Safety Injection during Main Steam Line Break

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the role of Safety Injection during a Main Steam Line Break in nuclear reactors, exploring the thermodynamic and operational implications of such events. Participants delve into the effects of rapid cooldown on reactor coolant system (RCS) volume, pressure control, and the interaction between feedwater heaters and steam generation.

Discussion Character

  • Technical explanation
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Debate/contested
  • Mathematical reasoning

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants explain that Safety Injection is necessary to compensate for the loss of water during a Main Steam Line Break, which leads to a decrease in RCS volume due to increased water density from rapid cooling.
  • Others argue that the cooling of the primary system can create a false demand for power, leading to a drop in pressure as water is drawn from the pressurizer to meet steam generator demand.
  • A participant questions whether similar effects would occur if extraction steam is lost to feedwater heaters, suggesting that this could also lead to insufficient heating of feedwater before it enters the steam generator.
  • Another participant discusses the energy dynamics involved, noting that a steam line break removes significant BTUs from the primary system, causing a decrease in mass and energy, which can confuse operators during an event.
  • Some participants mention that the loss of extraction steam typically does not significantly impact overall steam flow, but it does affect the temperature of feedwater and consequently the efficiency of steam generation.
  • One participant introduces the concept of "overpower runback," explaining how the instrument system responds to changes in temperature to manage reactor power and steam demand.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express various viewpoints on the implications of Safety Injection and the effects of steam line breaks, with no clear consensus reached on the specifics of how different scenarios would play out in terms of pressure and power dynamics.

Contextual Notes

Participants acknowledge the complexity of the interactions between different systems in a nuclear plant and the need for careful consideration of energy transfer processes. Some assumptions about system behavior under specific conditions remain unresolved.

Who May Find This Useful

This discussion may be of interest to students and professionals in nuclear engineering, particularly those seeking to understand the operational challenges and thermodynamic principles involved in reactor safety systems.

  • #61
For a Large Break LOCA the RCS would depressurize to the point where Accumulators discharge (about 600 psia) and ultimately where Low Pressure Safety Injection can take place (about 300 psia). Both of these systems would replenish inventory and provide boron.

For a Small Break LOCA, HPSI and charging are more important as the RCS pressure will level off above Accumulators and LPSI. This is Functional Recovery territory. I would first try heat removal with the SGs while sending someone to vent/start the HPSI pumps. If that is insufficient, the RCS would have to be depressurized using pressurizer relief valves. The idea would be to get the RCS pressure low enough for Accumulators/LPSI.

You are talking about losing 2 or 3 HPSI pumps and 2 or 3 Charging Pumps. Its hard to believe that the pump that had the most recent surveillance would be gas bound.

Can I ask what your background is? You sound like an engineering student.
 
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  • #62
FermiAged said:
For a Large Break LOCA the RCS would depressurize to the point where Accumulators discharge (about 600 psia) and ultimately where Low Pressure Safety Injection can take place (about 300 psia). Both of these systems would replenish inventory and provide boron.

For a Small Break LOCA, HPSI and charging are more important as the RCS pressure will level off above Accumulators and LPSI. This is Functional Recovery territory. I would first try heat removal with the SGs while sending someone to vent/start the HPSI pumps. If that is insufficient, the RCS would have to be depressurized using pressurizer relief valves. The idea would be to get the RCS pressure low enough for Accumulators/LPSI.

You are talking about losing 2 or 3 HPSI pumps and 2 or 3 Charging Pumps. Its hard to believe that the pump that had the most recent surveillance would be gas bound.

Can I ask what your background is? You sound like an engineering student.

So basically, for small break LOCA, loss of HPSI/charging is more severe because the RCS pressure doesn't drop enough to allow other remedial operations to initiate?

What about my guesses of losing boron injection and RCP seal injection? It seems from your description that you only lose boron injection on a small-break? Are either of these major concerns that could result in further damage, or are they minor compared to pressure concerns?

And yes, I am an engineering student. I am currently halfway through grad school, on my way to a masters degree in mechanical engineering. Just took a nuclear engineering course out of curiosity and now realized that one course can't even cover the BIG picture items that I would like to know. I really am trying to learn the components of the plant and how they interact. (If situation A happens, what happens to B, C, and D) type of stuff..
 
  • #63
FermiAged said:
For a Large Break LOCA the RCS would depressurize to the point where Accumulators discharge (about 600 psia) and ultimately where Low Pressure Safety Injection can take place (about 300 psia). Both of these systems would replenish inventory and provide boron.

For a Small Break LOCA, HPSI and charging are more important as the RCS pressure will level off above Accumulators and LPSI. This is Functional Recovery territory. I would first try heat removal with the SGs while sending someone to vent/start the HPSI pumps. If that is insufficient, the RCS would have to be depressurized using pressurizer relief valves. The idea would be to get the RCS pressure low enough for Accumulators/LPSI.

Also, do accumulators deliver boron when there is a loss of all power?
 
  • #64
Yes. They are essentially tanks of borated water driven by a charge of nitrogen (at a typical pressure of about 650 psia). They discharge to the RCS through check valves (like a door that only swings one way) that are closed or opened by the differential pressure across the valve. Under normal operating conditions the RCS pressure of 2250 psia keeps them closed. When RCS pressure falls below 650 psia, the valves open and the tanks discharge based upon the RCS pressure and level in the tank (which determines the elevation head and N2 pressure).

The accumulators (a Westinghouse term - CE designed plants call them Safety Injection Tanks - I don't know what B&W calls them) require no electrical power to function. Because there is no pump that requires time for power source alignment, start signal and start up, the accumulators can be the first source of safety injection in some accidents.
 
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  • #65
That is what I figured. Thanks for confirming!
 
  • #66
RCP seal cooling used to be PWR's Achilles heel.
Westinghouse came up with an improved one that's passive, but it was after I'd retired so I never saw one.. That would seem to be be a comfort.

http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Products_&_Services/docs/flysheets/NS-FS-0106.pdf

We added some fittings (I think back in the 90's) whereby one could connect a portable diesel driven pump to cool the seals should the unthinkable happen.
 
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