# What happens with causality at the Planck scale? Can effects precede causes?

1. Apr 2, 2007

### devhda

What happens with causality at the Planck scale? Can effects "precede" causes?

I would like to know what happens with causality at the Planck scale, explained in "educated layman" terms, if that's possible... :)

Might effects "precede" causes in time?

Do we have to redefine causality at the Planck scale?

2. Apr 3, 2007

### Chronos

The obvious answer is 'yes'. If time is an emergent property of the universe, then so must be causality.

3. Apr 3, 2007

The other obvious answer is no. If time is a fundamental concept, then so is causality. Causality violation may be an effective sieve that can be used to prune wrong theories.

4. Apr 3, 2007

### marcus

there is even an approach where time=causality is the only fundamental concept. like the pre-socratic Greek philosophers who said the universe was made of fire (or whatever) in this approach the universe is made of causal ordering = time.

if someone wants to do a keyword search
causal sets
Rafael Sorkin
Faye Dowker
Joe Henson

the idea which maybe sounds a bit eccentric but maybe should be explored as one of several possibilities on the longshot bet it could be right is the idea that

the universe is made of nothing but time
and time = causality itself
and so it can be modeled as a partialorder set, a web, or network, of causality connections
between primitive nodes which are only there for the sake of the connections between them

and so the correct mathematical model of spacetime is made of nothing but a web of pure causality which goes forward in time (because that is what time is) forever branching and rejoining and growing new branches. Sorkin and others can actually derive stuff, like an idea of distance and thus inklings of geometry, from this very spare, lean basis. minimalist qg.

Rafael Sorkin has a new paper in the past couple of months

my apologies, Thomas, if I distracted from your general statement which is a solid mainstream view----causal sets QG takes what you said to an extreme

Last edited: Apr 3, 2007
5. Apr 3, 2007

### Demystifier

There is also a third obvious answer. That time is a fundamental concept, while causality is not. (In fact, this answer seems the most obvious to me.)

6. Apr 3, 2007

### marcus

the fourth obvious: time is not fundamental
causality is fundamental
time is emergent (from causality)

==============
By way of illustration see this recent article
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0703098
Relativity theory does not imply that the future already exists: a counterexample
Rafael D. Sorkin (Perimeter Institute and Syracuse University)
(Submitted on 20 Mar 2007)
Abstract: It is often said that the relativistic fusion of time with space rules out genuine change or 'becoming'. I offer the classical sequential growth models of causal set theory as counterexamples.

in the above article Sorkin mentions several awkward things about time.
a universal time (as from a god's perspective) does not seem to exist.
we need a standard time for QM but there isnt any
if you describe time in the context of a classical SPACETIME then everything is static, the past present and future are all immobilized like a fly in amber, everything that has already happened or will happen exists in a 4D crystalline memory.

well I overstate to get the awkwardness of it across, perhaps its not that bad but there is a kind of inconvenience. if spacetime is complete, then where is the idea of BECOMING?

OK, Sorkin describes a spacetime that has an idea of becoming and that has many different strands of time-evolution.
but this spacetime is not made of time, it is made of causality or causal ordering.

Chronos: neither time nor causality are fundamental
Larson: both are fundamental (and I added the idea that time = causal ordering)
Demy: time is fundamental and causality is not
My take on Sorkin: causality is fundamental and time is not.

7. Apr 3, 2007

### Demystifier

I think it exhausts all the (obvious) possibilities.
Or does it?

Last edited: Apr 3, 2007
8. Apr 3, 2007

### Demystifier

If you want to see what I mean by this, see:
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0403121

9. Apr 3, 2007

### setAI

Cauasality can be invariant of time- therefore it does not matter if Time is fundamental- or even if it 'exists' at all: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CausalInvariance.html

which is the same as saying that [global] Time cannot be fundamental- and cannot be considered with regurd to a causal system even in principle

Last edited: Apr 3, 2007
10. Apr 3, 2007

### Careful

Sorkin has a universal time in these models, that is counting time. How you turn or twist the beast - unless you want to get stuck in a one observer universe (which only MWI cranks want) - you have to include universal time (and Sorkin has understood that very well).

11. Apr 3, 2007

### marcus

I'm glad to see that someone else seems to have read the paper.

==quote Sorkin page 4==
... “space developing in time”.
Perhaps a metaphor can bring out the key idea more clearly. Think of the causal set as an idealized growing tree (in the botanical sense, not the combinatorial one). Such a tree grows at the tips of its many branches, and these sites of growth are independent of one another. Perhaps a cluster of two leaves springs up at the tip of one branch (event A) and at the same moment a single leaf unfolds itself at the tip of a second branch (event
B). To a good approximation, the words “at the same moment” make sense for real trees, but we know that they are not strictly accurate, becauseevents A and B occur at different locations and distant simultaneity lacks objective meaning. If the tree were broad enough and the growth fast enough, we really could not say whether event A preceded or followed event B. The same should be true for the causal set. It is “growing at the tips” but not in a synchronized manner with respect to any external time. There is no single “now” that spreads itself over the entire process.

“But wait a minute”, you might object. “Didn’t you just describe the CSG growth process as a succession of births in a definite order, and doesn’t the resulting ranking of the elements of C imply something akin to a distant simultaneity?” The answer to this objection is that a definite birth-order, or an “external time”, did figure in the description I gave, but it is to be regarded as an artifact of the description analogous to one’s choice of coordinates for writing down the Schwarzschild metric. Only insofar as it reflects the intrinsic causal order of the causal set is this auxiliary time objective. The residue is “pure gauge”.
==endquote==

along any separate chain of events or branch, counting steps can be used as time. Causal sets people use that kind of counting a lot. But different chains are not assumed to proceed at the same speed according to a standard time. the "tree" does not grow in tick-tock lockstep. So the illusion that he is incorporating a universal time is "pure gauge", I would say.

an artifact of the means of description, to use his words.

I don't have a special need to discuss Sorkin's paper, so anyone can say whatever they please about it and I shall not wish to argue I simply point out in advance that I may well disagree with others in my understanding of what the paper says. Refer back to this quote from page 4.
Ciao.

12. Apr 4, 2007

### Careful

Funny, I never said the opposite. First, dynamical laws have to be invariant with respect to this universal time, the latter merely serving to include an objective now'' and counting time does exactly that in the CSG models. Actually, the residual gauge invariance is much small than in ordinary gravity where surfaces of equal time can be timelike or null, this is never the case here by definition. Second, albeit the CSG dynamics is stochastic and therefore only statistical properties can be predicted, our universe happens to be one member of this Monte Carlo'' simulations and therefore does posess a definite universal arrow of time (within an ensemble of identical universes resulting frow a different growth process).

Strictly speaking, the notion of speed with respect to universal time is not an observable quantity, but I assume you merely want to say that the timelike distance between two successive chains is in general a function of the points on the chain. But there is a definite difference between GR and the causet CSG dynamics: the latter singles out by construction one particular time gauge ! Now, if you think this is artificial somehow, I urge you to rewrite the theory such that this does not occur (quite impossible as you realize after a few moments).

Btw Marcus : no-one uses the word universal time as you just described it.

Bye

Last edited: Apr 4, 2007
13. Apr 4, 2007

### Chronos

I suspect time and causality [and entropy, for that matter] are different manifestations of the same underlying principle. Separating one from the other is like separating siamese twins conjoined at the brain stem, only harder. For all practical purposes, I think they are fundamental in our universe. On a deeper level, they may well be emergent, but no observables to test that hypothesis appear possible. The notion of universal time is intriguish. Could this be the 'Dark Time" a University of Central Lancashire scientist claims to have found experimental evidence for in this article?:

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1365-3040.1995.tb00201.x?journalCode=pce

14. Apr 4, 2007

### ccdantas

If time is motion, can you "get away" with time? Imagine a closed box, away in space very far from any other body, in which no information from the outside world can be accessed. If all particles inside the box are kept at a fixed relative location among themselves and to the box walls, then does time stand still? One of course would have to impose a balancing force so as to keep the relative distances of particles fixed (otherwise they would eventually atract each other due to their relative gravitational interactions). The presence of the balancing force, however, would be an indication that, once released, particles would move, so eventually one would not be able to get away with time, and hence time would manifestly exist, even tought in some kind of potential or latent form.

Now, if you set the box as small as you wish, then when you approach the Planck scale, spacetime geometry starts to fluctuate quantum mechanically (if the spacetime foam framework is correct), so you are no longer able to keep a fixed distance between particles anyway. But what would be the notion of time, then?

Suppose DSR is right, then you have a minimum length scale (e.g. the Planck length) in which all micro-observers would agree about. Let all particles inside the box fix their relative distances as the minimum invariant scale or length. Notice that there is an assumption that the minimum length scale is an invariant and does not fluctuate. That is, would one here again be able to add a prescribed balancing force, under such a situation? Or, better yet, would one really *need* a balancing force at all? If not, would one be able to make time stand still then?

Christine

15. Apr 5, 2007

### Careful

Dear chrisitine,

First of all you should distinguish clock time (being the result of a physical process) as periodic motion, and universal time as the parameter with respect to which this motion should be expressed (this distinction is unfortunately only somewhat made in GR). All other times in our laws of nature are clocktime : the time in Newtonian physics, Special and General Relativity. It is just so that in Newtonian physics and special relativity a gauge fixing of the universal time has been made (identifying it with physical clocktime of the prefferred class of observers).

Universal time cannot be banned from our laws (and never stops), unless you are prepared to go on the relational tour and describe the universe with respect to one observer (and by taking as time that observer's clocktime).

Careful

16. Apr 5, 2007

A single-observer description is exactly what is needed to get around the present stalemate. This is no more (and no less) solipsistic than expanding a function in a Taylor series.

Note that the Taylor coefficients do not only depend on the function being expanded, but also on the base point, i.e. the observer's position. One can of course change the base point, and the coefficients must transform accordingly, but it does not make sense to consider more than one base point at a time. So by passing from field to Taylor data, we pick out a single observer.

Remarkably, this seems to resolve all the conceptual problems in quantum gravity, cf the last section of http://www.arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0701164 . Careful may also note that the most glaring defects in my previous attempts (overcounting for the harmonic oscillator, no inner product) have been eliminated.

17. Apr 5, 2007

### Careful

I agree that it is a possibility, but it is too undemocratic to take one physical clock as a classical entity and study an identical clock as a quantum mechanical object relative to the first one. What one needs to do is to reformulate QM with respect to universal time and develop the relational picture from there : the braking of symmetry between clock1 and clock2 (which does not occur in the classical theory) can at best be an effective picture.

18. Apr 5, 2007

No, the parameter along the observer's trajectory is not a physical clock. A point-like observer moves along a one-dimensional curve, which can always be parametrized in some way. However, the parameter is not physical, since a group of reparametrizations act on it. It does define a sense of causality, since a continuous reparametrization cannot reorder points on a curve.

At any rate, the important thing about this modification is that it is either right or wrong. Since it gives rise to new diff and gauge anomalies, it is not merely a matter of interpretation.

19. Apr 5, 2007

### Careful

I was speaking about another approach where you can write physical observables in terms of A(tau), where tau is eigentime along the curve and then perform a quantisation with tau as the time parameter. I am aware that your theory does not suffer from this, but such symmetry braking occurs already at the classical level in the Starodubtsev Freidel approach where matter is generated by Wilson loops braking diffeomorphism symmetry upon the worldline (except for reparametrization invariance along the worline) - but again this is not the same thing.

However my point remains, it is undemocratic to break diffeo invariance on your preferred worldline and maintain it anywhere else (at least, I guess that this was the case in your theory).

Last edited: Apr 5, 2007
20. Apr 6, 2007