In volume 74 of Analysis, pg 148-157 L Leininger writes: I object that STR removes the possibility of a common present. For example, say that a beam of light flashes in all directions and we will call the time in which this happens, Jan 1, 3000. Traveler A is located 1 light year away from the flash and is traveling 95% the speed of light away from the flash. Given time dilation traveler A will learn about the event, let's say in year 3020, though I'm not aware of the exact calculations. Traveler A can reason that although they learned about the event in the year 3020, that given their speed and the speed of light, that the event occurred on Jan 1, 3000. Traveler B on Jan 1, 3000 was also located a light year away from the event but was traveling directly toward the flash. Let's say they learn about the event on Aug 1, 3000 though I'm not aware of the exact calculations. Now, although traveler A and B learn about the events at different times, they can both calculate their speed as a percentage of the speed of light and determine that the event happened at the same time for both of them, namely, Jan 1, 3000. Hence, there is a common present for both A and B.