ThomasT said:
But step 2 doesn't specify any particular way of expressing that. That comes with step 3. So, it would seem that step 3 is where the actual restriction is introduced.
ThomasT, you have the uncanny ability of focusing on steps I consider to be unimportant. Step 3 says "In order for the agreed-upon instructions (to go through or not go through) at -30 and 30 to be different, either the instructions at -30 and 0 are different or the instructions at 0 and 30 are different." Let me ask you this, is the following general statement true? "If A and C are different, either A and B are different or B and C are different." For example, "If the color of your pants and shoes are different, then the color of your pants and socks are different, or the color of your socks and shoes are different." (In this case, A="the instruction at -30", B="the instruction at 0", and C="the instruction at 30".) If you cannot tell that this statement is true, consider the equivalent statement "If A and B are the same, and B and C are the same, then A and C are the same." You should recognize that as the transitive property of equality, and presumably that is not in despite.
You can, of course, dispute that the particles have agreed in advance which angles to go through and which angles not to go through, in which case you should dispute step 2. But if you have accepted step 2, and thus believe that the particles have instructions as to exactly which angles to go through and which angles not to go through, then the transitive property of equality forces you to accept step 3.
Because determinism has to do with the temporal causal order of events. Instantaneous action at a distance between A and B precludes this. It says that A and B are happening simultaneously.
This is entirely irrelevant to our discussion, but do you not consider Newton's theory of gravitation to be deterministic, since it has instantaneous action at a distance? And would consider Bohmian mechanics to be nondeterministic, since it too has instantaneous action at a distance?
The restriction has to be introduced before the conclusion of a linear correlation between θ and rate of coincidental detection. Since step 2 doesn't express any particular literal restriction, then it has to be step 3. That is, you've chosen to express the assumption of independence (locality) in a certain way, and expressing it that way entails the conclusion that the correlation between θ and rate of coincidental detection must be linear.
But I am not making any assumption of locality or independence in step 3! Step 2 is where I say the particles have determined in advance, exactly what angles to go through and what angles not to go through. So they have a list of the instructions of the form "If you see a 20 degree polarizer, go through", "If you see a 40 degree polarizer, don't go through", etc., a list they have agreed upon in advance when they were emitted from the source.
If you agree with me up to there, I don't know how you can disagree with step 3, which is completely trivial.
The physical interpretation of QM has been an open question since the theory was first formulated. As far as I can tell it will always be an open question.
Yes, there are some philosophical views that are indistinguishable experimentally from quantum mechanics, so they can fairly be called interpretations. Copenhagen, Many Worlds, and Bohmian mechanics are good examples of those. But not all possible viewpoints are indistinguishable experimentally from quantum mechanics. For instance, Schrodinger himself originally viewed the wave function as a literal gas that surrounded the nucleus of the atom, and that the magnitude of the wave function was indication the thickness of the gas. But this view was rejected after it was found that when measured, an electron was detected as a particle, not a wave.
Similarly, I see local determinism (excluding superdeterminism) as a view that IS distinguishable experimentally from quantum mechanics, and thus it can't be fairly called an "interpretation".
Regarding your proof, is your step 3 the only way to conceptualize the experimental situation? If not, then does it establish that nature is nonlocal?
As I said, step 3 is not the step where locality is invoked. Step 3 is an unimportant step where I'm just saying something of the form "If A≠C, then A≠B or B≠C" (an application of the transitive property of equality), so that I can apply the laws of probability and say "The probability that A≠B or B≠C is less than or equal to the probablity that A≠B plus the probability that B≠C" and thus conclude that "The probability that A≠C is less than or equal to the probablity that A≠B plus the probability that B≠C", which is the Bell inequality I'm after.