Theory of everything ? A joke

[notknowing]

It has become fashionable to talk about a "Theory of everything (TOE)". Are scientists really serious that their model describes really everything in the universe? If so, they must be either extremely pretentious or extremely stupid or probably both. At one time, the "Earth, Water, Air, Fire" theory was also a TOE, and I am sure that the theories of now will in a far future be considered as primitive as this one. So, I want to plea to stop using this terminology. It gives also a completely wrong impression to the "man in the street". We can never obtain the final truth. The only thing we can do is to reach or describe just a level deeper. Then we need again a lot of time and effort to move down again a level deeper, and so on.

Rudi Van Nieuwenhove

 

[ZapperZ]

No, it isn't "fashionable" to talk about a TOE. In fact, I've highlighted written pieces by Phil Anderson and Bob Laughlin that pointed out the fallacy of such a thing. Laughlin even covered this considerably in his book. It only appears to be "fashionable" because the small group of people are getting more publicity due to the "sexiness" of the subject matter.

You might want to read Laughlin's PNAS paper arguing against TOE as being nothing more than a TOE for "reductionism", but not for physics.

Zz.

 

[fleem]

But then there is reductionism--based on the undeniable trend of the universe to base complicated things on simpler things. So it seems there is probably a very very simple axiom that explains everything.

 

[ZapperZ]

But then there is reductionism--based on the undeniable trend of the universe to base complicated things on simpler things. So it seems there is probably a very very simple axiom that explains everything.

But that's purely an assumption not based on facts.

Laughlin has shown, in his Nobel acceptance speech no less, on how one cannot derive phenomena such as superconductivity simply by invoking all the necessary interactions at the most fundamental level. Try it. No one has managed to do it.

It is a fact that none of the emergent phenomena that we currently have in physics today have been derived and described via such reductionist approach. I'm not talking about negligible here. I'm talking about absolute ZERO.

So the assumption that simple axioms can explain everything is something that has no support.

Zz.

 

[fleem]

But that's purely an assumption not based on facts.

Laughlin has shown, in his Nobel acceptance speech no less, on how one cannot derive phenomena such as superconductivity simply by invoking all the necessary interactions at the most fundamental level. Try it. No one has managed to do it.

It is a fact that none of the emergent phenomena that we currently have in physics today have been derived and described via such reductionist approach. I'm not talking about negligible here. I'm talking about absolute ZERO.

So the assumption that simple axioms can explain everything is something that has no support.

Zz.

Well, we are both using inductive reasoning here, so neither of our statements is 100% provable. All we can do is inductively estimate the probability of truth in our statements. The fact that no-one has yet elegantly explained such a new discovery as superconductivity is not surprising, considering that new discoveries usually take time to explain. But there aren't a lot of old discoveries we've explained outside of reductionism. In fact, I can't think of any. So our experience is that reductionism is very probably a general personality trait of the universe.

For the benefit of other readers, Zz, others, and I are currently having a heated but fun argument about this here: https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=199661

 

[ZapperZ]

Er.. superconductivity is a "new discovery"?

We DO have an explanation of conventional superconductivity. It's called the BCS Theory. But it isn't a reductionist theory. It starts with a many-body ground state, not from single-particle interactions being added on with more and more complexity.

I strongly suggest you read Laughlin's papers and other materials, because I don't think you are aware of what emergent phenomena are and how they are being described. The whole field of condensed matter physics is based on this, and this is the field of study responsible for your modern electronics that you are using right now.

Zz.

Ref:

1. http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/97/1/28.pdf
2. http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/97/1/32.pdf
3. http://arXiv.org/abs/hep-th/0210162
4. R.B. Laughlin, Rev. Mod. Phys., v.71, p.863 (1999).

 

[friend]

So are you saying, Zz, that there are some phenomena that definitely ARE unexplainable in terms of something more basic? Is the universe inherently unexplainable? Or are humans inherently not capable of understanding the universe? That doesn't sound very scientific.

 

[ZapperZ]

So are you saying, Zz, that there are some phenomena that definitely ARE unexplainable in terms of something more basic? Is the universe inherently unexplainable? Or are humans inherently not capable of understanding the universe? That doesn't sound very scientific.

Note that saying something cannot be explained using elementary interactions at the individual particle level is NOT the same as saying that there are NO explanations.

There are many emergent phenomena in condensed matter that have a solid, well-verified theoretical description. This includes conventional superconductivity, fractional quantum hall effect, quantum magnetism, band structure of solids, etc... etc. Heck, even simple theory of electricity in a conductor are explained and derived via such many-body renormalization. It is just that none of these ever started via a First Principle derivation using interactions at the individual particle level. I mean, how can one solve a gazillion interacting particles? We don't even have the most general solution to the 3-body problem, much less, something of the order of Avogadro's number! Yet, we still managed to have a solid theoretical description of many of these emergent phenomena involving such huge number of particles. How did we do this? By ignoring whatever is happening at those individual particles scale and starting with the formulation a many-body state for that system. That is how we solved those system.

No one has managed to actually see any signature of those emergent behavior by starting with those individual particle interactions. That is why I said that the assumption that once we know all the basic force, we will know everything, is a fallacy. We know that the particles involved in superconductivity need only be described by electromagnetic interactions at the individual particle level. Yet, even with such knowledge, and even including quantum mechanical aspect of the spin orientation, no one has derived superconductivity from this. The BCS theory certainly didn't start from there.

Zz.

 

[setAI]

when one looks at the algorithmic complexity of causal structures like the universe- one sees that complex relationships and states emerge non-deterministically- simple recursive processes form hierarchies of fractal structure- states with unpredictable complexity but yet with very isotropic and consistent patterns of interactions- read: physical laws- so physical laws can be statistically modeled from the bulk of observation- but I don't think there can be a general universal rule like a TOE that can both describe the algorithm in simplest terms AND describe/predict the emergent behavior that leads to physical laws- there can only be a mathematical description of the algorithm and then loose statistical modeling with taxonomic classification of the emergent phenomenology-

the only honest TOE [as printed on a t-shirt] should display the lambda calculus formulation for the simplest Turing Machine with an asterisk: *sort through bulk states to find this universe

 

[friend]

I appreciate all of what you are trying to say. But when you say things like...

That is why I said that the assumption that once we know all the basic force, we will know everything, is a fallacy.

It makes it sounds as if you are saying that it has actually been proven that these emergent properties cannot be derived from basic individaul particle/field interactions. I don't know that this kind of no-go theorm has ever been proved.

Your quote of not even having an exact solution to the 3-body probelm is well taken. But I think everyone agrees that even there the same basic types of interactions apply. If you are saying as a practical matter we can't derive emergent properties from basic interactions, OK, I agree at present. But doesn't mean that it is not possible. Has anyone ever proved that the 3-body problem is not solvable in theory? I think the Helium atom has been solved by going over to "eliptical" coordinates, right?

 

[ZapperZ]

I appreciate all of what you are trying to say. But when you say things like...

It makes it sounds as if you are saying that it has actually been proven that these emergent properties cannot be derived from basic individaul particle/field interactions. I don't know that this kind of no-go theorm has ever been proved.

Your quote of not even having an exact solution to the 3-body probelm is well taken. But I think everyone agrees that even there the same basic types of interactions apply. If you are saying as a practical matter we can't derive emergent properties from basic interactions, OK, I agree at present. But doesn't mean that it is not possible. Has anyone ever proved that the 3-body problem is not solvable in theory? I think the Helium atom has been solved by going over to "eliptical" coordinates, right?

I said that we don't have the most general solution to the 3-body problem, i.e. without any constraints. The He atom is actually simpler and with constraints.

Thus, if the 3-body problem is not tractable, how are we to know to what what kind of "solutions" we can get out of 10^26 particles?

In one of the article that I've referenced, there's a quote from Phil Anderson that said "More Is Different", not "More Is More Complex". Think about it. In fractional quantum hall effect and fractional charges, you are getting the smallest "particle" being LESS than the individual particles making up the conglomerate! This indicates to me that it isn't just simply scaling up the problem to include a lot of stuff.

When I said that the claim is a fallacy, I am not making a definite statement that it has been proven to be false. I am saying that it hasn't be done, and there's every indication that it can't be done. Granted, there's no evidence to prove that it can't be done. So I can't go out and tell people that in no uncertain terms. However, if you look at what I tried to say in my first post here, it is to counter the notion that it IS possible, and that such an assumption is valid. It isn't, and I think many people are not aware of that, and certainly not aware of these observations from condensed matter physics.

Zz.

 

[friend]

When I said that the claim is a fallacy, I am not making a definite statement that it has been proven to be false. I am saying that it hasn't be done, and there's every indication that it can't be done. Granted, there's no evidence to prove that it can't be done.

I'd like to disagree. These emergent properties represent added struction that takes information to describe and so has entropy. Now if it were possible to prove from QFT, for example, that there is a limit to the amount of entropy that can exist per unit volume - the horizon area entropy theory (or whatever it's called), then there would be some reduction of these emergent properties from fundamental reactions. But I haven't proven it yet. That kind of proof may have to wait until we have a valid QG theory. Hasn't Robert Wald proven this black hole horizon entropy in his QFT on curved spacetime book?

 

[f-h]

The three body problem can not be solved analytically, that is, three Newtonian particles interacting via gravity contain behavior that can not be analytically extracted from the equations that give rise to that very behavior. Neither the less, for the Universe consisting of these three particles these equations are a TOE in the sense that physicists use the term. The impossibility of deriving the emergent behavior from the equations does not imply that it is not contained in the equations.

 

[mheslep]

...But nature is much more heartless than I am, and those students who stay in physics long enough to seriously confront the experimental record eventually come to understand that the reductionist idea is wrong a great deal of the time, and perhaps always...

...I myself have come to suspect that all the important outstanding problems in physics are emergent in nature...

From Laughlin's http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1998/laughlin-lecture.pdf"

 

[Chronos]

Science is done from the top down [observation], not bottom up [theory]. We know where the top is, but not the bottom. Some scientists believe there is a 'bottom', but, none are claiming to have glimpsed it. Particle physicists, whom you might expect to be closest to the 'bottom' have more vexing questions than any other group of scientists. Zz's superconductivity example is an excellent example. The process of finding high temperature superconductors is more miss than hit due to an infuriating array of competing variables. The universe does not yet simplify as you descend into the pit.

 

[Boson the Klown]

Emergent behavior IS contained in the laws of physics, the problem is our inability to solve problems without approximations.

There are several reasons for this, first in lieu of exact solutions to problems will must resort to approximations and since we cannot specify initial conditions with infinite precison, even with 100 decimal accuracy eventually the error incurred by the numbers after the 100th decimal will begin to have a drastic effect on the approximation, leading it away from the actual solution. This is what is known as sensitivity to inital conditions.

It is a mathematical problem not a physical problem.

 

[fleem]

How can we have claimed to explain something by providing a more complex "explanation" than simply what we measure? For the sake of this argument, let's define "complexity" as the least number of words that can describe the concept. I claim that BCS requires fewer words than the number of words it would take to individually describe all the forms of superconductivity that we attribute to BCS. Its reductionism. Surely Zz you are not claiming BCS requires more words than would a description of all the forms of superconductivity it describes!

 

[ZapperZ]

How can we have claimed to explain something by providing a more complex "explanation" than simply what we measure? For the sake of this argument, let's define "complexity" as the least number of words that can describe the concept. I claim that BCS requires fewer words than the number of words it would take to individually describe all the forms of superconductivity that we attribute to BCS. Its reductionism. Surely Zz you are not claiming BCS requires more words than would a description of all the forms of superconductivity it describes!

Er.. requiring "less word" is reductionism IN PHYSICS? Since when? It certainly isn't the reductionism that Steven Weinberg is advocating, and it isn't what elementary particle physics is selling.

You had just redefined reductionism as used in physics. To claim that this is a valid definition, you should write a rebuttal to Laughlin's papers. If your rebuttal is published, then I'll accept your definition.

I've never seen anything in physics that has, as one of its criteria, a requirement for "fewer words".

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

I'd like to disagree. These emergent properties represent added struction that takes information to describe and so has entropy. Now if it were possible to prove from QFT, for example, that there is a limit to the amount of entropy that can exist per unit volume - the horizon area entropy theory (or whatever it's called), then there would be some reduction of these emergent properties from fundamental reactions. But I haven't proven it yet. That kind of proof may have to wait until we have a valid QG theory. Hasn't Robert Wald proven this black hole horizon entropy in his QFT on curved spacetime book?

Er... come again?

If I am not able to say that these emergent phenomena cannot be reduced to a description of individual particle interactions, then the reductionism claim that they can is also not true. Why you have to invoke entropy into this is beyond me. I cite the non-existence of any First Principle derivation is my evidence that the latter isn't valid.

Zz.

 

[arfa]

It is arguable that, for the past 80 years physicists have been stuck for a general explanatory theory of the universe basically by the narrow constraints of their methodology, which led, in particular, to the general acceptance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. So that this doctrine of indeterminacy effectively put an end to any progress towards a true and truly universal quantum revolution.

The consequence being that physicists can still dream that a general theory of quantum gravity, which assumes the action of the fundamental forces or interactions alone, could lead to a theory of everything that explains quantum mechanics. Whereas, especially given a determinate quantum interpretation, reasons can be found to consider that it's the distinctive quantum behaviour called wave, spin and entanglement that just couldn't possibly be explained as effects caused by any of the forces in any case.

And then if one stands back from the confines of experimental physics and its methodology and considers problems of explainiing the universe of the medium and large scale by assuming the action of the forces alone, the question may be asked: Would not a theory that generally explains the universe need to be one that accounts for everything that can't be explained as effects caused by the forces or the forces alone, and which would need to begin with a hypothesis that would causally explain quantum mechanics?

 

[ZapperZ]

It is arguable that, for the past 80 years physicists have been stuck for a general explanatory theory of the universe basically by the narrow constraints of their methodology, which led, in particular, to the general acceptance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. So that this doctrine of indeterminacy effectively put an end to any progress towards a true and truly universal quantum revolution.

Er... where did you learn quantum mechanics from?

I think you have a serious misunderstanding of not only quantum mechanics, but how physics is done. "indeterminancy" is not a "doctrine", at least not in physics.

The consequence being that physicists can still dream that a general theory of quantum gravity, which assumes the action of the fundamental forces or interactions alone, could lead to a theory of everything that explains quantum mechanics.

Quantum gravity is being formulated to "explain quantum mechanics"??!

Zz.

 

[fleem]

Surely Zz you are not claiming BCS requires more words than would a description of all the forms of superconductivity it describes!

Er.. requiring "less word" is reductionism IN PHYSICS? Since when? It certainly isn't the reductionism that Steven Weinberg is advocating, and it isn't what elementary particle physics is selling.

You had just redefined reductionism as used in physics. To claim that this is a valid definition, you should write a rebuttal to Laughlin's papers. If your rebuttal is published, then I'll accept your definition.

I've never seen anything in physics that has, as one of its criteria, a requirement for "fewer words".

Zz.

I'll take this, then, as a, "Yes, BCS requires more words to convey than do all the things that it explains". Thank you for your answer.

 

[ZapperZ]

I'll take this, then, as a, "Yes, BCS requires more words to convey than do all the things that it explains". Thank you for your answer.

.. and how did you arrive at that conclusion? Did you actually look up the BCS theory? Or did you simply use "induction"?

Zz.

 

[fleem]

Er.. requiring "less word" is reductionism IN PHYSICS? Since when? It certainly isn't the reductionism that Steven Weinberg is advocating, and it isn't what elementary particle physics is selling.

You had just redefined reductionism as used in physics. To claim that this is a valid definition, you should write a rebuttal to Laughlin's papers. If your rebuttal is published, then I'll accept your definition.

I've never seen anything in physics that has, as one of its criteria, a requirement for "fewer words".

Zz.

I'll take this, then, as a, "Yes, BCS requires more words to convey than do all the things that it explains". Thank you for your answer.

.. and how did you arrive at that conclusion? Did you actually look up the BCS theory? Or did you simply use "induction"?

Zz.

I arrived at it by reading your post.

 

[ZapperZ]

I arrived at it by reading your post.

... and that's sufficient information for you to actually form a conclusion?

Hey, if you're comfortable with that kind of "data" for formulate something, who am I to correct you on that?

Zz.

 

[fleem]

So in summary:

Fleem basically says science is reductionism. Zz disagrees.

Zz gives BCS as an example.

Fleem asks Zz, "Do you believe it takes more words to describe BCS than it does to describe all the various scenarios that BCS explains?"

Zz does not answer the question, but does complain that the complexity of a statement has nothing to do with the number of words in the statement.

So fleem responds, "I'll take that as a 'yes, you believe BCS takes more words to describe than all the things it explains'"

To which Zz complains, "Where did you arrive at that conclusion"

To which fleem responds, "From your post"

And then Zz smartly implies that there was some other source fleem should have used to find out Zz's answer tot he question.

 

[ZapperZ]

So in summary:And then Zz smartly implies that there was some other source fleem should have used to find out Zz's answer tot he question.

... such as studying the BCS theory. I thought this is obvious, but obviously it isn't.

Your question also requires that there exist a reductionist description of superconductivity for comparison with BCS theory. After all, how is one to determine which is more or less? Such comparison can't be done because, as I've repeated MANY times, there is NO reductionist description of superconductivity. Therefore, the comparison you asked can't be done. Again, since I've mentioned this several times, I thought this was obvious!

Frankly, I'm a bit surprised that this is how you arrive at your conclusion. I certainly do not make up my mind based simply on what I read on the 'net, much less, without doing ample research on my own. If I'm making definite statement about something, I want to know what that something is first, without learning it through someone else's interpretation.

The Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer's paper is one of THE most cited paper in all of physics. You can easily start from there. In fact, I'll even recommend Micheal Tinkham's classic text on Superconductivity if you want to learn about it in a clearer fashion. He even did it with two different approaches - the standard method and the variational approach. So how about getting it right from the horse's mouth itself?

Zz.

 

[fleem]

Zz,

We both, of course, agree that the value of an explanation is in its ability to predict the outcome of experiments. We both also agree, I'm sure, that the goal of science is to discover good explanations. The more different experiments to which an explanation can be applied, the more valuable is the explanation. Without an "explanation" for superconductivity, we would have to write down what we see in each of the superconductivity experiments that BCS has generalized. The number of words required to describe all of those is more than the number of words required to describe BCS. This is reductionism, and it is science.

 

[ZapperZ]

Zz,

We both, of course, agree that the value of an explanation is in its ability to predict the outcome of experiments. We both also agree, I'm sure, that the goal of science is to discover good explanations. The more different experiments to which an explanation can be applied, the more valuable is the explanation. Without an "explanation" for superconductivity, we would have to write down what we see in each of the superconductivity experiments that BCS has generalized. The number of words required to describe all of those is more than the number of words required to describe BCS. This is reductionism, and it is science.

Can you show me where in reductionism as applied to science, is there a criteria for the "number of words"? You easily contradict Weinberg here on HIS view of reductionism.

You are also confusing "universality" with "reductionism".

Zz.

 

[friend]

Er... come again?

If I am not able to say that these emergent phenomena cannot be reduced to a description of individual particle interactions, then the reductionism claim that they can is also not true.

The last clause does not follow from the first clause. In fact to say that it is not possible to prove A false is logically equal to saying that A is true.

Why you have to invoke entropy into this is beyond me. I cite the non-existence of any First Principle derivation is my evidence that the latter isn't valid.

Zz.

Entropy is about the only thing we have to describe aggregate effects from individual interactions. I'm thinking in terms of statistical mechanics which describes aggregate effects such as temperature, heat, and entropy in terms of average particle properties such as mass and velocity. So it should be no surprise at all that one would try to use entropy to connect emergent properties of aggregates to individual interactions.

 

[fleem]

If Weinberg's definition of "reductionism" is the same as the common definition, then it is not logical for you to complain that I was not using Weinberg's definition rather than the common one. If you believe the common definition of "reductionism" should not be applied to science, then what was it suppose to be applied to? If you think I was using neither definition, then I suggest you look up the common definition of reductionism. Reductionism most certainly is an issue of complexity in statements. Search for "reductionism" and count the hits, and search for "reductionism" and "complexity" and count the hits. Science is the process of finding less complex statements that are capable of predicting the outcome of more varied experiments. Reductionism is the belief that the universe is structured such that we will continue to find such statements. Although there is no consensus for the definition of "complexity", most will agree that a good way to measure complexity (even while we disagree on a precise definition for it) in a statement is to count the minimum number of words required to make that statement. Yes its vague (since we would also need to measure the complexity in each word), but I challenge you to provide a better way to measure complexity in a statement.

 

[ZapperZ]

The last clause does not follow from the first clause. In fact to say that it is not possible to prove A false is logically equal to saying that A is true.

No it isn't. This isn't an either-or scenario. Because in physics, unless something has an evidence for its validity, it cannot YET be shown to be true. So the claim that everything can be reduced to the basic interaction at the individual particle level isn't true because there is no evidence supporting it.

However, I too would say that I don't have concrete evidence to say that emergent phenomena can't be derived from such level. I have INDICATIONS that it can't via the phenomena that I've described, but I don't have a Morley-Michaelson-type of evidence to falsify it.

Entropy is about the only thing we have to describe aggregate effects from individual interactions. I'm thinking in terms of statistical mechanics which describes aggregate effects such as temperature, heat, and entropy in terms of average particle properties such as mass and velocity. So it should be no surprise at all that one would try to use entropy to connect emergent properties of aggregates to individual interactions.

Er.. I know all about entropy. I just don't see the context in applying it to THIS situation. What were you arguing for? That the inclusion of entropy can, in fact, allow reductionism approach to describe all the emergent phenomena? Do you have a particular formulation to show this to support your argument?

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

If Weinberg's definition of "reductionism" is the same as the common definition, then it is not logical for you to complain that I was not using Weinberg's definition rather than the common one. If you believe the common definition of "reductionism" should not be applied to science, then what was it suppose to be applied to? If you think I was using neither definition, then I suggest you look up the common definition of reductionism. Reductionism most certainly is an issue of complexity in statements. Search for "reductionism" and count the hits, and search for "reductionism" and "complexity" and count the hits. Science is the process of finding less complex statements that are capable of predicting the outcome of more varied experiments. Reductionism is the belief that the universe is structured such that we will continue to find such statements. Although there is no consensus for the definition of "complexity", most will agree that a good way to measure complexity (even while we disagree on a precise definition for it) in a statement is to count the minimum number of words required to make that statement. Yes its vague (since we would also need to measure the complexity in each word), but I challenge you to provide a better way to measure complexity in a statement.

You are welcome to check how he uses it in his book "Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries"

Can you tell me which is more "complex": Maxwell's equation for electromagnetism, or the electroweak theory? Which one is more of a "reductionist"?

You still haven't shown me any sources to support your argument that this is a "standard" criteria of defining what reductionism is in physics.

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

I have no idea if this access is only for certain domain, but here is a link to Phil Anderson's essay in Science on "More Is Different". I believe that this is the first, if not among the first, counter-argument from condensed matter physicists against such reductionist concept.

http://www.cmp.caltech.edu/~motrunch/Teaching/Phy135b_Winter07/MoreIsDifferent.pdf

Zz.

 

[Marco_84]

I want also to say that when you built up a QFT what u construct from the bottom (Fock space) are the asymptotic state when time goes to infinity (Non interacting particles). About what happen when they interact in a collider we don't know anything. we know only the cross sections and similars arguments. <psi|S|psi'>.
we can just built up a theory self consistent away from the "cahos". I tink this is the really problem of deriving EVERYTHING from the QFT theories.

 

[fleem]

You are welcome to check how he uses it in his book "Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries"

This proves you haven't read the post to which you are responding.

Can you tell me which is more "complex": Maxwell's equation for electromagnetism, or the electroweak theory? Which one is more of a "reductionist"?

My understanding of electroweak theory and my understanding of Maxwell's equations is unrelated to the validity of my claim that someone who does understand them should be able to roughly estimate (in theory) which is more complex by counting the words required to describe them.

You still haven't shown me any sources to support your argument that this is a "standard" criteria of defining what reductionism is in physics.
Zz.

Look it up in the dictionary, man! Reductionism is just as I've been using it! Its the belief, idea, process, whatever, of every behavior of the universe being explainable (reduced) to simpler and more generalized rules. the word "simple", here, refers to the concept of complexity, and roughly measuring the complexity of a statement, for lack of a better way, can be done with something like counting the words and hoping each word has roughly the same complexity (number of simpler words in its definition)--unless you can think of a better way, in which case i will be glad to embrace it.

You know, whether its the case or not, I really have the impression you haven't been reading half of what I've said. Perhaps I should revisit and expound on what I was trying to say in the beginning:

I believe the universe is the result (outside of time--since time is a facet of the universe) of some extremely simple concept. I believe this because it appears that every behavior we see is a special case of more general rules, which describe many different special cases. I am convinced that if we knew everything about particles, we'd see that superconductivity is unavoidable. Now it might be that the description for "everything about particles" would be more complex than the description for superconductivity. However, that description for "everything about particles" would explain a lot more than superconductivity. Said another way, if we knew everything about particles and concluded superconductivity should not happen, but then observed it, then we should by all reckoning call that a paradox.

 

[ZapperZ]

I want also to say that when you built up a QFT what u construct from the bottom (Fock space) are the asymptotic state when time goes to infinity (Non interacting particles). About what happen when they interact in a collider we don't know anything. we know only the cross sections and similars arguments. <psi|S|psi'>.
we can just built up a theory self consistent away from the "cahos". I tink this is the really problem of deriving EVERYTHING from the QFT theories.

QFT certainly has its own issues. However, I don't think this has any bearing on TOE, or the inability of constructing a First Principle description of many-body phenomena from individual interactions. Why? Because in condensed matter itself, we use QFT formulation, albeit using renormalized, many-body potential, for example. The Fermi Liquid Theory is an easy example. We lump all the many-body interaction into the self-energy of the system. That is why you can get, for instance, an electron in a heavy-fermion material that has an effective mass 200 times its bare mass.

So QFT itself isn't at fault here, since obviously we use it to describe these emergent phenomena as well.

Zz.

 

[ZapperZ]

Look it up in the dictionary, man! Reductionism is just as I've been using it! Its the belief, idea, process, whatever, of every behavior of the universe being explainable (reduced) to simpler and more generalized rules. the word "simple", here, refers to the concept of complexity, and roughly measuring the complexity of a statement, for lack of a better way, can be done with something like counting the words and hoping each word has roughly the same complexity (number of simpler words in its definition)--unless you can think of a better way, in which case i will be glad to embrace it.

This is like arguing with someone about the use of the word "theory". When one tries to explain how that word is used in science, we get "go look in a dictionary" argument.

Somehow, that has infected "complexity" as well.

Zz.

 

[fleem]

This is like arguing with someone about the use of the word "theory". When one tries to explain how that word is used in science, we get "go look in a dictionary" argument.

Somehow, that has infected "complexity" as well.

Zz.

You ask for evidence for the definitions I use, I give my definition, say it matches that in the dictionary, and you proceed to scoff at dictionaries. Suddenly it all becomes clear. I realize now that the definition you've been using for the word "the" is from some other source than the dictionary.

So tell me, if we thought we knew everything about particles and concluded superconductivity should not happen, but then observed that superconductivity does happen, does that imply we don't know everything about particles?

 

[ZapperZ]

You ask for evidence for the definitions I use, I give my definition, say it matches that in the dictionary, and you proceed to scoff at dictionaries. Suddenly it all becomes clear. I realize now that the definition you've been using for the word "the" is from some other source than the dictionary.

This is what I asked:

You still haven't shown me any sources to support your argument that this is a "standard" criteria of defining what reductionism is in physics.

So who's not reading what here?

So tell me, if we thought we knew everything about particles and concluded superconductivity should not happen, but then observed that superconductivity does happen, does that imply we don't know everything about particles?

Somewhere in this thread, someone gave a link to Laughlin's Nobel speech. I have the strong impression that you haven't read ANY of the links I've given you, because you are asking not only about something that I've already mentioned, but something that has been mentioned multiple times in those links, ranging from Laughlin's Nobel speech, to his PNAS paper, to Phil Anderson's "More Is Different" essay.

I'm going to end this here because I'm tired of repeating myself. Everything that you accuse me of doing, they're the same thing that you are doing. I do not like doing something that goes nowhere fast.

Zz.

 

[arfa]

Er... where did you learn quantum mechanics from?

I think you have a serious misunderstanding of not only quantum mechanics, but how physics is done. "indeterminancy" is not a "doctrine", at least not in physics.

Nonsense. Indeterminacy is a doctrine in quantum physics as long as quantum objects are described as being in a superposition of states before their behaviour is directly detected and measured and all physics undergraduates are not taught at least that some kind of determinate account like Bohmian mechanics could well be scientifically valid. If only because Schrodinger's cat paradox does not apply to such an interpretation that describes in detail how quantum objects could be both waves and particles while in motion and because it a systematic argument that is consistent with a wide range of experimental results.

I've now come across many physics graduates on the Internet who are simply unaware of Bohmian mechanics or who have misunderstandings about such an account.

Quantum gravity is being formulated to "explain quantum mechanics"??!

If only because quantum gravity theories seek to combine relativity or some kind gravity theory with quantum mechanics into a single theory then surely the implication is that such a general theory would explain quantum mechanics? And especially since general relativity is a cause and effect theory of gravity, it could be expected that the quantum mechanics should be causally explained. If not then why should such an account of quantum gravity be regarded as an adequate scientific theory in any case?

Where did you learn quantum mechanics from?

 

[fleem]

So tell me, if we thought we knew everything about particles and concluded superconductivity should not happen, but then observed that superconductivity does happen, does that imply we don't know everything about particles?

Somewhere in this thread, someone gave a link to Laughlin's Nobel speech. I have the strong impression that you haven't read ANY of the links I've given you, because you are asking not only about something that I've already mentioned, but something that has been mentioned multiple times in those links, ranging from Laughlin's Nobel speech, to his PNAS paper, to Phil Anderson's "More Is Different" essay.

I'm going to end this here because I'm tired of repeating myself. Everything that you accuse me of doing, they're the same thing that you are doing. I do not like doing something that goes nowhere fast.

Zz.

Zz it is ridiculous to imply that your answer to this simple "yes/no" question is so complex that you can't even give a hint at what it would be, and must send me away looking for it among all the other things in several papers you cite. Your actions, whether sincere or not, reek of avoidance. I suggest you answer the question. Here it is again:

If we thought we knew everything about particles and concluded superconductivity should not happen, but then observed that superconductivity does happen, does that imply we don't know everything about particles?

 

[friend]

Er.. I know all about entropy. I just don't see the context in applying it to THIS situation. What were you arguing for? That the inclusion of entropy can, in fact, allow reductionism approach to describe all the emergent phenomena? Do you have a particular formulation to show this to support your argument?

Zz.

I can't imagine that I will ever be able to prove from QFT the necessity of the fingers and eyes of the human form. Although, if it can be proven from cosmological horizon entropy, for example, that the complexity of intelligence is inevitable, then perhaps fingers and eyes can be considered necessary to get intelligence. And I think there are people that are trying to connect cosmological considerations to QFT. For example, there is the Higgs mechenism to explain cosmological inflation which produces a horzion and ends in particles obtaining mass (as I recall). The point being that there seems to be principles derived from QFT that do explain the emergent properties.

 

[arfa]

Nonsense. Indeterminacy is a doctrine in quantum physics as long as quantum objects are described as being in a superposition of states before their behaviour is directly detected and measured and all physics undergraduates are not taught at least that some kind of determinate account like Bohmian mechanics could well be scientifically valid. If only because Schrodinger's cat paradox does not apply to such an interpretation that describes in detail how quantum objects could be both waves and particles while in motion and because it a systematic argument that is consistent with a wide range of experimental results.

I've now come across many physics graduates on the Internet who are simply unaware of Bohmian mechanics or who have misunderstandings about such an account.

If only because quantum gravity theories seek to combine relativity or some kind gravity theory with quantum mechanics into a single theory then surely the implication is that such a general theory would explain quantum mechanics? And especially since general relativity is a cause and effect theory of gravity, it could be expected that the quantum mechanics should be causally explained. If not then why should such an account of quantum gravity be regarded as an adequate scientific theory in any case?

Ah but then, of course, there is an uncomfortable fact for the quantum gravity theorists, which they never mention and would like everyone to ignore or not take seriously. Which is that Bohmian mechanics is the only systematically argued theory of quantum mechanics that does, like general relativity, describe a distinct cause from its effects upon objects in motion to explain the observable evidence and is consistent with a wide range of experimental results. And this mechanics

• shows that the uncertainy principle need not describe any indeterminacy in the behaviour of quantum objects but only a universal limitation in the measurement of this behaviour in any quantum experiment. And so there need be no such thing as the "quantum foam" on the Planck scale that all quantum gravity theorists assume;
  
• describes a cause called the quantum potential that is quite distinct from any force since it would have nonlocal effects as it produces quantum wave and spin behaviour and as it acts at a distance to produce quantum entanglement. So that, as is consistent with the results of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_test_experiments" , such a cause would act without varying in any way at any distance between objects and thus act with no measurable strength. And therefore the conclusion can be that the nature of such a cause could not be deduced and described from any theory of quantum gravity.

[Quantum gravity theory as] a theory of everything, a joke? More like a quite tragic misunderstanding arising from an 80 year old error in interpreting the evidence found of matter and radiant energy on the smallest scale, I'd say.

 

[Fra]

the uncertainy principle need not describe any indeterminacy in the behaviour of quantum objects but only a universal limitation in the measurement of this behaviour in any quantum experiment

My personal objection to this viewpoint is that what I can say scientifically say about the behaviour of anything can not come from anywhere else, than from interactions, external of with myself (interactions that is essentially remodelling of the observers record). Direct, or indirect mediate by some chain of intercommunications.

This is what I personally consider to be the biggest point of QM - the emphasis on epistemology. And a point that I think will more or less survive to it's spirit into any future revisions including gravity.

If there is a limitation on measurements which is in essence is interactions, then that is the same thing as saying that there is constraints what I can say about things. Wether there are things that are certain ways, but I can't say anything about it that is almost an undefined reflection because if I could reflect to it, I could also say something about it via induction, a contradiction.

The essence I like to keeep from GR OTOH, that is disrespected in QM, is that there is a relation between ontology and epistemology that almost takes the form of an ontology of the epistemology and you can't have one without the other.

What I think is the problem with QM is that the epistemology is unmatched. We consider operators and measurements in absurdum, without connecting them to a matching ontology that can relate to this. This is where I think probability and information theory, with information processing, information storage and gathering can fill in the gap.

How can we collect information if we don't have a memory record where we can contain the results? This is one thing that is not respected in QM foundations. We related and store the information in background ontologies that are not respecting the measurement ideals, at least how i see it.

/Fredrik

 

[arfa]

But if your looking for the natural truth beyond the results of quantum experiments that explains matter and radiant energy then you won't do it by talking about the philosophy of knowledge.

Neils Bohr insisted that there was no such natural truth and thus devised the indeterminate Copenhagen interpretation (CI), which most physicists have since accepted some version of who have any interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Whereas Bohm's mechanics showed in mathematical and diagrammatical detail how it is that CI could be wrong. So that the Bohmian account describes an account of quantum particles with definite and determinate trajectories that are also real extended waves beyond the experimental results, and which is perfectly consistent with these results. While the wave would be a distinct cause that acts upon quantum particles in addition to the forces. And you can ask if this description represents, if only in a limited way, the unobservable natural truth about matter and the energy it radiates then how, in enough detail, could this be so and how could you empirically confirm that this is so?

And one can conclude that the only way of doing this is to develop a general cause and effect theory from both the quantum findings and the large scale observable natural evidence, while the observable evidence serves to confirm a detailed enough hypothesis of quantum behaviour that is based upon Bohmian mechanics.

 

[Fra]

First, we can agree that QM as it stands is not satisfactory.

But if your looking for the natural truth beyond the results of quantum experiments that explains matter and radiant energy then you won't do it by talking about the philosophy of knowledge.

The philosophy of knowledge is not irrelevant, since it relates to philosophy of science. I personally think it's a common bad habit of many people to reject all philosophical reflections with the assumption that they are irrelevant to the scientific process. I strongly disagree with that. Technically, I would say that philosophy is self-interaction/observation and not disjoint from reality. It's a real physical process in the human brain in this case and i have no reason to doubt it's connection to reality. By controlled contemplation we remodel our own understand, seeking a more coherent and consistent unity. This is progress. But that's only part of it of course, the other part is external interactions.

The problems seen with QM (IMO), are observations that there seems to be inconsistencies in the logic used. And perhaps resolving this, will also help move the theory forward - way beyond the contemplatory-only stage.

I guess this is what the bohmians do too - you see logical issues. That's nothing wrong of course. I was trying to argue that even though entire QM as it stands is unsatisfactory, there are some deep lessions that I think are right on, which is that the idea of acquiring information is taken more seriously than in CM, and that this actually affects the physical reality. This comes out as very sound and logical to me. Given that we agree in something beeing wrong with QM, don't you agree with this?

What I essentially think is that to understand and verify "knowledge" one need to analyse the process where knowledge is formed, this also gives you a complete strategy, where you do not only konw how to distinguish good theories from bad, you learn howto learn, by analysing and developing the learning process.

Whereas Bohm's mechanics showed in mathematical and diagrammatical detail how it is that CI could be wrong.

At minimum I agree that CI is incomplete, but I personally see many better options to than bohmian mechanics. Science is more than theories to me, it's a strategy of survival. In that context I don't quite understand the bohmian strategy.

Suppose bohm is right, then what? What is the best way forward?

/Fredrik

 

[arfa]

At minimum I agree that CI is incomplete, but I personally see many better options to than bohmian mechanics. Science is more than theories to me, it's a strategy of survival. In that context I don't quite understand the bohmian strategy.

Suppose bohm is right, then what? What is the best way forward?

/Fredrik

I'm not saying that the philosophy is irrelevant as a rational critique of science, at least. I'm just saying that only science can find, sufficiently justify and clearly describe just what is already in the natural world as a hidden cause to explain how something occurs. But this has not been the case in any theory of quantum gravity.

Whereas Isaac Newton was the first to show that such a cause could be something invisible and that acts universally but that the causal details can be justified and described just from its effects upon objects. And thus only by examining a wide range of evidence, such a cause that was called gravity was shown to act where before it could be thought that there was nothing in the world outside objects that produces their weight, fall and orbital motion.

Newton also provided what were surely incontravertable arguments just from the large scale evidence for proposing that light should consist of corpuscles or particles in motion. For what else could travel in narrow beams and produce sharp shadows and, one could add, what could be observed of just waves in space?

At the beginning of the 19th century Thomas Young and others showed that evidence on the small scale indicates that light possesses a wave property that varies in length according to the light's colour. But these findings didn't refute Newton's arguments. For the reasonable conclusion could be that, somehow, light consists of both waves and particles while in motion.

The trouble is, however, no direct evidence has ever been found of light or any quantum objects being either waves or particles while in motion. And physics has been dogged by a tyranny of describing and accepting the truth of just what can be measured from experimental results. Thus in the 20th century, after the successes of such methods in producing quantum mechanics and showing that the measurements of quantum behaviour could only be probablistic and uncertain in some respects, Neils Bohr and others could argue that, beyond the measured results, quantum objects are neither waves nor particles and, indeed, indeterminate in all respects.

Then not until 25 years after this decree of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which by then had been accepted by the very large majority of physicists, it can be insisted that David Bohm only served to support in a systematic argument what could already be reasonably deduced from both the large scale evidence and the experimental findings: light and matter does consist of both particles and waves beyond the direct observations and measurements. And the indeterminacy just results from the limitations of the measuring instruments.

But then, given that Bohm is correct in the essentials at least, where to now?

Well, I claim to have found enough empirical reasons to conclude that theoretical physics can only progress by accepting that, once again, only by considering together a wide range of observable natural and experimental evidence, a general theory can be developed that sufficiently justifies and describes enough details of another invisible cause from its effects upon matter and energy.

Although an account of this theory needs to be quite unlike any existing account in physics or elsewhere in the natural sciences, and would also mess up quite a lot of existing theories. And hence, so far, I've found it impossuble to convince any physicist on the internet that a properly scientific general theory can be developed of what could be described as a nonlocally acting and extradimensional cause and its effects in the natural world. One of the universal effects of this cause being that matter can remain in its organised forms as atoms, molecules and living organisms despite the forces acting within and upon it.

 

[tomas666]

First, we can agree that QM as it stands is not satisfactory.



The philosophy of knowledge is not irrelevant, since it relates to philosophy of science. I personally think it's a common bad habit of many people to reject all philosophical reflections with the assumption that they are irrelevant to the scientific process. I strongly disagree with that. Technically, I would say that philosophy is self-interaction/observation and not disjoint from reality. It's a real physical process in the human brain in this case and i have no reason to doubt it's connection to reality. By controlled contemplation we remodel our own understand, seeking a more coherent and consistent unity. This is progress. But that's only part of it of course, the other part is external interactions.

The problems seen with QM (IMO), are observations that there seems to be inconsistencies in the logic used. And perhaps resolving this, will also help move the theory forward - way beyond the contemplatory-only stage.

I guess this is what the bohmians do too - you see logical issues. That's nothing wrong of course. I was trying to argue that even though entire QM as it stands is unsatisfactory, there are some deep lessions that I think are right on, which is that the idea of acquiring information is taken more seriously than in CM, and that this actually affects the physical reality. This comes out as very sound and logical to me. Given that we agree in something beeing wrong with QM, don't you agree with this?

What I essentially think is that to understand and verify "knowledge" one need to analyse the process where knowledge is formed, this also gives you a complete strategy, where you do not only konw how to distinguish good theories from bad, you learn howto learn, by analysing and developing the learning process.



At minimum I agree that CI is incomplete, but I personally see many better options to than bohmian mechanics. Science is more than theories to me, it's a strategy of survival. In that context I don't quite understand the bohmian strategy.

Suppose bohm is right, then what? What is the best way forward?

/Fredrik

Ah i think that the knowlage is nothing one day we know something another we know that we are wrong.People have stop look for most beautiful pleace universe,how there can be diffrent force that rule of them?Meby I am not right but we should start to think beyond all we know,and try to do new theory not theory that look only for things we "see" or we can image but something close to question we say all time "Why we are living?".And how can be quantum wolrd right if there is chance that something will happen.What it means that there is no rule,atoms are crazy force that don't know what is should do?So why all exsist?Next thing why we always have to compicate easy things?And why in quantum world elektromagetic force is so overpowerd but gravitaion is nothing?If we look at Newton gravitaion formula and elektromagnetism they look like the same thing.So why non one is doing one force that rule rest and create things like "gravity".Next if atoms have mass it mean that they are build from smaller parts the smaller parts must have energy to
if they don't have mattery would colapse.Next Einstein relativity proof ,is not that time slow down but that elektromagnetic wave is slowing near something that move fast.We don't need hard experimets for it for example if i take a pen and line do some move if r is more we see the object less the same on satelite near earth.And i guess that there will be
theory of all someday but it will show all things in easy way that is should be showed.