russ_watters said:
Does that mean the the universe didn't know how to make objects move properly until Galileo discovered f=ma?
This is an attribution of intent to a deterministic process. The description of motion by classical mechanics is an approximation only, especially as it uses the system of real numbers (no physical device can measure a real number quantity, and there are other problems that are mentioned below). It's just one of the most popular systems in which calculus has a reasonably simple logical structure (non-standard analysis will present the same results using a different number system, so the popularity of the real number system is just an historical artifact).
russ_watters said:
Does that mean if I didn't have any math (subtraction) to describe my eating of grapes that eating grapes would make more grapes appear in front of me?
Subtraction is just one of many very abstract descriptions of that particular process. You can also describe the process of eating without any such great abstractions as separation of cardinal quantity from quality, as well as invoking the existence of an inverse operation between abstract cardinal quantities, as many authors and storytellers have no problem doing.
jerromyjon said:
F=ma isn't math? Move along people... nothing to multiply here...
No, it is not. A mathematical proposition is a purely logical one: it can be proven true or false solely on the basis of assumptions and certain
laws of thought . That is, a mathematical textbook or academic council will never request a student to necessarily perform an experiment in order to prove a theorem. Newton's assumption that F=ma could be made into a mathematical theorem if we make certain other assumptions (ie., the Newton-Laplace Determinacy Principle and certain assumptions about the manifold that best models physical processes). However, that is not the spirit of the equation: it is meant to be supported by its application to physical processes, not by mere internal self-consistency. Any internally consistent model can be made into a mathematical theory, including many that have no analogues in any physical process.
That is, if a single physical process disagreed with F=ma in any way that could not be removed by reasonable further assumptions, F=ma would be replaced by another model. This can never happen for a mathematical statement: a mathematical statement's proof depends only on logical argument and is thus always true when those assumptions are true. No interaction with physical verification is ever necessary (ie., see various abstruse theorems such as
Banach-Tarski ).
The latter (Banach-Tarski) implies that the system of real numbers together with unmeasurable subsets do not provide a model that is indiscernible from physical space (unless, of course, you believe Banach-Tarski actually does hold for some physical object). So already there is a clear result (and there are many more) that separates pure mathematics from the physical universe that it models.
On the other hand, there may be those that will staunchly believe that every mathematical theorem must have some physical application somewhere, and we just haven't encountered those processes yet. Without physical support, this is a rather nebulous belief.
PS. I hope this doesn't come across as argumentative in tone. I'm just presenting a personal opinion. :)