Is reality just a matter of perception?

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The discussion centers around the nature of color, particularly red, and its existence as both a subjective experience and an objective phenomenon. It explores the distinction between the first-person experience of seeing red and the third-person scientific definition based on light wavelengths. Participants debate whether concepts like color exist solely in the mind or if they have an objective reality, emphasizing that while the physical properties of red can be measured, the subjective experience of color perception is inherently personal. The conversation also touches on the limitations of science in fully capturing first-person experiences, suggesting that consciousness and perception may be more complex than currently understood. Ultimately, the dialogue raises questions about the relationship between subjective experience and objective reality.
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I've read somewhere around here someone saying that the color red is an abstraction and it does not exist on its own, which is to say, there can be a red car, but the red car is not the thing that makes up the color red.

I went on to think about this, and what is then the color red? First I thought that perhaps it is everything that is red, so in short, red is everything that is red. Then I asked myself, is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red? THere seems to be a great difference between something that you are directly seeing as red, and the redness that associates in your mind with your red car that is outside your field of vision.

This point can be made a bit more clearer with the C note (any one of them, infact let's suppose there's just 1 C note). What is a C note? Everything that includes the C note? A music composition book that has C notes written on it does not contain The C note, and neither does the CD that contains digital imprints that suggest your cd player to recreate that C note. The Real C note is experiencing (hearing) the C note.


So the big Red is really an experience that we get from seeing that color that we call red. Red and the C note do not exist on their own, until it is created in the mind, and can only exist in the now.

now the real question is, what else (or does
everything) simply exist in the mind
 
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graffix said:
I've read somewhere around here someone saying that the color red is an abstraction and it does not exist on its own, which is to say, there can be a red car, but the red car is not the thing that makes up the color red.

I went on to think about this, and what is then the color red? First I thought that perhaps it is everything that is red, so in short, red is everything that is red. Then I asked myself, is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red? THere seems to be a great difference between something that you are directly seeing as red, and the redness that associates in your mind with your red car that is outside your field of vision.

This point can be made a bit more clearer with the C note (any one of them, infact let's suppose there's just 1 C note). What is a C note? Everything that includes the C note? A music composition book that has C notes written on it does not contain The C note, and neither does the CD that contains digital imprints that suggest your cd player to recreate that C note. The Real C note is experiencing (hearing) the C note.


So the big Red is really an experience that we get from seeing that color that we call red. Red and the C note do not exist on their own, until it is created in the mind, and can only exist in the now.

now the real question is, what else (or does
everything) simply exist in the mind
Like most discussions on this forum, it all depends on how you define the term.

If you define red in 1st person perspective (subjective) terms as "the conscious experience that I associate with seeing a particular coloured object" then that "red" exists only in your conscious mind, and does not exist on its own (ie outside of your particular conscious experience).

But if you define red in 3rd person perspective (scientific) terms as "the neurophysiological response within a conscious agent when the visual receptors of that agent are stimulated by electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength" then that red exists in all conscious minds with visual receptors sensitive to such radiation.

So how do you define "red"?

Best Regards
 
I think graffix is getting at the problem of universals as well
as the problem of qualia.

"red" exists only in your conscious mind,

And where does that exist?
 
What do you mean by "exist". Certainly "red" does not exist as a physical object the way a "red car" does- that's obvious- but the concept exists. That's also obvious- we are talking about the concept so the concept exists. I'm not sure what else you could mean by "exist".
 
HallsofIvy said:
What do you mean by "exist". Certainly "red" does not exist as a physical object the way a "red car" does- that's obvious- but the concept exists. That's also obvious- we are talking about the concept so the concept exists. I'm not sure what else you could mean by "exist".

And where does the concept exist? In your head or "out there"?
 
HallsofIvy said:
What do you mean by "exist". Certainly "red" does not exist as a physical object the way a "red car" does- that's obvious- but the concept exists. That's also obvious- we are talking about the concept so the concept exists. I'm not sure what else you could mean by "exist".
if I look at a red object, and I consciously perceive the phenomenon of the colour red as a consequence, where/how does "concept" come into it?

Best Regards
 
The frequency of light is there. So if you see a red car, it is light of certain frequency. But your brain interprets this frequency as red. A color blind person might pick up the same frequency, but his brain will interpret it as blue or something like that.
 
waht said:
The frequency of light is there. So if you see a red car, it is light of certain frequency. But your brain interprets this frequency as red. A color blind person might pick up the same frequency, but his brain will interpret it as blue or something like that.
Yes, this is looking at and explaining the phenomenon from the 3rd person perspective : "the neurophysiological response within a conscious agent when the visual receptors of that agent are stimulated by electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength"

But this 3rd person explanation does not (cannot) explain the 1st person subjective perception of red as "the conscious experience that I associate with seeing a particular coloured object"

Most confusion about qualia (and inability of many people to understand qualia for what they really are) is caused by mixing up these 1st person and 3rd person definitions of "red".

Best Regards
 
selfAdjoint said:
And where does the concept exist? In your head or "out there"?
Thoughts exist only in your head, but...
HallsofIvy said:
What do you mean by "exist". Certainly "red" does not exist as a physical object the way a "red car" does- that's obvious- but the concept exists. That's also obvious- we are talking about the concept so the concept exists. I'm not sure what else you could mean by "exist".
I think we can be quite a bit more concrete than that: For the purpose of science, "red" can be defined as 620-740nm electromagnetic radiation. So to say "That car is red" means "That car reflects light at frequencies around 620-740nm".

So for scientific purposes, red most certainly does exist. If the OP is asking about the 'experience' or perception of 'red', well...that's something that can only really exist in your head. You can teach a blind person all about light, but that doesn't mean they can picture a red car in their head.
 
  • #10
russ_watters said:
Thoughts exist only in your head, but...
Isn't that a nice place to exist, then?
 
  • #11
russ_watters said:
Thoughts exist only in your head, but... I think we can be quite a bit more concrete than that: For the purpose of science, "red" can be defined as 620-740nm electromagnetic radiation. So to say "That car is red" means "That car reflects light at frequencies around 620-740nm".

So for scientific purposes, red most certainly does exist. If the OP is asking about the 'experience' or perception of 'red', well...that's something that can only really exist in your head. You can teach a blind person all about light, but that doesn't mean they can picture a red car in their head.
Hi russ

Exactly my point. The scientific (3rd person perpsective) definition of red can be specified objectively in terms that we can all understand and validate. But this definition of red tells us absolutely nothing about the 1st person subjective conscious experience or perception of red.

What people like Chalmers would like (it seems) is to be able to develop a "whole new science" which would enable us to apply 3rd person perspective definitions to the 1st person subjective experience - but this (imho) is an impossible dream - it mixes fundamentally incompatible perspectives.

Best Regards
 
  • #12
Yeah but MF, let's take an example..

I look at a car and I see that it's red, now a bunch of physical events enable me to see this red, but nowhere does my perception of red exist. (Except as an experience in my mind.)

Now as I understand it(and please do correct me if I am wrong) science is also a perspective, it is not a fully objective concept, because by definition something 100% objective has no viewpoint.

But this doesn't mean that science and subjective perception is equal in objectivity of course.
What this means is that the more you understand in a viewpoint, like science, the more objective and accurate it becomes.

Now on to my main point.
The problem with the fact that we cannot evaluate or research/predict subjective experience with science, is that by definition, science is a viewpoint that is created to understand all aspects of reality.

Now, unless we are talking a magical entity, the subjective experience is indeed completely physical in nature, and science is the study of the physical.
So why then are we unable to study it?

I simply do not believe that there exists such a thing as "first person", it's simply our lack of knowledge about how things work..

I'm certain that sometime in the future, when we are able to see things as the emergent patterns they are, that we will indeed be able to read with 100% accuracy, thoughts, emotions and so forth.

I come to this conclusion because if you look at yourself, or any other human, you see that all that is on the surface are physical things.. A brain, a body, a sensosry system, veins, flesh, and so forth.
Either consciousness is something magical and not considered physical, or it is everything we are seeing physically.

Also as a sidenote, what I think Chalmers is trying to get at with the strong emergence thing, isn't that consciousness is outside of the physical realm, but rather that we cannot deduce it to its components.
Like one of those cubes I can't remember the name of, an optical illusion where if you see it from one side you cannot see the other side, and vice versa.

Edit: it's called a necker cube.
 
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  • #13
octelcogopod said:
I look at a car and I see that it's red, now a bunch of physical events enable me to see this red, but nowhere does my perception of red exist. (Except as an experience in my mind.)
Then it does indeed exist, as an experience in your mind.

On what basis are you suggesting "nowhere does my perception of red exist"?

octelcogopod said:
Now as I understand it(and please do correct me if I am wrong) science is also a perspective, it is not a fully objective concept, because by definition something 100% objective has no viewpoint.
Agreed

octelcogopod said:
But this doesn't mean that science and subjective perception is equal in objectivity of course.
What this means is that the more you understand in a viewpoint, like science, the more objective and accurate it becomes.
Science by definition views the world through the 3rd person perspective, which precludes any understanding of 1st person perspective phenomena.

octelcogopod said:
The problem with the fact that we cannot evaluate or research/predict subjective experience with science, is that by definition, science is a viewpoint that is created to understand all aspects of reality.
No, it is created to understand reality from a 3rd person perspective.

octelcogopod said:
Now, unless we are talking a magical entity, the subjective experience is indeed completely physical in nature, and science is the study of the physical.
So why then are we unable to study it?
Nothing to do with magic. "Physical in nature" is not symonymous with "completely understandable from a 3rd person perspective". The explanation is quite straightforward and simple. Science by definition views the world through the 3rd person perspective, which precludes any understanding of 1st person perspective phenomena.

octelcogopod said:
I simply do not believe that there exists such a thing as "first person", it's simply our lack of knowledge about how things work..
You don't? Then your phenomenal experience of the colour red does not exist?
You will need to define exactly what you mean by knowledge. Knowledge in my book is based on perspective.

octelcogopod said:
I'm certain that sometime in the future, when we are able to see things as the emergent patterns they are, that we will indeed be able to read with 100% accuracy, thoughts, emotions and so forth.
From a 3rd person perspective you can read my thoughts etc yes. But not from the 1st person perspective, by definition.

octelcogopod said:
I come to this conclusion because if you look at yourself, or any other human, you see that all that is on the surface are physical things.. A brain, a body, a sensosry system, veins, flesh, and so forth.
Either consciousness is something magical and not considered physical, or it is everything we are seeing physically.
No magic involved. It is something we see physically. Indeed you see the colour red physically. But not all physical properties are necessarily accessible from a 3rd person perspective. I cannot see what you see as the colour red, by definition, because I am not you.

octelcogopod said:
what I think Chalmers is trying to get at with the strong emergence thing, isn't that consciousness is outside of the physical realm, but rather that we cannot deduce it to its components.
I agree completely. I don't believe consciousness is outside the physical realm and have never claimed that it is. But it does not follow that every physical property is accessible from a 3rd person perspective.

Best Regards
 
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  • #14
moving finger said:
But it does not follow that every physical property is accessible from a 3rd person perspective.

Best Regards

Hmm, but how can something be physical, yet not accessible from a 3rd person perspective?
How do you create a logical theory that completely covers this subject?
 
  • #15
octelcogopod said:
Hmm, but how can something be physical, yet not accessible from a 3rd person perspective?
Why not?

Where is there a law which says everything physical is necessarily accessible from a 3rd person perspective? (this may be an implicit assumption in scientific experimentation - but there is no a priori reason to believe the assumption is always valid)

I believe my consciously perceived phenomenal states are physical, but nobody else can access the same 1st person perspective properties of these states that I have access to.

octelcogopod said:
How do you create a logical theory that completely covers this subject?
By accepting that not all physical properties are accessible from a 3rd person perspective. The idea may not sit well within the conventional scientific framework, but there is nothing at all illogical about it.

Best Regards
 
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  • #16
Ohh I think I see what you are getting at..

If consciousness is some kind of physical state, then only the state itself can experience that state, right?

But in theory this should be able to be researched from a 3rd person perspective, although, no other FIRST person observer can directly see those states.

Or am I wrong?
 
  • #17
octelcogopod said:
Ohh I think I see what you are getting at..

If consciousness is some kind of physical state, then only the state itself can experience that state, right?

But in theory this should be able to be researched from a 3rd person perspective, although, no other FIRST person observer can directly see those states.

Or am I wrong?
That's right. Conscious perception, by definition, includes the perceiver along with the perceived - they form an indivisible whole - you cannot separate the observer from the observed in conscious perception. Unlike the traditional scientific model where you have an observer which is quite separate from the thing being observed (such that in the scientific model you can approximate and say that the thing being observed exists in its own right, independently of the observer). In conscious perception, this separation is impossible.

When you say "only the state can experience that state" it's not quite right, because this still implies there is some kind of observer which can separate itself from the conscious state. There isn't. Within consciousness, the observer does not exist as a separate entity "experiencing" conscious awareness, the observer IS the conscioius awareness. Observer and observed are inextricably bound up together.

Yes it can be researched from the 3rd person perspective, but all you are ever going to "see" from the 3rd person perspective are those properties accessible to the 3rd person perspective, such as the neural corelates of consciousness, and the behaviour and verbal or written reports from the subject. You cannot, from the 3rd person perspective, get inside the conscious subject and experience his consciousness exactly the same way that he is experiencing it, from the inside. Such a thing is impossible in principle.

Best Regards
 
  • #18
Yeah but my idea was that if the consciousness is physical in nature, a physical state, then there must be an emergent system that guides how it works.

While I do understand what you are saying, it's kind of like, we know everything there is to know about a car and its physical state, yet we cannot become that car.
We can create a car just like it but we'll end up with the exact same result.
The only way for us to become that car is to have the exact same physical composition, right?

So then in theory, we have lots of isolated humans with sensory systems, neuralnets/brains and bodies that each form their own isolated consciousness, of which is protected in the sense that to read the persons thoughts we would need to have the exact same physical composition..

If I am correct so far, I have one more question..

If we were to simulate planet Earth and a human in a computer, would the computer also include conscious experience, thus enabling us to somehow see it as hard data? Assuming this world and the human is an EXACT 1:1 replica of the real world/human.
 
  • #19
octelcogopod said:
The only way for us to become that car is to have the exact same physical composition, right?
If we want to become exactly that car, yes. Which of course makes the experiment impossible (because the only thing that can exactly be that car is that car).

octelcogopod said:
So then in theory, we have lots of isolated humans with sensory systems, neuralnets/brains and bodies that each form their own isolated consciousness, of which is protected in the sense that to read the persons thoughts we would need to have the exact same physical composition..
Yessssss, but. The "but" is that we would need to have the exact same physical composition in order to have the exact same conscious experience, but we may be able to get close to their conscious experience by simply having a similar composition (indeed this is what we normally assume - we assume other humans have similar conscious experiences to ourselves because they have similar compositions).


octelcogopod said:
If we were to simulate planet Earth and a human in a computer, would the computer also include conscious experience, thus enabling us to somehow see it as hard data? Assuming this world and the human is an EXACT 1:1 replica of the real world/human.
Not necessarily, it depends on the nature of the simulation. A simulation is generally not a carbon copy, it is usually simply a mathematical model which approximates some of the properties of the thing being simulated. A simulation of a hurricane on a computer, for example, would not have the same physical properties as a real (physical) hurricane.

Even if we could simulate a conscious human on a computer (such that the simulation reports to us that it is indeed experiencing consciousness), we would still be on the outside looking in - we would still be restricted from our 3rd person perspective from actually experiencing that simulated consciousness "from the inside".

Best Regards
 
  • #20
Yeah but that's there the problem comes in..

Computers by definition are closed systems, and any application running on the computer, in this case, must have been hand coded by a programmer.
This means that unless you create code that transcends the binary file it is run from, the conscious experience will be seen as hard data somewhere in there.

This is analogous to true objectivity to an object, where we ourselves are on a lower emergent level than our subject.
We WILL have complete understanding of the subject application inside the computer by default, because no code can be invisible, nor can its output.

My point here is that this is analogous to somehow getting objective non-perceiver data about something in the universe.
Say take the monitor you are reading this post on, while we may not be able to exactly explain how it can exist, we can without a doubt explain all the emergent properties that WE created, aka the RGB tubes, the pixels, the screen, the plastic around the screen, and how all the data is ported to pixels on our screen.

This is an emergent property of the atoms that make up the monitor.

So my final point is that if we were to run even a remotly close to 1:1 replica of a human and world inside a computer, there would be no way that the conscious experience would not be outputted as pure data in the format we chose.

Theoretically this means that either 1. We cannot make such a simulation ever, even in theory or 2. We can make such a simulation and if we know enough about the world, we WILL one day receive "qualia data" or subjective data, as it were.
 
  • #21
octelcogopod said:
We WILL have complete understanding of the subject application inside the computer by default, because no code can be invisible, nor can its output.
I disagree. You are still assuming you can get the internal perspective by looking at it from the outside. Even if you break it down to lines of code, your perspective is external. In the same way, you can dissect the human brain all you like, analyse it down to individual molecular motions, no molecular motion is "invisible" to you, but you will never be able to get inside the same conscious experience that I am having, because you cannot do that "from the outside".

octelcogopod said:
Theoretically this means that either 1. We cannot make such a simulation ever, even in theory or 2. We can make such a simulation and if we know enough about the world, we WILL one day receive "qualia data" or subjective data, as it were.
It doesn't matter how you "output" the conscious data - if you are not "inside" the conscious experience, if you are looking at it from a 3rd person perspective, it will simply seem like a string of ones and zeros.

You need to understand that consciousness is a fundamentally 1st person perspective phenomenon; examining it from the outside, even breaking it down into ones and zeros, does not give you any insight into the true nature of the phenomenon.

Best Regards
 
  • #22
Well, after some contemplation I've come to the conclusion that I agree with you.

I wrote around 3 larger posts but erased them and started over because something was missing.
But to summarize my thoughts on this..

Conscious experience is an indivisable whole created by the perceiver and the perceived, the sensory input combined with the senses and the brain and the body, creates a conscious experience that while we are able to research in depth from a third person perspective, we can never perceive anyones elses first person experience because that would entail us completely being the emergent 'pattern', all the physical states that make up consciousness.. Right?

And when you think about it that makes perfect sense really, it's like my car example..
You can create several cars almost like it, but never the exact same car, because only one car of that exact kind exists, and that is the car itself.

So in other words, in a way, this room I am sitting in is about half of my conscious experience, while the other half resides in my memories, and my ability to recognize and pattern match what the things in the room mean to me..

Well, to me this makes perfect sense right now so hopefully you agree with me :P
 
  • #23
octelcogopod said:
Conscious experience is an indivisable whole created by the perceiver and the perceived, the sensory input combined with the senses and the brain and the body, creates a conscious experience that while we are able to research in depth from a third person perspective, we can never perceive anyones elses first person experience because that would entail us completely being the emergent 'pattern', all the physical states that make up consciousness.. Right?
This is exactly in accord with my belief, yes.

octelcogopod said:
And when you think about it that makes perfect sense really, it's like my car example..
You can create several cars almost like it, but never the exact same car, because only one car of that exact kind exists, and that is the car itself.
Yes

octelcogopod said:
So in other words, in a way, this room I am sitting in is about half of my conscious experience, while the other half resides in my memories, and my ability to recognize and pattern match what the things in the room mean to me..
I wouldn't go so far as to say the room is necessarily "half" of your conscious experience, I don't think we can quantify it so precisely. If there is no external sound, you close your eyes and "listen" to your thoughts, you are still having a conscious experience, but how much does the room contribute to that?

octelcogopod said:
Well, to me this makes perfect sense right now so hopefully you agree with me :P
I am happy that it makes perfect sense to you, because it also makes perfect sense to me, and I am pleased that we seem to agree :wink:

Where people like Chalmers seem to come unstuck, imho, is that they seem to insist that every property in the world must be accessible and describable from a 3rd person perspective. This is indeed the premise of science, but there is no a priori reason why this premise need necessarily be true for all properties of the world.

Best Regards
 
  • #24
i enjoyed the volley.research an individual snowflake.no two are ever the same,yet we all see it the same.
 
  • #25
I also enjoyed reading this. I couldn't post back in here sooner simply because I was waaay lost in contemplation!

I'm not sure if you can experience what someone else is experiencing no matter how similar the physical compositions are. You can take experiment with twins, give them identical environments for a year but still.. there is a huge isolation between the two consciousnesses. They can be similar yes, but they never could BE the other, or replace even in part, what your consciousness is.

But on another subject, I think I've found a reason or a theory that can be behind my first post. I was reading some Zen stuff and it says when you are angry, it is more accuate (from a buddhist perspective) to say "at this moment I am this anger" instead of saying "I am angry."

This made sense. Maybe we won't get to any conclusions as longs as we keep refereing it as a persective from the 1st person or the 3rd person, or holding the observer higher than his observation. What is red? We are red!

Going back to color, we've figured out the primary colors and we couldn't add a primary color to the color wheel just as we couldn't add a new note to the piano. So these things have existed since the beginning of time and exist all the way to the end. The C note is the most pleasant note to the human ear, and was so before we got here.

My theory is that this fuzzy pleasant thing that it is the C note must be an attribute of the mind behind all creation, and our minds ARE this greater mind, but of course it feels like it is our own mind/brain.
 
  • #26
To a realist, such as myself, red does indeed exist whether or not anyone is there to see it. experience it or perceive it. Does a rose quit being red when we look away? How did we as well as countless other animals adapt to see red or any other color if color doesn't exist. Why would a flower or a bird go to all the trouble to develop red coloring it it doesn't exist long before we existed to have minds to perceive it.

The energy or frequency of the light whether reflected or produced is the way in which the information RED is conveyed. We see a rose or a car as red because it is red, it has the property of red color.
 
  • #27
Royce said:
To a realist, such as myself, red does indeed exist whether or not anyone is there to see it. experience it or perceive it. Does a rose quit being red when we look away?

Man, you ARE a realist! The rose continues to scatter light in a way that is interpreted differently by different organisms. Bees, I am told, respond to the ultraviolet spectrum of the scattered radiation. "What is it like to see like a bee?" Red is what a human mind gets out of processing the scattered radiation, if no human is looking at a particular rose, there is no red there. Or so it seems to me, as much a nominalist as you are a realist.

How did we as well as countless other animals adapt to see red or any other color if color doesn't exist. Why would a flower or a bird go to all the trouble to develop red coloring it it doesn't exist long before we existed to have minds to perceive it.

Who says birds see "red"? Prove it! Presumably birds and other organisms responded to some Humean association: such-and-such a distribution of frequencies ("spectrum" is the term physicsts use for that) is frequently found to accompany some particular situation of interest: ripe fruit, presence of nectar, fresh blood indicating danger from a predator, or many many other things. The organisms evolved under selection to take advantage of the situations, and part of that evolution entailed improved perception of the associated spectrum. When human minds came along they gave names and attributed values to these associations (the ones they could perceive) as they did with all the rest of their perceived world.

The energy or frequency of the light whether reflected or produced is the way in which the information RED is conveyed. We see a rose or a car as red because it is red, it has the property of red color.

No. We see them as red because it is the property of our minds to interpret the range of spectra that way.
 
  • #28
graffix said:
I also enjoyed reading this. I couldn't post back in here sooner simply because I was waaay lost in contemplation!

I'm not sure if you can experience what someone else is experiencing no matter how similar the physical compositions are. You can take experiment with twins, give them identical environments for a year but still.. there is a huge isolation between the two consciousnesses. They can be similar yes, but they never could BE the other, or replace even in part, what your consciousness is.

But on another subject, I think I've found a reason or a theory that can be behind my first post. I was reading some Zen stuff and it says when you are angry, it is more accuate (from a buddhist perspective) to say "at this moment I am this anger" instead of saying "I am angry."

This made sense. Maybe we won't get to any conclusions as longs as we keep refereing it as a persective from the 1st person or the 3rd person, or holding the observer higher than his observation. What is red? We are red!

Going back to color, we've figured out the primary colors and we couldn't add a primary color to the color wheel just as we couldn't add a new note to the piano. So these things have existed since the beginning of time and exist all the way to the end. The C note is the most pleasant note to the human ear, and was so before we got here.

My theory is that this fuzzy pleasant thing that it is the C note must be an attribute of the mind behind all creation, and our minds ARE this greater mind, but of course it feels like it is our own mind/brain.
This makes a great deal of sense to me, except for the last paragraph.

Best Regards
 
  • #29
moving finger said:
This makes a great deal of sense to me, except for the last paragraph.

Best Regards

I will probably get battered at trying to make this connection but let me try to point out where I wrote, 'What is red? We are red' ... and if you understand that these things have always existed (and we are still talking about this thing as NOT the 3rd person view) then... it is more an attribute of our universe. But let's go back to us being red. then... we are this attribute.

Since I think I have/am a mind, and if I am also these things like color and notes, and the universe, then I can call the universe a mind as well... so that's how I got the 'greater Mind behind all creation.' A bit of a stretch, but this answers if the rose is still red when no one is seeing it... if there is a greater mind behind all of this, red is always red. ... but red is you, you are red, your mind is this greater mind... a bunch of = signs then follow ... = = = =

Ok i know to convey this idea without being assaulted, and being without contradictions is nearly impossible. :)

I guess I'm trying to articulate what I think I know about zen and how they simply say, 'everything is everything...'

best regards
 
  • #30
graffix said:
Since I think I have/am a mind, and if I am also these things like color and notes, and the universe, then I can call the universe a mind as well...
That depends on how one defines "mind". To quote Wiki :

Mind refers to the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

By saying the universe has a mind do you mean that “the universe has a mind by virtue of the fact that I have a mind, and I am part of the universe”, or do you mean that the universe as a whole (independently of your own mind) has an intellect and consciousness manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination?

graffix said:
so that's how I got the 'greater Mind behind all creation.' A bit of a stretch, but this answers if the rose is still red when no one is seeing it... if there is a greater mind behind all of this, red is always red. ... but red is you, you are red, your mind is this greater mind... a bunch of = signs then follow ... = = = =
What you seem to be saying is “if there is a greater mind behind all of this”…..

I don’t see that the zen idea that “everything is everything” (whatever that might mean) entails that there is a greater mind behind everything?

Best Regards
 
  • #31
octelcogopod said:
While I do understand what you are saying, it's kind of like, we know everything there is to know about a car and its physical state, yet we cannot become that car.
We can create a car just like it but we'll end up with the exact same result.
The only way for us to become that car is to have the exact same physical composition, right?

But...if we did become the car we would not (necessarily) learn
anything that we didn't
already knwo from a 3rd-person perspective
since there is not (necessarily) anything
it is like to be a car. Our inability to become
some other kind of systems explains why we don't know
1st-personal things about them assuming there are
such things to be known in the first place
. It does
not explain why there are (necessarily) any
qualia, subjectivity, or 1st-personal perspectives ITFP.
 
  • #32
moving finger said:
Even if we could simulate a conscious human on a computer (such that the simulation reports to us that it is indeed experiencing consciousness), we would still be on the outside looking in - we would still be restricted from our 3rd person perspective from actually experiencing that simulated consciousness "from the inside".

Which would only prevent us from experienceing the
1stP subjecive experiences within the simulation if they
exist in the first place
. However, the fact that it
is a vast computer programme suggests that it is
entirely objective, deterministic, reducible and knowable.
 
  • #33
Tournesol said:
But...if we did become the car we would not (necessarily) learn
anything that we didn't
already knwo from a 3rd-person perspective
since there is not (necessarily) anything
it is like to be a car. Our inability to become
some other kind of systems explains why we don't know
1st-personal things about them assuming there are
such things to be known in the first place
. It does
not explain why there are (necessarily) any
qualia, subjectivity, or 1st-personal perspectives ITFP.
Let X = "there is something it is like to be a Z" (where Z = car or bat or fish or human being or whatever)

That X is not logically necessarily true does not entail that X is logically necessarily false. Something which is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false is contingent.

We do not attempt to explain the law of gravity by saying the law of gravity is a "necessary" property of the world. For all we know, it is simply a contingent property.

Thus, there is no requirement to explain why there are necessarily any qualia, because qualia may be contingent properties of the world, and not necessary properties.

Best Regards
 
  • #34
moving finger said:
Where people like Chalmers seem to come unstuck, imho, is that they seem to insist that every property in the world must be accessible and describable from a 3rd person perspective. This is indeed the premise of science, but there is no a priori reason why this premise need necessarily be true for all properties of the world.

Chalmers doesn't insist "every property in the world must be accessible and describable from a 3rd person perspective" is true of the world. He insists
it is an implication of physicalism, and the existence in the world
of inaccessible properties is therefore a problem - -a Hard Problem - for
physicalism.
 
  • #35
Tournesol said:
Which would only prevent us from experienceing the
1stP subjecive experiences within the simulation if they
exist in the first place
. However, the fact that it
is a vast computer programme suggests that it is
entirely objective, deterministic, reducible and knowable.
knowable from which perspective?

how would you propose to go about "knowing" what it is like to be the computer?

Best Regards
 
  • #36
Tournesol said:
Chalmers doesn't insist "every property in the world must be accessible and describable from a 3rd person perspective" is true of the world. He insists it is an implication of physicalism
therein lies his mistake then, because it's not (at least it's not an implication of physicalism defined as the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical - perhaps he has a private meaning in mind)

Best Regards
 
  • #37
graffix said:
I've read somewhere around here someone saying that the color red is an abstraction and it does not exist on its own, which is to say, there can be a red car, but the red car is not the thing that makes up the color red.

I went on to think about this, and what is then the color red? First I thought that perhaps it is everything that is red, so in short, red is everything that is red. Then I asked myself, is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red? THere seems to be a great difference between something that you are directly seeing as red, and the redness that associates in your mind with your red car that is outside your field of vision.

i like to read and ponder philosophy.i do wonder at times though how discussions get so off course from the original question.

so to get back to the original question which becomes a scientific answer not philosophical here we go:

a red apple has no color or light energy of it's own..it appears red because it reflects wavelenghts of white light that cause us to see red.and it absorbs most other wavelengths that contribute to the sensation of red.because of this,the human eye,camera film, or a light-sensing instrument will all perceive the apple as red.it's not as subtractive color.


a bit deeper regarding red:

The Doppler effect causes objects moving away to have their light spectrum red-shifted while objects approaching have their light blue-shifted. This really means that the wavelengths of light they radiate (or reflect) are moved downward or upward on the frequency spectrum. These measurements were the first clue that the universe is expanding.
However, it does not mean that visible light is more red (or more blue in the unfortunate event of a fast approaching object). Visible light is only a small portion of radiation; there also exists significant infrared (longer wavelengths below visible red) and ultra-violet (shorter wavelengths above visible violet) radiation.


what was previously red becomes invisible infrared
some colours may remain as different visible colours with a longer wavelength (eg blue may become yellow)
some of what was previously invisible ultra-violet becomes a visible colour
so we still continue to see a full visible colour spectrum as white.

incidentally, the absence of light on colors of the spectrum creates black.
 
  • #38
bchmtnedisto said:
i like to read and ponder philosophy.i do wonder at times though how discussions get so off course from the original question.
with respect, I'm a scientist myself, but I do often wonder why so many scientists often look at everything from a purely 3rd person perspective (which then leads to the 3rd person scientific answer that you provided).

The original questions in the OP regarding “red” were in fact :
graffix said:
is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red?
graffix said:
now the real question is, what else (or does everything) simply exist in the mind
These seem to me to be most definitely philosophical, and not simply scientific, questions.

Best Regards
 
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  • #39
That depends on how one defines "mind". To quote Wiki :

Mind refers to the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

By saying the universe has a mind do you mean that “the universe has a mind by virtue of the fact that I have a mind, and I am part of the universe”, or do you mean that the universe as a whole (independently of your own mind) has an intellect and consciousness manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination?
[/QUOTE]

That's an interesting question, but if I had to pick one, I would have to say the first one because, I don't think there is any thing really independent or really separate from other things.

But I do see the limitation of the use of the word mind, since those things you've mentioned seem more like human qualities (though some seem like they would apply). I would assume that it doesn't have memory though, since I think this thing is above time.

moving finger said:
What you seem to be saying is “if there is a greater mind behind all of this”…..

I don’t see that the zen idea that “everything is everything” (whatever that might mean) entails that there is a greater mind behind everything?

Best Regards

descriptions can't be complete. It's just one way to describe it (perhaps not a very good one). Maybe I should refrain from that term. It borders on being a infallible belief.

If I go back to this moment being me, and i am this moment, the whole universe and my mind is a big equal sign. But I know my mind (this time brain?) is also at the same time, not the universe since .. getting back to the human brain, it's restricted to not knowing all. So maybe I'm trying to explain the mind without these restrictions. It probably is above the concept of time. It probably encompasses all probabilities. Its only desire probably is to view itself.

Those descriptions borders on being beliefs.

As trying to prove it or to accurately define it, I don't have much :)

Best regards
 
  • #40
The question is: do you exist?

If you experience sound and color you could construe this to indicate that they exist. When we read your typing on our monitors we could construe that you exist. When you feel your own hand clapping against your other hand this could indicate that you have two hands. However the only proof is that you have perceived this to be true. And your perception is not admissible as evidence that you, the hands, the color or the sound exist.

It's left to each individual's discretionary powers to decide if anything exists or does not exist. If there is agreement between two observers this simply confirms that two people have found similarities in their assumed independent observations. Whether the observations are independent and not influenced by one or the other opinion would have to be determined by a third party. And then, the results of this inquiry would be questionable with regards to whether or not the results actually "exist".
 
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  • #41
MF said:
knowable from which perspective?

If physicalism is true, everything is knowable
in principle from any perspective (literal only,
of course).

how would you propose to go about "knowing" what it is like to be the computer?

How would you go about persuading me that there is anything
it is like to be a computer ?
 
  • #42
moving finger said:
therein lies his mistake then, because it's not (at least it's not an implication of physicalism defined as the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical - perhaps he has a private meaning in mind)

There is nothing private about it. (He makes much of the difference
between logical and metaphsyical supervenience, BTW).
And all the physicalists who think qualia must be rejected seem to
agree with him -- about the incompatibility, if not
about which of the two is best retained.
 
  • #43
MF said:
If I claimed that "A is neither B nor C", does that imply I am claiming that B entails C, or that C entails B? No, I don't think so.

But then what does entail the inaccessability of consciousness?
but it is entailed by physicalism in
the sense that Chalmers uses the word, so his
claim that there is a HP is entirely consistent.
That must be some kind of "private meaning" of physicalism then. Physicalism is simply the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical, this thesis does not entail that all properties of the world are accessible from all perspectives.

If everything logically supervenes on the properties known to
physics, everything is 3rd-person accessible, since the
properties known to physics are, and since anything
logically deducibe from what is 3rd-person
knowable is itself 3rd-person knowable.(And therefore
not strongly emergent).

Thus you must be using some other sense of "supervenes". (Such
as natural supervenience. Chalmers thinks qualia supervene
naturally, but doens't think that is enough for full-blooded
physicalism).

It is only because some people seem to believe that all properties of the world must be accessible from all perspectives (which is in fact not entailed by physicalism) that they then create the HP for themselves (ie qualia are then mysterious and inexplicable). Accept the truth that not all properties of the world are accessible from all perspectives and the HP doesn't exist (ie qualia are trivially explained as 1st person perspective properties of the world) - and all still consistent with physicalism.

Yet they remain indescribable by the mathematical
language of physics. (And in that sense the HP remains)
All you are doing is employing
a sense of the word "physical" that is detached from physics.
There is nothing wrong with the concept, but it
would be better to call it something that makes it clear
you have watered-down your concpet of physicalism
(e.g. "liberal naturalism" or "non-reductive physicalism").
 
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  • #44
Tournesol said:
If physicalism is true, everything is knowable
in principle from any perspective (literal only,
of course).
That's where I disagree. How do you conclude that everything is necessarily knowable in principle from any perspective if physicalism (ie the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical) is true?

Tournesol said:
How would you go about persuading me that there is anything
it is like to be a computer ?
Ask the computer. If it replies and tells you that there is something it is like to be it, why would you disbelieve it? If you would disbelieve it, why believe a human being who tells you there is something it is like to be that human being?

Best Regards
 
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  • #45
Tournesol said:
There is nothing private about it. (He makes much of the difference
between logical and metaphsyical supervenience, BTW).
And all the physicalists who think qualia must be rejected seem to
agree with him -- about the incompatibility, if not
about which of the two is best retained.
Sure there is. Physicalism simply says that everything supervenes on the physical. It does not say everything is measurable, it does not say everything can be described by mathematics, it does not say that everything is accessible from any particular perspective. These latter assumptions are not assumptions of physicalism, they are arbitrary additional assumptions which some people like Chalmers seem to wish to make. These additional assumptions are not necessary at all. And it is these additional unnecessary assumptions which lead to problems understanding qualia.

Best Regards
 
  • #46
Tournesol said:
But then what does entail the inaccessability of consciousness?
This refers to a post of mine in a different thread I think?

Phenomenal consciousness is inaccessible to any perspective apart from the perspective of the conscious agent itself, by definition, because the conscious agent is an integral part of the conscious experience. Consciousness is not something where you can separate “observer” and “observed” (which separation is the fundamental assumption of 3rd person perspective science), because the observer is an inextricable part of the conscious experience. Hence, the 1st person perspective properties of phenomenal consciousness are not accessible to study from any other perspective.

Tournesol said:
If everything logically supervenes on the properties known to
physics, everything is 3rd-person accessible, since the
properties known to physics are, and since anything
logically deducibe from what is 3rd-person
knowable is itself 3rd-person knowable.(And therefore
not strongly emergent).
The argument is rather confused, but seems to be :
1) Premise : All physical properties are 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)
2) Premise : Everything which supervenes on 3rd person accessible properties is logically deducible (knowable from any perspective)
3) Hence, if physicalism is true, everything is 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)

Is this a correct rendition of your argument?

Unfortunately, I challenge both of your premises (1) and (2). Neither of these premises is a necessary premise under physicalism, these seem to be additional ad-hoc premises that you assume to be true (and thence lead to the so-called Hard Problem)

Tournesol said:
Thus you must be using some other sense of "supervenes". (Such
as natural supervenience. Chalmers thinks qualia supervene
naturally, but doens't think that is enough for full-blooded
physicalism).
Not at all.
“Full blooded physicalism” is simply the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical.

Tournesol said:
Yet they remain indescribable by the mathematical
language of physics. (And in that sense the HP remains)
All you are doing is employing
a sense of the word "physical" that is detached from physics.
There is nothing wrong with the concept, but it
would be better to call it something that makes it clear
you have watered-down your concpet of physicalism
(e.g. "liberal naturalism" or "non-reductive physicalism").
Not at all, my definition of physical is the same as the one that I gave in the "weak and strong emergence" thread, viz :

Physical = pertaining to physics, which is the study of the properties and principles related to matter and energy, and of systems comprising matter and energy.

Do you disagree with this definition?

And my definition of physicalism (viz that everything supervenes on the physical) comes straight from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Where do you get yours from?

But physicalism does NOT say that everything (which supervenes on the physical) is itself necessarily physical.

You seem to be insisting that all properties of the world must be describable mathematically. Physicalism simply says that everything supervenes on the physical, it does not say that everything is physical, it does not say that everything is measurable, it does not say that everything can be described by mathematics, it does not say that everything is accessible from any particular perspective. These latter are not premises of physicalism, some of them seem to be your own personal premises (and incidentally most of them are part of the premises of 3rd person perspective science). Your additional premises lead to a much more constrained version of physicalism, which I would then say is the "watered down version" since it imposes extra boundaries on physicalism which are unnecessary. "Full-blooded physicalism" does not include such unnecessary boundaries. Thus perhaps your notion of physicalism would be better described as "scientific physicalism" or "scientism" - meaning no disrespect to science, being a scientist myself (if the term "scientism" had not already been coined, but on the other hand scientism is indeed the belief that scientific knowledge is the foundation of all knowledge, which is exactly what you seem to be claiming)

Best Regards
 
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  • #47
selfAdjoint said:
Man, you ARE a realist! The rose continues to scatter light in a way that is interpreted differently by different organisms.

We can't know how different organisms interpret anything. The colored markings of red and black seem to be universal (inter-species) signs of poisonous organisms. So much so that other harmless organisms copy the markings as a defense mechanism. How long have cardinals or blue jays been around? Are they the color they are to impress us our their potential mates?
Octopus and squid use color to communicate and give warnings and show emotion or excitement. Regardless of what they perceive or interpreter they use color that existed long before there was a human mind to perceive it as red or any other color the same with sounds.

Bees, I am told, respond to the ultraviolet spectrum of the scattered radiation. "What is it like to see like a bee?" Red is what a human mind gets out of processing the scattered radiation, if no human is looking at a particular rose, there is no red there. Or so it seems to me, as much a nominalist as you are a realist.

I ask one simple question. How did life on Earth adapt to and develop organs to see and hear that which exists only in our human minds? How did life develop the genes, DNA, to produce or reflect a certain color consistently, if it, the information and the property of color, is just perception and interpretation? (Okay two related questions.)

Who says birds see "red"? Prove it! Presumably birds and other organisms responded to some Human association: such-and-such a distribution of frequencies ("spectrum" is the term physicsts use for that) is frequently found to accompany some particular situation of interest: ripe fruit, presence of nectar, fresh blood indicating danger from a predator, or many many other things. The organisms evolved under selection to take advantage of the situations, and part of that evolution entailed improved perception of the associated spectrum. When human minds came along they gave names and attributed values to these associations (the ones they could perceive) as they did with all the rest of their perceived world.

We gave it names. We named that which we see. We did not created it nor the perception of color. We simply observed it and agreed to call it color and each color red, blue, etc, figuratively comparing note and observations and agreeing that we see the same things and colors even though we have no way of knowing that what I perceive as red is the same perception of red that you have.

No. We see them as red because it is the property of our minds to interpret the range of spectra that way.

Could it just possibly be that our minds interpret the range of spectra as color because that is what it is. That all life that is able to generate, reflect and/or see color do it because it is color and it is real and we, life, respond to and utilize what is really there rather than just what is in our minds?
If it is only in our mind that we perceive color then why is it so prevalently used in both Flora and Fauna. All of life survives by being able to perceive reality as it really is to the best of their ability and needs, not by perceiving that which is not really real.
 
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  • #48
About the color thing..

Whether or not color exists AS WE SEE IT, is irrelevant, other species and/or humans might see the color in a different way, but because it is the same frequency spectrum, we all see the same property.

I think it's more a matter of contrast than anything else.

Even if color wasn't perceived the same way, it would look the same compared to another color.
In that way we all see the same thing, because they all look the same when compared to each other, only we MIGHT have completely different WAYS of comparing.

Right?
 
  • #49
octelcogopod said:
About the color thing..

Whether or not color exists AS WE SEE IT, is irrelevant, other species and/or humans might see the color in a different way, but because it is the same frequency spectrum, we all see the same property.

I think it's more a matter of contrast than anything else.

Even if color wasn't perceived the same way, it would look the same compared to another color.
In that way we all see the same thing, because they all look the same when compared to each other, only we MIGHT have completely different WAYS of comparing.

Right?
imho it makes sense to ask questions such as "can birds distinguish between objects which humans see as red and blue?" (in which case the answer is either yes or no, and we can verify this experimentally)

but it makes no sense to ask questions such as "do birds see red the same way that humans see red", because this question is meaningless (for the same reason that the question "what would moving finger's sensation of the colour red be like if experienced by octelcogopod?" is meaningless)

Best Regards
 
  • #50
Royce said:
All of life survives by being able to perceive reality as it really is to the best of their ability and needs, not by perceiving that which is not really real.
I disagree. I believe life survives simply because it has learned to utilise properties of the world to give it competitive advantage (the ones who don't survive are generally the ones who fail to gain enough competitive advantage).

Survival does not entail that we have access to "reality as it really is", it entails only that our models and interpretations of the world provide us with at least some competitive advantage compared to those against which we compete.

As to whether the property "my phenomenal consciousness perception of the colour red" is real or not, I maintain that it is indeed a real property of the world, but it is a property which is accessible only from my conscious perspective (because consciousness inextricably convolves the perceiver and the perceived, they cannot be separated).

Best Regards
 

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