Wave Function Collapse and Entropy

[StarsRuler]

Something that I've thought about that in some ways makes the information-theoretic view more palatable to me, personally, is the "consistent histories" approach

I read the Grifiths Book about consistent histories and it was unsmokable. ¿ Do you know another source for this interpretation more readable

I don´t understand the problem with Bell theorem for the informational interpretation of wavefunction.

The only thing that it no solves is that it imposses a minimun limit for the measurement, but no the real duration of measurement ( maybe it implies to study measurement apparatus), and the possible degeneration in measurement, that can provokes an increased entropy from pure state just before the decoherence start

 

[rkastner]

The consistent histories approach boils down to the idea that one can formulate differing sequences (histories) of events (typically between a given first and last event), and the different possible sequences can form a classical probability space if the associated observables satisfy certain criteria. But that doesn't solve the measurement problem. Instead it invokes linguistic limitations on what properties you are allowed to consider as simultaneously determinate, based on which 'framework' (decomposition of the multiple-time Hilbert space) they belong to. Thus it is 'contextual' in that certain properties are only attributable to the system in the context of a given framework -- and the framework is an epistemic construct. In contrast I argue that you don't need an observer to solve the measurement problem, if you take emission and absorption into account. Things happen -- and what happens does not depend on which framework an observer wishes to consider.

 

[StarsRuler]

In contrast I argue that you don't need an observer to solve the measurement problem, if you take emission and absorption into account

But an observer is not a mental observer neither in informational aproximation to wavefunction, it is a classical apparatus, considered like any system , or better, coordinates ( in phase space) of any system with a preccissión lower than uncertainty relations. Even a electron could be a classical aparatus, but preccissión in position ( if momentum is reasonable determinate) would be ridiculous. This is the Landau vision, for example, the only problem I see is that we could consider all universe classical, maybe the only limitation than space uncertainty could not up to the universe lenght. Maybe it would obligate the particle to be ONLY quantic. This last is a conjecture of mine. Without a limitation, the Landau vision would be problematic, all the universe would be classical and there isn´t wavefunction. Well, maybe Landau vision probably would be more elaborated, I only know the book of not relativistic quantum physics from him completed with decoherence process . This is the only vision I get to understand. Many worlds too, but ...

I like many worlds too , but many worlds=many problems. for example: Probability rules only works in an infinite repetition of an experiment, but probability is near relative frequency when repetitions are reasonable large, with an error sqare of n order.

 

[Demystifier]

I dont´know details about the Bohmian interpretation. But there is no QFT theory for this interpretation. I don´t know if it is beacuse it is not possible or it is not clear that it is possible, but it is a pending question.

Or perhaps there is Bohmian interpretation of QFT, but you didn't know about it? See e.g.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0904.2287 [Int. J. Mod. Phys. A25:1477-1505, 2010]

 

[rkastner]

But an observer is not a mental observer neither in informational aproximation to wavefunction, it is a classical apparatus," ...

"I like many worlds too , but many worlds=many problems. for example: Probability rules only works in an infinite repetition of an experiment, but probability is near relative frequency when repetitions are reasonable large, with an error sqare of n order.

Concerning your first statement, I was referring to the notorious 'Heisenberg cut' problem in which there is no criterion within nonrelativistic QM for saying where the 'quantum' realm ends and the 'classical apparatus' realm begins. This is the point of the Schrodinger's Cat paradox: Schrodinger could not find any way to say that the cat isn't in a superposition (or any of the other classical objects in the box, such as the geiger counter). In the TI approach as I have developed it (see my papers and book), there is a clear criterion. You need to include the relativistic domain, noting in particular that the coupling amplitude between fields is the amplitude to emit or absorb a field quantum, to get it.

Yes, many worlds interpretations have a big problem explaining the Born Rule. In TI it is completely evident. You can read it off the density matrix (which describes the set of weighted incipient transactions due to a particular set of absorbers), as I noted previously.

 

[rkastner]

Yes, there is a criterion for sepparate quantum from classical. All apparatus are classical with more or less preccission, restricted of course by uncertainty relations. When the apparatus impreccissions are more than measurements error that we got in our experiment, then we must study by a quantum wavefunction. But with a minor preccission, even an electron become to be classical, for example

What you have given is just a pragmatic criterion.
Do you understand the point of the 'Schrodinger's Cat' paradox?
Schrodinger recognized that when you must describe an object by a quantum state, all the interactions of that object with other objects must seemingly inherit the linear evolution of the quantum state of the original object, and there is no way to 'break the linearity', so it seems to infect all other objects with which it interacts, even if they are macroscopic (like a cat). The principled (as opposed to pragmatic) way to stop the 'infection' of macroscopic objects by the quantum linearity is to take into account absorption, which is a relativistic process. You can't successfully solve the measurement problem purely within the nonrelativistic theory.

 

[rkastner]

StarsRuler, the measurement problem is not the same as a shortcoming in a given theory such as Newtonian physics. It is an intractable problem that nobody has been able to solve adequately in the usual approaches, which treat nonrelativistic theory as the whole story in conceptual terms. Even when using the relativistic QM, people still think there is a measurement problem (e.g. Feynman was baffled by the measurement problem even though he invented a lot of the relativistic quantum theory). This is because he ultimately rejected the direct-action theory he pioneered with Wheeler, because he thought it did not allow self-action. Cramer developed the Wheeler-Feynman approach into TI and that is what offers the solution. Davies developed the W-F approach into a quantum relativistic version that successfully addresses the self-action issue that bothered Feynman.

The solution to the measurement problem consists in using a direct-action theory (Wheeler/Feynman/Davies) to describe field propagation, and taking into account the response of the absorber as the physical circumstance defining measurement. Taking into account that the coupling amplitudes between fields are amplitudes for emissions or absorption defines the micro/macro boundary. This is all explained in my book (specifically Chapters 3,4 and 6) and you can get an idea of the treatment of the micro/macro distinction in Part 5 of this paper published in Foundations of Physics: http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5227

 

[StarsRuler]

Bell's theorem shows that there is no sensible notion of "state" that the wave function could be about.

Sorry, my english is not good, Stevendaryl, I don´t understand the sentence. Does you mean that wavefunction represents a state, and information about a state is not strictly the state? Anyway, I don´t get the relation with Bell´s theorem

 

[NegativeDept]

Since we're throwing around lots of interpretations of entropy, I can't resist adding my personal favorites as fuel to the fire:

E. T. Jaynes argued that "entropy of a system" is an ill-defined concept. Entropy should be defined for probability distributions, not for physical systems. In Jaynes' words (PDF link):

It is possible to maintain the view that the system is at all times in some definite but unknown pure state, which changes because of definite but unknown external forces; the probabilities represent only our ignorance as to the true state. With such an interpretation the expression “irreversible process” represents a semantic confusion; it is not the physical process that is irreversible, but rather our ability to follow it.

And here's Claude Shannon explaining why he chose the name entropy for his famous information-theoretical entropy:

My greatest concern was what to call it. I thought of calling it "information," but the word was overly used, so I decided to call it "uncertainty." When I discussed it with John von Neumann, he had a better idea. Von Neumann told me, You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it already has a name. In the second place, and more important, no one really knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have the advantage."

 

[stevendaryl]

Sorry, my english is not good, Stevendaryl, I don´t understand the sentence. Does you mean that wavefunction represents a state, and information about a state is not strictly the state? Anyway, I don´t get the relation with Bell´s theorem

Well, in the usual way that people talk about "information", there is a distinction between what is true about the system we are interested in, and what we know about that system. For example, in communication theory, we have a message, which is a sequence of letters, and that sequence is altered by noise in the communication channel. Since the receiver doesn't know for certain whether any particular character is noise or not, the best he can do is come up with a probability distribution on possible messages.

In the case of classical statistical mechanics, the system is assumed to be in some unknown state, described by a point in phase space (phase space gives the locations and velocities of all the particles in the system). But we don't actually know this state, so we can quantify our lack of knowledge by using probability distributions on phase space.

In these classical examples, the word "state" is used to mean two different things: (1) what is true about the system of interest, and (2) what we know about the system.

If you want to interpret the wave function as information about the system, then that's a state in sense (2). But it's hard for me to see how it is meaningful to talk about "information about the system" unless there is also an unobserved REAL state in sense (1) that this information is about.

 

[StarsRuler]

Ok, but is not neccesary know about the real system, there is no lost of power if we preocupate only about that we know about the system. In relativity theory, is information what can´t go over light speed, no problem with entanglament

 

[stevendaryl]

Ok, but is not neccesary know about the real system, there is no lost of power if we preocupate only about that we know about the system. In relativity theory, is information what can´t go over light speed, no problem with entanglament

As I said, it's hard for me to understand what the word "know" means, unless it means a correspondence between the system itself and our description of the system.

 

[StarsRuler]

it's hard for me to understand what the word "know" means, unless it means a correspondence between the system itself and our description of the system.

But this is because you wish that QM be a complete theory. If we not impose this matter, there is no problem with collapse. You are not the only that has this wish, of course. I think is good work over this question ( and many others, physics is far away of be the final theory by the moment), but then the theory could be very different, many postulates could change. I think the problem of go out of the information sphere to the real states sphere is that we always in the information sphere. What conditions must have a theory that we not can directly study for being the correct theory in the out sphere correspondly to our (probably) known information sphere?

 

[stevendaryl]

But this is because you wish that QM be a complete theory.

I don't think that's correct. It doesn't have anything to do with whether it is a "complete theory" or not. I'm talking about the meaning of the word "information". Or "knowledge". Those words don't require a complete theory, but they do require some notion of "fact" that is distinguished from "information".

 

[StarsRuler]

So I would expect an oscillating entropy for the systems (in classical mechanics, no entropy change arises from such a situation).

No, because the measurement time is always equal or greater than decoherence time, then you never observe the entropy increase relative to decoherence. You can observe an increase of entropy because the observation that you do about the system is not so precisely like the observable in which decohere the system. You can repeat the measure with more precision, but the system will be evolutionate in the new decoherence time before the new measurement.
This doesn´t justify the permanent no reduction of entropy in the "strobbed story" after every measurement , but it permits it. There is no in present days a deduction of second principle of thermodynamics.

Well, there is one ( I only saw mencionated by Schiller in his books, but he doesn´t desarrollate the second principle demostration, supussing that is a minimum value for entropy of any system that is the Boltzmann constant (planck units). If something now a reference for it.