Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
fliption

Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.

If it seems I have focused on single points, it is because I think they are irrelevant points. There is no contextual mis-interpretation of them. When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.

I've read your explanation once again. It's seems to be more of the same. It says over and over that there is no reason to think that current methods cannot reductively explain consciousness and that a mere philosophical argument is not sufficient to suggest otherwise. But there is then no attempt to discuss the actual philosophical argument that Hynagogue has so eloquently presented here. If you look at it, you will see that it is not just some a'priori statement. It can be applied to real emperical things. My analogy of wall colors is an example of how some things are emperically impossible.

Go to the analogy and say where it is wrong. Relating your view to it would be helpful. Any unbiased participants would surely agree and are welcome to jump in.

 

[metacristi]

Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.

 

[metacristi]

When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.

What main argument?What knowledge gaps?We are always open to find there are knowledge gaps,scientifc knowledge is always provisional.Are you accustomed with the basics of the scientific method?The fact that some predictions have not been yet tested at a certain moment means nothing.We do not have the right for the moment to believe they will also be confirmed but in any case have we the right to conclude they are wrong.You must provide sufficient arguments to show that the predictions made by such a detailed theory of consciousness I talked above,counting as an explanation of the subjective experiences,are wrong or at least not enough to really describe subjective experiences.Scientists are prepared to find it is not enough but only in the front of sufficient reasons either by disproving the conjecture at a whole or by discovering new facts not taken in account initially.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.

Yes, I did read it. It was the exact same response as all the others. The additional thing that you did in that post was to say that the philosophical argument was not logical. You said that no one has been able to convince you that it is and that many scientists agree. But there were no words explaining why it is illogical. It just is.

Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
What main argument?

The one that is in the title of this thread.

What knowledge gaps?

The gap we currently have around consciousness.

The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.

If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.

 

[metacristi]

At limit if the third data confirmations will not be possible for an enough long time I think the first data accounts in direct correlation with the third data observations will be finally accepted.After all if a majority of reliable subjects will report approximatively the same subjective experiences in connection with a certain observed neural state this could be seen at limit as an intersubjective confirmation,anyway a strong reason to believe that there is a correlation between some subjective experiences and brain states.But I am not at all sure the final conclusions will be that we should not reduce subjective experiences at brain's functioning,that qualia involves something more.

 

[metacristi]

Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.

No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.

Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.

The topic of this article is what this thread is about. If you want to weigh in please do. But you have to engage in philosophy to dispute a philosophical claim. Ignoring the issue and defining the scientific method for us is not sufficient nor relevant.

"Vast knowledge" is only a good thing if it's relevant. So if I don't have what you're looking for, I suspect it doesn't matter with regard to the topic at hand.

 

[olde drunk]

METACRISTI !

you have criticized several posters! why are you exempt??

quite frankly, i don't have the slightest idea what point you are trying to make. perhaps you can break it down, slowly, for us mortals of poor intellect.

WHAT IS YOUR POINT??[BRIEFLY PLEASE],

peace,

 

[metacristi]

fliption

And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.

But the claim is that the reduction is impossible.Again I ask why is it so?The fact that we cannot measure directly subjective experiences now maybe never is not an explanation.It is not about the impossibility to reach certitudes,we are always prepared for that,it is about the claim that there cannot exist a detailed theory of consciousness based on neurology alone in which to have a high degree of confidence,capable to account for subjective experiences also.

Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.

Read again.I only said it not sound.It is logically valid but at least one of the premises is not true.Therefore I cannot conclude that the conclusion is true.Maybe it is but this does not follow from the premises.Hence it fails to prove that the reductive approach is incoherent as it was aimed.Finally I really doubt that a purely logical argument will be able to achieve that.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi
fliption

And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.

This is you disagreeing with the conclusion of the philosophical argument. But you don't ever specifically say why you disagree with it. Other than to say it isn't sound.

Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained". It is one thing to give a rational explanation for how something happens and then concede that the explanation could be wrong. This is what science does, so we all agree that it can't be certain about many of it's explanations, as you have repeated many times. In these cases, the explanation goes something like this:

Reductive explanation:

Step 1 happens and necessarily causes
Step 2 to happen which then necessarily causes
Step 3 to happen which allows for the
End Result/Conclusion to happen and therefore be reductively explained

This is an explanation that would cause a rational person to say "ahhh yes I see how this works." If we test this explanation emperically we can test it at each point and conclude that this explanation is emperically verified. But of course it isn't certain.

On the other hand this uncertainty does NOT mean that there is an explanatory gap allowed to exists in the reductive explanation itself. You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%. A real explanation will allow you to measure anything that needs measuring, in principal(Not necessarily in practice). Of course the results could be wrong.

Here is how I perceive consciousness to be as it relates to the example above.


Step 1 brain stuff happens and necessarily leads to
Step 2 Details around neurology happen which could lead to
Step 3 Consciousness

We can test emperically that brain states in step 1 correspond to conscious events in step 3 and assume that the explanation is emperically verified because of the correlation. But the problem is that the link between step 2 and step 3 is not a necessary step and there is nothing you can even postulate that would make it so. This is not even an explanation because it just jumps over where the real gap exists. If a rational person looked at this explanation, they would not say "ahh that's how it works". They still wouldn't know except that somehow neurology magically creates a subjective experience.

So if you are calling this last example a reductive explanation then I agree with you that a reductive explanation of consciousness can be developed by science. But this is not what I and what I think others here are calling a reductive explanation. So perhaps the definition of what it means to be reductively explained is where we need to focus.


Just to be sure all of this is clear, here's another analogy:

A mother gets home from work and finds orange juice on the ceiling of her bedroom. She goes to each of her 2 sons to find out how this happened.

1st Son: Saw son #2 walk in there with a glass of orange juice and the cat jump on his head and he threw the glass up, splashing the juice onto the ceiling.

2nd Son: Saw son #1 walk into the room with a glass of orange juice and close the door behind him.

The first one is a reductive explanation. It could be completely false but it is the better explanation. The second is not a reductive explanation because you still don't know how the juice got on the ceiling. You can even verify that the second story is absolutely true. It still doesn't explain anything. You would then have to go interrogate the first son.(or change the natural ontology with regard to consciousness )

 

[Dark Wing]

Originally posted by Another God
One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.

This does not quite sit right with me yet. I have been thinking all night why not. Mayby its that the fuel is not actually a starter in the brain process, (though you might say that an experience or a stimulus is) or that you have an officialkick off point caused by energy or friction at all. More so the brain just IS, it never starts as such, just when the right configuration appears, then it just is.

That does not make much sense either. I will keep thinking. But i think the annalogy, although showing its point, proberly can't be taken litrally all the way down (if it can, then bring it on! it has to be better than the computer annalogy)

 

[Dark Wing]

Flipton:

Nice post. well explained. (i have not heard the orange juice analogy before, but its a good way to describe the diffrences). and good work taking on a mediating position there, looks as if it might start working. There is much philosophy to discuss here, and it gets lost in the throw is everyone turns it into a shamble.

 

[Canute]

metacristi

I don't think anybody is trying to browbeat you or put you down. But you just repeat your claims over and over like a mantra rather than engage in a debate on the issues. It gets a bit frustrating.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Fliption
The one that is in the title of this thread.

The gap we currently have around consciousness.

The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.

If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.

Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.

This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.

Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.

Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.

Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"?

 

[metacristi]

Fliption

Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained".

By reductionism in general,I understand the usual definition ‘the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.’In the case of consciousness reductionism has usually two meanings: 1.that consciousness can be explained in terms of laws of physics and chemistry. 2.that consciousness can be explained in terms of the complex functioning of the neural network. It is this second approach which is usually favorized by the scientists in the cognitive sciences.

You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%.

It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…First there are almost never 100% certitudes.At least in the majority of cases we cannot establish that.That's why the default is that we must always be open to new facts.We accept those as ‘complete explanations’ based on observed facts only.There are sufficient reasons for the moment,experimentally derived,to assume that.It is the best we could achieve so far.We cannot put in evidence finer causes and we assume they do not exist.If put in evidence,we introduce them in the explanation by enlarging the theory.Thus we are always entitled to expect new data.There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.And this is valid for all logical arguments against reductionism so far.The conclusion might be right but it does not follow from the premises therefore there is no obligation for all rational persons to believe it is true.I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts (that’s why we must first confirm the predictions of scientifc theories experimentally in order to have a high confidence in their truth) even if the argument were sound.Namely that there is no reason to believe that unique and inevitable conclusions,derived from a true set of premises empirically inferred,are true before confirming them experimentally.But I’m afraid no one will understand…

Secondly the lack of a more detailed reductionist (at the neuronal network) theory of consciusness now does not entile the conclusion we will not find one later. From what I’ve seen you argee with this possibility.What you failed to notice is that my argument is much stronger than that.Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see) the fact that there is an explanation of how the subjectice experiences appears from the functioning of the brain leaves open the possibility that is is actually true.A fully reductionist scientific approach explaining qualia as being due to the functioning of the brain,as it is usually done in science in general is still possible (no certitudes implied only sufficient experimental reasons to have a high degree in its truth).Moreover,as an irony,maybe exactly using a first person type of research,as Chalmers advocate,will we be able confirm what the reductionist approach postulated.Chalmers went much further (I'm afraid the logical arguments he propose are not sound either;I do not think however that he really believes in the experimental necessity of the conclusion since in his papers he only say it is skeptical about the possibility of reductionism) and proposed that,in spite of the possible existence of such correlations,we should not attempt to reduce qualia at the brain functioning not even in that case,by proposing that it is possible that qualia is fundamental (he is confident we will be able to confirm that later).Unfortunately this is entirely a philosophical,though fully compatible with observed facts,argument,maybe true in absolute.But not accepted by the scientifc method in case that the existing theory happens to be very successful by proving the existence of clear correlations between subjective experiences and the functioning of the brain also+no other scientific alternative exists.In that situation we will not have any reasons to believe qualia is indeed fundamental or implies something more,that there is a gap in knowledge in your sense finally.Scientists will be fully entitled to say that we have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the truth of the existing theory-this a fact which happen very often in usual science.Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.Even if first it will be used a first person type of research and only after proposed a detailed theory things will not change in case that clear correlations will be put in evidence.That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.Till then scientists will have the right,based on all observed facts,to consider the reductive explanation as sufficient to explain consciousness exactly how we do in the case of a vast majority of scientific explanations you and other say are able to convince people.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.

This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.

Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.

Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.

Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"? [/B]

This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.

What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?

Are string theorists microphenomalists?

And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?

Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".

And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?

I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common defintion. I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.

Are string theorists microphenomalists?

I would say say so. For them everything is epiphenomenal on strings.

And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?

Nope, I just checked and it's still sixteen.

Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".

Not quite nothing at all though.

And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend? [/B]

Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.

Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by metacristi

It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…

Yes I understand how this feels. I sympathize. Eliminating the run-on sentences might help. I'd appreciate you taking care of that before you assume your sentences are clear and everyone but you is an ignoramus because they can't understand. Thanks.

And did you think you were arguing? If so then let me know because I don't come here to argue. I don't have time for that. I come here to attempt a progressive discussion. I actually want you to attempt to prove hypnagogue/chalmers wrong. That's the whole point of the forum. But you don't seem to be interested in trying to grasp the issue.

This post is just more of the same. Insulting my intelligence, more descriptions of science that I already completely understand and find irrelevant, and total disregard for and complete silence to my analogies and other desperate attempts to pull you down into the real discussion. Yet again, you have totally ignored what I'm trying to point you to and gone off and simply copied and pasted your standard 5 paragraph response. Only this time without the indentions.

There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

"There is no compel to believe"? You're right, I just don't undestand.

You say this about hypnagogue's points because you do not understand the premises. If you did you would see that a white wall will never be black, no matter how long and hard you look at it. You are surface reading, looking for key words to trigger your pre-conceived conclusions. It is the only thing that explains these responses.

I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts

Ok, you keep looking at that white wall to see if it's black. A white wall by definition cannot be black. If our premise is that a wall is white, you do not need to verify emperically that it isn't black. It cannot be by definition. This is very simple. If you disagree with the premise then you have to say why. You cannot just assert it. Unless, of course, you're just arguing.

But I’m afraid no one will understand…

It's because we're all just slow and you're not. It must be hard to be you.

Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see)

Try english.

Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.

No not all philosophical arguments are equally valid. The fact that you say this simply re-enforces my belief that you haven't understood what is really being said here.

That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.

Why should something that is not reducable necessarily involve something more? I'm not even sure what this means, let alone why I have to prove it.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common definition.

"What it is like to be..." ...a frog, a man, an electron?

I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.

Here's how I would define information within the context of what I have proposed: Input -- of whatever quality -- from a source other than self that causes a change -- however minute -- in the self.

I would say so. For them (string theorists) everything is epiphenomenal on strings.

What might "epiphenomenal" mean? Per the American Heritage Dictionary -- henceforth AHD -- it means "besides". Besides what?

Not quite nothing at all though.

Since I did not stop to take inventory of my entire internal world to see if ANYTHING was "axiomatic", I left room for the possibility that something might be.

Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.

If you say so.

Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.

It did sound a bit pejorative but I'm over it now. In any case, in the greater scheme of things, an entire lifetime is a "microphenomenon" ...perhaps an "engram" in the mind of the Universe (should the Universe HAVE a mind). Meanwhile, our cells are "having experiences" and "communicating with" one another (via chemicals and electricity) and may thus be "conscious" of whatever they can sense and respond to. Likewise, particles, stars and galaxies.

You see, Canute, I am more than a microphenomenonalist; I'm a full-on panpsychist who is proposing that the detection of information -- simple or complex -- that alters in any way the behavior of the detecting "entity" -- simple or complex -- is perhaps all the "reducing" we need to be doing with regard to "consciousness"

 

[Canute]

Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.

However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."

I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.

Before I answer this, I guess we're assuming that bats are conscious to begin with? We don't know this for certain but we can reasonably assume it. Having said that then my answer would be this: While observing the AI bat do a lot of the things the same as a real bat, you can point to the specific code/hardware wiring that allows each of those individual things to happen. But if the bat truly does have consciousness, you cannot point to any such thing. It is an unnecessary addon with no way to point to it's cause in your AI design. If someone asked, "how did you achieve it being conscious?"...you're answer would be "I have no idea".

Since we're talking about bats your point has more weight because we don't know for certain what a bat feels. But if the AI were a human, and all of the facts were the same would you claim the exact same thing? Can you claim an AI human is conscious simply from it's behaviour without understanding how it was done in the design?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."

From which piece of scientific research do you conclude that? From a scientific point of view it might be true, but there's no evidence that it is. There's not even any scientific evidence that bats are conscious (or people come to that).

I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here.

No 'experience' then. Or are you saying that experience is a physical substance?

If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing. [/B]

Feelings, experience and what it is like to be a bat. If you do a search on Harnard + Dennett you may find their email argument on this point, on which Dennett has to give way.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.

My apologies ..although, technically, I was being "pi**y" (rhymes with "missy") ...my preferred conversational style. It's a bit like Touret's Syndrome, except harder to control. Mostly, I'm playing.

However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.

I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.

You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.

What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious?

 

[Dark Wing]

... Redefine consciousness? May I ask exactly what definition of consciousness you have that is constant amongst all that talk of it? As far as I know, every author has their own definition in which they work with...

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.

As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.

You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.

Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.

What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious? [/B]

I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness. I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.

 

[M. Gaspar]

Originally posted by Canute
As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.

I dispute it.

Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.

So say.

I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness.

Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]

I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.

How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious" because, in fact, I think "consciousness" is a matter of DEGREE! IOW, it might be on a continuum from VERY SIMPLE to VERY COMPLEX ...based on the complexity of the detection and response system of the entity.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I dispute it.

Ok.

So say.

I stated a fact.

Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]

Hmm. I don't think I'm clever enough to unpick this muddle. You seem to be confusing 'emptiness' and 'nothing'.

And of course our life is about how we handle suffering, if you use suffering in the Buddhist sense of the word.

How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious"

It's a well known example from the literature, not mine.