Originally posted by Fliption
And yet you haven't even read the opposing view?
No, because to say that the mind is anything other than physical is to imply a line of reasoning that leads to infinite regress - as I've shown
numerous times in the past.
And that is all I have done.
Yeah right. No offense, but you used terms of a
completely Idealistic nature (such as "inside consciousness" and "outside consciousness" and "mind" (as something other than the brain, that is)), throughout the entire discussion thusfar, and now you say that you've only been saying "Idealists believe in emergent properties"?
No, you were saying (before, at least) that Idealists believe that these "emergent properties" are primary while materialists believe them to be secondary.
Yes don't counter it cause you would be proving exactly what I was trying to prove. Don't you understand that the point of that example was not to defend Idealism? I wasn't trying to make a good argument for why love existed. I was merely trying to show that someone can take the view that it does because we cannot define "shown to exists". The fact that the materialist can make the claim you suggested just makes my point even more.
No it doesn't. Don't you realize yet that
no one can show love (or anything else that isn't physical) to exist? It isn't logically possible, because, even if Idealism was correct, there would be no way to convey my "thoughts" to you, except through physical means.
Thus, when I say that Zero's definition is OK (though slightly misleading), I am saying that because no Idealist can ever *show* that there is such a thing as "things that exist only 'inside consciousness'".
Whether the argument for or against materialism in my example is a good one or not is not the point. The point is that the definition doesn't lend itself to a debate on the topic at all. It just begs for more definitional clarification.
Only when someone (you, in this case) wishes to enforce the fact that phenomenological things can be shown to exist. This is, obviously, not the case.
Now, we can either continue to debate this utterly meaningless problem that you have with Zero's original definition or we can move on (perhaps using my definition instead), like rational people do.
I just don't get why you cannot accept this.Your view seems VERY extreme and impractical. What does the word "color" mean to you? Under your understanding of what "color" is, do you think it is a creation of your subjective experience or do you think color really exists?
Color doesn't "really exist" (I can't believe that you, of all people, would ever use the term "really exist"

). Color is a part of our processing incoming light of different wavelengths.
Basically, it (light of a particular wavelength) has a certain effect on our retina and that sends a distinguished message (distinguished from other wavelengths, that is) to the brain.
Color exists as much as pain does. It is just a way that our brain has evolved to process a certain kind of stimulus.
I feel that we are having severe semantic problems here. Just answer the question about color and maybe I can understand better what you're view is because it seems totally radical and unusable to me right now.
What's so "unusable" about it? I understand if it seems "radical", since it's counter-intuitive (our consciousness plays a very convincing "trick" on itself), but not unusable.
As is the case with a magician and a gullible audience, the card never really passed through the table (nor did it in any metaphysical make-believe world), it is a trick the brain plays on itself.
You are not wrong in your conclusion but your assumptions are wrong. I was trying to be extra careful so that you wouldn't make this claim but you did anyway. The labeling of the secondary "things" is simply assigning words to perceived effects to the processes of the primary "things". The word "color" is used to describe an effect of experiencing matter. Must people would agree color does not really exists but it is a very useful word for describing the effect. The materialists can easily make the conclusion that all things are material from this definition. The only bias here is desired bias. If you cannot see that this definition at least lends itself to helping people understand the distinctions between the views then I'm not sure what else to say.
Oh, it's easy to see how it helps in
explanation, but it's nothing more than that. Color (and all other such words that you believe refer to some "secondary thing") does not exist (in any sense of the word).
This is completely unreasonable for you to say there is no grey area. This goes against the whole idea of philosophy; claiming we cannot have a discussion on a topic because all the words are biased. When you started out participating in this thread you weren't saying this at all. You were disagreeing with me when I claimed that Zero's definition was biased and not effective for use in a discussion. Now you are trying to claim that it is impossible to come up with an unbiased definition of your view. So 2 things can be concluded from your view.
1) I was right. Zero's definition is biased.
2) There is no definition of materialism that will allow an opposing view. Because the materialists conclusion is built into the definition. And this apparently doesn't allow even a word to be assigned to an opposing view. Let alone an opposing argument.
No, no, no, you misunderstood (probably my fault). When I said that there was no "grey area", I meant that you haven't found any unbiased way of defining Idealism. And, if you can't be unbiased, then you can't try to define immediately, but must reverse the order that you and Heusdens decided on.
Anyway, Zero's definition doesn't directly refer to what materialism is, because (and I was hoping I wouldn't have to bring this up) materialism is
not a belief (any more than atheism is), but it is rather a negation of a belief. The materialist's opinion is that there are no "emergent properties", which is merely a negation of the Idealistic assumption that there are.
AFAIC, even the definition "...believes in all things that can be shown to exist" is just a negation (rightly so, since it is ascribed to materialism) of the idea that "something exists which cannot be shown to others as existing".