Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

[Fliption]

I think I've been careful enough in establishing a definition that it should be clear that I haven't defined everything as physical. I even said I don't consider myself to be a physicalist, so obvious I must not believe that everything is physical. It doesn't seem you're reading my posts very carefully.

What you are attempting to define physical as isn't really relevant to my comment. I was only pointing out that categorizing consiousness is all the argument seems to be geared to do. But since you brought it up, I do know what you have defined physical to be. Your argument basically says that if things in our reality have a causal relationship, then they are physical.
I can't think of anything that doesn't have a causal relationship. I assume consciousness does to. I just don't know where in the causal chain it is, the beginning or the end. But regardless of it's ontological nature, with this definition, it is physical and that's all we've concluded with this argument.

Actually, discussion of a framework by which consciousness might be efficacious was what I wanted to discuss. I got sidetracked because of people focusing in on my use of the word physical, which I felt I must defend. I do feel it is a better definition, but it isn't particularly important what words we use. Maybe now that we've got all of it out, we can now get back on point and actually discuss what you just said we should be discussing. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

I assumed that there had to be something you were trying to show with the post other than semantics but I just haven't been able to figure out what it is. I have gone back and read the original post several times thinking each time that I might see something I didn't before. Each time, I see this conclusion:

"Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source."

which means to me that p-consciousness is physical. So the whole point of the argument seems to be to classify consciousness as physical as opposed to non-physical. Maybe I have misunderstood.

So I need more direction. As I said to Les...me slow

 

[Les Sleeth]

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical. Who cares? Once that is done then it's a new word that means nothing to anyone else other than loseyourname. Physical means causal, consciousness is causal, therefore consciousness is physical. So what? What does this tell us? We can define words how ever we like in our assumptions and can conclude anything we wish but what do we know about the real world as a result of this exercise? I'm struggling here

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

I’ll take one more shot at explaining why I think it is important to define physical properly. I just reviewed the debate between Loseyourname and myself, and I can’t agree with either your version of how we got to debating about the meaning of physical, or that the definition of physical is insignificant to his theme. It seems to me you’ve forgotten Loseyourname’s original assertion:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

His conclusion:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Well, what is physical? I see our disagreement starting with two of his statements. The first was, “’Remember the definition of physical here is "constrained by material laws of cause and effect.’" Okay, look at that statement. Does it not say material laws? What is material? Matter. What is matter? Mass (and I’d include the products/effects of mass).

Loseyourname’s second point is what made me object. He then decided that if anything behaves mechanically, that too must be physical. He indicated that by mechanics he meant order-regularity-predictability (“If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics . . .”) My objection is, order-regularity-predictability isn’t necessarily only associated with matter. I didn’t want to allow him to claim if anything possesses order-regularity-predictability, then it is material. (Remember, it is he who first defined physical as “constrained by the material laws of cause and effect”)

You claim Loseyourname was not trying to suggest that physicalness is the bottom line, and make a case that consciousness is physically derived. Well, have you read this entire thread carefully? He says, for instance, “I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness.”

Later he says, “. . . as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise.”

And don’t forget his original proposition:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

How much more plainly can he put it that consciousness is derived from material properties, proven (he claims) by the fact that it MAY use energy (he doesn’t know if consciousness uses energy or not, of if it does that it is a large enough quantity to measure)?

So I have been trying to hold him to a proper definition of physical, which no other authority seems ambiguous about. Does consciousness have a material source? Is it ONLY mechanistic and material? Or is there something more we yet need to explain consciousness?

 

[loseyourname]

I suggest that you guys abandon the conclusion of my original series of syllogisms and instead focus on the truth or falsity of my revised proposition as I stated it on page 4 (after all of the clarification):

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

If you still find this proposition to be unclear, then I can further elaborate after any questions have been asked. I will specify, for now, that contracausality can mean either that conscious acts are not the result of mechanical causation, or that they are, but conscious volition, as the first link in the causal chain, is not itself the result of any other cause.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I suggest that you guys abandon the conclusion of my original series of syllogisms and instead focus on the truth or falsity of my revised proposition as I stated it on page 4 (after all of the clarification):

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

If you still find this proposition to be unclear, then I can further elaborate after any questions have been asked. I will specify, for now, that contracausality can mean either that conscious acts are not the result of mechanical causation, or that they are, but conscious volition, as the first link in the causal chain, is not itself the result of any other cause.

Cool (hey, I do that all the time, adjust my statements when I understand either more about the subject or how to communicate it better during the discussion).

I think I'm going to drop out of this discussion however because I feel like I've interfered with what you want to say. I honestly don't get either the earlier statement or this one. Others seem to get it, so I'll let everyone who does, work on this question.

 

[Philocrat]

I was just thinking about this last night. Granted, I'm not pretending to answer any questions as to whether or not p-consciousness is efficacious or whether or not it has a non-physical origin. I am attempting only to eliminate one possibility. My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. Here is how I reached this conclusion:

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world. This includes the energy necessary to carry out physical functions in the human body, as well as the energy to initiate neural processes that lead to physical action. If p-consciousness is efficacious, then it is capable of initiating these neural processes. Because neural processes require energy, they must be initiated by a physical source. Let me see if I can construct a formal proof for this. I will assume for the purposes of this proof that p-consciousness is efficacious.

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Edit: I can't get LaTeX to separate my lines, so you'll need to accept this series of syllogisms as a formal proof. Two hypothetical syllogisms and a modus ponens are used.

Additional unanswered questions include:

1) THE DEFINITION OF 'CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATES': for the debates often approach a point where critical mechanical states are mistaken for the over-and-above-the-mechanical conscious activities.

QUESTION: Do critical mechanical states naturally mimic conscious states? If they do, why should one be mistaken for the other?

2) DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS (REGARDLESS OF TYPE): the general impression given so far in all the threads that deal with the subject in this forum seems so far to hold that 'Consciousness is indefinable', at least to the full satisfaction of both the philosophical and scientific communities. The most powerful definition would be that which bodly says consciousness is this and nothing else. But then why are we going around in circles in threads after threads? Why are we all afraid to land the aguments in safe intellectual grounds and say this is what consciousness is and get on with other issues?

3) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS TRULY DISTINCT FROM OR OVER AND ABOVE THE MATERIAL, HOW DOES IT INTERACT WITH THE MATERIAL BODY WITHOUT THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS THAT YOU ARE HYPOTHESISING ABOUT? The cartesian dualism is widely disputed in various ways in a forest of literatures. Aristotle's version of how they interact comes just very close to making a lot of sense, but fails when applying purposive analysis to it.

4) WHAT THE OUTWARD AND OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF MIND AND MATTER ARE. Can the 'what' and 'how' questions about both be answered via a purposive account of both? That is, if we cannot answer the questions about what they are, how they interact, can we answer these two questions by asking why they are in this sort of dual relationship in the first place? What is the fundamental purpose of them coming together in this inexplicable union? Since 1998, I have always had the suspicion that this might very well be the case. Othwerwise we might as well default to supension of all judgements about everything.

NOTE: Your argument has some validity in it, but as you know circularism often turns our focus to self-serving hypotheses.

 

[loseyourname]

1) THE DEFINITION OF 'CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATE': for the debates often approach a point where critical mechanical states are mistaken for the over-and-above-the-mechanical conscious activities.

QUESTION: Do critical mechanical states naturally mimics conscious states? If they do, why should one be mistaken for the other?

You'll have to answer that one. I'm not too sure what a "critical mechanical state" is.

2) DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS (REGARDLESS OF TYPE): the general impression given so far in all the threads that deal with the subject in this forum seems so far to hold that 'Consciousness is indefinable', at least to the full satisfaction of both the philosophical and scientific communities.

I'm only asking about the efficacy of phenomenal consciousness in this thread. Some people will tell you that is the only kind of consciousness, while others will say that we should include some level of functionality. Regardless, all I'm referring to when I use the word "consciousness" in this thread is P-consciousness; that is, the ability to subjectively experience qualitative states. The question then becomes whether or not this capacity alone has any causal significance to human action and, by extension, whether or not it can be non-physical. (It should be noted that non-physicality does not necessarily imply dualism.)

3) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS TRULY DISTINCT FROM OR OVER AND ABOVE THE MATERIAL, HOW DOES IT INTERACT WITH THE MATERIAL BODY WITHOUT THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS THAT YOU ARE HYPOTHESISING ABOUT? The cartesian dualism is widely disputed in various ways in a forest of literatures. Aristotle's version of how they interacts comes just very close to making a lot of sense, but fails when applying purposive analysis to it.

Do you mean Aristotle's notion of final causation, or the influence of the Prime Mover on the intelligences? hypnagogue has brought up an interesting parallel between one of the hypotheses being investigated on these forums and the Aristotelian notion of material causation. Have you been following any of that?

The question of how any agent can be the cause of a physical event without requiring energy is part of what is being addressed here. There are several rather novel ways of getting around the apparent impossibility, but they either require an overhaul of the modern notion of causation or a leap of rationalism that is not supported by any empirical evidence.

4) WHAT THE OUTWARD AND OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF MIND AND MATTER. Can the what and how questions about both be answered via a purposive account of both? That is, if we cannot answer the questions about what they are, how they interact, can we answer these two questions by asking why they are in this sort of dual relationship in the first place. What is the fundamental purpose of them coming together in this inexplicable union?

By what and how questions do you mean "What matter and consciousness are?" Along with "How do matter and consciousness interact (assuming, of course, that consciousness does not have a material origin)?" This seems to be the case, but I cannot see how answering these questions (if we even can) would lead to any teleological conclusions, nor do I see how a teleological assumption could lead to the answering of these questions. I suppose I am giving you a tentative no here, although it is only tentative.

NOTE: Your argument has some validity in it, but as you know circularism often turns our focus to self-serving hypotheses.

Well, I'm not exactly a professional researcher as of this moment, so I have no vested interest in the truth or falsehood of anyone model over another. That is to say none of these hypotheses would serve my self.

Note that I would like the discussion, at this point, to turn not on the first post, but rather on the bold-faced proposition I've copied above. We'll see where that leads us.

 

[Fliption]

How much more plainly can he put it that consciousness is derived from material properties, proven (he claims) by the fact that it MAY use energy (he doesn’t know if consciousness uses energy or not, of if it does that it is a large enough quantity to measure)?

Ok I've got all that. Honestly, to me it still looks like a battle of definitions with no implications at all . It seems he's just redefining "material" to include all things that act mechanically in a causal relationship. To me, this has no meaning at all. Pardon the pun .

Let me try an analogy to show you how this appears to me. Let's say two scientists are trying to determine the color of a flash of light. They use their equipment to determine that the light is in the range of 610 Thz. They look at their chart and see that this is "blue". This is an example of people learning something about reality. They understand the ontology of that flash of light better now than they did before.

Now let's say that a week later scientist #1 comes back to scientist #2 and claims that the flash of light was not blue; It was green. Scientist #2 doesn't believe this for a second. He did the experiment very carefully and is sure the light frenquency was 610 Thz. Scientist #1 then begins to debate him. His trump card is an article in Scientific American claiming that the science community has changed the frequency range for green by raising it to 610 Thz. The flash of light is now green! Scientist #2 says "Oh poo is that all?! I thought I had done something wrong! The light IS at 610 Thz!

The ontology of the light does not change and the credibility of the experiment and the information it provided does not change. We have gained absolutely zero information about the ontology of this flash of light as a result of this definition change.

This is what I see happening in the original post of this thread and beyond. We know nothing about consciousness that we didn't know before. We're just calling it Fred now instead of Ralph.

 

[hypnagogue]

A. Consciousness exits
B. Consciousness can desire and will an experience
C. Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will and consumes pizza.
D. Les’ conscious will has caused physical effects

Here’s the logic (I can’t get my computer to make all the proper logic marks so I’ll use words:

If A and B, and if and only if C, then D

I can't really make head or tails of what you're trying to say here with your revised conditional statement. It would really be helpful if you could use arrows and dashes to represent the conditional (eg "->" for if... then and "<->" for "if and only if... then"). As it stands, I'm not sure the verbal logic statement you wrote here can be translated into symbolic logic.

But ignoring that for now, I see your general idea is to have A, B, and C as your premises and D as your conclusion. But again, this amounts to a trivial proof. If you take as a premise "Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will," then of course it follows that your consciousness has caused physical effects, but you haven't really done any explanitory work here. You want to argue that consciousness is efficacious, but in step C you basically already assume that it is.

I have not excluded the possibility that the brain or conditioning can also cause Les to unconsciously eat pizza (your “R”). I made that about as clear as I could in my last post. I did not say only consciousness causes physical activity in the body.

For our purposes, this distinction isn't vitally important. You can assume that in my previous post, Q means that there is at least some causal effect from p-consciousness onto the body, and that R implies that there is absolutely no causal effect from p-consciousness onto the body.

Finally, I claim that I know I, as consciousness, will my body to do things because I experience what consciousness is. In fact, that is primarily what my statement was. I refuse to indulge the question much because it’s about on the same plane as contemplating if we are brains in a vat, or if we are just someone’s dream in another universe. If a person sacrifices the certainty of being consciously present for the speculation, imaginings and doubt that comes with trying to figure that sort of stuff out, then have at it. I’d rather just experience the certainty of knowing what I am doing.

I have no doubt that you experience certainty about p-consciousness's causal agency, but that's not necessarily a compelling reason for believing it is so. We can be certain of the existence and character of p-consciousness in and of itself, but when we take p-consciousness as a representation of some other phenomenon and use it to draw conclusions about that represented phenomenon, we can be wrong in our conclusions. Any number of perceptual illusions will prove the point.

Your only way out of the above consideration is to claim that you do not experience will as a representation of a causal process, but that you directly experience the causal process itself. But this does not get us very far. How are you justified in believing that you are experiencing will-as-causation as opposed to will-representing-causation? Simply noting the systematic correlation between will and action is not sufficient, for reasons I've already explained. Is it something in the experience itself, then, that somehow tips you off? If the only evidence is experiential, then once again we are prone to being victims of illusion.

Maybe framing the question in this manner will be most helpful: suppose there are two kinds of people. One kind of people (call them 'Causers') possesses a p-consciousness that directly influences the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Causers directly experience will-as-causation. The other kind of people (call them 'Effectees') possesses an epiphenomenal p-consciousness that does not directly influence the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Although their p-consciousness is not efficacious, Effectees still experience will; they believe that their p-consciousness causes them to act just as much as the Causers do. There is no discernible difference in the average behavior of a Causer as opposed to that of an Effectee.

Now, how do we differentiate the two? How do the Causers' subjective experiences give them justified belief in knowing that they possesses conscious will, while an Effectees' subjective experience does not provide such a justified belief? How does a Causer know he is not an Effectee, and how does an Effectee know he is not a Causer? Unless you can provide a good answer to this question, you can't be sure that you yourself are a Causer and not an Effectee.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Hypnagogue, I believe this debate perfectly exemplifies our very different approaches to philosophy. It is the experientialist and the rationalist trying to make sense to each other. I hope I can explain things better by the end of this post because so far we are not even close to talking about the same thing (miiiiiiles apart ).

I can't really make head or tails of what you're trying to say here with your revised conditional statement. It would really be helpful if you could use arrows and dashes to represent the conditional (eg "->" for if... then and "<->" for "if and only if... then"). As it stands, I'm not sure the verbal logic statement you wrote here can be translated into symbolic logic.

I know the logic symbols, got’em right here, but we don’t need them. A philosopher should be able to reason with people and make sense. If we were computers talking to each other, then maybe . . . but I don’t enjoy thinking like a computer or exchanging ideas with one.

But ignoring that for now, I see your general idea is to have A, B, and C as your premises and D as your conclusion. But again, this amounts to a trivial proof.

Lol . . Either you haven’t been listening or I’ve been dreadfully unclear. I am at a loss for why I can’t get you understand it’s not an attempt at a proof at all!

If you take as a premise "Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will," then of course it follows that your consciousness has caused physical effects, but you haven't really done any explanatory work here. You want to argue that consciousness is efficacious, but in step C you basically already assume that it is.

That’s correct. I haven’t done any explanatory work because I am not attempting to justify my statement beyond demonstrating how it represents the testimony of my experience. I am not trying to prove anything. I am not concerned if it satisfies others’ intellectual dilemmas. It is you who are attempting to reframe my meaning into a logical proof. I never meant it as one (since I don’t believe such a proof is possible), so I don’t care now to engage in what I consider a futile effort by trying to convert it into a proof.

I have no doubt that you experience certainty about p-consciousness's causal agency, but that's not necessarily a compelling reason for believing it is so.

Not compelling for whom? Do you mean for others? If you only knew how that statement utterly dumbfounds me as an experientialist. What you state as no “compelling reason for believing” is the only reason I know for believing: experience.

We can be certain of the existence and character of p-consciousness in and of itself, but when we take p-consciousness as a representation of some other phenomenon and use it to draw conclusions about that represented phenomenon, we can be wrong in our conclusions. Any number of perceptual illusions will prove the point.

What conclusions am I drawing when I make a report as a witness? I am the witness of the event of me, consciousness, watching what happens to my body when I exert my will. There isn’t much concluding necessary. What I could do is question what has over time become patently obvious to me, and thereby needlessly confuse myself. I won’t do it.

Your only way out of the above consideration is to claim that you do not experience will as a representation of a causal process, but that you directly experience the causal process itself. But this does not get us very far.

It gets me as far as I need to go, I am not concerned about how far it gets anyone else. Take it or leave it. It is just an affidavit.

How are you justified in believing that you are experiencing will-as-causation as opposed to will-representing-causation?

You are closer now because for me personal justification is the key. I’ll explain below.

Simply noting the systematic correlation between will and action is not sufficient, for reasons I've already explained. Is it something in the experience itself, then, that somehow tips you off? If the only evidence is experiential, then once again we are prone to being victims of illusion.

Well, you will never know, in my opinion, trying to figure it out. Because you think it can be figured out is why you keep demanding proof, and because I don’t believe it can be done is why I refuse to attempt it.

Maybe framing the question in this manner will be most helpful: suppose there are two kinds of people. One kind of people (call them 'Causers') possesses a p-consciousness that directly influences the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Causers directly experience will-as-causation. The other kind of people (call them 'Effectees') possesses an epiphenomenal p-consciousness that does not directly influence the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Although their p-consciousness is not efficacious, Effectees still experience will; they believe that their p-consciousness causes them to act just as much as the Causers do. There is no discernible difference in the average behavior of a Causer as opposed to that of an Effectee.

Now, how do we differentiate the two? How do the Causers' subjective experiences give them justified belief in knowing that they possesses conscious will, while an Effectees' subjective experience does not provide such a justified belief? How does a Causer know he is not an Effectee, and how does an Effectee know he is not a Causer? Unless you can provide a good answer to this question, you can't be sure that you yourself are a Causer and not an Effectee.

Maybe there are two kinds of people. One kind prefers and practices living in and under the influence of (as best as they are able) the experience of the present (let’s call them “Experientialists”). The other kind prefers and “practices” living under the influence of relentless, incessant, inexorable thinking (let’s call them “Rationalists”).

From the point of view of a dedicated Experientialist (especially one who formerly was a Rationalist), Rationalists do not have complete control over their thought processes or they would be able to halt them when they wished (easily found out by closing one’s eyes and attempting it). Since they cannot be consciously still, they cannot experience consciousness as it is when clean of all that thinking. Also, they usually are unaware of the after effects ceaseless thinking causes, which lingers and influences one’s perspective of reality. The result is, Rationalists can see consciousness performing various functions, but they cannot see what consciousness is.

As an Experientialist I’ve been trying to say that to see the causal connection between conscious will and physical action, the non-functionalistic state of consciousness must first be experienced. That state of just “being” consciousness, which in stillness rests as pure potentiality, reveals what it is about consciousness that “causes.” One can actually witness it doing it because the contrast of movement against the stillness makes it stand out as clear as day.

I claim that years of witnessing that experience has created a certainty about it, and that none of functionalist nonsense I’ve heard fits my experience. When the Rationalist wants me to “think” about what conscious is, I already know that once I’m involved in functionality I won’t be able to experience what consciousness is, and so like the Rationalist, I must resort to speculation. To that suggestion I must say . . . forget about it, I am not going back to that state where everything is subject to doubt. If there is one true advantage of the pure experience of consciousness it’s that it firmly instills in one the knowledge of existence and one’s nature (including the fact that will is present and consciousness can cause through it).

Now how is the Experientialist going to prove that? It can’t be done because the entire experience is internal. We can only “prove” external events and circumstances; the veracity of internal truths must be realized by each individual human being. I cannot do it for others, and others cannot do it for me. That’s not my fault, I didn’t make reality this way!

Likewise, there is no logical proof possible. You labeled my claim “trivial.” Well, I say it isn’t trivial to know one’s self, and it isn’t trivial to point out that if one really wants to know consciousness one is going to have to stop thinking about consciousness and learn to experience it directly.

It is like this. What if you and a friend were eating a mango, and then you offered a mango to a man who’d never had it before. He asks you “what is it like”? You say, “it’s sort of like a peach.” Then he asks your friend what the mango is like, and he replies, “It isn’t like a peach at all, it is like a papaya.”

The man says, “oh wow, it is so interesting to me what the taste of a mango is.” So he goes off and starts a new academic discipline called Mango Studies. He attract geniuses from all over the world who are interested in figuring out how a mango tastes. They debate all the time, and demand “proofs.” The peach-like side figures out ways to undermine the papaya side, and the papaya-like side figures out ways to counter that and then undermine the peach-like side.

Meanwhile, you are back home enjoying the taste, and wondering why each person doesn’t taste it and decide for himself what a mango is like. When you say you know exactly how it tastes, the Mango Studies geniuses demand proof. You say that is ridiculous, just taste it! NO, they answer, show us the logical steps between R and Q, how S derives from B, and how A can avoid being contradicted by your statement that a mango tastes like a peach.

Of course that is a silly analogy, but to me so is people trying to “figure out” what consciousness is, when they have one, are one, and could, if they wanted to, learn how to experience its fundamental nature.

I respect your right to try to figure it out, but I’m not interested in submitting to what I have proven to myself is a colossal waste of time. You have a lot more years to waste than I do, so knock yourself out. Who knows, maybe you will figure it all out. But of course, that still doesn’t mean you will “know” consciousness, the same way the person with a concept of a mango does “know” the experience of a mango.

So I repeat my certainty that as consciousness I will my body to move, and it does. I am not going to attempt a proof because none is possible, or necessary either since mine is the statement of a witness, not of a theorist. Experience and know, or indulge in speculation. It doesn’t matter to me as long as I am allowed to practice philosophy as I see fit, and am not forced to conform to other’s personal standards.

 

[StatusX]

I haven’t done any explanatory work because I am not attempting to justify my statement beyond demonstrating how it represents the testimony of my experience. I am not trying to prove anything. I am not concerned if it satisfies others’ intellectual dilemmas. It is you who are attempting to reframe my meaning into a logical proof. I never meant it as one (since I don’t believe such a proof is possible), so I don’t care now to engage in what I consider a futile effort by trying to convert it into a proof.

You seem to think the causal ability of consciousness is an unanswerable question, but this is not the case. If we are one day in possession of a physical explanation of everything we do, right down to the mechanism in our brain that's responsible for our discussions of consciousness, then we'll know the answer: consciousness is not causal. If we reach a roadblock and have accounted for everything our brain does but still have actions that are unexplained, then there's a good chance consciousness is the missing piece. This question is in the realm of science because all science does is study cause and effect relationships. So unless you're going to deny everything science shows and claim all that's real is what you experience, (which is solipsism, and I don't think you intend to do that), then you have to admit there is at least a valid question to be answered: Can consciousness cause? We don't have the answer now, but one day we might. You can't just say that since all you know for sure is what you experience, that's all there is, and that what you experience is objectively true.

Likewise, there is no logical proof possible. You labeled my claim “trivial.” Well, I say it isn’t trivial to know one’s self, and it isn’t trivial to point out that if one really wants to know consciousness one is going to have to stop thinking about consciousness and learn to experience it directly.

You're proof was trivial because, as you admitted, you've already decided that you believe consciousness is causal, and your proof was totally unnecesary, as the conclusion was in one of the premises.

 

[hypnagogue]

I know the logic symbols, got’em right here, but we don’t need them. A philosopher should be able to reason with people and make sense.

Yes, that's the whole point. Expressing things formally can help remove ambiguities inherent in natural language communication, so we can get a clearer idea of exactly what is being claimed.

What conclusions am I drawing when I make a report as a witness? I am the witness of the event of me, consciousness, watching what happens to my body when I exert my will. There isn’t much concluding necessary. What I could do is question what has over time become patently obvious to me, and thereby needlessly confuse myself. I won’t do it.

Consider this analogy. Suppose there is a person, Bob, who lives his whole life confined in a room. There is only one object in the room: an unopenable black box with two light bulbs protruding from a side. Whenever one of the lightbulbs lights up, the other light bulb lights a second later. Bob is the witness of this box, watching what happens whenever one of the bulbs lights up for his entire life. To Bob, there isn't much concluding necessary; the light from one light bulb obviously causes the other to light up. Bob sees no reason to question what has become a patently obvious causitive relation.

But, in fact, Bob is mistaken in his belief that the light from one bulb causes the other to light up. What is actually causing the bulbs to light up is the underlying circuitry inside the black box. Bob holds his belief because he witnesses repeated, reliable correlation, and given his existential circumstances, it's a very good belief. But it still turns out to be wrong.

Please don't misunderstand me here. I'm not trying to say you are wrong. I'm trying to say you very well may be wrong, and thus should not consider this matter decisively concluded.

Well, you will never know, in my opinion, trying to figure it out. Because you think it can be figured out is why you keep demanding proof, and because I don’t believe it can be done is why I refuse to attempt it.

Granted, perhaps 'proof' was too strong of a word. However, if there are two competing hypotheses that fit a phenomenon equally as well, we must at least have considerable doubt when choosing one over the other.

Maybe there are two kinds of people. One kind prefers and practices living in and under the influence of (as best as they are able) the experience of the present (let’s call them “Experientialists”). The other kind prefers and “practices” living under the influence of relentless, incessant, inexorable thinking (let’s call them “Rationalists”).

Now I've done it... I never thought I would get the famous Rationalist lecture from you!

The result is, Rationalists can see consciousness performing various functions, but they cannot see what consciousness is.

I think the situation is the complete opposite. I won't speak in terms of your Rationalist/Experimentalist dichotomy, but in general, it is philosophically accepted that we are acquainted with what p-consciousness is, but not with what it does. Contrast this with physical phenomena: we know what (eg) an electron does, but we don't know what it is.

Because we have a firm grasp on what physical phenomena do, we have a pretty good idea of their causal relationships, as depicted by physics. But we don't know what they are-- it's like the physical world is a bundle of math equations without a computer to process those equations. Another way to say this is that our understanding of physical phenomena is entirely relational, or extrinsic, in nature. We know how physical things relate, but we don't know what is doing the relating.

On the other hand, it is precisely because we don't know what p-consciousness does that this thread was started in the first place, and in general why there has been no historical consensus on epiphenomenalism vs. interactionist dualism or some other causal depiction of p-consciousness. Contrariwise, the only reason we are talking about p-consciousness is because we know what it is-- because we are immediately acquainted with it. If I just sit and stare blankly at a red ball, it's not clear that my subjective experience of redness is doing anything to me, but it's certainly there, right in my conscious visual field. Another way to say this is that our understanding of p-consciousness is entirely intrinsic. We know the thing-in-itself (eg phenomenal redness), but we're not sure what role it plays in the causal structure of the world.

It is like this. What if you and a friend were eating a mango, and then you offered a mango to a man who’d never had it before. He asks you “what is it like”? You say, “it’s sort of like a peach.” Then he asks your friend what the mango is like, and he replies, “It isn’t like a peach at all, it is like a papaya.”

The man says, “oh wow, it is so interesting to me what the taste of a mango is.” So he goes off and starts a new academic discipline called Mango Studies. He attract geniuses from all over the world who are interested in figuring out how a mango tastes. They debate all the time, and demand “proofs.” The peach-like side figures out ways to undermine the papaya side, and the papaya-like side figures out ways to counter that and then undermine the peach-like side.

Meanwhile, you are back home enjoying the taste, and wondering why each person doesn’t taste it and decide for himself what a mango is like. When you say you know exactly how it tastes, the Mango Studies geniuses demand proof. You say that is ridiculous, just taste it! NO, they answer, show us the logical steps between R and Q, how S derives from B, and how A can avoid being contradicted by your statement that a mango tastes like a peach.

I'm entirely with you on this. The only way to know a mango taste is to actually experience tasting a mango; there is no objective analysis that will reveal this experience. If I disagreed with you here, I would probably be a deflationary materialist extolling the virtues of Dennett, but you already know that that's not me.

What is different about experiencing the taste of a mango and experiencing will moving the physical body? In the former, we are talking exclusively about an intrinsic property, a thing-in-itself, whereas in the latter we are talking about a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic phenomena (subjective experience of will + causal movement of the body). There can be no doubt that a mango tastes a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us; likewise, there can be no doubt that the experience of will subjectively feels a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us. Where we run into problems is trying to bridge that ineffible 1st person datum across the great divide to the causal dynamics of the external world.

For all I know, interactionist dualism may be true; however, there is not enough in just the experience of will to come to this conclusion. Why not? Because given what we know about the causal dynamics of the world, the experience of will is entirely compatible with epiphenomenalism as well. Assume epiphenomenalism and the world still runs smoothly, with no contradictions as to what we actually experience. Perhaps it contradicts our intuitions, but it's entirely possible-- that is to say, there is no contradiction in assuming-- that we feel as if p-consciousness causes something without it actually causing anything.

 

[loseyourname]

Ok I've got all that. Honestly, to me it still looks like a battle of definitions with no implications at all . It seems he's just redefining "material" to include all things that act mechanically in a causal relationship.

I actually made it pretty clear several times that what I was talking about had nothing to do with anything "material," which again tells me you haven't been reading the posts very carefully. I'll just ask, though: Has it not occurred to you that it might be a good idea to clearly define terms before we get into implications and learning?

You know, that way we don't have you thinking I mean one thing by "material" when I mean something else, and Les realizes that I don't mean the same thing by "physical" that he does, so he will not get perturbed when I call something "physical" that he wouldn't. Otherwise, what happens is this - we get into an argument over definitions rather than learning anything. I didn't think it would be this difficult just to get everyone on the same page so we can start the real discussion.

Lord almighty.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Now I've done it... I never thought I would get the famous Rationalist lecture from you!

I won't have time to answer you properly for a couple days, my wife is leaving town and so we are doing Christmas early. I quoted that above because I've been feeling a bit under-understood by your insistance I formulate my approach in your terms, but your words there made me feel like you are trying to get it.

Let me say that when I do answer, I will continue not to agree with you much. I still don't think you appreciate the approach I am taking to philosophy. While I understand everything you say, I feel like you have yet to "get" where I am coming from. Once I believe you get it, and if you can make a strong argument against it, then I will be impressed.

I'll give you one little clue. Have you read Carlos Castenada's account of Don Juan describing "seeing"? (I liked the description in "Journey to Ixtland" best.) This practice of "seeing," if you understand it, is quite different than how you are suggesting we decide about conscious will and causility. In my opinion, we are split exactly at the difference between seeing and pure reason.

My life has not been a sheltered or cautious one. I've taken a lot of chances, gotten seriously injured, fallen hard (embarassingly hard), tried everything I could, sometimes to the point of obsession . . . I've studied too, so I am not ignorant of the varieties of things in our universe. You are talking to someone who, though battered somewhat, is still a game experimenter. But I am not going to go backwards. The approach you are taking is "backward" for me, and the only reason I'd consider it is if I've missed something there which would have changed my mind if I'd experienced it.

I'll probably respond Saturday sometime.

 

[hypnagogue]

Let me say that when I do answer, I will continue not to agree with you much. I still don't think you appreciate the approach I am taking to philosophy. While I understand everything you say, I feel like you have yet to "get" where I am coming from. Once I believe you get it, and if you can make a strong argument against it, then I will be impressed.

I'm not under the illusion at this point that we're going to change each other's minds. But I think it would still be informative to continue the discussion. I am giving you an honest effort trying to understand where you're coming from. Probably the best way for you to state your case to me would be to address my black box analogy and explain why it is not analogous to your situation, even if you think it's a step backwards for whatever reason. Humor my foolish rationalism. In the meantime I'll look into the Castenada thing.

my wife is leaving town and so we are doing Christmas early.

Enjoy!

 

[Fliption]

I actually made it pretty clear several times that what I was talking about had nothing to do with anything "material," which again tells me you haven't been reading the posts very carefully. I'll just ask, though: Has it not occurred to you that it might be a good idea to clearly define terms before we get into implications and learning?

I have read the posts carefully. I was responding to the post from Les, not any of yours. I was responding to his description of what you were doing. If you weren't actually doing that then you need to take that up with Les. My summation was from Les' point of view.

And you're singing to the choir when you talk to me about making sure we all have the same definitions. I have been on the "let's define physical and non-physical" bandwagon for quite some time now. My request has typically been ignored. It's quite amusing to me seeing people fight over something when they are talking about two different things. But it gets old fast.

This particular thread isn't that bad. It has become obvious to all participating here that the definitons were different and that's been part of the discussion. That's a good thing that rarely happens.

But from what I see in your points on this thread, if we remove the semantics then there is nothing else to talk about because all you're doing is engaging in an exercise of semantics. For example, let's take your advice and get the definitions straight. If you just accept Les' definition of physical and replace your word with a word "X", your conclusion will read: "Consciousness comes from a "X" source." What you'll find is that it is a no-brainer conclusion that you already knew because it's sitting right there in your assumptions.

 

[Les Sleeth]

For example, let's take your advice and get the definitions straight. If you just accept Les' definition of physical and replace your word with a word "X", your conclusion will read: "Consciousness comes from a "X" source." What you'll find is that it is a no-brainer conclusion that you already knew because it's sitting right there in your assumptions.

I agree with you that definitions need to be clear. But to be accurate about the definitions I posted, they weren't mine. I assume we all have Google, so why not do what I did and look up every definition you can find of "physical"? I did that, and then checked my Britannica, my Oxford Dictionary, Scientific American Encyclopedia of Science, my Chambers, my McGraw Hill Science Encyclopedia, my Webster's Unabridged (the $125 version), my Columbia Encyclopedia, my . . .

What I published is not just some specialized definition I dug out of an occult science dungeon. It is mainstream. Virtually every authority defines physical in terms of mass and energy, and even Loseyourname (though he doesn't seem to want to admit it) started out defining it the same way when he said "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." I can't see how that definition can construed any other way than as materiality.

Why should it be so hard to accept the mainstream definition? And then if you want to get creative, start from the mainstream, and the explain how you want to diverge from that. But any communication endeavor is going to be made more difficult when someone uses a word with an established definition in a new way.

 

[Philocrat]

WHAT IS A CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATE?

Since all mechanical laws or scientific laws are logical laws, a crtical mechanical state is a point in a mechanical process where logical pathways appear to visually vanish when in actual facts they are not. At this point pure mechanical states or logical steps appear unintelligible when in actual fact they are still naturally intelligible at this critical point and beyond. Logical or Mechanical connectedness suddenly appears discontinuous and logically disconnected.

The question that I am still asking is this:

Is it this illusive logical discontinuity in a critcal mechanical state that is being mistaken for consciousness?

 

[Fliption]

I agree with you that definitions need to be clear. But to be accurate about the definitions I posted, they weren't mine.

Yes I agree with you. I was just pointing out to Loseyourname that I too am one of the last that needs a lecture on being clear about definitions.

In the case of this thread, once you get the definitions straight and everyone can agree on the right words, I don't believe there will be anything left to talk about since the whole purpose of the thread is seemingly to do nothing but define the concepts in such a way as to categorize consciousness as "Physical". I can't see that Loseyourname's argument does anything other than make a statement about categories. "The Law of conservation" implies NOTHING about the efficacy of consciousness to answer the title of this thread. All this thread seems to be saying is IF consciousness is efficacious, then we can now call it "Physical" because physical means "X". This is a semantic argument.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Hypnagogue, I’ve rearranged the order of your comments to help me answer them in a logical way (it seems I found some time after all ).

Bob holds his belief because he witnesses repeated, reliable correlation, and given his existential circumstances, it's a very good belief. But it still turns out to be wrong.

I’ve always understood your point. It’s just that I haven’t wanted to bring union experience into this. But I can’t find any other way to communicate my conviction about conscious will unless you understand the perspective I am describing things from. As you will see, besides my own experience I’ve relied on other individuals experienced with union to help me explain myself. Hopefully the process of providing this perspective will answer why your black box analogy doesn’t apply.

Since I referred you to Carlos Castaneda, let me start there with two of don Juan’s concepts, in particular “seeing” and “stopping the world.” In an interview Castaneda explained, “. . . what he [don Juan] calls seeing is apprehending the world without any interpretation . . . When we stop the world, the world we stop is the one we usually maintain by our continual inner dialogue. Once you can stop the internal babble you stop maintaining your old world.”

What Castaneda reports is fully in line with union practice, which not only achieves a high level of “seeing,” but also lifts consciousness out of its normal p-consciousness-only perspective to “see” much bigger and deeper than before the “lift.” I’ll explain as answer the rest of your post.

I think the situation is the complete opposite . . . in general, it is philosophically accepted that we are acquainted with what p-consciousness is, but not with what it does. . . . We know the thing-in-itself . . . but we're not sure what role it plays in the causal structure of the world.

We aren’t using the same meaning for “is-ness.” I agree that we don’t understand all that p-consciousness does, and we do know that aspect of subjectivity everyone in consciousness studies is talking about.

But that isn’t the only “is-ness” I am referring to. In fact, that is merely the tip of the iceberg, which is a good analogy because beneath the surface of our familiar subjective experience is much more. My overall point has been: everyone is trying to figure out consciousness by looking at the part that’s showing, and trying generate a model from that limited view.

There can be no doubt that a mango tastes a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us; likewise, there can be no doubt that the experience of will subjectively feels a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us. Where we run into problems is trying to bridge that ineffable 1st person datum across the great divide to the causal dynamics of the external world.

The thing is, from your descriptions of things I’m forced to conclude that the great divide you see is different than what I see from the perspective of union experience. That experience seems to pull one out of the brain somewhat to reveal that consciousness is joined to something big, really big. The experience brings to mind the words of the 13th century monastic Angela of Foligno (Italy), “The eyes of my soul were opened . . . so that through excess of marveling the soul cried with a loud voice, saying, ‘This whole world is full of God!’ Wherefore did I now comprehend that the world is but a small thing . . .”

With enough practice this withdrawal or pull-back from the brain can become permanent, so that one experiences being sort of “behind” the body and more within the great expanse. Here’s how I might represent what I “see” in terms of that aspect when I look at the interaction of consciousness and the body (C stands for consciousness and P stands for physical):

Former p-consciousness perspective of the “great divide”:
C--->P--------------------------------------------------------->
“Great divide” after conscious perspective is shifted:
C--------------------------------------------------------->P--->

In this major shift in perspective, the physical shrinks considerably, and one experiences consciousness as the fundamental thing, as the larger thing. Another monastic, Julian Norwich in the 14th century described it, “And then the Lord opened my ghostly eye and shewed my soul . . . I saw the Soul as it were an endless world.”

Part of the sense too is that one has been pulled out a bit from the multiplicity of brain functions and unified. Plotinus’ description seems apt, “Because what the soul seeks is the One . . . from the multiplicity that it was it must again become one. Only thus can it contemplate the supreme principle, the One.”

For all I know, interactionist dualism may be true; however, there is not enough in just the experience of will to come to this conclusion. Why not? Because given what we know about the causal dynamics of the world, the experience of will is entirely compatible with epiphenomenalism as well.

Well, that’s what you know, but that doesn’t necessarily apply to me. Besides experiencing that consciousness extends much further than one’s brain, there’s another part of the experience which reveals consciousness has an essence (commonly reported as light) and this essence seems shared by, and the “stuff” of, all of reality. I mention that here because of your use of the word “dualism.” Since you didn’t say “substance dualism,” then I assume you don’t necessarily mean that, but just in case . . .

The important thing is, where before the shift one sees virtually only the physical and only sees reality as zillions of different things, after the shift one “sees” that consciousness is the big thing (because one is now part of it), and that there is an underlying unity behind all existence. Here are some descriptions by famous union adepts that give a sense of this:

The 12th century German monastic Hildegarde, “. . . my soul has always beheld this Light; and in it my soul soars to the summit of the firmament and into a different air . . . the brightness which I see is not limited by space and is more brilliant than the radiance round the sun. . . . . sometimes when I see it . . . I seem a simple girl again, and an old woman no more!”

The Sufi Nimatullah Wali in 9th century Persia, “In the prison of form we still rejoice—watch what we do then in the world of essence . . . we are drowned in the universal ocean, we do not seek water now.”

George Fox in the 17th century, “[The Light is where] there is no division but unity in the life . . . . Therefore, in the Light wait where the unity is, where the peace is, where the Oneness . . . is, where there is not rent nor division.”

Zen master Kakuan in 12 century China, “ . . . all merge in No-Thing. This heaven is so vast no message can stain it. How may a snowflake exist in a raging fire?”

Jacopone Da Todi in the 13th century, “When the mind’s very being is gone . . . in a rapture divine and deep, itself in the Godhead lost . . . knowing not how it was crossed . . . drawn from its former state, to another [that is] measureless . . .”

Please don't misunderstand me here. I'm not trying to say you are wrong. I'm trying to say you very well may be wrong, and thus should not consider this matter decisively concluded. . . . Granted, perhaps 'proof' was too strong of a word. However, if there are two competing hypotheses that fit a phenomenon equally as well, we must at least have considerable doubt when choosing one over the other.

So we are back at your suggestion that I cannot possibly “know” if my experience of conscious will is what I believe it is. To that I would say that we cannot absolutely know anything of that sort (at least while still in the confines of the body). You cannot prove to me that I am not someone else’s dream, for example.

What we can have in the inner world is some degree of certainty that is established by the extent of our experience. The perspective I have described to you, which I have been experiencing for many years, has given me certainty. If someone hasn’t had that experience, they cannot possibly have such certainty. What can I do about that? Nothing, not a thing, except possibly recommend others to check out the possibility of acquiring such experience themselves. If you don’t want to, fine. I still am able to report to you, as a witness, that I can see conscious will is asserting itself over physicalness. I can even report that in light of the vastly disproportionate size difference, the concept that physicalness is capable of producing consciousness is ludicrous.

This idea of sticking with and totally trusting the experience of “shifted” consciousness is sometimes called the “path of knowledge.” I believe it is called that because in the experience one is more aware of one’s existence, and the nature of that existence, than in any other mode of consciousness (intellectual, for instance). So when I resist your efforts to have me participate in what I can clearly see is not going to give a definitive answer, I resist. Since I started off with don Juan I’ll finish by saying my effort is similar to his idea of a “man of knowledge.”

He says, “A man of knowledge chooses a path with heart and follows it and then he looks and rejoices and laughs, and then he sees and knows."

 

[hypnagogue]

Les, I think we're getting deeper to the heart of the matter, but we're also drifting farther away from the topic of this thread. I'll be happy to continue our discussion once you get back from your break, but it should probably take place in a new thread.

 

[loseyourname]

In the case of this thread, once you get the definitions straight and everyone can agree on the right words, I don't believe there will be anything left to talk about since the whole purpose of the thread is seemingly to do nothing but define the concepts in such a way as to categorize consciousness as "Physical". I can't see that Loseyourname's argument does anything other than make a statement about categories. "The Law of conservation" implies NOTHING about the efficacy of consciousness to answer the title of this thread. All this thread seems to be saying is IF consciousness is efficacious, then we can now call it "Physical" because physical means "X". This is a semantic argument.

Well, you'll see that once we got past that, I was more clear on what the conclusion is. For a mental state to be initiated, energy has to be used. Energy is physical in the traditional sense. So we were able to conclude that, in order for consciousness to not be physical in the material sense, is has to either:

a) Be an organizational principle of energy/matter that does not perform any work but rather acts as some sort of static guide. There are several paths we can take here. The first would be the liberal naturalist contention that consciousness can be explained through intrinsic properties of natural things that are not physical in the t-physicalism sense because they are not a relational property. The other approach is Les' approach, if we consider his fundamental existent or illumination to be an agent that can manipulate energy (which would not require work).

b) Simply be contracausal in nature.

If you don't think this is progress or worthy of a thread, so be it. But I think there is at least the possibility that something has begun to get uncovered here. If you already knew this, again, so be it. Let the rest of us indulge.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, I think we're getting deeper to the heart of the matter, but we're also drifting farther away from the topic of this thread. I'll be happy to continue our discussion once you get back from your break, but it should probably take place in a new thread.

You will likely be busy with your new thread project (I noticed Mr. Rosenberg checking out your thread). I don't have any more to say unless you want to challenge me further, or ask more questions.

 

[Fliption]

Well, you'll see that once we got past that, I was more clear on what the conclusion is. For a mental state to be initiated, energy has to be used. Energy is physical in the traditional sense. So we were able to conclude that, in order for consciousness to not be physical in the material sense, is has to either:

If I just drop the step where we categorize things as physical or non-physical then I can make more sense of this. I think what you're saying is that if consciousness cannot be described mathematically, in principle, and it is efficacious then alternative A is our choice. Otheriwse it's B.

a) Be an organizational principle of energy/matter that does not perform any work but rather acts as some sort of static guide. b) Simply be contracausal in nature.

I agree that these two are possibilities.

If you don't think this is progress or worthy of a thread, so be it. But I think there is at least the possibility that something has begun to get uncovered here. If you already knew this, again, so be it. Let the rest of us indulge.

It's just my opinion but I still say this is a no-brainer. Why do you think it is that you can insert Hypnagogue and Les' views into these options if no one knew these were our choices?

 

[loseyourname]

It's just my opinion but I still say this is a no-brainer. Why do you think it is that you can insert Hypnagogue and Les' views into these options if no one knew these were our choices?

Hey, we got to start somewhere. If we can put some restrictions on what Les' or hypnagogue's views can really say when it comes time for some details, at least we can do that. I had no grand aims here. Even if I failed to do that, at least I tried.