Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

[loseyourname]

In the case of this thread, once you get the definitions straight and everyone can agree on the right words, I don't believe there will be anything left to talk about since the whole purpose of the thread is seemingly to do nothing but define the concepts in such a way as to categorize consciousness as "Physical". I can't see that Loseyourname's argument does anything other than make a statement about categories. "The Law of conservation" implies NOTHING about the efficacy of consciousness to answer the title of this thread. All this thread seems to be saying is IF consciousness is efficacious, then we can now call it "Physical" because physical means "X". This is a semantic argument.

Well, you'll see that once we got past that, I was more clear on what the conclusion is. For a mental state to be initiated, energy has to be used. Energy is physical in the traditional sense. So we were able to conclude that, in order for consciousness to not be physical in the material sense, is has to either:

a) Be an organizational principle of energy/matter that does not perform any work but rather acts as some sort of static guide. There are several paths we can take here. The first would be the liberal naturalist contention that consciousness can be explained through intrinsic properties of natural things that are not physical in the t-physicalism sense because they are not a relational property. The other approach is Les' approach, if we consider his fundamental existent or illumination to be an agent that can manipulate energy (which would not require work).

b) Simply be contracausal in nature.

If you don't think this is progress or worthy of a thread, so be it. But I think there is at least the possibility that something has begun to get uncovered here. If you already knew this, again, so be it. Let the rest of us indulge.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, I think we're getting deeper to the heart of the matter, but we're also drifting farther away from the topic of this thread. I'll be happy to continue our discussion once you get back from your break, but it should probably take place in a new thread.

You will likely be busy with your new thread project (I noticed Mr. Rosenberg checking out your thread). I don't have any more to say unless you want to challenge me further, or ask more questions.

 

[Fliption]

Well, you'll see that once we got past that, I was more clear on what the conclusion is. For a mental state to be initiated, energy has to be used. Energy is physical in the traditional sense. So we were able to conclude that, in order for consciousness to not be physical in the material sense, is has to either:

If I just drop the step where we categorize things as physical or non-physical then I can make more sense of this. I think what you're saying is that if consciousness cannot be described mathematically, in principle, and it is efficacious then alternative A is our choice. Otheriwse it's B.

a) Be an organizational principle of energy/matter that does not perform any work but rather acts as some sort of static guide. b) Simply be contracausal in nature.

I agree that these two are possibilities.

If you don't think this is progress or worthy of a thread, so be it. But I think there is at least the possibility that something has begun to get uncovered here. If you already knew this, again, so be it. Let the rest of us indulge.

It's just my opinion but I still say this is a no-brainer. Why do you think it is that you can insert Hypnagogue and Les' views into these options if no one knew these were our choices?

 

[loseyourname]

It's just my opinion but I still say this is a no-brainer. Why do you think it is that you can insert Hypnagogue and Les' views into these options if no one knew these were our choices?

Hey, we got to start somewhere. If we can put some restrictions on what Les' or hypnagogue's views can really say when it comes time for some details, at least we can do that. I had no grand aims here. Even if I failed to do that, at least I tried.