Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

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The discussion centers on the relationship between p-consciousness and the law of conservation of energy, arguing that if p-consciousness is efficacious, it must have a physical source. The law states that energy cannot be created or destroyed, implying that all energy, including that used in neural processes, originates in the physical world. The conversation explores whether consciousness can exist outside physical parameters, with some participants suggesting that matter, energy, and consciousness might share a fundamental origin. There is a debate on the implications of dualism and whether consciousness can influence physical processes without violating physical laws. Ultimately, the discussion raises questions about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to physical reality.
  • #61
Les Sleeth said:
That's if you define consciousness using only qualia, which has never made sense to me. How does it make sense that conscious experience is defined only by "what it's like" to taste a gourmet pizza, and then to say it is not conscious that I personally willed my intellect to learn and my body to create the dish I was going experience "what it's like"?

A definition of consciousness might include that aspect and I guess that's why there are terms like A-consciousness and P-consciousness to differentiate between the various components. Qualia is the part that is best understood to be non-reducable and subject to study by science. "Will" I'm not so sure about. It seems one might could argue that "will" could be explained with brain processes.
 
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  • #62
Les Sleeth said:
One way is, can consciousness "cause" physical effects. The other is, is consciousness "caused" by physical processes. Which are you referring to?

I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

Well If Loseyouename is trying to make an argument along these lines then the thread doesn't seem as insane as it did before. I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any implications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

This is my impression of the first post. It's possible I missed some points in subsequent posts from him though.
 
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  • #63
Fliption said:
I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any impications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

LOL. That's exactly my argument with him. :-p
 
  • #64
Fliption said:
A definition of consciousness might include that aspect and I guess that's why there are terms like A-consciousness and P-consciousness to differentiate between the various components. Qualia is the part that is best understood to be non-reducable and subject to study by science. "Will" I'm not so sure about. It seems one might could argue that "will" could be explained with brain processes.

But you've left out the rest of my argument. :cry: How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?
 
  • #65
Les Sleeth said:
The rules of proof are, if you assert functionalism can account for consciousness, YOU are the one who has to make your case. No one expected to prove it CANNOT be done.

Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness. Now, I happen to use the term "consciousness" to mean nothing more than that, and if you want to include the various functional processes of the mind in your definition, then we're not talking about the same thing. You think those processes can't be explained by science and I think they can. But I don't think we necessarily have to agree on this to talk about the non-functional "aspect" of consciousness, which is subjective experience.

I think it's pretty funny you can't distinguish between human consciousness and that of an earthworm.

Well, I'm glad you had a good laugh about it, but you're missing the point. There is only a quantitative difference, ie, in the number of neurons and synapses. So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience? If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

How exactly will an alien race without consciousness be baffled? That makes NO sense. :-p

It might not feel the subjective experience of being baffled as we do. But it would report confusion, much in the same way a computer would give an error message if it doesn't "know" what to do next. You have to understand that processes and the experiences of them are not the same thing.

Yes, I've stated my opinion on this many times. I think the "line" is a nervous system.

Ok, good. Does it have to be a biological one? If so, why?
 
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  • #66
Fliption said:
I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.
 
  • #67
Les Sleeth said:
But you've left out the rest of my argument. :cry: How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?

Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow :redface:
 
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  • #68
StatusX said:
Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.

I agree with you.
 
  • #69
Fliption said:
Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow :redface:

I'm the one blushing now. :redface: I left a few words out of my post. Jeez, I must have been hungry. Okay, let's try it again.

The first step: my desire to have a qualia experience of what the experience of a pizza "is like."

I will my intellect to learn pizza making, I will my body to prepare it.

Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.
 
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  • #70
StatusX said:
Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness.

Okay, but that isn't what you said initially. You said, "There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically."


StatusX said:
So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience?

Personally I don't think it can, but the earthworm's subjectivity is so primitive I can't make a convincing case. But in brief, I see the worm's will as a primitive form of subjectivity.


StatusX said:
If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

Well, there's more complexity too.
 
  • #71
Les Sleeth said:
Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.

I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept :blushing: .
 
  • #72
Fliption said:
I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept :blushing: .

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

As far as some functionalist only pointing to the behaviors, he still has to commit the error of denying subjectivity by refusing to acknowledge why the person is doing an act specifically aimed at achieving a subjective experience.
 
  • #73
Les Sleeth said:
Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before.


I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that itself measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.
 
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  • #74
selfAdjoint said:
I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that itself measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.

True, I agree want or intent is theoretically programmable, I argued that myself earlier in this thread (or the thread on consciousness).

But you've left out the essential part of my statement, which is that an intent be linked to the desire for an experience of "what it's like." If that isn't part of the conditions, then I have nothing to say about intent alone (though I've recently seen papers by philosophers trying to prove intent alone indicates consciousness).

I am talking about what we're defining as conscious experience intiating actions, say using the brain and body to make a pizza, specifically out of the desire to have an experience of what the pizza "is like." In this case, intent is being used by what we've already defined as consciousness . . . it is not following programming. Even if someone were so experienced at making a pizza they could do it unconsciously, I still maintain that if consciousness sets the programming in motion in order to experience "what it's like" to taste pizza, then consciousness "causes" physical effects (everyone has probably forgot, but that's the original point I was making :smile: i.e., that consciousness can physcially "cause").
 
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  • #75
Les Sleeth said:
I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

This is the premise I used in another thread to reach the opposite conclusion. I argued that zombies would try to discover the cause of their own "consciousness", just like us. I'm not saying that my way is necessarily right; neither way is. You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.


Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.
 
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  • #76
StatusX said:
You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.

I am not saying anything about zombies, or anything about exploring questions. This is just a point of logic.

IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

If you don't accept that definition of consciousness, then the logic doesn't apply.


StatusX said:
Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.

It just might be, but again, that's not the dynamic I am referring to. I am only referring to the IF-THEN I stated above.
 
  • #77
Les Sleeth said:
IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

First, let me clear the air a bit. I do not put in any weight in deflationist arguments that suppose that subjective experience does not exist or is an "illusion"; it is obvious enough to me that it does exist. That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable. However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about, or derived from, qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. To an observer who goes no further, it could very likely appear as if bulb A's lighting up causes bulb B to light up. However, the truth of the situation is that inside the box, there is an electronic circuit designed such that whenever circuit 1 is on, circuit 2 turns on as well. It just so happens that circuit 1 is connected to bulb A, and circuit 2 to bulb B. So in actuality, the underlying circuitry is what causes bulb B to light up, not the lighting of bulb A. The correlated activity of A and B mimics that of 1 and 2, but the causative links between A and B and 1 and 2 are nonetheless distinct. In this case, obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.
 
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  • #78
Les Sleeth said:
I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia.


OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way
 
  • #79
hypnagogue said:
That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

Well, this is an interesting thing to debate. Since I don’t believe your analysis is correct I am tempted to start another thread so we don’t hijack Loseyourname’s theme. If you don’t accept the point I am about to make, or I yours in the next post or two, then I’ll start that thread.


hypnagogue said:
That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable.

Good, because my point is contingent on accepting qualia as true.


hypnagogue said:
However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

I would agree we can be misguided by judgements and beliefs. But judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument.


hypnagogue said:
How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Having stated judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument I probably don’t need to agree with you here, but I do agree.

hypnagogue said:
Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. . . . obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.

Likewise, I don’t disagree.

Let me see if I can make my point more clear so you don’t argue against something I don’t mean.

Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

I am not arguing that epiphenomenalists or functionalists or behaviorists can’t point to any observable act whatsoever and find a way to explain it with their theory. I know they certainly can. Neither would I argue that I cannot believe or misjudge circumstances. But if I, as consciousness, merely attempt or even wish to produce a specific qualia experience, and that desire has physical consequences, then the existence of consciousness has been physically causal.
 
  • #80
Fliption said:
OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way

It isn't about free will, I was trying to explain how consciousness can be seen as causal. I hope my last post to Hypnagogue made it more clear.
 
  • #81
Here's a thought experiment that might illustrate the point:

Picture a man in a virtual reality system. This system simulates an external world and supplies the man with all the appropriate sensory stimulation. But another thing the program does is predict exactly how this man will react in given situations. It knows the sensory data this man is getting, and it knows the way his brain is wired to respond to this data. So, for example, if the program predicts the man will want to scratch his back, it will simulate the sights, sounds, and other sensations of the man scratching his own back. If it predicts the man will want pizza, it will get some virtual pizza for him. (Specifically, it will predict the man wants to stand up, then once he's up it will predict that he'll want to start walking towards the fridge, etc.)

This man will think he is in complete control. When he feels the subjective desire for pizza (say he sees a pizza hut commerical on tv), he will get some. But this is only because the computer has predicted he will feel this desire and done what it predicted the man would do.

Now there is no doubt the man would have subjective experiences identical to those he would have if he was really doing these things. The only crucial assumption is that human behavior can be predicted given a sufficient understanding of the person's brain and sensory experiences. This may not be practically possible, but the point remains even if it is only explainable in principe, ie, governed by physical laws. I think this basically does boil down to a free will argument, which is disappointing, but unavoidable.


One more thing. I don't know if you saw any of my posts in the other consciousness thread about zombies, but what we're talking about now is closely related. I was talking about the paradox that arises if consciousness is not causal. Zombies with the same physical makeup as us but lacking conscious experience would also try to explain consciousness, because that's really just physical behavior. I had a hard time convincing people they really would, but I hope you can all see why it's a real problem if you deny consciousness causal power. My resolution was that zombies can't exist, and if one physical system is conscious, an identical one must necessarilly also be.
 
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  • #82
Les Sleeth said:
Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects. Depending on how one interprets your exact phrasing, one could make a case that either your argument is circular or that the conditional is false; I'll argue briefly for both cases.

The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

If you don't mean to imply anything about the nature of a causal connection here and are simply listing correlated events, then you've underdetermined the problem, because we don't have enough information in the antecedent to determine the nature of the causitive link. Suppose we are given the events

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection between these events is that D leads directly to B, which leads directly to E, as you are suggesting; in other words, B happens in virtue of D, or D does the ontological 'work' required to bring about B. This causal model looks like this: D -> B -> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the ontological 'work,' and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. This causal model would look like this:

D
^
|
B -> E

In this scenario, your antecedent is true and your consequent is false, meaning that your original conditional statement was false as well.
 
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  • #83
hypnagogue said:
By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

I didn’t realize that’s what you meant by “judgment.” I suppose I thought you meant it figuratively. So to get more precise now, if we use the experience of blue, then I was referring to the specific moment of experience when blue information reaches consciousness and is experienced. We don’t need a word or concept to experience that, we need only be conscious. If a person were able (and some humans are), they could refrain from assigning interpretation or inference or a name to the experience and still recognize blue the next time it was experienced. So my argument doesn’t concern mental interpretations or logical inference unless you want to say recognition is a judgment. I am just pointing to what happens when consciousness desires experience and that consequently involves the brain and body.


hypnagogue said:
You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects.

Correct.


hypnagogue said:
If you . . . are simply listing correlated events . . .

Let’s get this out of the way first. I am not simply listing correlated events.


hypnagogue said:
The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

:confused: It is hardly a presumption or a vacuous conclusion to suggest cause and effect after repeated observations of subjective longing (“I want”) setting the brain and body in motion. Just how prohibitive are you going to be about considering something a cause which obviously behaves as one?

I am going to quote others a bit, so I’ll make them the color blue so they are easily recognized. :wink:

Rudolf Carnap points out, “From my point of view, it is more fruitful to replace the entire discussion of the meaning of causality by an investigation of the various kinds of laws that occur in science. When these laws are studied, it is a study of the kinds of causal connections that have been observed. The logical analysis of laws is certainly a clearer, more precise problem than the problem of what causality means.”

In other words, rather than speculate, let's look at how reality “works.” What does our experience with cause tell us? Consider the concept of causality as offered by physics Nobel laureate Max Born:

"1. Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.

2. Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.

3. Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact.”

Of course, he is talking about physical cause and effect, but without the endless “what ifs” rationalists tend to attach to every question, the meaning of cause should seem clear to anyone interested in being practical. When one class of occurrence A is followed under the same conditions every time by occurrence B, and when there is an unambiguous connection between A and B, then we can assume A causes B.

In their book “Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible” Aronson, Harré, and Way suggest, “The relative verisimilitude of laws can be thought of . . . as the degree to which the relationships between properties depicted in relevant theories resemble the actual relationships between properties in nature.”

They continue, “It is the method of manipulation. It is so commonplace that we are hardly aware of its ubiquitous role in our lives and practice. Every time we turn on the shower and stand beneath it we are, in effect, using the unobservable gravitational field to manipulate the water. The way that Stern and Gerlach manipulated magnetic fields to manipulate atomic nuclei in their famous apparatus is metaphysically much the same as our everyday strategy of standing under the shower.”

John Sowa, whose pragmatic thinking influenced me in the past http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/, and whose view of causality guided my response here says, “As Peirce would say (:!) . . . love Peirce!), experience provides a pragmatic confirmation of the law of gravitation and its applicability to the event of taking a shower. But Peirce's view of law includes much more than the laws of logic and physics. In addition to the laws that make the shower work, he would include the habits and social conventions that cause people to take a shower. Various formulas ‘to which real events truly conform’ can be observed, tested, and verified at every level from mechanical interactions to the conventions, habits, and instincts of living creatures.’”

In the case of consciousness causing brain and body effects, there is an unswerving relationship between consciousness seeking specific experiences, and brain and bodily activity. What possible reason is there to question the consistent response of brain and body in accordance with conscious intent? If I say lift your hand, and you will it, then hand lifts. You want water, you will your body to get water to drink, and it does.

You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn’t always in control of one’s physical and mental faculties, I’d agree. But that doesn’t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

When we observe the same consistency between two events in purely physical situations, science accepts that as an adequate indication of cause and effect. So is there a different standard of certainty required for the apparent cause and effect relationship between consciousness and brain/body?

To make sure it doesn’t seem I’ve wandered from my original argument, let me reaffirm that. I claim that because experience is what defines consciousness, when its intention/desire to stimulate a specific experience in itself results in brain and body involvement, those are instances of consciousness causing physical effects.

EDIT: I suppose to be correct I should say those are instances of consciousness triggering physical effects. I am not implying that consciousness is handling the entire range of activity-movement of the brain and body. It appears conscious lives in the brain, and is able to affect it in what ever place it needs to for the brain and body to respond. The pathways for physical response are already set up and powered, ready to respond.
 
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  • #84
Les Sleeth said:
His is not the definition physical science gives us, nor any dictionary/encyclopedia I can find, so why should I adopt his defintion just because he needs the definition to be a certain way to help him to make his argument?

Princeton's Word Reference site give the definition of physical science here:

- the science of matter and energy and their interactions


On the same page you can find a definition for physicalness:

- the quality of being physical; consisting of matter


The Word Reference site gives several relevant definitions of physical here:


1* physical
* involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit . . .

2* physical
* relating to the sciences dealing with matter and energy; especially physics; "physical sciences"; "physical laws"
3* physical, tangible, touchable
* having substance or material existence; perceptible to the senses; "a physical manifestation"; "surrounded by tangible objects"
4* physical
* according with material things or natural laws (other than those peculiar to living matter); "a reflex response to physical stimuli"

6* physical
* concerned with material things; "physical properties"; "the physical characteristics of the earth"; "the physical size of a computer"

Well, I thought I gave a pretty good account of why I think these definitions are inadequate and fail to communicate the essence of what a physical interaction is. If you're satisfied with these definitions, continue to use them.

Of Physicalism the Wikipedia says:

Physicalism is the metaphysical position that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- that is, matter and energy.

So tell me, what is semantic about insisting we use proper definitions. Physical is defined first and foremost by mass and energy, and then those properties and laws which stem from that. The tactic of redefining physical so you can claim broaden the meaning to include what isn't necessarily physical is a dubious approach.

I don't exactly see how it helps to describe "physicalism" as the theory that "everything is physical." That explains nothing. If all "physical" meant was "pertaining to matter or energy," then it would include the intrinsic properties of matter and energy, but it does not. It is this central inconsistency in the idea of physicalism that led me to attempt a better definition.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

Anyway, I did want to show that anything that is the cause of a mechanical effect must use energy, because the definition of energy entails that. I really just wanted to use this as a jumping off point from which we can then move on to the possibilities for the principles by which this interaction takes place, all the while assuming that phenomenal consciousness is indeed efficacious (an assumption that I guess you don't mind since you agree with it). Energy has to be used. There is no way around that. That's the reason that I actually like your idea of the fundamental existent as an organizational principle that plays a causative role in the workings of energy, since it does not take (or at least there is the theoretical possibility that it does not take) work to perform a causal role on a massless material agent.

I'm honestly not too concerned with the historical origins of consciousness and materialism, or attempting to delineate the order in which each came to be (or perhaps in which one came to be from another that simply always existed). This investigation may come to such conclusions incidentally, but that really isn't the point. The point is simply to determine relations as they exist currently. Let's just run with your own theory here, but develop it a little further. If there is such a fundamental existent that preceded all other existence, what is it and how does it give rise to experiential phenomena? For that matter, if it is indeed fundamental, how does it give rise to non-experiential phenomena? Is it truly the fundamental existent, or is it in fact only a property of things that exist? If it is an organizational principle by which matter/energy comes to create complex structures that accounts for structures that you don't think known organizational principles do, how is it different from these other principles? Of course, to ask that, we need to know what these other principles are to begin with. Are they relational properties that exist because of interactions between material agents, or are they intrinsic properties that give rise to the interactions of material agents?

I really didn't mean to get into such a fundamental aspect of metaphysics, but I'm coming to realize that any construction of a model of consciousness is going to have to account for these others things if it is not to be ad hoc.
 
  • #85
Les Sleeth said:
You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn?t always in control of one?s physical and mental faculties, I?d agree. But that doesn?t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.
 
  • #86
loseyourname said:
I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.

You didn't include the timing on that experiment, but I assume you mean his brain was stimulated before he pushed the button. If so, to me it indicates exactly the opposite of the interpretation you gave.

If consciousness is not created by the brain, but is instead associated with it, then you could stimulate the brain to act, but consciousness, having not initiated it, would be unaware of that until after the action.
 
  • #87
loseyourname said:
See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

This is a pretty big point. Traditionally, non-physical has been described as lacking materiality, and materiality is associated with mass/matter. Why is that significant?

You say math could describe mechanics, and you are correct. But that isn't all there is to science. In science, a mathematical prediction must be experienced, and with the senses, to be considered true! You cannot leave this out of any debate about what is real to physicalists.

Once you no longer require mass and the effects of mass to be the definition of physicality, you have also eliminated the possibility that something unavailable to the senses is present, lacks mass, but has a mechanical or orderly aspect to it. The definition of physical I'm arguing for allows both physical and non-physical to have ordered aspects, but the demarcation between them is mass and the effects of mass (which is also the definition virtually every authority states).
 
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  • #88
Mass is pretty small cheese in modern physics. The mass of protons and neutrons, which is nearly all your tangible mass, is partly due to interactions between quarks and Higgs particles, and partly the binding energy of the sea of gluons that holds them together. Neither string theory or LQG add anything that would make mass more central.
 
  • #89
selfAdjoint said:
Mass is pretty small cheese in modern physics. The mass of protons and neutrons, which is nearly all your tangible mass, is partly due to interactions between quarks and Higgs particles, and partly the binding energy of the sea of gluons that holds them together. Neither string theory or LQG add anything that would make mass more central.

Let me ask you a sincere question. If it weren't for the realities of mass, what would there be to observe? Gravity, for instance, might exist, but who would know it unless something with mass were present? What was the measure of mass at the moment of the Big Bang? Even if you say there is significant masslessness around, how much of hasn't emerged from mass or isn't manifested by the presence of mass?
 
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  • #90
Isn't mass another vibrational signature of a string operating in a compactified dimension that masquerades as a higgs field ?

The transition through said field is how a particle/object acquires mass.

so mass while having a physical presence in our 4d universe doesn't limit universes to having objects with mass only universe that have 3d + time d...

...like ours ?

consciousness on the other hand not requiring mass or a physical presence to exist transcends the multiverse scenario...

What then is there to observe in a universe without mass ?... seemingly chaotic string activity like neo vision in the matrix

of course this is all IMHO...
 

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