I Getting rid of nonlocality from quantum physics

  • #51
@Vaxjo I see your main agenda here is not to have a discussion, but to draw attention to your work. Well, I guess that's legitimate too.
 
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  • #52
Demystifier said:
The right question is what they do have even when we don't measure it? Clearly they have a name (an "electron"), but what else? And if there is nothing specific which they have (except the name), then how is that different from the claim that they don't exist?
What does an electron have? As any particle, it's classified by its intrinsic properties, i.e., its mass, spin, and its charges wrt. the interactions described in the standard model.
 
  • #53
Correct me if i am wrong, but fields in QFT are treated as mathematical objects(ie operator fields). Thus 'particles' have no objective existence and properties except as excitations of the respective quantum field(upon the loosely defined concept of 'measurement').
The quantum fields permeate all of space and time and because the respective field is not in its lowest energy state everywhere, this give rise to 'particles'(fermions, etc.) which are being created at various points. Correct?
 
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  • #54
EPR said:
Correct me if i am wrong, but fields in QFT are treated as mathematical objects(ie operator fields). Thus 'particles' have no objective existence and properties except as excitations of the respective quantum field(upon the loosely defined concept of 'measurement').
The quantum fields permeate all of space and time and because the respective field is not in its lowest energy state everywhere, this give rise to 'particles'(fermions, etc.) which are being created at various points. Correct?
This is self contradictory. The first paragraph says that quantum fields are mathematical objects. The second that they permeate space-time!
 
  • #55
Demystifier said:
What do you mean by "electron field"? Do you mean the field operator? The electron field operator is not even an observable (because it's not hermitian), and it doesn't even need to be a part of the formalism (as in path integral quantization). So I don't understand what do you mean when you say that "there is always electron field".
To me that is so obvious, I am not sure what confuses you. It seems to me that you constantly mix up the map and the territory.
 
  • #56
Demystifier said:
See post #16 by @Lord Jestocost !
It doesn't contradict anything I said!
 
  • #57
martinbn said:
This is self contradictory. The first paragraph says that quantum fields are mathematical objects. The second that they permeate space-time!

Indeed, there is a contradiction(in my understanding). What is the correct answer?
 
  • #58
martinbn said:
To me that is so obvious, I am not sure what confuses you. It seems to me that you constantly mix up the map and the territory.
What's obvious? What's the "territory" in the case of the electron?
 
  • #59
martinbn said:
It doesn't contradict anything I said!
But it answers the specific question that you asked.
 
  • #60
EPR said:
Correct me if i am wrong, but fields in QFT are treated as mathematical objects(ie operator fields). Thus 'particles' have no objective existence and properties except as excitations of the respective quantum field(upon the loosely defined concept of 'measurement').
The quantum fields permeate all of space and time and because the respective field is not in its lowest energy state everywhere, this give rise to 'particles'(fermions, etc.) which are being created at various points. Correct?
Hm, that's a bit strange to me, because it's not different in classical physics. There you can say with the same right: "Particles are described as mathematical objects (i.e., trajectories in phase space). Thus 'particles' have no objective existence...".
 
  • #61
Demystifier said:
What's obvious? What's the "territory" in the case of the electron?
You are missing the point. The point is that there is a territory, which is different from the model. So, something exists, we call it an electron, we study it and model it. If the model is constructed in such a way that some observables like position don't have a value at all times, unlike the analog in a different model (classical physics), it doesn't in any way imply that the electron doesn't exist. Of course the model may be inaccurate and with better understanding will make us revise our ontology, say that a field exists, but that is not what we are argueing about.
 
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  • #62
Demystifier said:
But it answers the specific question that you asked.
No, it doesn't. The quotes are missing the context, and they don't say that things don't exist. You choose to interpret them that way. For example Heisenberg's quote only says that the world as described by QT is very different from the world as described by Classical Physics.
 
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  • #63
vanhees71 said:
What does an electron have? As any particle, it's classified by its intrinsic properties, i.e., its mass, spin, and its charges wrt. the interactions described in the standard model.
How can you know that? All you can know is that the state in the Hilbert space has those properties (by being an eigenstate of the corresponding operators). But the real electron is not the same as its state in the Hilbert space. So if you consistently stick to the minimal interpretation, you have no right to say that the "electron itself" (if that notion makes sense at all) has all those properties.
 
  • #64
EPR said:
Indeed, there is a contradiction(in my understanding). What is the correct answer?
The answer is that the terminology isn't perfect. Quantum fields refer both to the things that exist in space-time and to some of the objects in the mathematical model.
 
  • #65
Demystifier said:
How can you know that? All you can know is that the state in the Hilbert space has those properties (by being an eigenstate of the corresponding operators). But the real electron is not the same as its state in the Hilbert space. So if you consistently stick to the minimal interpretation, you have no right to say that the "electron itself" (if that notion makes sense at all) has all those properties.
It's known, because all observations are in accordance with this description at a very high level of accuracy.

I think again, this philosophical approach to physics rather mystifies things than clarifying them. A physical theory is about a description of observational facts, no more no less.
 
  • #66
martinbn said:
For example Heisenberg's quote only says that the world as described by QT is very different from the world as described by Classical Physics.
Let me repeat what Heisenberg said:
"But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts."
Sorry, but I don't see how to interpret this in a way you suggest. He talks about "particles themselves", not about our descriptions of particles.
 
  • #67
That's the typical Heisenbergian gibberish. I never cared much...
 
  • #68
Demystifier said:
Let me repeat what Heisenberg said:
"But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts."
Sorry, but I don't see how to interpret this in a way you suggest. He talks about "particles themselves", not about our descriptions of particles.
Yes, and he says that they are not as real. He doesn't say that they don't exist, does he? He could mean that that they don't have coordinates if not measured.
 
  • #69
martinbn said:
You are missing the point. The point is that there is a territory, which is different from the model. So, something exists, we call it an electron, we study it and model it. If the model is constructed in such a way that some observables like position don't have a value at all times, unlike the analog in a different model (classical physics), it doesn't in any way imply that the electron doesn't exist. Of course the model may be inaccurate and with better understanding will make us revise our ontology, say that a field exists, but that is not what we are argueing about.
I agree with all the above, but it seems to me that you are missing my point. The simplest model we have (QM with the collapse postulate) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse (many worlds) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse and without the many worlds (Bohmian mechanics) is nonlocal. The very general class of models (defined by the Bell theorem) are nonlocal.

So is there a local model at all? No there isn't. There is only a local interpretation (Copenhagen), but such an interpretation is not a model. (By a model I mean a set of equations, by an interpretation I mean a set of words in plain English that explain what those equations mean.) In particular, any model containing a nonlocal wave function such as ##\psi({\bf x}_1,{\bf x}_2)## is a nonlocal model. A local interpretation of such a nonlocal model may contain a statement such as: "But this ##\psi## is not real, it's only our description.", but it doesn't change the fact that the model is nonlocal.

Now you may argue that the reality itself is local, but how then would you interpret the Bell theorem that no model of reality (under very general assumptions) can be local?
 
  • #70
martinbn said:
The answer is that the terminology isn't perfect. Quantum fields refer both to the things that exist in space-time and to some of the objects in the mathematical model.
In Bohmian mechanics there is no such confusion in terminology.
 
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  • #71
vanhees71 said:
It's known, because all observations are in accordance with this description at a very high level of accuracy.
That's nonsense. All the observations are also in accordance with Bohmian mechanics (because it makes the same measurable predictions as standard quantum theory, including QFT), and yet you will not say that "it's known" that nature obeys nonlocal laws just because it does according to Bohmian mechanics.
 
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  • #72
Demystifier said:
I agree with all the above, but it seems to me that you are missing my point. The simplest model we have (QM with the collapse postulate) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse (many worlds) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse and without the many worlds (Bohmian mechanics) is nonlocal. The very general class of models (defined by the Bell theorem) are nonlocal.

So is there a local model at all? No there isn't. There is only a local interpretation (Copenhagen), but such an interpretation is not a model. (By a model I mean a set of equations, by an interpretation I mean a set of words in plain English that explain what those equations mean.) In particular, any model containing a nonlocal wave function such as ##\psi({\bf x}_1,{\bf x}_2)## is a nonlocal model. A local interpretation of such a nonlocal model may contain a statement such as: "But this ##\psi## is not real, it's only our description.", but it doesn't change the fact that the model is nonlocal.

Now you may argue that the reality itself is local, but how then would you interpret the Bell theorem that no model of reality (under very general assumptions) can be local?
I am not talking about nonlocality at all in this thread. My original qustion and the following discussion was only about the existence. There is no disagreement about the nonlocality except about the terminology.
 
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  • #73
martinbn said:
Yes, and he says that they are not as real. He doesn't say that they don't exist, does he? He could mean that that they don't have coordinates if not measured.
That's typical for Copenhagenians to use such a vague language.

But I think you still didn't tell me what I really want to here from you. What is your interpretation of the Bell theorem? Does it prove nonlocality of QM?
 
  • #74
Demystifier said:
That's typical for Copenhagenians to use such a vague language.

But I think you still didn't tell me what I really want to here from you. What is your interpretation of the Bell theorem? Does it prove nonlocality of QM?
Yes, it does prove that. I only dislike the choice of terminology.
 
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  • #75
martinbn said:
I am not talking about nonlocality at all in this thread.
Well, I am. See the title of the thread.

Concerning "realism", I only talk about it to the extent it is relevant to nonlocality.
 
  • #76
martinbn said:
Yes, it does prove that. I only dislike the choice of terminology.
Good! Now do you agree that some physicists don't agree that the Bell theorem proves "nonlocality" (or whatever you want to call it)? And if you do, how do they justify it? It seems to me that they justify it by denying the existence of things in the absence of measurement, but maybe I'm wrong, maybe they justify it by denying something else.
 
  • #77
Demystifier said:
Well, I am. See the title of the thread.

Concerning "realism", I only talk about it to the extent it is relevant to nonlocality.
I know, but the OP doesn't seem interested in any discussion. I started in post #10.
 
  • #78
Demystifier said:
Good! Now do you agree that some physicists don't agree that the Bell theorem proves "nonlocality" (or whatever you want to call it)? And if you do, how do they justify it? It seems to me that they justify it by denying the existence of things in the absence of measurement, but maybe I'm wrong, maybe they justify it by denying something else.
I don't think that they disagree with the theorem. They (and I) disagree with the conclusions some physicists jump to.
 
  • #79
martinbn said:
I don't think that they disagree with the theorem. They (and I) disagree with the conclusions some physicists jump to.
So what's your conclusion regarding the Bell theorem?
 
  • #80
martinbn said:
No, it doesn't. The quotes are missing the context, and they don't say that things don't exist.

To merely claim the existence, or reality, of something is no great challenge. A realist has to provide more: a specific set of claims concerning what exists and, especially, how it exists, viz. the character of its existence.

The separate images that we form of the quantum world (wave, particle, for example) from different experimental viewpoints do not combine into one comprehensive whole” (Nick Herbert). Thus, we cannot simply think of an “electron” or an “atom” as an object which can be given a description in its own right: There exists no single image that corresponds to an electron or an atom: The character of their existence is missing. What is within this context the meaning of the term "things"? It's an empty notion. That’s the reasoning behind Heisenberg’s "Atoms are not things".
 
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  • #81
Demystifier said:
I agree with all the above, but it seems to me that you are missing my point. The simplest model we have (QM with the collapse postulate) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse (many worlds) is nonlocal. The simplest model without the collapse and without the many worlds (Bohmian mechanics) is nonlocal. The very general class of models (defined by the Bell theorem) are nonlocal.

So is there a local model at all? No there isn't. There is only a local interpretation (Copenhagen), but such an interpretation is not a model. (By a model I mean a set of equations, by an interpretation I mean a set of words in plain English that explain what those equations mean.) In particular, any model containing a nonlocal wave function such as ##\psi({\bf x}_1,{\bf x}_2)## is a nonlocal model. A local interpretation of such a nonlocal model may contain a statement such as: "But this ##\psi## is not real, it's only our description.", but it doesn't change the fact that the model is nonlocal.

Now you may argue that the reality itself is local, but how then would you interpret the Bell theorem that no model of reality (under very general assumptions) can be local?
Again one should really be specific what's meant by "nonlocal"! Relativistic QFT is local by construction, i.e., any local observables commute at space-like-separated arguments. This implies the cluster-decomposition principle and thus there are no nonlocal causal influences. There's inseparability described by entanglement, but that's nothing that contradicts relativistic causality as the collapse postulate implies, and I still have not seen any convincing argument, what the collapse is good for. I also don't understand in how far "many worlds" helps to solve any physical problem. Bohmian mechanics adds some mathematical formalism on top of standard QM and describes "trajectories". That's of course in a sense non-local, but it's just an addition in the math which doesn't add anything to what's observable according to standard QT, i.e., probablities to find a particle at some position.

I do not know, what you mean by "local Copenhagen interpretation". I also have no idea, why you consider a wave function ##\psi(x_1,x_2)## as non-local. Usually it's a wave function describing a two-particle system. There's nothing more or less non-local than with a single-particle wave function. I've also no idea what it means a "wave function is non-local". What can be non-local are interactions, and this they indeed are in Newtonian physics (no matter whether they are classical or quantum) since there the standard are instantaneous interactions at a distance as in Newtons law of gravity.

It seems that gets again a thread, where phase space is filled with equal probability, i.e., it's leading to maximum entropy (the state of least information content). SCNR.
 
  • #82
Demystifier said:
Good! Now do you agree that some physicists don't agree that the Bell theorem proves "nonlocality" (or whatever you want to call it)? And if you do, how do they justify it? It seems to me that they justify it by denying the existence of things in the absence of measurement, but maybe I'm wrong, maybe they justify it by denying something else.
No Bell's theorem does not prove "nonlocality" it only proves that there's no local deterministic theory that reproduces the outcome of quantum theory and the corresponding results of their real-lab tests, which always agree with QT rather than local deterministic hidden-variable theories. Relativistic QFT has only local interactions and describes the Bell tests correctly. So there is a local model, namely simply relativistic QFT! It's of course not deterministic. Some people say it's "non-realistic" and they say that one gives up "realism". But if you simply consider as realistic what's objectively and reproducibly observed, there's nothing non-realistic with QT.
 
  • #83
Demystifier said:
So what's your conclusion regarding the Bell theorem?
That it proves Bell non-locality (which is a misnomer), not non-locality in the usual sense of the word.
 
  • #84
Lord Jestocost said:
To merely claim the existence, or reality, of something is no great challenge. A realist has to provide more: a specific set of claims concerning what exists and, especially, how it exists, viz. the character of its existence.

The separate images that we form of the quantum world (wave, particle, for example) from different experimental viewpoints do not combine into one comprehensive whole” (Nick Herbert). Thus, we cannot simply think of an “electron” or an “atom” as an object which can be given a description in its own right: There exists no single image that corresponds to an electron or an atom: The character of their existence is missing. What is within this context the meaning of the term "things"? It's an empty notion. That’s the reasoning behind Heisenberg’s "Atoms are not things".
I don't know what to say. This seems to have absolutely no connection to science.
 
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  • #85
martinbn said:
I don't know what to say. This seems to have absolutely no connection to science.

The connection is simple. Quantum mechanics is in no need for any reality hypothesis.
 
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  • #86
martinbn said:
That it proves Bell non-locality (which is a misnomer), not non-locality in the usual sense of the word.
Fine. And which name (instead of nonlocality) would be better? And how would you explain (interpret) what it means in plain English?
 
  • #87
Lord Jestocost said:
The connection is simple. Quantum mechanics is in no need for any reality hypothesis.
And how does this relate to what I wrote? I never claimed that QM needs a reality hypothesis.
 
  • #88
martinbn said:
The answer is that the terminology isn't perfect. Quantum fields refer both to the things that exist in space-time and to some of the objects in the mathematical model.
The mathematical formalism says that quantum fields can extend indefinitely(mathematically, this isn't an issue, right?). There is always some non-zero probability that particles with definite momentum may be completely delocalized(and found on Mars, theoretically). What about conservation laws in the scenario that involved my conundrum( quantum fields which permeate all of space-time)?

This point never became clear to me.
 
  • #89
Demystifier said:
Fine. And which name (instead of nonlocality) would be better? And how would you explain (interpret) what it means in plain English?
Any name that is not already in use. I am sure you agree that it is confusing to call it red, and claim that Bell proved that QM is red! Plain English is not often suitable for these things.
 
  • #90
EPR said:
The mathematical formalism says that quantum fields can extend indefinitely(mathematically, this isn't an issue, right?). There is always some non-zero probability that particles with definite momentum may be completely delocalized(and found on Mars, theoretically). What about conservation laws in the scenario that involved my conundrum( quantum fields which permeate all of space-time)?

This point never became clear to me.
I don't know, it seems like a valid question about quantum field theory. But it is not related to existence.
 
  • #91
martinbn said:
Any name that is not already in use. I am sure you agree that it is confusing to call it red, and claim that Bell proved that QM is red! Plain English is not often suitable for these things.
OK, one (hopefully last) question for you. Given that Bohmian mechanics makes the same measurable predictions as standard quantum theory, in your opinion which of the following is true? (Mutiple choices are allowed.)
1. Bohmian mechanics is nonlocal in the ordinary sense.
2. Bohmian mechanics is "nonlocal" in the Bell sense.
3. Bohmian mechanics is "nonlocal" in some third sense.
 
  • #92
martinbn said:
But it is not related to existence.
I really don't understand this issue at all. Two electrons will interact as predicted even when they are are not "measured", correct? an electron in the hydrogen atom stays put(i.e. has all the properties that binds it to the proton at all times) even when it is not "measured", correct?. So it seems there is a serious misunderstanding somewhere in QM.
 
  • #93
Demystifier said:
OK, one (hopefully last) question for you. Given that Bohmian mechanics makes the same measurable predictions as standard quantum theory, in your opinion which of the following is true? (Mutiple choices are allowed.)
1. Bohmian mechanics is nonlocal in the ordinary sense.
2. Bohmian mechanics is "nonlocal" in the Bell sense.
3. Bohmian mechanics is "nonlocal" in some third sense.
I don't know. I think 2. possibly 1.
 
  • #94
ftr said:
I really don't understand this issue at all. Two electrons will interact as predicted even when they are are not "measured", correct? an electron in the hydrogen atom stays put(i.e. has all the properties that binds it to the proton at all times) even when it is not "measured", correct?. So it seems there is a serious misunderstanding somewhere in QM.
Why is there a misunderstanding?
 
  • #95
martinbn said:
Why is there a misunderstanding?
because QM claims that particles have undefined properties when not "observed".
 
  • #96
QM claims that particles have undefined properties when they are not prepared to have them defined. Further it claims that it is not possible to prepare all possible properties (determining the values of all observables) at once, i.e., that some properties are undefined.

That's what QM claims and all observations so far have confirmed with high accuracy.
 
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  • #97
Are you saying that in the said examples we can consider the electron as "prepared".
 
  • #98
vanhees71 said:
QM claims that particles have undefined properties when they are not prepared to have them defined. Further it claims that it is not possible to prepare all possible properties (determining the values of all observables) at once, i.e., that some properties are undefined.

That's what QM claims and all observations so far have confirmed with high accuracy.
BM claims that fundamental objects (particles or fields) have some properties (positions or field configurations in space) always defined. That's what it means, according to BM, that things exist even without measurements.

That's what BM claims and all observations so far have confirmed the measurable predictions of BM with high accuracy.
 
  • #99
martinbn said:
And how does this relate to what I wrote? I never claimed that QM needs a reality hypothesis.

In post #31 you declare from the nowhere: “Electron is the name for the thing that have objective existence.”

Isn't this a reality hypothesis? One can see this in a different way. For example, as Paul Davies puts it: "Thus an electron or an atom cannot be regarded as a little thing in the same sense that a billiard ball is a thing. One cannot meaningfully talk about what an electron is doing between observations because it is the observations alone that create the reality of the electron. Thus a measurement of an electron's position creates an electron-with-a-position; a measurement of its momentum creates an electron-with-a-momentum. But neither entity can be considered already to be in existence prior to the measurement being made."
 
  • #100
martinbn said:
I don't know. I think 2. possibly 1.
Given that, do you think that Bohmian mechanics is less plausible than the standard QM? If you do, why do you think so?
 
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