Originally posted by FZ+
I guess I've just been reading Popper too much, then.
What Popper says, if I'm reading right, is that science (and perhaps, most human knowledge) does not use induction. Instead, it produces the illusion of induction through a process of eliminating failures, or falsification.
http://dieoff.org/page126.htm
Unfortunately, the repeatability of results is a primary aspect of science -- hence the notion of induction is still vital to it.
The formation of theories is not necessarily an inductive process -- special and general relativity were both created deductively -- but, the scientific testing of these theories is always an inductive process.
Our society, and the generally high accuracy of scientific theories have led us to believe that scientific theories are somehow fundamental descriptions of the way that the universe works, when, in fact, they are more accurately described as methods for describing (hopefully) massive catalogs of experimental data.
The website you link to agress with this:
... To put it in a nutshell, our conjectures are our trial balloons, and we test them by criticizing them and by trying to replace them - by trying to show that there can be better or worse conjectures, and that they can be improved upon.
but then throws out this whopper:
The place of the problem of induction is usurped by the problem of the comparative goodness or badness of the rival conjectures or theories that have been proposed...
When in fact, the process of testing scientific theories ,that is determinign the comparitive goodness or badness, is ultimately known to be inductive in nature. (There are other criteria, but the predictive value is the primary concern for science.)
In my (inductive) experience, philosophers are reluctant to admit the imperfection of inductive reason into their theories, so they often build elaborate scaffolds to cover it, when it would probably be better to accept and acknowlege it as a potential weakness, and coresspondingly point out uses of it. (Much like the use of the axiom of choice in mathematics.)