Is the Second Law of Thermodynamics Falsifiable?

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The discussion centers on whether the Second Law of Thermodynamics is an empirical or mathematical law, questioning its falsifiability. Participants argue that while the law describes predictable outcomes based on observations, it does not imply absolute certainty, allowing for potential violations under specific conditions. The distinction between mathematical laws and empirical laws is emphasized, with the Second Law being classified as empirical due to its reliance on real-world observations. Examples are provided to illustrate how one could theoretically falsify the law, such as the existence of a perpetual motion machine. Ultimately, the conversation highlights the complexity of defining scientific laws and their applicability to reality.
  • #91
madness said:
how did you come to know that “I observe a three sided square” "does not correspond to any sensory stimulus or combination of sensory stimuli"?

Because having four sides is part of the definition of a square, as has already been pointed out.
 
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  • #92
PeterDonis said:
Because having four sides is part of the definition of a square, as has already been pointed out.

Exactly, which is equivalent to saying that the observation can't occur because it's logically impossible.
 
  • #93
madness said:
Presumably you will admit that “I observe a four sided square” does correspond to a sensory stimulus?
The relevant observation sentence would be eg “I observe four straight connected line segments each of 1 m length by ruler with four 90 degree interior angles by protractor”. That is the sensory stimulus, a series of observable measurements.

There are no such observation statements that correspond to your straw man. So just purely by Poppers definition the second law is falsifiable and your straw man is not. There is no need to add the additional language. Poppers definition is sufficient on its own.

In this case it is true that the reason there is no observation sentence is because of logical impossibility. But the reason is not necessary for the definition, merely the fact that there is no such observation sentence.

There are other situations where there is no observation sentence and the reason has nothing to do with logic. For example, the Lorentz aether is perfectly logically possible but is designed so that there is no observation sentence that can be attributed to it. The Lorentz aether is therefore non-falsifiable, but logically possible. So the key is the existence or non-existence of observation sentences, not logical possibility or impossibility.

Importantly, I was not quoting out of context nor twisting words. I was correctly applying the quoted definition to reach the clear conclusion that the 2nd law is falsifiable and the straw man is not. So your posts 62 and 79 are wrong.
 
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  • #94
Dale said:
The relevant sensory stimulus would be eg “I observe four straight connected line segments each of 1 m length by ruler with four 90 degree interior angles by protractor”. That is the sensory stimulus, a series of observable measurements.

This line of argument equates to denying that the original statement was an observation statement. An observation statement is taken to be a statement about sense experiences that can be directly used for falsification, and which does not require to be further decomposed into simpler sensory stimuli to be applied. Quine used examples such as "the cat is on the mat", but he emphasised the requirement of intersubjective agreement on the utterance within a community of speakers. If (as you appear to argue) "I see a four sided square" isn't already sufficient to define the observation, then it's not an observation statement. But that's not how the term was intended, at least by Quine, and "I see a four sided square" is already good enough as is. If anything, the reason "I see a 4 sided square" would be considered an observation statement while "I see a 3 sided square" would not is that there would not be intersubjective agreement among the community of speakers in the latter case. At least according to the definitions in the source below.

Source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42969075.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A17843ed1c85feac7ab9dc15b66cc5f5d

"Such, then, is an observation sentence: it is an occasion sentence whose occasion is not only intersubjectively observable but is generally adequate, moreover, to elicit assent to the sentence from any present witness conversant with the language. (Quine (1975a) p. 73)"

" A person p understands the observation sentence s if and only if there is unique set of stimulations such that p and every speaker of the same language as p would assent to s, when asked s in the presence of any member of this set and would dissent from s when asked s in the presence of no member of the set. "

 
  • #95
The reason why you don't see someone flip a coin ten times, and heads every time, is because that is a small percentage of allowed outcomes. The reason why you don't get a royal flush when playing poker is because it is a small percentage of allowed outcomes. The reason why you don't see the air rush to the corners of the room is because trajectories of air molecules that lead to that configuration are a small percentage of allowed trajectories. Of course, it is possible in all these cases. Of course, it possible to flip a coin ten times in a row, and get heads every time. If you flip a coin enough times, it is guaranteed to happen. Of course, it is possible to get a royal flush while playing poker. Of course, it is possible for the air to rush to the corners of the room. If you wait long enough, it is guaranteed to happen. It is possible for entropy to decrease. It is possible for the Second Law of Thermodynamics to be violated.

In Renaissance Europe, they had absolute monarchy and the divine right of kings. The laws were not the result of any legislative process. Laws were simply decreed by the king. You were not allowed to debate whether the laws could be different or ask why they are the way they are, because that would be questioning the will of the king. It was assumed that the laws must always be followed since to imply otherwise was treason punishable by death.

In Renaissance Europe, they made an analogy between a country and the Universe, and the king and God. Whatever a scientist's private beliefs, they had to at at least publicly pretend that their goal was to gain insight into God's will. Natural laws were simply decided by God. You were not allowed to debate whether the laws could be different or ask why they are the way they are, because that would be questioning the will of God. It was assumed that the laws must always be followed since to imply otherwise was blasphemy punished by eternal damnation. This analogy is the reason for the use of the word "laws" in physics. It was assumed that all "laws" were sacred, and that "laws" in physics must always be true.

This changed in the 19th Century. Government shifted from absolute monarchy to parliamentary democracy. Science became more secular, and openly contradicted the church with such things as the age of the Earth, or evolution. It was also recognized that so-called laws in physics were not always true. You were allowed to ask why laws were true, or usually true, or under what circumstances, they were true. We now know that many laws are not always true. For example, Ohm's law does not apply to non-linear elements, such as diodes. With this new way of thinking, we quit using the word "law". This is why we say "Maxwell's laws" but do not say "Einstein's laws" when referring to the various equations discovered by Einstein. However, in physics. we do not change the names of things. We are not going to stop using the name "Maxwell's laws" and start calling them "Maxwell's equations". If you hear someone calling something a "law" in physics, it is only because they referring to something that was named before we quit using the word "law".
 
  • #96
madness said:
he emphasised the requirement of intersubjective agreement on the utterance within a community of speakers
And there is no such agreement for “I observe a three sided square”. So again Poppers definition is sufficient and your posts 62 and 79 are wrong.
 
  • #97
Dale said:
And there is no such agreement for “I observe a three sided square”. So again Poppers definition is sufficient and your posts 62 and 79 are wrong.

Yep, that's what I wrote. But your posts are also wrong :P
 
  • #98
madness said:
Yep, that's what I wrote. But your posts are also wrong :P
Which one? Certainly not my 61.
 
  • #99
Dale said:
Which one? Certainly not my 61.

Specifically certain claims in most of the posts you made from 85 onwards, that an observation sentence needs to spell out a set of sensory stimuli to be valid. I had conceded openly a few times and long ago that I had become convinced the 2nd law was falsifiable, as you claim in 61.
 
  • #100
Also, it still seems to me that the only way we know there couldn't be intersubjective agreement by a community of speakers regarding the statement "I see a square with 3 sides", is that it is logically impossible. So as far as I can see, my reasoning was correct.
 
  • #101
madness said:
Also, it still seems to me that the only way we know there couldn't be intersubjective agreement by a community of speakers regarding the statement "I see a square with 3 sides", is that it is logically impossible.
So as far as I can see, my reasoning was correct.
Your reasoning is incorrect because the logical impossibility is not relevant, only the fact that there is no observation sentence is relevant. As I showed in post 93.

At this point this has become unproductive. This thread is closed again.
 

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