Shouldn't we disable Nuclear Reactors in California?

[NUCENG]

Of course. But the initial question was if it's possible to shut down NPPs, and it certainly is. I wanted to answer this initial question without having to discuss any non-related topics. Saying that we won't met the Kyoto protocol then is totally correct, but nothing than a distortion to the initial question.

There'll be a price to be paid. That's a given. Overall, the article tells us that we may not met our target of -40% compared to 1990, but -30-33% is still not to be scoffed at. I'm not familiar with the US numbers, but what's the US 1990 to 2020 target, and what's the real number you probably will reach? I'm pretty sure that even with over two dozen new NPPs you won't even reach somewhere near 40%, while we come to 30% with shutting down NPPs... ;)

Shutting down all NPPs was always planned in for our 2020 emission goals. Remember, the phase out of nuclear power was already decided in 2000. At least until some politician dip-garbages decided to phase-out the phase out in 2010, with phasing out the phase out of the phase out hastily after a certain event in 2011.

I knew that and I was just tweaking you. You are right. Others may criticize Germany and Italy for their decision, but it is your/their choice and I wish you luck. You do have the advantage of a small geographic area so your distribution systems may (with a lot of work) be able to handle a larger share of wind and solar power and remain stable. In the meantime Germany will have to figure out what to do about the existing nuclear plants, spent fuel that exists and continues to be generated until all the plants are shutdown, decommissioning and restoration of the plant sites. You won't be out of the nuclear business for quite a while yet. If economics of oil and LNG continue according to current trends, and the promises of smart grids and solar efficiencies are slow to arrive, you may reconsider this someday, and that too will be your choice and your decision.

Edit: Just saw Boreks's post so let me add: Please don't be disappointed if we continuel to operate nuclear plants in California. They need their tanning beds because they lack sufficient sunshine to run them on solar power.

 

[Luca Bevil]

Since there was debate especially between me and NUCENg on risks of potential terrorist attacks on NPP, when I had a little time i went looking on the web for US commentators/scientists that shared my general (not US specific to be honest) worry about this issue.

not surprisingly i found some

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/sabotage_and_attacks_on_reactors/

I do not know wheter discussing this would be OT here or in the forum, may be it belongs to the "political" 3d, but apparently at least I can feel reinsured that I am not the only person who keeps on being worried about nuclear safety ...

I'll try to find somethig in french, for several reasons I am more worried about french readiness about this risk than i am about the US

 

[Luca Bevil]

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/20061201-ucs-brief-security-by-design.pdf

this short document in particular seems interesting and common sense to me, I may be wrong, however, I would be interested to read comments.

regards

 

[zapperzero]

I see little purpose in passive defenses, of any kind. Hijacking commercial aircraft for use as missiles was a one-off thing, anyway.

I can see why you'd want some short range air-to-air missiles at hand, and I hope they're already in place, at least where terrorism is a problem, like, say, in Japan.

Again, there are many, many other, simpler ways to cause chaos.

More to the point, I'm sure any of us here can think of a simpler, more effective plan to screw with a NPP than:

"oh, I'll just find a dozen co-conspirators, we'll train for a year, then go past God-knows how many layers of security in the airport so that we can all board the same plane. Once on board, we will overpower all the passengers (who will be fighting for their lives at this point, because they've all seen 9/11 on tv) using our shoelaces, then find a way to get past the locked cockpit door to the pilots, then disable them, take charge and hope the USAF does not shoot us down en route to the NPP"

Way too many things could go wrong. Compare and contrast with the attack on Superphenix.

 

[nikkkom]

Are the conditions between the tectonic plates at Japan similar enough to the ones at Chile to cause a 9.5 quake?

Also, I read that the 63 meter seawall at Kamaishi was insufficient to hold back the Tsunamai from the quake. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_wall#Japan

Wrong.

"4-metre waves surmounted the seawall —the world’s largest, erected a few years ago in the city’s harbour at a depth of 63 metres"

*depth of 63 meters*. It wasn't 63 meter high. Looks like it was not more than 4-5 meters high above water.

 

[nikkkom]

Many people are claiming that the Japanese tsunami was about a one in 1000 year event.

Wrong. It was more like "one in 100 year event". Do your homework, go to Wikipedia and read on tsunami history in Japan.

IMO, anyone who claims that Fukushima's tsunami defense was adequate is either didn't do any research on this subject, or is a dishonest troll.

Most troubling, though, is not that Fukushima's flood defenses were too low. Most troubling is the trend of the companies operating NPPs to *systematically* under-protect them. It looks like they tend to decide that organizing a "our NPPs are sooo safe" PR campaign is always cheaper than actually fixing problems.

I'm afraid it's a common trend in this industry to save money on safety, even in cases where improving it is simple and even relatively cheap. Read 1999_Blayais_Nuclear_Power_Plant_flood article on wikipedia. It's a direct "close call" for Fukushima event. Did anyone care in the industry? No! Can we trust these people to start caring about safety? I'm afraid so far I can't. I saw no post-Fukushima admissions a-la "yes. We did screw up. We will do this, this and this to not screw up in the future". I see a lot of denial. I see more PR campaigns.

 

[nikkkom]

Can they do anything about that probability? Can they turn off their section of the "Pacific Ring of Fire"?

No. But they could build 30 meter high seawall. It's not a engineering miracle, you know. It's a rather simple pile of rocks reinforced with concrete.

Why they didn't do it? What else nuclear industry should have done but didn't?

 

[clancy688]

To all: please get back to topic. That is - nuclear reactors in California.

If you want to discuss anything else, go to Politic & Woirld Affairs, or General Discussion.

~~~

Anti Tsunami Wall Thread: https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=506517 (btw, the Kamaishi wall wasn't only awashed, it was totally destroyed and torn apart, check google earth)

 

[NUCENG]

Wrong. It was more like "one in 100 year event". Do your homework, go to Wikipedia and read on tsunami history in Japan.

IMO, anyone who claims that Fukushima's tsunami defense was adequate is either didn't do any research on this subject, or is a dishonest troll.

Most troubling, though, is not that Fukushima's flood defenses were too low. Most troubling is the trend of the companies operating NPPs to *systematically* under-protect them. It looks like they tend to decide that organizing a "our NPPs are sooo safe" PR campaign is always cheaper than actually fixing problems.

I'm afraid it's a common trend in this industry to save money on safety, even in cases where improving it is simple and even relatively cheap. Read 1999_Blayais_Nuclear_Power_Plant_flood article on wikipedia. It's a direct "close call" for Fukushima event. Did anyone care in the industry? No! Can we trust these people to start caring about safety? I'm afraid so far I can't. I saw no post-Fukushima admissions a-la "yes. We did screw up. We will do this, this and this to not screw up in the future". I see a lot of denial. I see more PR campaigns.

Actually the 2011 tsunami of 14+ m was an 800 to 1100 year event per the following:

http://coastalcare.org/2011/03/nuclear-plant-and-tsunami-risk-3000-years-of-geological-history-disregarded/

The seawall design basis event of 5.7 m turns out to be about a 100 year event.

I have not heard anyone defend the 5.7 m design basis at Fukushima as adequate.

You claim there is a "trend of the companies operating NPPs to *systematically* under-protect them." Further you claim that "I'm afraid it's a common trend in this industry to save money on safety, even in cases where improving it is simple and even relatively cheap." Finally you cite the Blayais flooding event as an example.

At Blayais the emergency diesel generators started and ran and allowed operators to mitigate the event without any core damage or radiation releases to the public. You omitted any consideration of lessons learned from this event or changes made by other nuclear power plants. Japan has shut down several additional plants to investigate seismic and flooding design. Regulatory agencoes and nuclear plant operators are also following lessons learned at Fukushima. You don't mention that either.

So my question is this. Will you please clarify where you think those "trends" are applicable? If you are implying that these trends are applicable in France, Germany, the UK, or the US, please explain or cite evidence to support you claim. Citing an example (Blayais) that was 12 years ago without discussing actions taken by the industry is only telling half the story. Of course telling the whole truth will make your claim less credible. Or was that the only way you could justify your claims?

 

[nikkkom]

Actually the 2011 tsunami of 14+ m was an 800 to 1100 year event per the following:

http://coastalcare.org/2011/03/nuclear-plant-and-tsunami-risk-3000-years-of-geological-history-disregarded/

The seawall design basis event of 5.7 m turns out to be about a 100 year event.

1933 Sanriku earthquake resulted in 28 meter tsunami.
1896 Meiji-Sanriku earthquake resulted in 38 meter tsunami.

These "1000 year events" happen so often that they look more like 100 year events to me.

You claim there is a "trend of the companies operating NPPs to *systematically* under-protect them." Further you claim that "I'm afraid it's a common trend in this industry to save money on safety, even in cases where improving it is simple and even relatively cheap." Finally you cite the Blayais flooding event as an example.

At Blayais the emergency diesel generators started and ran and allowed operators to mitigate the event without any core damage or radiation releases to the public.

After the flood the dam was built up to 8 meters. But *before* the flood, operator fought tooth and nail to not build it up by additional *half a meter*, from 5.2 to 5.7. This is not what I "claim", this is fact. My point is, operator actually needed to come this >< close to a serious accident to start taking safety seriously.

You omitted any consideration of lessons learned from this event or changes made by other nuclear power plants.

Yeah, right. After Blayais flood, NPP operators all over the world seriously beefed up their flood protection. Such as in Fukushima and Calhoun. Oh, wait... they didn't!

Japan has shut down several additional plants to investigate seismic and flooding design. Regulatory agencoes and nuclear plant operators are also following lessons learned at Fukushima.

With the same rigor as they did after Blayais flood?

So my question is this. Will you please clarify where you think those "trends" are applicable? If you are implying that these trends are applicable in France, Germany, the UK, or the US, please explain or cite evidence to support you claim. Citing an example (Blayais) that was 12 years ago without discussing actions taken by the industry is only telling half the story.

The point is, I don't see any actions taken by the industry. I see one NPP suffering from INES 7 accident, *caused by flood*. I see another NPP *sandbagged* against the flood instead of sitting behind a 8-meter concrete dam, which is far from inspiring confidence.

 

[NUCENG]

1933 Sanriku earthquake resulted in 28 meter tsunami.
1896 Meiji-Sanriku earthquake resulted in 38 meter tsunami.

These "1000 year events" happen so often that they look more like 100 year events to me.



After the flood the dam was built up to 8 meters. But *before* the flood, operator fought tooth and nail to not build it up by additional *half a meter*, from 5.2 to 5.7. This is not what I "claim", this is fact. My point is, operator actually needed to come this >< close to a serious accident to start taking safety seriously.



Yeah, right. After Blayais flood, NPP operators all over the world seriously beefed up their flood protection. Such as in Fukushima and Calhoun. Oh, wait... they didn't!



With the same rigor as they did after Blayais flood?



The point is, I don't see any actions taken by the industry. I see one NPP suffering from INES 7 accident, *caused by flood*. I see another NPP *sandbagged* against the flood instead of sitting behind a 8-meter concrete dam, which is far from inspiring confidence.

The 1933 Sanriku earthquake generated a 94 foot runup Nprth of Fukushima but was "much less than "9 m at Fukushima. The 1896 quake you referenced generated the 5.7 m design basis runup at Fukushima that was used by TEPCO. The probability of another 14 m tsunami at Fukushima is on the order of once per 800 to 1100 years as I quoted. How that "looks" to you has no effect or meaning.

If you are suggesting that the possibility of a 100 ft tsunami should be applied anywhere in Japan that a NPP isbuilt then you are going to waste money where it isn;t needed. The huge runup cases tend to be at the closed end of narrowing inlets. Site specific coastal characteristics and seabed topography can be evaluated and site specific height probabilities established. TEPCO had received information of a threat of larger tsunamis and did nothing.

Where evaluations have been done and included both historical and geological risks, the fact that no action was taken may be justified, and the lack of physical modifications you equate to ignoring the issue is a bogus accusation. Fort Calhoun and Cooper plants have preepared for this flood and as of yet are not any threat to anyone. They have made modifications including the hydraulic dams, raising access roads, building berms, and bringing in reserves of fuel oil. You sit there at your computer and pontificate that isn't good enough. Your attemot to equate their situation with Fukushima is totally bogus. Or do you want them to fail so it will support yor bias? Will you be disappointed if they don't fail?

 

[nikkkom]

The 1933 Sanriku earthquake generated a 94 foot runup Nprth of Fukushima but was "much less than "9 m at Fukushima. The 1896 quake you referenced generated the 5.7 m design basis runup at Fukushima that was used by TEPCO. The probability of another 14 m tsunami at Fukushima is on the order of once per 800 to 1100 years as I quoted. How that "looks" to you has no effect or meaning.

We witnessed a miracle, then. In 40 year timespan we saw a 1000 year event. Yeah, right.

If you are suggesting that the possibility of a 100 ft tsunami should be applied anywhere in Japan that a NPP isbuilt then you are going to waste money where it isn;t needed.

"Isn't needed"? This "unnecessary" dams would cost a few billion dollars total for all NPPs combined.

Now Japan needs $250bn to clean up the mess. How you are going to quantify the cost of future deaths from cancers I have no idea.

Fort Calhoun and Cooper plants have preepared for this flood and as of yet are not any threat to anyone. They have made modifications including the hydraulic dams, raising access roads, building berms, and bringing in reserves of fuel oil. You sit there at your computer and pontificate that isn't good enough.

It's atrocious. How dare I to have an opinion!...

Your attemot to equate their situation with Fukushima is totally bogus.

Your attempt to put words in my mouth. I did not say that their situation is anywhere near Fukushima.

Or do you want them to fail so it will support yor bias?

Repeating specially for you: I want to see NPP sufficiently protected, with *LARGE* margins, from various dangers (in this case, from floods). With margins like what Blayais implemented after the flood. But I want to see them implemented *before* the flood. I don't see this happening. This tells me that we have a systemic problem.

I don't want to see frantic sandbagging efforts at any NPP. They should be simply unnecessary.

 

[NUCENG]

We witnessed a miracle, then. In 40 year timespan we saw a 1000 year event. Yeah, right.

N: Not a miracle, Probability. This is a physics forum. Tou want miracles? That's what it would take to prove your point.



"Isn't needed"? This "unnecessary" dams would cost a few billion dollars total for all NPPs combined.

N: If it was free I wouldn't build a 100 foot wall because then some moron would say we are trying to hide what is going on behind the wall.

Now Japan needs $250bn to clean up the mess. How you are going to quantify the cost of future deaths from cancers I have no idea.

N: They had the opportunity to listen to scientists that believed a tsunami larger than 5.7 m was likely. Their Regulators had that information. The loss of innocent life from cancer is bad, as was the death of 25,000+ from the tsunami. But it may be impossible to even detect the "extra deths." You can not legitimately blame the nuclear industry in other countries for the failures in Japan. And it is totally untrue that we are plotting to save a buck no matter how many people are hurt. And I for one care not a whit whether you believe that or not.



It's atrocious. How dare I to have an opinion!...

N:Only because your opinion is uninformed and wrong. Perhaps you need to follow your own advice and do some legitimate research. Otherwise we'll have to classify you as a troll per your own standard.

Your attempt to put words in my mouth. I did not say that their situation is anywhere near Fukushima.

N: Then why did you bring up Ft Calhoun and I quote: "Read 1999_Blayais_Nuclear_Power_Plant_flood article on wikipedia. It's a direct "close call" for Fukushima event." and then: "Yeah, right. After Blayais flood, NPP operators all over the world seriously beefed up their flood protection. Such as in Fukushima and Calhoun. Oh, wait... they didn't!" What I read seems to say "A near miss of flooding at Blayais was a near miss for a Fukushima and Ft Calhoun is similar to Blais but they didn't do anything about the event at Blayais. Therefore Fort Calhoun is a near miss for a Fukushima event."

N: That may not be what you meant, but it is what you wrote. Do you even read your own posts? You should appreciate it if I'm putting words in your mouth, because it makes more sense than your denial that wasn't what you said.


Repeating specially for you: I want to see NPP sufficiently protected, with *LARGE* margins, from various dangers (in this case, from floods). With margins like what Blayais implemented after the flood. But I want to see them implemented *before* the flood. I don't see this happening. This tells me that we have a systemic problem.

N:You don't know what the heck you are talking about. You don't apply the same unreasonable standards to the rest of your life or you wouldn't fly or get in a car or eat food you didn't grow yourself. You don't know what Ft Calhoun or Cooper did to prepare for the flood (or conveniently omitted that information). You probably have not looked at how much margin they have to the design basis flood level. And because you don't know, you leap to the unfounded opinion that they didn't do anything or it wasn't enough.

N: Repeated specially for you: You are wrong and your opinions do not become facts just because you closed your mind and opened your online mouth.

I don't want to see frantic sandbagging efforts at any NPP. They should be simply unnecessary.

And I don't want to see any more frantic "The sky is falling." posts, but I expect I will be disappointed too.

 

[mheslep]

1933 Sanriku earthquake resulted in 28 meter tsunami.
1896 Meiji-Sanriku earthquake resulted in 38 meter tsunami. ...

And the Krakatoa eruption generated http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merak,_Banten" :

The scientists also found two additional layers of sand and concluded that two additional “gigantic tsunamis” had hit the region during the past 3,000 years, both presumably comparable to Jogan. Carbon dating couldn’t pinpoint exactly when the other two hit, but the study’s authors put the range of those layers of sand at between 140 B.C. and A.D. 150, and between 670 B.C. and 910 B.C. ...

 

[nikkkom]

Your attempt to put words in my mouth. I did not say that their situation is anywhere near Fukushima.

N: Then why did you bring up Ft Calhoun and I quote: "Read 1999_Blayais_Nuclear_Power_Plant_flood article on wikipedia. It's a direct "close call" for Fukushima event." and then: "Yeah, right. After Blayais flood, NPP operators all over the world seriously beefed up their flood protection. Such as in Fukushima and Calhoun. Oh, wait... they didn't!"

What I read seems to say "A near miss of flooding at Blayais was a near miss for a Fukushima

Yes:

"Starting from 7:30 pm all four units lost their 225 kV power supplies, while units 2 and 4 also lost their 400 kV power supplies. The isolator circuits that should have allowed units 2 and 4 to supply themselves with electricity also failed, causing these two reactors to automatically shut down, and diesel backup generators started up, maintaining power to plants 2 and 4 until the 400 kV supply was restored at around 10:20 pm. In the pumping room for unit 1, one set of the two pairs of pumps in the Essential Service Water System failed due to flooding; had both sets failed then the safety of plant would have been endangered. In both units 1 and 2, flooding in the fuel rooms put the low-head safety injection pumps and the containment spray pumps, part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (a back-up system in case of coolant loss) out of use. Over the following days, an estimated 90,000 m3 (3,200,000 cu ft) of water would be pumped out of the flooded buildings."

How close was this to a meltdown of unit 1? One set of pumps away? Do you realize that this is simply not acceptable to the general public?

Moreover, "close call" events are an excellent predictor of safety problems, even if they themselves were resolved with no bad effects whatsoever. NASA ignored close calls with eroded O-rings in SRBs, result - Challenger accident. NASA ignored close calls with falling foam - Columbia accident.

Continue ignoring close calls at NPPs and you will continue to get Fukushimas.

and Ft Calhoun is similar to Blais but they didn't do anything about the event at Blayais.

Ft Calhoun is similar to Blayais in a sense that its flood defences are inadequate. Since it's 12 years since Blayais flood happened, I don't see any reasonable excuses why it is so.

That may not be what you meant, but it is what you wrote. Do you even read your own posts?

Yes I do read my posts.
And I still don't see where I said Ft Calhoun is anywhere close to Fukushima. Where is it?

Repeating specially for you: I want to see NPP sufficiently protected, with *LARGE* margins, from various dangers (in this case, from floods). With margins like what Blayais implemented after the flood. But I want to see them implemented *before* the flood. I don't see this happening. This tells me that we have a systemic problem.

N:You don't know what the heck you are talking about. You don't apply the same unreasonable standards to the rest of your life or you wouldn't fly or get in a car or eat food you didn't grow yourself.

Because if I eat bad food or drive a broken car, at maximum a few people can die. It can't cause thousands of square kilometers permanently evacuated. NPP accident can. Therefore, NPP should be significantly more secure than my car.

 

[NeoDevin]

We witnessed a miracle, then. In 40 year timespan we saw a 1000 year event. Yeah, right.

As of January 19, 2011, there were http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-world-wide.htm" . Thus the total number of operating years is around 11,000. Thus we would expect to have seen approximately 11 "thousand year events" occur at nuclear power plants.

This estimate neglects power plants that are no longer operational, or that have become operational since Jan 19, 2011. The 25 year estimate is also 2008, and has most likely increased by a year or more since then.

It also (and probably more significantly) neglects that many nuclear power plants are not in geologically active regions and/or tsunami territory. However, even those relatively "safe" locations must contend with tornadoes, wildfires, flooding, etc. The point remains that a single "thousand year event" causing damage to a nuclear power plant is not cause to assume that estimates of the frequency of such events are in error.

 

[NUCENG]

Yes:

"Starting from 7:30 pm all four units lost their 225 kV power supplies, while units 2 and 4 also lost their 400 kV power supplies. The isolator circuits that should have allowed units 2 and 4 to supply themselves with electricity also failed, causing these two reactors to automatically shut down, and diesel backup generators started up, maintaining power to plants 2 and 4 until the 400 kV supply was restored at around 10:20 pm. In the pumping room for unit 1, one set of the two pairs of pumps in the Essential Service Water System failed due to flooding; had both sets failed then the safety of plant would have been endangered. In both units 1 and 2, flooding in the fuel rooms put the low-head safety injection pumps and the containment spray pumps, part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (a back-up system in case of coolant loss) out of use. Over the following days, an estimated 90,000 m3 (3,200,000 cu ft) of water would be pumped out of the flooded buildings."

How close was this to a meltdown of unit 1? One set of pumps away? Do you realize that this is simply not acceptable to the general public?

Moreover, "close call" events are an excellent predictor of safety problems, even if they themselves were resolved with no bad effects whatsoever. NASA ignored close calls with eroded O-rings in SRBs, result - Challenger accident. NASA ignored close calls with falling foam - Columbia accident.

Continue ignoring close calls at NPPs and you will continue to get Fukushimas.



Ft Calhoun is similar to Blayais in a sense that its flood defences are inadequate. Since it's 12 years since Blayais flood happened, I don't see any reasonable excuses why it is so.



Yes I do read my posts.
And I still don't see where I said Ft Calhoun is anywhere close to Fukushima. Where is it?



Because if I eat bad food or drive a broken car, at maximum a few people can die. It can't cause thousands of square kilometers permanently evacuated. NPP accident can. Therefore, NPP should be significantly more secure than my car.

Again with the nonsense. Blayais mitigated their event and issued lessons learned. You assume nobody else did anything in response with no evidence to support your claim. You further assume that other plants have inadequate protection, because that is what you want to believe. In my last post I quoted two sentences in which you linked Ft Calhoun and Blayais and Fukushima. And now you say that the 500,000 worldwide deaths per year from traffic accidents is somehow better than an unknown number of latent cancer deaths from Fukushima because it is only a few at a time.

http://www.transport-links.org/transport_links/filearea/publications/1_771_Pa3568.pdf

That is so grossly wrong as to be unbelievable. You clearly do not understand the concept of risk and risk management. You substitute opinion for fact and expect that no one will challenge you. You are intellectually lazy and make claims you can't support.

You have come to the wrong forum. You have a right to your opinion, however uninformed, but don't expect to win any respect here.

 

[Luca Bevil]

Statistically speaking the fact that two other events of a magnitude similar to the last tsunami wave at Fukushima seem to have been observed at a close to 1.000 years interval it is in no way a sufficient proxy to estimate the probability of recurrence of such an event.
There are not even close to enough samples for such an estimate and the underlying phisical phenomenon may be undergoing changes that we cannot scientifically evaluate just yet, undermining any implicit assumption of statistically independent distribution among the medium time of arrivals.

In this scenario assuming a far higher mean frequency of recurrence would be just plain good sense.
What is more important since safety is (better should be) of paramount importance for NPPs any NPP should actually be procted for events larger that the actual historical maximum problem recorded.
Any less protection is not risk management is quite simply putting innocent lives in danger.
It is not morally acceptable on any ground.

The sight of the US plant in the middle of the flood is not reinsuring.
It might not be such a big risk, or even not a risk at all, as NUCENG is pointing out, but I'd rather not take anyone word for it.
I quite simply do not like the fact that a NPP is in that situation.

Call me overconscious, or biased, or whatever you like.. it is fairly clear that the situation they are operating in is far from normal.

And no... in case anyone doubts it I would not like to see it fail, quite the contrary. Fukushima was already enough for me.

 

[NeoDevin]

What is more important since safety is (better should be) of paramount importance for NPPs any NPP should actually be procted for events larger that the actual historical maximum problem recorded.
Any less protection is not risk management is quite simply putting innocent lives in danger.
It is not morally acceptable on any ground.

So we should design all nuclear power plants to withstand a global extinction level asteroid impact? Or how about the collision that formed the moon? Should they survive something of that scale undamaged as well?

It might not be such a big risk, or even not a risk at all, as NUCENG is pointing out, but I'd rather not take anyone word for it.

No matter what safety precautions are in place, you're taking the word of the experts.

I quite simply do not like the fact that a NPP is in that situation.

You've already made up your mind that no amount of risk is allowable. It's a ridiculous position to take, as it doesn't matter what form of power generation we use, there are risks. Wind turbines can be torn apart in storms, launching extremely heavy pieces at high velocity. People fall while installing them. Hydrocarbons cause pollution (far more radioactivity is released by coal plants than by NPPs). I could go on, but I think you get the picture. It doesn't matter what source we choose for our energy, there are risks. These risks must be balanced against the benefits (life saving medical technologies, for example). Your idea that NPPs should be engineered against everything is absurd.

If you want to argue that the precautions at Fukushima, or in California are (were) insufficient based on the evidence available, go ahead. Don't go making irrational and impossible demands of an entire industry, especially not one that has proven over its history to be far safer than it's competitors.

 

[nikkkom]

So we should design all nuclear power plants to withstand a global extinction level asteroid impact? Or how about the collision that formed the moon? Should they survive something of that scale undamaged as well?

No.

You've already made up your mind that no amount of risk is allowable.

Wrong. That's not what he said, by a long shot.

It's a ridiculous position to take

Straw man argument. You put something in a mouth of your opponent which he didn't say, and then argue with these misrepresented words.

 

[nikkkom]

Again with the nonsense. Blayais mitigated their event and issued lessons learned. You assume nobody else did anything in response with no evidence to support your claim.

I have reasons to assume that some operators indeed did not do enough, because I see that 12 years after Blayais NPPs are still not adequately protected. It's an empirical fact. I'm not dreaming it up, there REALLY are three melted nuclear cores on the coast of Japan, right?

Some NPP operators showed Blayais "lessons learned" where sun doesn't shine.

 

[clancy688]

Actually the 2011 tsunami of 14+ m was an 800 to 1100 year event per the following:

http://coastalcare.org/2011/03/nuclear-plant-and-tsunami-risk-3000-years-of-geological-history-disregarded/

The seawall design basis event of 5.7 m turns out to be about a 100 year event.

It may be a thousand year event for the Fukushima Daiichi location, but it certainly is not one if we take whole japan into consideration.

While certain spots along the coast seem to attract giant tsunamis (let's take the village of Taro for example), it's not the case for the coast as a whole.
To summarize: Yes, it's true that a tsunami as high as in Fukushima may have been a thousand year event for THAT specific location. But giant tsunamis hit the japanese coast not every thousand years, but every few decades, as history proves.

Let's make a little made up math example:

Nuclear power plants run for, let's say, 50 years. The Fuku I Unit 1 reactor was 40 years old and should've been in service for another 10 years.
So the possibility that a thousand year event (tsunami) hits a plant during its lifetime is 1/20. But we don't have only one plant. Let's say we have ten along the coast. For every plant, the possibility to be hit by a thousand year tsunami during its lifetime is 1/20.
So overall, the possibility that ONE of these ten plants is hit by a thousand year event during its lifetime is 50%.

Conclusion: We absolutely HAVE TO secure plants against thousand year and even ten thousand year events. The more plants there are, the higher the possibility for one is to get "lucky". The german Biblis plant for example is secured against a flood two meters higher than a once in ten thousand years event.

A big german (conservative btw) newspaper made a little comparison between NPPs and the lottery:

Operating NPPs is like playing the lottery: The overall chances for "success" (a disaster) are very, very low. But the more players there are, the higher the possibility is for at least one to get "lucky".

 

[NUCENG]

I have reasons to assume that some operators indeed did not do enough, because I see that 12 years after Blayais NPPs are still not adequately protected. It's an empirical fact. I'm not dreaming it up, there REALLY are three melted nuclear cores on the coast of Japan, right?

Some NPP operators showed Blayais "lessons learned" where sun doesn't shine.

What do you base that on? You keep making that claim and I agree it does apply to Japan. But you state again, "NPPs are still not adequately protected. It's an empirical fact. I'm not dreaming it up, there REALLY are three melted nuclear cores on the coast of Japan, right?
Some NPP operators showed Blayais "lessons learned" where sun doesn't shine."

So what other NPPs are not protected. What operators did not pay heed to Blayais and other past flooding events. Tell us about those empirical facts. Tell us about your background or experience that would make your opinion worth listening to.

There are plenty of blogs and forums where you can rant and rave and everyone will agree with you. Yhere "LOL" or "IMO" constitutes a valuable contribution. Here the standard is higher. Here you are expected to contribute or at least be committed to learn. Repetition is not proof, opinion is not fact, unfounded claims are not arguments, and stubbornness is not logic. Apparently you have nothing more to offer. People here reached the conclusion that TEPCO was negligent several months ago. You aren't adding anything to that discussion and by trying to generalize the problem to the rest of the world with no arguments or foundation, you only look silly.

 

[nikkkom]

What do you base that on? You keep making that claim and I agree it does apply to Japan. But you state again, "NPPs are still not adequately protected. It's an empirical fact. I'm not dreaming it up, there REALLY are three melted nuclear cores on the coast of Japan, right?
Some NPP operators showed Blayais "lessons learned" where sun doesn't shine."

So what other NPPs are not protected. What operators did not pay heed to Blayais and other past flooding events.

We will know when the next flood / tsunami / earthquake hits. Or when press will uncover more cases of fudged inspections and the like.

 

[clancy688]

What do you base that on?

We will know when the next flood / tsunami / earthquake hits. Or when press will uncover more cases of fudged inspections and the like.

A simple "Nothing but my instinct" would've been enough, you know?

 

[Borek]

Locked pending moderation.

Edit: most of the posts in the last two weeks were off topic (including those deleted). That means the thread has ran its course. Locked for ever.