What is the most difficult text on mathematics?

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  • #51
Demystifier said:
That's good news, there is still some hope for you to become a mathematical physicist. :wink:

The more I read physics the more I get used to the style. Now I can read general relativity from physicists without any convulsions.

I myself am a theoretical physicist (not even a mathematical physicist) who finds Mac Lane pleasant to read. Is there a hope for me to become a pure mathematician? :woot:

You probably are and always have been at heart.
 
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  • #52
another one which I thought was hard is lang's algebra. there's a lot of stuff incorporating other subjects so it helps to know a bit about them, and a lot of the problems are good too

lavinia said:
Most mathematicians find Spanier's Algebraic Topology unreadable.

I remember reading about that one too now that you mention it. it would be good to give that one a go sometime too :biggrin:
 
  • #53
Fredrik said:
One of the problems with Varadarajan's book is that it attracts interest from physicists and physics students who don't have the prerequisite mathematical knowledge. But there are many other issues. The proofs are difficult to follow, and it's difficult to skim through it to get a "big picture" view or an idea about which parts of the book are important. For example, how much projective geometry do you need to know, and do you have to know everything about systems of imprimitivity or measure theory on simply connected locally compact topological groups to understand the later chapters?

In my case, I learned most of the topics from other sources. Armed with this background, I read Varadarajan and found these topics exposed in a much more detailed (but still clear and in most cases motivated) way and ordered in a beautiful and consistent narrative, which makes the foundations of QM to sound and flow like a Mozart piano concerto.

But it was indispensable to know beforehand most of the topics involved and to some degree of precision.

For example, I learned symplectic geometry in a course I took about the topic (and it was preparing a final monograph for this course that I discovered the book in question, since I wanted to talk about the structural analogies between classical mechanics in the symplectic geometry formulation and QM). So, I could easily follow the first chapter and concentrate in the relevant aspects that are needed later (like symmetries of the configuration space and momenta observables, etc.).

For chapters II,III and IV, I learned these topics for the first time from this book. I strongly recommend it, it has a very clear and "only the essential" point of view in the exposition of QM as generalized probability measures on the lattice of projectors (it also contains a complete exposition of all the functional analysis needed for QM; it also has material in quantum symmetries, like projective representations, multipliers, extensions, etc., chapter VII in Varadarajan).

For chapters V and VI, definitely Folland's A Course in Abstract Harmonic Analysis. It's of course a math book for mathematicians, but Folland is very clear. A mathematically minded physics student and with the necessary math background shouldn't have any problem with it.
It contains accessible statements and proofs of the Imprimitivity theorem and the Mackey Machine for semidirect products (also all of the stuff about compact groups, like the Peter-Weyl theorem, etc.)

For chapter VIII, Jauch's Foundations of Quantum Mechanics gives an introduction on the application of the Imprimitivity theorem in QM.

For chapter IX, Folland's Quantum field theory, a tourist guide for mathematicians gives a nice and basic introduction on how to use the Mackey Machine to obtain Wigner's classification (supplemented with material from the Moretti book for the galilei group in order to include non-relativistic QM).

From my experience with all this, I think the method that worked for me was: first, read the books that deal with the physical part (in particular, Jauch and Folland's QFT). From these books I was able to understand which are exactly the relevant points for physics. Then I went to Folland's Harmonic analysis to learn more about the math (not so much how to prove the theorems, but about their precise statement and background material, like, e.g., semidirect products, dual groups, characters, induced representations, etc.). Then I went back to the more physical books and learned how these things are used in physics, i.e., concrete things like how to obtain the Dirac equation from the induced representations, etc. Simultaneously, I was studying from the Moretti the lattice approach and all that.

After all that, I went to Varadarajan and read chapters VIII and IX. Since I already knew some of the topics, I finally was able to understand the big picture (which wasn't completely clear to me from the other books). I found the exposition relatively clear, motivated and also I was able to fill many of the details missing from the other more elementary expositions. But yes, I ended using the book more as a reference. In this post I tried to give a summary of the big picture of these two chapters.

Finally, now that I think I undersatand most of the physical applications and implications, I'm studying in more detail the proofs of the theorems. I'm still studying from the other books rather than Varadarajan. I rely on the latter when details are missing in the others (for example, the Moretti only gives the easy proof about how Gleason's theorem reduces to show that all frame functions are regular, but doesn't prove this, it refers the reader to Varadarajan, but that's fine since the book doesn't want to overwhelm the reader).

I know this post is a little convoluted, but that was my experience.

From the experience I recounted here, I think Varadarajan was difficult for me because it touches on so many different topics and with a lot of detail. From topics in pure math (at the mathematician's level) to their application in physics. From projective geometry to the representation theory of non-compact groups.
 
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  • #54
Great post aleazk. That book by Moretti looks very interesting, and I'm sure I'll find the other parts of your post useful as well.
 
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  • #55
The proof of Fermat's last theorem by Andrew Wiles 1994.

An + Bn = Cn ( A, B, C, n are all positive integers ).

Proof: No solutions for n > 2.
 
  • #56
Oh come on, if we're going to do monster proofs, how about:

1) Proof of the 4 color map theorem. No human has digested it.

2) Classification of finite simple groups
 
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  • #57
Hesh, what you've written is not a proof, it's the statement! And did you try to read Wiles and found it difficult or do you go by its reputation?
 
  • #58
martinbn said:
Hesh, what you've written is not a proof, it's the statement! And did you try to read Wiles and found it difficult or do you go by its reputation?
I think that what Fermat wrote was a statement. Many mathematicians ( amongst Euler ) tried to prove it with no succes, until Wiles spent 7 years of his life to do it. That was about 357 years after the statement had been written. Wiles got a reward of about 1 million $, that had been offered by some mathematical/physical institute in Berlin ( maybe Max Planck institute? ).

No, I've not read the proof itself, but I've read a book ( "Fermat's last theorem" ) about the history of the theorem, and about the struggle several mathematicians had had to prove it. What amazes me is that the theorem is so very simple, but the proof is not.

Do you fully understand the proof?
 
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  • #59
Fredrik said:
Great post aleazk. That book by Moretti looks very interesting, and I'm sure I'll find the other parts of your post useful as well.

Yes, I found it interesting because it gives a clear exposition of the very basics: how to derive all the formalism of QM from the basic set-up of a generalized probability measure on the lattice of projectors on a Hilbert space (and to give a good feeling on the motivations for the concepts).

I think this is the right approach for an introduction. The problem with a lot of the (highly specialized) references on the subject is that they also go (if that's not their primary interest in the first place) into a lot of details about the general theory; for an introduction, it simply becomes very difficult when they start to bombard you with all sort of definitions and results on the abstract/general theory that are not really necessary for the basics. Of course, it's not their fault, since, usually, these references, like Varadarajan, aim to be encyclopedic references on the subject.
 
  • #60
Is there a rigrorous distinction between mathematics and physics? Physics is essentially English or some intuitive, non-rigourous language like German or Chinese, and so if mathematics is physics, then mathematics is essentially non-rigourous.

Here's an example of how mathematics seems to be physics. For example, if mathematics claims that 7+1 = 8, that is physics, because it is a prediction about a physical action: if I google 7+1, then I will get 8.
 
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  • #61
atyy said:
Here's an example of how mathematics seems to be physics. For example, if mathematics claims that 7+1 = 8, that is physics, because it is a prediction about a physical action: if I google 7+1, then I will get 8.

Can you do that with the proof of the Riemann hypothesis?
 
  • #62
martinbn said:
Can you do that with the proof of the Riemann hypothesis?

No. But I can argue it in full generality. Mathematics is ZFC. To define ZFC, we need the metalanguage. The metalanguage is essentially English. So all of mathematics is just English.
 
  • #64
atyy said:
No. But I can argue it in full generality. Mathematics is ZFC. To define ZFC, we need the metalanguage. The metalanguage is essentially English. So all of mathematics is just English.

You can make even simpler by starting with "mathematics is the multiplication table up to ten" instead of ZFC.
 
  • #67
martinbn said:
You can make even simpler by starting with "mathematics is the multiplication table up to ten" instead of ZFC.

Yes, and obviously I can google the multiplication table :)

Actually, I do need more than that, don't I? Don't I need to know how to use the multiplication table for numbers larger than 10?
 
  • #68
atyy said:
Yes, and obviously I can google the multiplication table :)

Deutch has a better take on this. Ah, and Arnold has repeatedly state that maths is that part of physics where experiments are cheap. As a bourbakist a must disagree.
 
  • #69
martinbn said:
Deutch has a better take on this. Ah, and Arnold has repeatedly state that maths is that part of physics where experiments are cheap. As a bourbakist a must disagree.

But wasn't Arnold rigourously right, given that to define ZFC we need the metalanguage (ie. physics)?
 
  • #70
In your statements you make so many implicit assumptions, as to what physics is and what maths is and so on, and you do it in a way as if that is the only possible and universally accepted view.
 
  • #71
& taking things out of context
 
  • #72
martinbn said:
The ones that I find hard to read are those written by physicists or physics minded mathematicians. Those that I find easier are the Bourbaki or Bourbaki style.

In moments like that, keep in mind this:

"Physics is not so mysterious as many mathematicians seem to consider it. It is rather that physicists have different values and a different viewpoint, and this leads them to explain things in a manner uncongenial to mathematicians. If one works at it, it is possible to translate practically all of physics into well-defined mathematics. Moreover, when one does so, one finds a beautifully coherent scheme, which can be rather briefly summarized" - George Mackey.

Demystifier said:
Is there a hope for me to become a pure mathematician? :woot:

martinbn said:
You probably are and always have been at heart.

Indeed! because we all know in the deeps of our hearts that:

"Mathematical proofs really aren't there to convince you that something is true—they're there to show you why it is true" - Andrew Gleason.

GleasonAndrewMattei_withGeorgeMackey2000.jpg


-Gleason & Mackey.

:smile:
 
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  • #73
Can mathematicians even define the so called "natural numbers"?
 
  • #74
I'm in deep love with abstract algebra so in this thread, I'm with mathematicians.:biggrin:

I don't think math is just english or physics. atyy seems to say that because the rigorous ways the mathematicians tend to use can't actually give everything from start, so there should be another thing at the beginning. But from the things I've understood, mathematicians have a sense of seeing that there should be a mathematical concept for something. I mean, they just encounter some calculation and say "oh man...this should have a name on its own! people should work on this...because this is great!". I had such a feeling in its elementary form. I think mathematics is on its own and its beauty is just its own! I just love it. The reason I'm pursuing physics more than mathematics, is that I'm self-studying things and its really hard to self-study rigorous mathematics.(But hey, I love physics too!)
 
  • #75
fourier jr said:
another one which I thought was hard is lang's algebra. there's a lot of stuff incorporating other subjects so it helps to know a bit about them, and a lot of the problems are good too

A former student of Lang told me that some students in his calculus class complained to him about his book - and Lang told them to throw the book out.
 
  • #76
atyy said:
Can mathematicians even define the so called "natural numbers"?

Can you clarify the question? How about an infinite cyclic group on one generator?
 
  • #77
lavinia said:
Can you clarify the question? How about an infinite cyclic group on one generator?

Well, doesn't the Goedel incompleteness theorem basically say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatically defined?
 
  • #78
atyy said:
Well, doesn't the Goedel incompleteness theorem basically say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatically defined?
No, it just says Natural numbers as defined by the Peano axioms cannot be proved consistent within this system itself. Several proofs of consistency for the Peano axioms have been achieved using elements outside them. Of course, then there are other statements whose truth cannot be decided within that system. However it seems a big stretch to me to call any this 'inability to axiomatically define the natural numbers'.
 
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  • #79
PAllen said:
No, it just says Natural numbers as defined by the Peano axioms cannot be proved consistent within this system itself. Several proofs of consistency for the Peano axioms have been achieved using elements outside them. Of course, then there are other statements whose truth cannot be decided within that system. However it seems a big stretch to me to call any this 'inability to axiomatically define the natural numbers'.

There is the syntactic version and the semantic version. The semantic version does say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatically defined, because it says that there is a statement that is true of the natural numbers but that every consistent extension of the Peano axioms neither proves nor disproves.

The version you are thinking about is the syntactic version, proven by Rosser, using key insights from Goedel's work. It is theorem 4.17 in these notes by Victoria Gitman: http://boolesrings.org/victoriagitman/files/2013/05/logicnotespartial.pdf.

The semantic version is theorem 4.13.

There is also the very interesting discussion on p14-16 of http://www.columbia.edu/~hg17/nonstandard-02-16-04-cls.pdf about what we mean by the "standard model" of arithemetic.
 
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  • #80
[
atyy said:
There is the syntactic version and the semantic version. The semantic version does say that the natural numbers cannot be axiomatically defined, because it says that there is a statement that is true of the natural numbers but that every consistent extension of the Peano axioms neither proves nor disproves.

The version you are thinking about is the syntactic version, proven by Rosser, using key insights from Goedel's work. It is theorem 4.17 in these notes by Victoria Gitman: http://boolesrings.org/victoriagitman/files/2013/05/logicnotespartial.pdf.

The semantic version is theorem 4.13.
I still don't see this as saying you can't axiomatically define natural numbers. It just says for any such axiomatic definition, there will be statements whose truth or falsity cannot be determined. Incompleteness is in no way the same as absence of definition.
 
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  • #81
PAllen said:
I still don't see this as saying you can't axiomatically define natural numbers. It just says for any such axiomatic definition, there will be statements whose truth or falsity cannot be determined. Incompleteness is in no way the same as absence of definition.

The important point is that the undecidable statements can be shown to be true, contrary to your assertion.
 
  • #82
atyy said:
The important point is that the undecidable statements can be shown to be true, contrary to your assertion.
They can be shown to be true outside of that axiomatic system. I meant inside the given system. I have never seen this, or any discussion of Godel's theorem as saying you can't axiomatically define Natural numbers. Just that the resulting system has limitations not previously recognized or expected.
 
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  • #83
PAllen said:
They can be shown to be true outside of that axiomatic system. I meant inside the given system. I have never seen this, or any discussion of Godel's theorem as saying you can't axiomatically define Natural numbers. Just that the resulting system has limitations not previously recognized or expected.

You can take the undecidable sentence and add it or its negation to the axioms and obtain a consistent system. However, you are not free to add either one if you insist the system models the natural numbers. Therefore the natural numbers cannot be formalized.
 
  • #84
atyy said:
You can take the undecidable sentence and add it or its negation to the axioms and obtain a consistent system. However, you are not free to add either one if you insist the system models the natural numbers. Therefore the natural numbers cannot be formalized.
Nonsense. The statement that any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them does not mean natural numbers are not formalized let alone not defined. Limitations or incompleteness of a formalization does not mean the formalization doesn't exist, or is useless, or doesn't serve to define anything. These are wild overstatements, IMO.
 
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  • #85
PAllen said:
The statement that any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them does not mean natural numbers are not formalized let alone not defined.

"The statement that any formalization of the natural numbers does not encompass all true statements about them"

Well, that means that you have an intuitive sense of the natural numbers that cannot be formalized.

Either that, or you formalize the natural numbers in ZFC. But that means that you do not acknowledge that Goedel's incompleteness theorem applies to ZFC, which is unorthodox but fine. But then that means the metalanguage used to define ZFC, when using notions like "finite" is really about steps that a human mathematician acting as a robot, or that a computer as a physical machine can take.

So if one has the intuitive natural nunbers, that is basically a lack of rigour. If one does not have the intuitive natural numbers, then ZFC is defined by physics.
 
  • #86
Incomplete does not mean non-rigorous. In fact, the finding of incompleteness is the result of using rigor. Thus, as I see, rigor requires acceptance that meaningful axiomatic systems are not complete - not that they don't exist, or don't act as definitions, etc.
 
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  • #87
PAllen said:
Incomplete does not mean non-rigorous. In fact, the finding of incompleteness is the result of using rigor. Thus, as I see, rigor requires acceptance that meaningful axiomatic systems are not complete - not that they don't exist, or don't act as definitions, etc.

But incomplete does mean that one used the "intuitive natural numbers".
 
  • #88
atyy said:
But incomplete does mean that one used the "intuitive natural numbers".
I disagree. I have a formally defined axiomatic system. It's consistency can be shown by going outside itself. Rigorous methods show it is incomplete in a specific sense, as are all substantive formal systems. We will probably never agree, but I will say I have never seen your expansive interpretation of the consequences of Godel in literature I've read. In particular, I have never seen anyone besides you suggest it means there is no formal definition of natural numbers.
 
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  • #89
PAllen said:
I disagree. I have a formally defined axiomatic system. It's consistency can be shown by going outside itself. Rigorous methods show it is incomplete in a specific sense, as are all substantive formal systems. We will probably never agree, but I will say I have never seen your expansive interpretation of the consequences of Godel in literature I've read. In particular, I have never seen anyone besides you suggest it means there is no formal definition of natural numbers.

In the (usual) proof of Goedel's theorem, the notion "natural number" is used without definition. It is assumed intuitively.
 
  • #90
atyy said:
In the (usual) proof of Goedel's theorem, the notion "natural number" is used without definition. It is assumed intuitively.
So what? I don't see that having any bearing at all on whether some axiomatization of natural numbers (that is incomplete) constitutes a rigorous definition.
 
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  • #91
PAllen said:
So what? I don't see that having any bearing at all on whether some axiomatization of natural numbers (that is incomplete) constitutes a rigorous definition.

There are two general routes to proving Goedel's theorem.

1) Assume the intuitive natural numbers. This is the usual route, and leads to the view that ZFC itself is incomplete.

2) Deny the intuitive natural numbers. Define ZFC and define the natural numbers in them, and then prove Goedel's theorem. This route does not prove that ZFC is incomplete, which is fine. But then how does one define ZFC? One is then basically saying something about a human mathematician or a computer as physical objects. The basic point is that the top level is always "intuitive".
 
  • #92
Shyan said:
I'm in deep love with abstract algebra so in this thread, I'm with mathematicians.:biggrin:

I don't think math is just english or physics. atyy seems to say that because the rigorous ways the mathematicians tend to use can't actually give everything from start, so there should be another thing at the beginning. But from the things I've understood, mathematicians have a sense of seeing that there should be a mathematical concept for something. I mean, they just encounter some calculation and say "oh man...this should have a name on its own! people should work on this...because this is great!". I had such a feeling in its elementary form. I think mathematics is on its own and its beauty is just its own! I just love it. The reason I'm pursuing physics more than mathematics, is that I'm self-studying things and its really hard to self-study rigorous mathematics.(But hey, I love physics too!)

I agree with you. Mathematics exists as a realm of beautiful ideas. The correspondence between the sensed world - what some people call the "real world" - and Mathematics is a wonderful mystery. I love it when physical experiments suggest or even demonstrate theorems.
 
  • #93
Another argument that shows that mathematical rigour depends on intuitive physical statements is that a rigrourous proof is one that is executed step by step by a computer. For example, the proof of the Kepler conjecture is an attempt at rigrourous proof. First, it assumes that we know what a "computer" is, which is already an appeal to physics. Then, it assumes that there was no cosmic ray that struck the computer and unluckily produced an erroneous step. One could run the entire thing multiple times to check that the same answer is given, but that assumes things like the probability of a cosmic ray is low, and assumptions about space and time translation invariance.
 
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  • #94
atyy said:
Another argument that shows that mathematical rigour depends on intuitive physical statements is that a rigrourous proof is one that is executed step by step by a computer. For example, the proof of the Kepler conjecture is an attempt at rigrourous proof. First, it assumes that we know what a "computer" is, which is already an appeal to physics. Then, it assumes that there was no cosmic ray that struck the computer and unluckily produced an erroneous step. One could run the entire thing multiple times to check that the same answer is given, but that assumes things like the probability of a cosmic ray is low, and assumptions about space and time translation invariance.
In the same style, one could also argue that mathematical rigor depends on psychological assumptions, which are even less rigorous than those in physics. Namely, when I perform a mathematical proof based on precisely defined logical rules, I assume that I am not insane, so that I can be confident that I really do follow the rules when I think I do.
 
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  • #95
Demystifier said:
In the same style, one could also argue that mathematical rigor depends on psychological assumptions, which are even less rigorous than those in physics. Namely, when I perform a mathematical proof based on precisely defined logical rules, I assume that I am not insane, so that I can be confident that I really do follow the rules when I think I do.

So what I don't understand is how the measurement problem fits in. Basically, rigourous mathematics always has (at least) two levels, the top level is intuitive and the bottom level is formal. This seems similar to the Heisenberg cut of Copenhagen, with the top level being the classical observer and the bottom part being the quantum system. So it seems mathematics must intrinsically have something like a Heisenberg cut and a measurement problem. Then it seems tempting to say that since mathematics has a cut, physics must have a cut. Yet there seems to be the counterexample of Bohmian Mechanics. Or perhaps it is that Bohmian Mechanics does have a cut which it inherits from mathematics, but the difference is that in Copenhagen some "key" features (like the observer) of the top level are not reflected in the bottom level, whereas in BM those key features of the top level are reflected in the bottom level? The mathematical analogy is that if we let the top level have the intuitive natural numbers, then the bottom level is "faithful" if it captures "enough" of the natural numbers, eg. ZFC (analogous to BM) as the bottom level is believed to be faithful to all known "mathematics", whereas Peano's axioms (analogous to Copenhagen) are not faithful to things like the Paris-Harrington theorem.
 
  • #96
Demystifier said:
In the same style, one could also argue that mathematical rigor depends on psychological assumptions, which are even less rigorous than those in physics. Namely, when I perform a mathematical proof based on precisely defined logical rules, I assume that I am not insane, so that I can be confident that I really do follow the rules when I think I do.

I think it more accurate to say that correctly applying mathematical rigor depends on psychological assumptions. The rigor itself is,in my mind, independent of our fallacies.
 
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  • #99
Maybe you should read the preface again: "This book is an attempt to present the rudiments of QFT (...) as actually practiced by physicists (...) in a way that will be comprehensible for mathematicians. (...) It is, therefore, not an attempt to develop QFT in a mathematically rigorous fashion."
 
  • #100
aleazk said:
Maybe you should read the preface again: "This book is an attempt to present the rudiments of QFT (...) as actually practiced by physicists (...) in a way that will be comprehensible for mathematicians. (...) It is, therefore, not an attempt to develop QFT in a mathematically rigorous fashion."

I'm not sure the book is even comprehensible to physicists, so if mathematicians can understand it, maybe there is something wrong.
 
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