nismaratwork
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FlexGunship said:Actually, Mug, if you entirely ignore the sightings outside of the building, this hypothesis gets a little bit better. It would make sense for the military/government to have a way to remotely disable a nuclear missile silo in the event that it were overrun and the operating crew were taken hostage.
In that case, it would simply be a switch unknown to the operators (for security reasons) which could be remotely triggered. Of course, there would be no reason at all to involve an aircraft/balloon/disc to accomplish this; so that part of the "report" is still superfluous.
I still think, however, that the primary operating crew would be informed of the test if that were the case. Simulating intermittent malfunctions would surely demoralize the operators there ("first my Walkman breaks, now the integrated nuclear missile launch system breaks... what next?").
It's very hard to imagine that a missile launch control site could be overrun, and if it were you'd need to extract the relevant codes from personal. The most efficient means of stopping such a scenario is just to blow the silo to hell in that event, introduce an incapacitant into the air supply, rely on the loyalty and training of the personnel, and at the most you could shoot down a ballistic missile when you KNOW where it's being launched. Once the silo doors open, a cruise missile or F-** could blast the missile with no fear of a nuclear detonation.
The only feasible reason to shut down the launch capability of a control center is offensive in nature, or as a means to delay a hostile launch.