What is the most difficult text on mathematics?

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  • #101
My specific complaints about Folland's QFT text are that there are two ways in which physicists understand QFT.

1) Wightman axioms, and explicit construction via Osterwalder-Schrader axioms

2) Heuristic but physical Wilsonian effective field theory viewpoint.

My quick impression was that Folland mentions neither of these. So what he is writing is incomprehensible old QFT that Dirac and Feynman knew, but did not understand.
 
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  • #102
Folland's book is the only book about QFT that I can read. Everything else that I have tried leads to frustration. atyy before complaining read the book.
 
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  • #103
martinbn said:
Folland's book is the only book about QFT that I can read. Everything else that I have tried leads to frustration. atyy before complaining read the book.

Does he mention either idea in post #101?
 
  • #105
  • #106
atyy said:
He has to do it for interacting fields and mention the Osterwalder-Schrader conditions (or an equivalent thing). For free fields, all the physics texts are essentially rigourous.
Major universities continue to use Peskin and Schroeder, and it appears to use what you describe as 'obsolete' and 'not what any physicist uses'.

Also Weinberg's books are not based on your 'unique correct approach'. I guess Weinberg is not a physicist.
 
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  • #107
PAllen said:
Major universities continue to use Peskin and Schroeder, and it appears to use what you describe as 'obsolete' and 'not what any physicist uses'.

Also Weinberg's books are not based on your 'unique correct approach'. I guess Weinberg is not a physicist.

The other approach is the Wilsonian effective field approach. Both Peskin and Schroeder and Weinberg mention it. Also, one should distinguish between use and understand. The usual method that is used is not understandable. The method that is understandable is impractical to use. As far as I can tell, Folland only presents the method that can be used but is not understandable.

Overall, the Wilsonian effective field approach is the most important conceptual advance in QFT, and I never understand why the standard texts present it only in the later chapters, and in a way that is still quite hard to understand. If one knows what one is looking for, the relevant ideas are in Srednicki's chapter 29 http://web.physics.ucsb.edu/~mark/ms-qft-DRAFT.pdf, where the key equations are Eq (29.9 -29.11) and the conclusion on p193 "The final results, at an energy scale E well below the initial cutoff 0, are the same as we would predict via renormalized perturbation theory, up to small corrections"
 
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  • #108
PAllen said:
Nonsense. The statement that any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them does not mean natural numbers are not formalized let alone not defined. Limitations or incompleteness of a formalization does not mean the formalization doesn't exist, or is useless, or doesn't serve to define anything. These are wild overstatements, IMO.

Basically the reason I am right is that what I mean is exactly "any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them".
 
  • #109
atyy said:
Basically the reason I am right is that what I mean is exactly "any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them".
It comes down to definition. Including definition of definition. You are claiming a formalization that is incomplete is not a formalization or a definition. I claim it is still both a formalization and defintion despite incompleteness. This is a matter of definition. So far as I know, my definition is much more popular among experts than yours. And there really is no debating definitions, thus we keep going in circles.
 
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  • #110
PAllen said:
It comes down to definition. Including definition of definition. You are claiming a formalization that is incomplete is not a formalization or a definition. I claim it is still both a formalization and defintion despite incompleteness. This is a matter of definition. So far as I know, my definition is much more popular among experts than yours. And there really is no debating definitions, thus we keep going in circles.

You are misreading my claim. I don't disagree that there are incomplete formalizations. But the point remains that no formalization of the natural numbers can encompass all true statements about them. And this does not hinge just on "incompleteness". Incompleteness only means that if you have a formalization, then there is an undecidable statement. The important additional point is that one cannot say that since either statement is consistent with the axioms, I will just choose one and add it. If one does that, the formal system will not have as a model the standard natural numbers. So the point is beyond "incompleteness", and hinges on the "true natural numbers".

The incompleteness you mention is a syntactic point. The failure I am referring to is a semantic point.
 
  • #111
atyy said:
You are misreading my claim. I don't disagree that there are incomplete formalizations. But the point remains that no formalization of the natural numbers can encompass all true statements about them. And this does not hinge just on "incompleteness". Incompleteness only means that if you have a formalization, then there is an undecidable statement. The important additional point is that one cannot say that since either statement is consistent with the axioms, I will just choose one and add it. If one does that, the formal system will not have as a model the standard natural numbers. So the point is beyond "incompleteness", and hinges on the "true natural numbers".

The incompleteness you mention is a syntactic point. The failure I am referring to is a semantic point.
I am not missing that point since I described it. Per my definition of definition and formalization it remains interesting but not limiting. I still have (several) possible formalizations that can serve as definitions of natural numbers. Their failure to encompass all true statements doesn't change that. We disagree on even on the definition incompleteness. To me, both the feature of true but unprovable statements, or undecidable statements that can be added as either the statement or its contradiction (consistently) , are different flavors of incompleteness, and neither is more problematic to me. In fact the 'true but unprovable flavor' is the first that I studied.
 
  • #112
atyy said:
You are misreading my claim. I don't disagree that there are incomplete formalizations.
That's not what you said. Look over your posts:
Well, doesn't the Goedel incompleteness theorem basically say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatically defined?
You can take the undecidable sentence and add it or its negation to the axioms and obtain a consistent system. However, you are not free to add either one if you insist the system models the natural numbers. Therefore the natural numbers cannot be formalized.
You insisted multiple times that the natural numbers cannot be "formalized", complete or incomplete.

This "http://boolesrings.org/victoriagitman/files/2013/05/logicnotespartial.pdf" point you cited (4.13) says that number theory cannot be axiomatized--it does not say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatized.
 
  • #113
PAllen said:
I am not missing that point since I described it. Per my definition of definition and formalization it remains interesting but not limiting. I still have (several) possible formalizations that can serve as definitions of natural numbers. Their failure to encompass all true statements doesn't change that. We disagree on even on the definition incompleteness. To me, both the feature of true but unprovable statements, or undecidable statements that can be added as either the statement or its contradiction (consistently) , are different flavors of incompleteness, and neither is more problematic to me. In fact the 'true but unprovable flavor' is the first that I studied.

suremarc said:
You insisted multiple times that the natural numbers cannot be "formalized", complete or incomplete.

This "http://boolesrings.org/victoriagitman/files/2013/05/logicnotespartial.pdf" point you cited (4.13) says that number theory cannot be axiomatized--it does not say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatized.

Hmmm, ok, interesting point. Is there a difference between natural numbers and number theory?

For example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_model_of_arithmetic:

"The term standard model of arithmetic refers to the standard natural numbers 0, 1, 2, …."

There's also this interesting passage in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-theoretic_definition_of_natural_numbers:

"A consequence of Kurt Gödel's work on incompleteness is that in any effectively generated axiomatization of number theory (i.e. one containing minimal arithmetic), there will be true statements of number theory which cannot be proven in that system. So trivially it follows that ZFC or any other effectively generated formal system cannot capture entirely what a number is.

Whether this is a problem or not depends on whether you were seeking a formal definition of the concept of number. For people such as Bertrand Russell (who thought number theory, and hence mathematics, was a branch of logic and number was something to be defined in terms of formal logic) it was an insurmountable problem. But if you take the concept of number as an absolutely fundamental and irreducible one, it is to be expected. After all, if any concept is to be left formally undefined in mathematics, it might as well be one which everyone understands.

Poincaré, amongst others (Bernays, Wittgenstein), held that any attempt to define natural number as it is endeavoured to do so above is doomed to failure by circularity. Informally, Gödel's theorem shows that a formal axiomatic definition is impossible (incompleteness), Poincaré claims that no definition, formal or informal, is possible (circularity). As such, they give two separate reasons why purported definitions of number must fail to define number."
 
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  • #114
atyy said:
Basically the reason I am right is that what I mean is exactly "any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them".
I can't agree with that because you're misusing the word "true". What it means for a statement to be true about natural numbers? I can only imagine two meanings: 1) Axioms imply it. 2) We usually assume it to be true. Either as someone who couldn't care less about axiomatization of natural numbers or as a mathematician who knows about incompleteness and just chooses a statement or its negation to add as a new axiom.
Looking at it this way, it seems to me your statement is meaningless.
 
  • #115
It's time to bring in Bill Clinton to discuss what the meaning of "is" is.
 
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  • #117
Some time ago I tried Ticciati and I couldn't read it. I have seen Araki, but haven't tried it. My guess is that i probably could read it. My tolerance to physics style text has increased and there is a chance that I can actualy read physics text if I tried.
 
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  • #118
Demystifier said:
It's good to know that, for the case a mathematician asks me to suggest him a book on QFT. Have you also tried the books
by Araki https://www.amazon.com/dp/0199566402/?tag=pfamazon01-20
or Ticciati https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521060257/?tag=pfamazon01-20 ?

martinbn said:
Some time ago I tried Ticciati and I couldn't read it. I have seen Araki, but haven't tried it. My guess is that i probably could read it. My tolerance to physics style text has increased and there is a chance that I can actualy read physics text if I tried.

I would not recommend Folland's QFT. As far as I can tell, it is old style QFT which even Dirac and Feynman considered nonsensical, but which we knew was a fragment of something correct because of experiment. This is a case where one should not develop a tolerance to physics style!

I haven't read Ticciati, but have glanced at Araki, which seems good. For rigourous QFT, I would also recommend
Dimock https://www.amazon.com/dp/1107005094/?tag=pfamazon01-20
Rivasseau http://www.rivasseau.com/resources/book.pdf

However, rigourous QFT is still not able to deal with physically important QFTs like QED. For that, one needs the other great conceptual advance of Wilsonian effective theory that Dirac and Feynman did not know about, and has still not been made rigourous in all cases of interest. However, it is related to rigourous renormalization, and Rivasseau does discuss it. Wilson's ideas came from classical statistical mechanics (and particle physics, as Wilson was a particle physicist who worked on statistical mechanics), and the key physics ideas are usually better described there than in QFT texts. A good non-rigourous text is Kardar https://www.amazon.com/dp/052187341X/?tag=pfamazon01-20.
 
  • #119
atyy, you seem very quick to judge textbooks (that you haven't read) and people's understanding (of people you haven't spoken to, and about topics that probably you don't understand)! If you have an opinion about something or someone you need to write it as an opinion, not as god's given truth.
 
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  • #120
atyy said:
I would not recommend Folland's QFT. As far as I can tell, it is old style QFT which even Dirac and Feynman considered nonsensical, but which we knew was a fragment of something correct because of experiment. This is a case where one should not develop a tolerance to physics style!
That reminds me of an old joke:

A physicist constructed a new theory and shown it to his friend mathematician to say him if it looks mathematically consistent to him. The mathematician took some time to study it and eventually concluded that the theory doesn't make any sense. But in the meantime, the theory turned out to be in a perfect agreement with experiments, and the physicist earned the Nobel Prize for it. Then the physicist talked to his friend mathematician again: "Look, the theory is in perfect agreement with experiments, so it cannot be totally wrong. Can you take a look at it again?" Then the mathematician studied it again, and after a lot of time he made his final conclusion: "Yes, the theory does make sense, but only in the trivial case when x is real and positive."
 
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  • #121
Demystifier said:
That reminds me of an old joke:

A physicist constructed a new theory and shown it to his friend mathematician to say him if it looks mathematically consistent to him. The mathematician took some time to study it and eventually concluded that the theory doesn't make any sense. But in the meantime, the theory turned out to be in a perfect agreement with experiments, and the physicist earned the Nobel Prize for it. Then the physicist talked to his friend mathematician again: "Look, the theory is in perfect agreement with experiments, so it cannot be totally wrong. Can you take a look at it again?" Then the mathematician studied it again, and after a lot of time he made his final conclusion: "Yes, the theory does make sense, but only in the trivial case when x is real and positive."

:) This is one of the most frustrating things about physics. How hard is it to write that x is real and positive!
 
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  • #122
martinbn said:
atyy, you seem very quick to judge textbooks (that you haven't read) and people's understanding (of people you haven't spoken to, and about topics that probably you don't understand)! If you have an opinion about something or someone you need to write it as an opinion, not as god's given truth.

I have read large parts of Folland's book. Everything I write is obviously an opinion and not god's given truth.
 
  • #123
martinbn said:
:) This is one of the most frustrating things about physics. How hard is it to write that x is real and positive!
I guess that similar problems logicians and set theorists have with "normal" mathematicians. How hard is it to write that you assume consistency and axiom of choice?

Which reminds me of another joke, about a physicist, mathematician and logician he saw a black sheep during a trip ... But you probably know that one.
 
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  • #124
Demystifier said:
I guess that similar problems logicians and set theorists have with "normal" mathematicians. How hard is it to write that you assume consistency and axiom of choice?

Haha, may be, but how much 'real' math do they read.
 
  • #125
martinbn said:
Haha, may be, but how much 'real' math do they (logicians) read.
And how much physics mathematicians read?
And how much real engineer stuff physicists read?
And how much about real economy engineers read?
And how much about politics economists read?
And finally, to close the circle, how much logic politicians have any idea about?
 
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  • #126
Demystifier said:
And how much physics mathematicians read?

Do physicists need mathematics? Or do they just need logic? If mathematics is just a short hand for meaningless combinatorial symbols that logicians use, then in the Copenhagen spirit, can I just say that mathematics is the correspondence between mathematical objects and meaningless symbols, while physics is the coorespondence between physical objects and meaningless symbols, so physicists do not need mathematics?

BTW, did you see post #95?
 
  • #127
Demystifier said:
And how much physics mathematicians read?
And how much real engineer stuff physicists read?
And how much about real economy engineers read?
And how much about politics economists read?
And finally, to close the circle, how much logic politicians have any idea about?

PAllen said:
It's time to bring in Bill Clinton to discuss what the meaning of "is" is.

Apparently they read a lot!
 
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  • #128
atyy said:
Do physicists need mathematics? Or do they just need logic? If mathematics is just a short hand for meaningless combinatorial symbols that logicians use, then in the Copenhagen spirit, can I just say that mathematics is the correspondence between mathematical objects and meaningless symbols, while physics is the coorespondence between physical objects and meaningless symbols, so physicists do not need mathematics?
What is wrong here is the claim that they are "meaningless". No physicist or mathematician (not even Hilbert) really finds these symbols meaningless. These symbols have a meaning in the heads of physicists and mathematicians, and that's why they find them useful.

atyy said:
BTW, did you see post #95?
atyy said:
Or perhaps it is that Bohmian Mechanics does have a cut which it inherits from mathematics
Yes, I am quite sure this is the case.
 
  • #129
Demystifier said:
What is wrong here is the claim that they are "meaningless". No physicist or mathematician (not even Hilbert) really finds these symbols meaningless. These symbols have a meaning in the heads of physicists and mathematicians, and that's why they find them useful.

Yes, but let me see if I can make myself clearer. The symbols alone and the rules alone for manipulating them are meaningless. It is the correspondence between the symbols and "real" objects that gives them meaning. In the case of mathematics, the real objects are mathematical objects, and in the case of physics the real objects are physical objects.

Do physicists need the mathematical objects?
 
  • #130
atyy said:
In the case of mathematics, the real objects are mathematical objects, and in the case of physics the real objects are physical objects.
And the concrete physics objects are modeled by abstract mathematical objects. (For instance, an astrophysicist models a physical planet by a mathematical ball.) So yes, physicists do need mathematics.
 
  • #131
Demystifier said:
And the concrete physics objects are modeled by abstract mathematical objects. (For instance, an astrophysicist models a physical planet by a mathematical ball.) So yes, physicists do need mathematics.

Sometimes it is argued that this issue goes away if we assume that physicists use second-order logic, since in some sense second order logic can uniquely specify mathematical objects.

But there seem to be counterarguments (you linked to this very interesting blog, I think in the thread on Lowenheim-Skolem): http://lesswrong.com/lw/g7n/secondorder_logic_the_controversy/

I think many prefer first order logic, because the completeness theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_completeness_theorem fails for second order logic.
 
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  • #132
atyy said:
Sometimes it is argued that this issue goes away if we assume that physicists use second-order logic, since in some sense second order logic can uniquely specify mathematical objects.

But there seem to be counterarguments (you linked to this very interesting blog, I think in the thread on Lowenheim-Skolem): http://lesswrong.com/lw/g7n/secondorder_logic_the_controversy/

I think many prefer first order logic, because the completeness theorem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_completeness_theorem fails for second order logic.
Most logicians prefer first-order logic, but all other people ("normal" mathematicians, scientists, lawyers, etc.) use higher-order logic. For example, without second order logic, a biologist could not say that "Cell is an aggregation of molecules and all cells have cytoplasm." (If you wonder why, that's because "all cells" is a quantification over sets, which is not allowed in first-order logic.)
 
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  • #133
Demystifier said:
Yes, I am quite sure this is the case.

If Bohmian Mechanics also has a cut, then what is the difference between Copenhagen and Bohmian Mechanics? (I made a proposal in #95 also, would you agree?)
 
  • #134
suremarc said:
You insisted multiple times that the natural numbers cannot be "formalized", complete or incomplete.

This "http://boolesrings.org/victoriagitman/files/2013/05/logicnotespartial.pdf" point you cited (4.13) says that number theory cannot be axiomatized--it does not say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatized.

I also replied earlier to this in post #113. Here is another thought. In the section Question 2.1 on p10, the notes do refer to the standard model of arithmetic as the "natural numbers", which is the same thing referred to in Corollary 4.13 on p45, so my terminology is not entirely unconventional. However, I do agree it could be interesting to distinguish the concepts.
 
  • #135
PAllen said:
I am not missing that point since I described it. Per my definition of definition and formalization it remains interesting but not limiting. I still have (several) possible formalizations that can serve as definitions of natural numbers. Their failure to encompass all true statements doesn't change that. We disagree on even on the definition incompleteness. To me, both the feature of true but unprovable statements, or undecidable statements that can be added as either the statement or its contradiction (consistently) , are different flavors of incompleteness, and neither is more problematic to me. In fact the 'true but unprovable flavor' is the first that I studied.

OK, so technically we agree. I don't mind your terminology although you object to mine. But how about the larger point that mathematics needs either an idea of the natural numbers before any formalization, or it needs some idea of a physical machine like a computer. Again the argument is:

1) The semantic version of the Goedel incompleteness theorem - it means that we have an intuitive notion of the true arithemetic of the natural numbers before any formalization

2) If one doesn't accept that argument, by saying that the Goedel incompleteness theorem is only proved for natural numbers defined within a formal system like ZFC, then one still has to define ZFC. But for ZFC, or even PRA, the definition already assumes the natural numbers when terms such as "countable" or "recursive" are used (eg. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primitive_recursive_arithmetic), so again we need the intuitive idea of the natural numbers before any formalization

3) If one rejects the intuitive natural numbers, then one cannot have things like the Turing machine (infinite memory tape), and one is basically saying something like I can make a computer that will verify such and such a theorem in a finite time, which is a physical statement. So one needs an intuitive view of the natural numbers or of physics in order to formalize mathematics.
 
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  • #136
atyy said:
If Bohmian Mechanics also has a cut, then what is the difference between Copenhagen and Bohmian Mechanics? (I made a proposal in #95 also, would you agree?)
Yes, I agree.
 
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  • #137
atyy said:
OK, so technically we agree. I don't mind your terminology although you object to mine. But how about the larger point that mathematics needs either an idea of the natural numbers before any formalization, or it needs some idea of a physical machine like a computer. Again the argument is:

1) The semantic version of the Goedel incompleteness theorem - it means that we have an intuitive notion of the true arithemetic of the natural numbers before any formalization
Does physics need a theory of everything before it can make any predictions? You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians relinquish 100% rigor. By that logic, I assert that the standard model is moot until physicists derive the values of its 26 free parameters analytically.

2) If one doesn't accept that argument, by saying that the Goedel incompleteness theorem is only proved for natural numbers defined within a formal system like ZFC, then one still has to define ZFC. But for ZFC, or even PRA, the definition already assumes the natural numbers when terms such as "countable" or "recursive" are used (eg. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primitive_recursive_arithmetic), so again we need the intuitive idea of the natural numbers before any formalization
There is no distinction between countable and uncountable in PRA itself. No uncountable ordinal exists in PRA (its proof theoretic ordinal is ##\omega^{\omega}##).
Nor does recursion involve quantification over the natural numbers, which is a condition of the incompleteness theorems.

3) If one rejects the intuitive natural numbers, then one cannot have things like the Turing machine (infinite memory tape), and one is basically saying something like I can make a computer that will verify such and such a theorem in a finite time, which is a physical statement. So one needs an intuitive view of the natural numbers or of physics in order to formalize mathematics.
Please explain the reasoning behind your first statement. Turing machine tape does not involve any arithmetic, save for addition and subtraction by 1.
 
  • #138
suremarc said:
Does physics need a theory of everything before it can make any predictions? You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians relinquish 100% rigor. By that logic, I assert that the standard model is moot until physicists derive the values of its 26 free parameters analytically.

Did you mean "You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians are 100% rigorous"?
 
  • #139
atyy said:
Did you mean "You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians are 100% rigorous"?
I will say it differently, then: "You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians accept that mathematics is not 100% rigorous."
 
  • #140
suremarc said:
I will say it differently, then: "You're saying that the whole of mathematics is invalid unless mathematicians accept that mathematics is not 100% rigorous."

My point is the exact opposite! What I am saying is that even the most rigourous mathematics makes use of intuitive notions, eg. the intuitive natural numbers. For this reason, I don't believe there is an essential difference between the intuition needed to understand a physics text and a mathematics text. In short, physicists are not worse sinners than mathematicians :biggrin:

suremarc said:
There is no distinction between countable and uncountable in PRA itself. No uncountable ordinal exists in PRA (its proof theoretic ordinal is ##\omega^{\omega}##).
Nor does recursion involve quantification over the natural numbers, which is a condition of the incompleteness theorems.

Here I am not using the argument that there is a "true arithmetic of the natural numbers" not captured by any formal system. I am using a different argument because I acknowledge it is possible to reject the argument via the incompleteness theorem. This second argument is simply that to even define many formal systems, terms like "countable infinite" or "recursive" are used, which assume the intuitive natural numbers. (Maybe that is not needed for PRA, but most specifications of PRA do use such words, eg. the one on the Wikipedia page.)

suremarc said:
Please explain the reasoning behind your first statement. Turing machine tape does not involve any arithmetic, save for addition and subtraction by 1.

The Turing machine tape is a countable infinity, and usually "countable" uses an intuitive understanding of the natural numbers.
 
  • #141
suremarc said:
There is no distinction between countable and uncountable in PRA itself. No uncountable ordinal exists in PRA (its proof theoretic ordinal is ##\omega^{\omega}##).
Nor does recursion involve quantification over the natural numbers, which is a condition of the incompleteness theorems.

I replied to this in post #140, and as I said my main point in bringing up PRA had nothing to do with the incompleteness theorem. However, it does seem that PRA is also incomplete http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/notes/logic.pdf (Theorem 6.6.4, p122).
 
  • #142
atyy said:
But wasn't Arnold rigourously right, given that to define ZFC we need the metalanguage (ie. physics)?

martinbn said:
In your statements you make so many implicit assumptions, as to what physics is and what maths is and so on, and you do it in a way as if that is the only possible and universally accepted view.

In fact, Bourbaki also says that the language of mathematics rests on the informal language of physics, biology and psychology. For example, they say in the Introduction to their Theory of Sets that one needs to assume that we know what is meant by a letter of the algebra being "the same" in two different places on a page.

In the same Introduction they also say "The verification of a formalized text is a more or less mechanical process". Again that is physics, implicit in the word "mechanical".

They also say that it is impractical to carry out all mathematics in the formalized way, and they will therefore use informal arguments in which the existence of the intuitive natural numbers will be assumed before any formal arithemetic is defined.

As far as I can tell, my views are very Bourbakist :biggrin:
 
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  • #143
atyy said:
In fact, Bourbaki also says that the language of mathematics rests on the informal language of physics, biology and psychology. For example, they say in the Introduction to their Theory of Sets that one needs to assume that we know what is meant by a letter of the algebra being "the same" in two different places on a page.

In the same Introduction they also say "The verification of a formalized text is a more or less mechanical process". Again that is physics, implicit in the word "mechanical".

They also say that it is impractical to carry out all mathematics in the formalized way, and they will therefore use informal arguments in which the existence of the intuitive natural numbers will be assumed before any formal arithemetic is defined.

As far as I can tell, my views are very Bourbakist :biggrin:

In practice mathematics is done through intuition and insight. Formalism is always an after thought - part of the process of verification - but not the source of ideas.
 
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  • #144
PAllen said:
While I can't follow the details, I have always found Perelman's papers to seem well written. There is plenty of description of the idea to be established, how it fits with other idea, and how it will be used. On the other hand, experts in the field are pretty unanimous that the logical 'step size' is way above average. This is the aspect that made it so hard, and meant every verification of it was 10 times the size of the original. On the other hand, my first point about a clear game plan led, in my recollection, to experts 'believing the program' way before they completed detailed verification.

One of the interesting things about Perelman's http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0211159 is that he throws a bone to physicists, saying that the Ricci flow may be linked to the renormalization flow. I've always wondered about that, and googling brings up this piece by Urs Schreiber which gives the whole strategy in such a simple way that even a physicist can understand it (of course, the details are still far off)!

http://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Ricci+flow:
"[Ricci flow] is the renormalization group flow of the bosonic string sigma-model for background fields containing gravity and dilaton (reviewed e.g. in Woolgra 07, Carfora 10, see also the introduction of Tseytlin 06). In (Perelman 02) Ricci flow for dilaton gravity in 3d was shown to enjoy sufficient monotonicity properties such as to complete Richard Hamilton’s proof of the Poincaré conjecture."

On the subject of difficult texts, I've found Hairer's paper on the KPZ equation inpenetrable http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.6811. It should be very interesting for physicists, because the KPZ equation is a standard equation in statistical physics, and physicists have known for years that it is meaningless because it multiplies distributions, yet instinctively it must mean something, so they've worked around its non-existence for 30 years. Apparently Hairer has now found a way to make sense of it in a way that makes the physics way of treating it correct, as well as giving it meaning beyond what physicists have known.

Incidentally, here is a video of Kardar (the "K" of KPZ) saying at 1:11:00 in a different context "It's good that you know that these equations can do all kinds of strange things. But when you take a particular physical system, you have to beat on them until they behave properly." :biggrin:



If one is thinking physically, then it would seem that Hairer and Perelman's works are linked, since the KPZ is motivated by renormalization group thinking.
 
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  • #145
this is completely subjective, in that it can only mean what do i myself find difficult. i found EGA a very difficult math book to read (too long, too abstract), and I find Russell Whitehead to be a book of logic not mathematics. Euclid is very easy and clear, although old. I like Riemann's works, although many people have found them impenetrable for decades. I like Dieudonne's Foundations of modern analysis, and spivak's calculus on mNIFOLDS, although not all do. baby Rudin is easy to read but hard for me to get any benefit from. all physics books are hard for me to read for the reason given by David Kazhdan(?) "physics has wonderful theorems, unfortunately there are no definitions".

you also need to define what you mean by difficult. does that mean which text is harder to plow through 10 pages of in a certain amount of time? or which is harder to learn something from? I once spent 3 hours struggling with a few pages of a research paper by Zariski and was very discouraged at my rate of progress in terms of number of pages. however, when i returned to class the next day i answered literally every question on that topic from my profesor until he told me to be quiet since i "obviously know the subject cold." so that research paper was much easier to read in the sense of how much insight can one gain per hour say than baby rudin.
 
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  • #146
Definitely have to second Perelman's "paper" on the Poincare conjecture (apparently he wrote the proof in his blog). It took a long time until people had filled in the steps, and as far as I remember a Chinese research group took up the task and filled in the details in a large paper.

As far as popular grad student books, I'd say Harthshorne's Algebraic Geometry is far up the list of books considered pretty difficult. EGA is considered easier in comparison (at least according to those who I have talked to who reads it), due to the way it generously fleshes out proofs. I haven't read much of it, though (french is difficult).
 
  • #147
disregardthat said:
Definitely have to second Perelman's "paper" on the Poincare conjecture (apparently he wrote the proof in his blog). It took a long time until people had filled in the steps, and as far as I remember a Chinese research group took up the task and filled in the details in a large paper.

Perelman published his papers to arxiv, not a blog. It is true that he didn't submit them for publication. Instead, he pointed out the papers in e-mails to several mathematicians he knew and who had relevant expertise. He also did one tour of several universities explaining his papers to mathematicians. Finally, for a year or so, he responded to questions posed by experts by e-mail.

There were 3 (later, a fourth, involving Hamilton) independent groups that verified his papers. The Chinese group exaggerated the nature of the gaps, plagiarized the work of a different group (claiming it was accidental from mixing up notes), and had to retract and re-issue their paper (with different title, abstract, and apology).
 
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  • #148
"atyy said:
In fact, Bourbaki also says that the language of mathematics rests on the informal language of physics, biology and psychology. For example, they say in the Introduction to their Theory of Sets that one needs to assume that we know what is meant by a letter of the algebra being "the same" in two different places on a page.

In the same Introduction they also say "The verification of a formalized text is a more or less mechanical process". Again that is physics, implicit in the word "mechanical".

They also say that it is impractical to carry out all mathematics in the formalized way, and they will therefore use informal arguments in which the existence of the intuitive natural numbers will be assumed before any formal arithemetic is defined.

As far as I can tell, my views are very Bourbakist :biggrin:"


lavinia said:
In practice mathematics is done through intuition and insight. Formalism is always an after thought - part of the process of verification - but not the source of ideas.
I am a firm believer in the above statement from lavinia being true.

Math is important, but I once worked out an observation about intuition, oft called insight, being foremost in the ultimate gain of human knowledge. I call it the Race Team principle.

Suppose we observe a successful, typical race team that races cars, a NASCAR team for example. The "win" seems to depend upon the driver having an intuition that most closely approximates real physics. In a nutshell, he, or she, must quickly calculate the best balance between tire adhesion and centrifugal forces. This seems to me to be a rather pure example of intuition. On the other hand, the car cannot win without the skills of a top notch mechanic, no matter the naturally gifted extent of the drivers intuition.

The mechanic uses skills of physics that can be taught, thermodynamics, material selection, a variety of tools which he, or she, knows how to apply quite well... even if it involves some head scratching on occasion. This is not unlike a well trained mathematician and his, or her, tools. The driver wins because he, or she, is an exceptionally well tuned child to Mother Natures laws of motion and friction. So well tuned that the driver intuitively knows where to go when there is no time allocated for head scratching; a quick conjecture in the raw... a sudden eureka of sorts.

This is not to say that the best driver is not an accomplished mechanic, nor the best mechanic an accomplished driver, and the best of both would therefore be a driver/mechanic that surpassed any of either. But in reality almost all gain is still made by teams. And so is it true of the giants of physics whom at least stand on the shoulders of their team-mates.

As examples, many of our scientific giants, our scientific "drivers", could apparently see, could conjecture, Nature's geometry before hashing out the mathematical proof. Copernicus (Heliocentricity), Kepler (eliptical orbit), Newton (the most far-flung falling cannonball), Einstein (rods do get shorter, Equivalence), Feynman (his diagrams, the Lost[/PLAIN] Lecture) and more.

Back to subject, I found a purported partial english copy of Principia Mathematica here: http://www.olimon.org/uan/principia_3.pdf .
By substituting 1 and 2 in the above address, I find earlier sections of the book. However, by substituting 4, I find no more. Is the above address 3, the final end of it all? The last page of the series looks incomplete. A glance at http://www.olimon.org home reveals the main website is in Spanish.

Wes
...
 
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