some mysterious alchemist type of knowing. Do you not see that it is nothing more that what they think they know? We have enough in common meanings to know what each is talking about. It seems to me that what is believed can not be known at the same time to you. You think that I think different and I do not.

Doesn’t this agree with what I have said above?

No, it does not; it says that there is disagreement and debate on everything. What it says is what I have been saying all along, only sometimes do we agree on anything and its only because we say we do and we have no way of knowing if we do.

You are the one who keeps referring to “absolute truth”, but what do you mean by this?
Best Regards

Quite frankly, I can only describe this to you from the meanings of words. I have never experienced it nor probably anyone else for that matter. It is an idea that I can have in my head and its assumption lays in the fact, that I know something. I can build a hypothesis and eventually a theory that I do not know how to test in any other way than to eventually know everything. This theory seems to be not falsifiable for the very fact that we seem to know more not less as time goes by.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Rader

As entertaining as this discussion is, we seem to be going round in circles. I cannot afford the time to keep repeating the same things over and over again.

I’ll just summarise below what I think are the important issues here :

“Absolute truth” is a complete set A of all knowledge. What is known “truth” is a subset B of this complete set of all knowledge.

Again you are mixing ontology with epistemology.
Truth does NOT entail knowledge. Something can be true without anybody knowing that it is true. To claim that “absolute truth is a complete set of all knowledge” is absurd.

Its now nosnsensical the meanings of belief and knowing, do you not think?

The conventional definition of knowledge in philosophical circles is knowledge = justified true belief. Neither truth nor belief entails knowledge, but knowledge certainly entails both truth and belief. There is nothing nonsensical in such definitions. As I have said many times already you are free to have your own private and different definitions of these words, but don’t expect others to understand what you are talking about if you do.

To claim that conventional thinking knows anything more than non-conventional thinking is naïve at best.

I am not claiming that conventional thinking “knows the definitions of words” better than non-conventional thinking. You miss the point. I am claiming that words derive their meaning simply by convention. Read Wittgenstein for more on this.

Where do you think the knowing of new knowledge comes from then?

What does this have to do with the meaning of the word knowledge?

A true proposition cannot be falsified. If a proposition is false then it is false, it cannot be true. Again you are mixing epistemology with ontology.

Why is it nonsensical?

A true proposition is true by definition of the word “true”. It cannot be false.
To say that a true proposition can be false is like saying “all bachelors are unmarried, but some bachelors are married”.

Then how can facts be true propositions always if nothing is known about them?

Because truth does not entail knowledge.

You keep saying that tell me why?

The following proposition is true : For any right-angled triangle in Euclidean space, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

This proposition reflects an eternal truth of Euclidean geometry, it was true before Pythagoras or anyone else knew it was true, and it will be true after homo sapiens has died out and there is no intelligence left in the universe to know it is true. Such a truth does not rest on any agent knowing it is true in order for it to be true. The proposition is timelessly true, independent of our knowledge of it.

What is a “true fact” as opposed to a “false fact”?

Mary lives on 911th street is a true fact. No it’s not, Mary lives on 116th street you looked at the number upside down, it is a false fact.

Here you are clearly contradicting yourself.
You have already agreed that a fact is defined as “state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language”. The proposition “Mary lives on 911th street” is NOT a true proposition (because Mary actually lives on 116th street). Therefore, by your own definition of “fact”, the proposition “Mary lives on 911th street” (being false) is not a fact.

All “truths” are either assumed (premises), or are inferred (by deductive or inductive argument). You have used the phrase “absolute truth”, but I do not know what you mean by this phrase.

You said before that facts were true propositions. If the truth is now assumed not known this would seem to me, to be more like faith.

Every argument in logic is based on premises. Premises are propositions which are assumed to be true, but cannot be proven to be true. If you like they could be considered as articles of faith, yes.

What is it that true and false is to you? Subjective relative objective absolute? “Absolute truth” is all that is known of which we only have a hint of what it is, by what we know.

See above. This confuses epistemology with ontology. Truth does not entail knowledge.

We have enough in common meanings to know what each is talking about.

Not in cases such as this, where you seem to have concepts such as “absolute truth” and “false facts”, and the notion that “truth entails knowledge”, which are concepts and notions nonsensical to me.

Rader – it seems that you and I define certain key words very differently. Therefore, with all due respect, to continue this discussion seems pointless. We’re not talking the same language. So please forgive me in advance if I say adieu at this point.

Best Regards

 

[Rader]

Hi Rader

As entertaining as this discussion is, we seem to be going round in circles. I cannot afford the time to keep repeating the same things over and over again.

I’ll just summarise below what I think are the important issues here :

Hola MF
Well yes very much entertaining, I will agree with you on that. I do not expect you to go in circles; I would have hoped that you might understand the meanings to my words.

Again you are mixing ontology with epistemology.
Truth does NOT entail knowledge. Something can be true without anybody knowing that it is true. To claim that “absolute truth is a complete set of all knowledge” is absurd.

I think I know why this is your meaning, you believe that what you think you know is an emergent property (ie conscious experience).

Think:
If a circle is absolute truth.
It is the complete set of truth.
Its circumference has then no diameter.

Subsets are the diameter of the complete set.
What we know are subsets in the circle.
Knowledge increases the diameter of the circle.

You can imagine in your mind the circle as infinite or finite depending on how you conceptualize the subsets filling the circle. You can build your circle in your head or do it in a laboratory.

Imagine a circle of no definite size, one that you can see in your head and imagine it so small that you can not and so large that you can not either. I am sure you can do this because I can. Imagine the circle containing absolute truth, the circle is the truth and the truth is the circle. We come to know how big it is by what we know. Now since we know that we know something we now know the circle has a size. We also know that knowing is a becoming of the circle larger but we also know something more. We know that in order to make the circle larger the parts of knowing would increase its diameter. Wait a minute we also know that what we know now once was not known the way we know it now, we called them beliefs because we thought they were knowledge. So is the diameter of the circle really any size at all, for it seems that what we thought we knew was nothing more than what we believe we thought we knew in the first place.

The conventional definition of knowledge in philosophical circles is knowledge = justified true belief. Neither truth nor belief entails knowledge, but knowledge certainly entails both truth and belief. There is nothing nonsensical in such definitions. As I have said many times already you are free to have your own private and different definitions of these words, but don’t expect others to understand what you are talking about if you do.

I understand the conventional meanings. I just do not agree with them. I would have hoped you understood why. I can not discuss what I think I know by using meanings that do not explain what I think I know.

I am not claiming that conventional thinking “knows the definitions of words” better than non-conventional thinking. You miss the point. I am claiming that words derive their meaning simply by convention. Read Wittgenstein for more on this.

Yes words derive there meaning simple by convention and since mine are not conventional, my interpretation does not reflect what you think you know. As I said before meanings of words do not reflect correctly what we are trying to explain, only in the context of all the words used and there relationship to each other expressed in a model, clearly interprets that.

What does this have to do with the meaning of the word knowledge?

I told you before that the knowing of old facts in a new way is knowledge.

A true proposition is true by definition of the word “true”. It cannot be false.
To say that a true proposition can be false is like saying “all bachelors are unmarried, but some bachelors are married”.

Your right we are just playing ping pong now. Do you not see my point we do not live in a fixed time zone. What we think we know changes over time. Of course some bachelors are married when they get married.

Because truth does not entail knowledge.

You realize that neither of us can prove if truth entails knowledge or not. I will come down to the fact, if what we think we know (ie conscious experience) is emergent or not.

The following proposition is true : For any right-angled triangle in Euclidean space, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

This proposition reflects an eternal truth of Euclidean geometry, it was true before Pythagoras or anyone else knew it was true, and it will be true after homo sapiens has died out and there is no intelligence left in the universe to know it is true. Such a truth does not rest on any agent knowing it is true in order for it to be true. The proposition is timelessly true, independent of our knowledge of it.

Your proposition is true, now place it on a sphere and you will understand my example of the Earth being flat.
You know, I am beginning to think that what I think I know is not so different that what you think you know, it all in the meanings. How can you say that about Euclidean geometry if it’s not out there in that absolute circle? You think math reflects eternal truths, I am believer also but do you not see that it is not the only reality, mind matter and mathematics all overlap each other when we interpret what we think we know. How else could we know that on quote “any right-angled triangle in Euclidean space, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides” is erroneous on the surface of a sphere. Yes Euclidean space is not a surface of a sphere but you must get my point.

Here you are clearly contradicting yourself.
You have already agreed that a fact is defined as “state of affairs in reality that corresponds to a true proposition in a human language”. The proposition “Mary lives on 911th street” is NOT a true proposition (because Mary actually lives on 116th street). Therefore, by your own definition of “fact”, the proposition “Mary lives on 911th street” (being false) is not a fact.

Please just tell me that you understand my view not that you agree before you buzz off.

Every argument in logic is based on premises. Premises are propositions which are assumed to be true, but cannot be proven to be true. If you like they could be considered as articles of faith, yes.

I would have hoped we could have made more progress than this.

See above. This confuses epistemology with ontology. Truth does not entail knowledge.

Well I guess that is our main difference, mind is not primordial to you

Not in cases such as this, where you seem to have concepts such as “absolute truth” and “false facts”, and the notion that “truth entails knowledge”, which are concepts and notions nonsensical to me.

Rader – it seems that you and I define certain key words very differently. Therefore, with all due respect, to continue this discussion seems pointless. We’re not talking the same language. So please forgive me in advance if I say adieu at this point.

Best Regards

Are my meanings really so alien to bringing us closer to the truth?

Well this has been a pleasure discussing all this with you.
Adios Rader