Why the bias against materialism?

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The discussion centers on the tension between materialism and idealism, emphasizing that materialistic views are often dismissed despite their empirical support. Participants argue that while science is a valuable tool for understanding the physical universe, it has limitations and cannot fully explain consciousness or the meaning of life. There is a critique of anti-materialist sentiments, likening them to historical resistance against scientific progress, and highlighting the psychological need for beliefs beyond materialism. The conversation also touches on the role of community in belief systems and the subjective nature of human experience. Ultimately, the debate reflects a struggle to reconcile scientific understanding with deeper existential questions.
  • #601
Originally posted by Zero
Yes, but we CAN say that their vision exists as electrochemical brain activity, can't we?

No. A materialist, in my experience, does not accept that the phenomenological world can be "looked at" at all. It is not "produced" by brain activity, it is brain activity, and there are no "emergent properties" that exist as a "picture in the mind". So, actually, yes we can say that their supposed vision (along with their supposed "picture") exist as electrochemical brain activity, but it may be slightly misleading to do so (especially if they miss the "as" part, and assume that we mean "as a result of").

You know, I just thought of another reason why "pictures in the mind" (no matter how they are "produced") may be illogical. Think of the monitor, that you are looking at now. Do you think that there is a place inside the computer, where these words are displayed as words? I'm no expert on computers (I know about enough to get by), but I really doubt it. It has always been explained to me that the information is in binary code, and that the display on the monitor is just a translation of that code.

So, the display on the monitor (the picture) is not for the benefit of the computer at all; since the computer doesn't process in "pictures", but in binary code. It's only for the benefit of the humans who look at the monitor, that this code is ever translated into a picture or text (like the text you are reading now).

Our brains are organic computers, so doesn't it stand to reason that there would be no purpose in our having actual "pictures" in our minds, if there was no "observer" inside the mind to watch them (like the observers that are reading this text)? And there cannot be such an observer, for it (the observer) would then have to be conscious (otherwise the "picture" would mean nothing to it) which would mean that it also had an inner "observer", and so on ad infinitum.
 
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  • #602
BTW, the above idea about why "pictures in the mind" may be illogical is not entirely original, it's just the illustration that I thought of, which I decided to share. Daniel Dennett explains much the same principle, using the primitive AI robot, "Shakey", as his example. But, of course, his explanation is much longer and more detailed than mine.
 
  • #603
Originally posted by Mentat
No. A materialist, in my experience, does not accept that the phenomenological world can be "looked at" at all. It is not "produced" by brain activity, it is brain activity, and there are no "emergent properties" that exist as a "picture in the mind". So, actually, yes we can say that their supposed vision (along with their supposed "picture") exist as electrochemical brain activity, but it may be slightly misleading to do so (especially if they miss the "as" part, and assume that we mean "as a result of").

You know, I just thought of another reason why "pictures in the mind" (no matter how they are "produced") may be illogical. Think of the monitor, that you are looking at now. Do you think that there is a place inside the computer, where these words are displayed as words? I'm no expert on computers (I know about enough to get by), but I really doubt it. It has always been explained to me that the information is in binary code, and that the display on the monitor is just a translation of that code.

So, the display on the monitor (the picture) is not for the benefit of the computer at all; since the computer doesn't process in "pictures", but in binary code. It's only for the benefit of the humans who look at the monitor, that this code is ever translated into a picture or text (like the text you are reading now).

Our brains are organic computers, so doesn't it stand to reason that there would be no purpose in our having actual "pictures" in our minds, if there was no "observer" inside the mind to watch them (like the observers that are reading this text)? And there cannot be such an observer, for it (the observer) would then have to be conscious (otherwise the "picture" would mean nothing to it) which would mean that it also had an inner "observer", and so on ad infinitum.
I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?
 
  • #604
Originally posted by Mentat
BTW, the above idea about why "pictures in the mind" may be illogical is not entirely original, it's just the illustration that I thought of, which I decided to share. Daniel Dennett explains much the same principle, using the primitive AI robot, "Shakey", as his example. But, of course, his explanation is much longer and more detailed than mine.
Thinking of my last post, an 'image of the mind' is illogical, because images are defined as the transfer of photons...
 
  • #605
Originally posted by Zero
I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?
And yet what the mind makes out of the image is real. Otherwise what's the point in "creating" the image in the first place?
 
  • #606
Originally posted by Zero
Thinking of my last post, an 'image of the mind' is illogical, because images are defined as the transfer of photons...

The transfer of photons is not an image but information. Information gives order to the transfer of photons. Those ordered photons strike our eye casing electrochemical information bearing signals to go to our brains. The ordered electrochemical responses in our brain cause the mind to perceive the information as a image. Only at the perception phase did that information become unreal or did it finally become the real image that the information was transfering from one media to another?
 
  • #607
Originally posted by Royce
The transfer of photons is not an image but information. Information gives order to the transfer of photons. Those ordered photons strike our eye casing electrochemical information bearing signals to go to our brains. The ordered electrochemical responses in our brain cause the mind to perceive the information as a image. Only at the perception phase did that information become unreal or did it finally become the real image that the information was transfering from one media to another?
What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.
 
  • #608
Originally posted by Zero
What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.
What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?
 
  • #609
Originally posted by Iacchus32
What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?
?This doesn't make any sense, and has nothing to do with what this thread is about, does it?
 
  • #610
Originally posted by Zero
?This doesn't make any sense, and has nothing to do with what this thread is about, does it?
What is a stop sign? If not an image (that conveys information) of what's been painted on to it? What's the difference between that and an image on your computer screen? The mind still interprets the information the same way.

And, where one uses paint as a medium, the other uses photons on your computer screen.
 
  • #611
Originally posted by Mentat
Your definition of Idealism uses terms that only exist in the Idealist paradigm. The definition is biased in itself, as it makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm. I think that a "fair" (accurate, good...) definition is supposed to have no biases, and will thus (at least) make sense in both paradigms.

BUT THAT'S THE POINT! Your definition directly implied the existence of these things and (the definition itself) is thus utterly biased, and logically unusable. Surely you can see this, I've said it enough times.

Yes I see exactly what you are saying, but you are saying it because you are not understanding me. And that is why I keep saying that! You're going to have think a little more practical here. The definition I was suggesting makes it possible to differentiate the 2 views so they can disagree with each other and KNOW what they're disagreeing about! There is no bias. Your point is unreasonable and not practical as I hope to show.

I probably don't know complexity theory by that name. You'd have to tell me what it postulates, instead of referring to it by the name, before I can know whether I understand it (or agree with it) or not.

If you don't believe in holistic/emergent properties where the sum is greater than the parts then you don't know what it is. Type it in a search engine. Thats what I did.

The difference is that I'm not at all intimidated by the fact that these may be long-standing definitions. I say that - from my observations of your post - they are biased (or, at least, the one for Idealism) is, and are thus logically unusable, unless you can show otherwise.

Well I'm certainly glad I'm not the one having to dismiss established topics to keep my point of view.

Intimidation is not the point. The point is that maybe you ought to take the time to read and understand established works before you criticize or disagree with them. It's good to question things but we have to be a bit responsible I think. Our self-perceived strengths are usually also our greatest weakness.

But your definition contained reference to the emergent properties! It is thus biased toward the Idealistic PoV, and makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm[/color]. As I said before (above somewhere), a definition that is biased commits the same sin that you keep pointing out: it proclaims truths.

No, the definition does not make any claims to truth. If emergent properties are a key component of the idealist view, then we MUST be able to assign a word to it. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant at the stage of assigning words. I've said this many times.

Here's one definition (from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary):
1 a : a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter

Ugh. Not good. Let's try to make this a little practical and see if it helps.


Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.


Heusdens definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe that what exists independent, outside and apart from consciousness is the primary existence."

Idealists: "I disagree with you. I believe what exist outside of consciousness is secondary."

Thoughts:
Right away an observer has the criteria for deciding which things a materialist believes in and which an idealist believes in. All the observer has to do is ask the question "Does the thing exists outside of consciousness?" Color for example does not so a materialists does not believe color actually exists. The debate between the 2 views can now move forward productively.

Clearly this definition is better. You have somehow convinced yourself that this definition is biased. I can hear you saying now that by claiming matter(things outside of consciousness)is primary, it implies there is something else that is secondary. Again I must say that this is pure semantics. Believing that these things are secondary is the same as saying that they are useful concepts but they owe their entire existence to the thing that is primary. We must agree that using concepts like love and mind to describe the results of a process is practical for communication. Whether it actually exists or not is not relevant for the definition. The materialist can claim that these things are simply words used to describe what is intrinsically the perceived results of material processes. But if we don't use these words then we have no way of expressing the idealist view.
 
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  • #612
Originally posted by Fliption
Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.

Although I find your representation of my viewpoint to be intentionally simplistic, it does bring up an important point. The key distinction falls in defining what counts as appropriate evidence.
 
  • #613
Originally posted by Zero
I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?

Perfect sense, IMO.
 
  • #614
Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet what the mind makes out of the image is real. Otherwise what's the point in "creating" the image in the first place?

But the mind doesn't "make" anything "out of the image". If it did, who would be there (inside the mind) to see it? You see how this constantly leads to infinite regress?
 
  • #615
Originally posted by Zero
What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.

Good man! Don't lose that, I need someone on the materialist side :wink:.
 
  • #616
Originally posted by Iacchus32
What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?

There is no "image" on a stop sign. There's the paint and the metal, the photons and the neurons.
 
  • #617
Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.
 
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  • #618
Originally posted by Fliption
Yes I see exactly what you are saying, but you are saying it because you are not understanding me. And that is why I keep saying that! You're going to have think a little more practical here. The definition I was suggesting makes it possible to differentiate the 2 views so they can disagree with each other and KNOW what they're disagreeing about! There is no bias. Your point is unreasonable and not practical as I hope to show.

Alright. BTW, I apologize if my previous post came off as sort of hostile (or, in any way, out of form), I just got caught up in writing, and didn't get to proofread before posting.

If you don't believe in holistic/emergent properties where the sum is greater than the parts then you don't know what it is. Type it in a search engine. Thats what I did.

Ok, I'll try that (and, perhaps, post some results). However, I feel it only right to inform you that people like Le Doux and Dennett (materialists who study the processes of the mind) have postulated that there are no such "emergent properties", and have explained (rather aptly, IMO) why this should be the case (just see my illustration (a few posts back, I guess) about the computer image. I came up with it from the information I gathered in these two Materialists' books).

Well I'm certainly glad I'm not the one having to dismiss established topics to keep my point of view.

Ever since discussing with Manuel_Silvio, I have detested the very concept of "established topics". Just the idea that such a thing exists is closed-minded, IMO. Of course, I appreciate (as did Manuel) that long-standing arguments are not to be taken lightly (inspite of my tendency to do so, from time to time), but that doesn't mean that there is such a thing as an "established topic".

Intimidation is not the point. The point is that maybe you ought to take the time to read and understand established works before you criticize or disagree with them. It's good to question things but we have to be a bit responsible I think. Our self-perceived strengths are usually also our greatest weakness.

I don't think I have any strength, or special ability, for challenging these "established topics". I just think that there may be some flaw, and am trying to point out a possible candidate. I have not had time (not just as far as lifetime goes, but also time within each day) to read very much on the different "Philosophies of the Mind", but I am continuing to learn, and do recognize the need for education (especially for someone like me, who likes to question).

No, the definition does not make any claims to truth. If emergent properties are a key component of the idealist view, then we MUST be able to assign a word to it. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant at the stage of assigning words. I've said this many times.

I disagree (note: I understand, but I disagree). As I've said before, I've no problem with your assigning words to what you call "emergent properties" (even though I am positing that there is no such thing (IOW, "emergent properties" is about as useful a collection of words for describing something as the word "nothing")), however, you cannot (or, rather, shouldn't) use them as part of your definition of Idealism (except to say that Idealists believe that there is such a thing as an "emergent property").

Ugh. Not good. Let's try to make this a little practical and see if it helps.


Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.

Erm...I probably shouldn't counter this, since it's not my main dispute with you, but I think you may be wrong. After all, the Materialist could tell the Idealist that the proposed kiss needn't be an indication of love, and thus "love" would still fall under the category of "things that cannot be shown to exist".

However, as I said, you may or may not be right about this and it probably makes no difference, as far as my main dispute with you goes.

Heusdens definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe that what exists independent, outside and apart from consciousness is the primary existence."

Idealists: "I disagree with you. I believe what exist outside of consciousness is secondary."

ARE YOU KIDDING ME?? I think it's been said WAY too many times, for me to need to say it again: To say that something "exists inside of consciousness" is a completely Idealistic assumption. The true materialist cannot believe that something "exists within consciousness", since such things would not be material.[/color]

I again apologize for getting a bit "worked up", but I don't think I should edit this paragraph any further - as it may lose its "flavor".

Thoughts:
Right away an observer has the criteria for deciding which things a materialist believes in and which an idealist believes in. All the observer has to do is ask the question "Does the thing exists outside of consciousness?" Color for example does not so a materialists does not believe color actually exists. The debate between the 2 views can now move forward productively.

Not at all! To ask "does the thing exist outside of consciousness" is a non-sequitor to a materialist, since nothing exists "inside of consciousness". There is no phenomenological "world", as such things (again) would have to be immaterial.

Clearly this definition is better. You have somehow convinced yourself that this definition is biased. I can hear you saying now that by claiming matter(things outside of consciousness)is primary, it implies there is something else that is secondary. Again I must say that this is pure semantics. Believing that these things are secondary is the same as saying that they are useful concepts but they owe their entire existence to the thing that is primary.

No, no, no, it's not about their existing in a "secondary" form (or existing as "useful concepts that owe their existence to the material interactions"). Since you probably still don't see the bias, I will spell it out: If something immaterial exists as a result of something material, then the materialist viewpoint (that all things are material)is wrong, since the things that "owe their existence to" material interactions would not themselves be material![/color]

Am I wrong?

We must agree that using concepts like love and mind to describe the results of a process is practical for communication. Whether it actually exists or not is not relevant for the definition. The materialist can claim that these things are simply words used to describe what is intrinsically the perceived results of material processes. But if we don't use these words then we have no way of expressing the idealist view.

And here you arrive at what I already posted some time ago: There is no grey area, from which to form a definition. You are trying to remain completely unbiased, but your attempt is in vain (AFAICS (as far as I can see)).
 
  • #619
Originally posted by sascha
Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.

I believe, sascha, that you may have missed my point. I'm not saying information is as good as tangible things (if anything, I'm saying quite the opposite), I'm saying that, since there are no such "tangible things" in the brain, then (according to the materialist view) there are no such things at all in the mind.
 
  • #620
I was answering Zero's proposal to take the description for the thing. This does not necessarily mean only "information". For someone believing in cognitive theory, this theory is not just information, it is believed to be fact -- in fact, the only relevant fact.
 
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  • #621
Originally posted by Mentat
There is no "image" on a stop sign. There's the paint and the metal, the photons and the neurons.
Yeah, and I would like to see you explain that to the cop when he pulls you over for running the stop sign!
 
  • #622
Originally posted by sascha
Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.
I think this is the confusing part. What myself and Mentat are trying to say (I think) is that something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do.
 
  • #623
Originally posted by Zero
I think this is the confusing part. What myself and Mentat are trying to say (I think) is that something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do.
And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark -- i.e., if we didn't have them. :wink:
 
  • #624
Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark, i.e., if we didn't have them. :wink:
I'm not trying to sneak anything past anything... I wish Mentat were around to help me get my point across, but I'll press on regardless. I think(correct me if I am wrong) that you and some others are objectifying the concept of processes as somehow separate from the physical workings of those processes. Claiming consiousness as distinct from the electrochemical reactions of the brain is like saying that fire is distinct from the combustion of something flamable. I seems that you would claim that an running automobile engine is made of two parts; the engine and the 'running', which exists on a different plane of existence from the engine.
 
  • #625
You say "something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do". The trouble with this idea is that if it were completely true, you would have no influence over the process. The objects, photons, eyes etc. would do all of it. But in fact you can consciously control what you want to look at, i.e. you can look or not look (this is called "intentionality"). The idea which you and Mentat are exposing is contradictory with the facts as soon as one takes all of them into account. Of course one can choose to look at and thus 'see' (sic!) only part of the facts, but then this comes close to what Iacchus32 seems to address in saying you "sneak" us past something. We are not saying the engine is different from its running, but that you forget part of the engine and running.
 
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  • #626
Originally posted by sascha
You say "something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do". The trouble with this idea is that if it were completely true, you would have no influence over the process. The objects, photons, eyes etc. would do all of it. But in fact you can consciously control what you want to look at, i.e. you can look or not look (this is called "intentionality"). The idea which you and Mentat are exposing is contradictory with the facts as soon as one takes all of them into account. Of course one can choose to look at and thus 'see' (sic!) only part of the facts, but then this comes close to what Iacchus32 seems to address in saying you "sneak" us past something. We are not saying the engine is different from its running, but that you forget part of the engine and running.
Actually, it is you that is trying to sneak something in. You are trying to claim some sort of special exception for consciousness, when in fact it is the 'running' that our brain-as-engine does. It is simply another process, and our control over it makes no difference at all.

I think that is certainly a source of your bias against materialism, isn't it? That it doesn't treat human intellect as some sort of special case? That tends to be the reason why people choose to ignore 'cold' facts, because they often don't feed people's self-centered need for meaning.
 
  • #627
I am not talking about your consciousness that is doing something, I am talking about your capacity of a willful choice, which is not explained in the machine model you present. Of course control makes all the difference, because there the machine idea is not applicable any more. Machines don't make and control themselves. You need a meta-machine (programmer, manufacturer, power, etc.) for that.
If the intellect were fully controlled by some mechanism, it would not be able to think freely, i.e. choose what it wants to think and check whether that corresponds. If your mind is under the control of something, then this is a good reason for me to stop communicating with you, because then what you think and say would be determined by that. There is nothing interestring in that, and nobody needs to lose his time with zombies.
So in what you say the problem is only shifted away into words. But of course any words can be uttered and believed in.
The real trouble is that the machine metaphore does not operate in categories that allow to think things like consciousness and personal identity in a noncompromised way. I have hinted at this many times. The Cartesian Split has some logical drawbacks which you still seem to ignore. Hard luck, buddy.
 
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  • #628
Originally posted by Iacchus32
Yeah, and I would like to see you explain that to the cop when he pulls you over for running the stop sign!

LOL!

The policeman believes that there is an image there just as much as you do.
 
  • #629
Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark -- i.e., if we didn't have them. :wink:

Yes, but our "ability to see" is nothing more than our brain's ability to process incoming photonic emissions. This does nothing to prove your point.
 
  • #630
Originally posted by Zero
I'm not trying to sneak anything past anything... I wish Mentat were around to help me get my point across, but I'll press on regardless.

I got your back now :smile:.

I think(correct me if I am wrong) that you and some others are objectifying the concept of processes as somehow separate from the physical workings of those processes. Claiming consiousness as distinct from the electrochemical reactions of the brain is like saying that fire is distinct from the combustion of something flamable. I seems that you would claim that an running automobile engine is made of two parts; the engine and the 'running', which exists on a different plane of existence from the engine.

Good illustration, btw.
 
  • #631
Originally posted by sascha
You say "something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do". The trouble with this idea is that if it were completely true, you would have no influence over the process.

Why not? When he said that "objects, photons, and eyes exist" he may have omitted neurons and synapses, but I think they were implied.
"Choice" itself can be explained in terms of nothing more than the processes of the brain.

The objects, photons, eyes etc. would do all of it. But in fact you can consciously control what you want to look at, i.e. you can look or not look (this is called "intentionality"). The idea which you and Mentat are exposing is contradictory with the facts as soon as one takes all of them into account.

Not so. In fact, I turn this accusation back on you, and challenge you to point out the flaw in my reasoning for why there cannot be a part of the mind that is not physical.

Of course one can choose to look at and thus 'see' (sic!) only part of the facts, but then this comes close to what Iacchus32 seems to address in saying you "sneak" us past something. We are not saying the engine is different from its running, but that you forget part of the engine and running.

I didn't understand this last statement, could you please re-state it?
 
  • #632
Originally posted by sascha
I am not talking about your consciousness that is doing something, I am talking about your capacity of a willful choice, which is not explained in the machine model you present. Of course control makes all the difference, because there the machine idea is not applicable any more. Machines don't make and control themselves. You need a meta-machine (programmer, manufacturer, power, etc.) for that.

Machines can indeed control themselves. You do it every day :wink:.

Basically, your problem with the materialistic PoV is that you don't see how it can account for choices. Well, I don't see how you've explained "choices" in an Idealistic framework either.

There is, of course, my preferred explanation of "choice" from the materialistic PoV, and that is Daniel Dennett's from Consciousness Explained (this will be rather long, but I hope you endeavor to read it all before responding).

Basically (and I really mean "basically" since I couldn't possibly sum up the whole chapter in one post): An Idealist thinks of a "central id" or a "singular self" that controls the brain's functions. This is not allowable in the materialistic framework, and so we must completely eliminate the "center" altogether. In order to do this, Dennett proposes that all of the different parts of your brain can serve the multi-purpose of "asking" and "answering".

Now, there is an illustration that helps to explain what this means, and that is of the party game wherein one guest tries to figure out the content of a dream that the host (or anyone else really) has had. So, in order to figure this out, he asks each guest yes/no questions and tries to deduce the dream from their answers. However, there is a twist: the guests have not really been told a dream, but have been instructed to respond with a "yes" or a "no" depending on the last letter of the question that is asked.

So, if he were to ask you "Is the dream about the host's father", you would answer "no", because the last letter of the question ended in a letter that is in the second half of the alphabet. In this game, there is also the "non-contradiction" override rule, which doesn't allow you to contradict a previous answer, no matter what the last letter of the question was. So, if he later asked you "Is the dream about his dad?", you would still answer "no", even though the last letter is in the first half of the alphabet.

Do you understand the game? (If not, I can attempt to clarify any points you don't get.)

Dennett proposes that this is a very close model of what happens in our brains, all of the time (except, of course, for the fact that there is no central "questioner" but rather, all of the "answerers" also serve as "questioners").

Now, to apply it: Let's say that someone insults you. They thus trigger a response from the brain. The different parts of your brain involved (such as the language-producing parts, the parts that deal with emotion (since, obviously, this insult would affect how you "feel"), the "memory bank" (which is full of previous occurances that resemble this one), etc...) begin the question/answer process. This serves as a refinement of not only what you are going to say in response, but also if you are going to say anything at all.

Interestingly enough, this process doesn't necessarily stop after you respond with a witty come-back, since (as you've probably experience before) we often think about what "I should have said" (and sometimes, our memory is remodeled to think that we actually did say some of the things that we "wish we said").

I'm sorry for the length of this explanation, but it's not a matter easily addressed (and I've only given an outline).

The Cartesian Split has some logical drawbacks which you still seem to ignore. Hard luck, buddy.

It seems rather obsurd that you would direct a comment about the Cartesian division at Zero, when it is you who subscribes to a "mind" that exists separate from the "brain" (the main concept behind Cartesian dualism).
 
  • #633
Mentat: Adding neurons and synapses (or anything else down the ladder) to objects, photons, and eyes won't change the principle. One can talk about choice as processes of the brain, at the price of nobody being responsible for anything any more (maybe this is what makes the idea so attractive to many). But this talk is an "explanation" only for the gullible, technicians who want to believe everything in the world is mechanisms. The point is not that the mind would not physical, because it evidently is, but that using it is not physical. The functioning of the mind as a "flow of consciousness" (as William James has been calling it) is not the same as your choosing what you want to be attentive to. If you were not capable of this choice, you could not coherently answer me there at your computer. You would be guided by whatever that mechanism happens to choose. That's where your flaw of reasoning is, or rather its blind spot (way back I gave the names of the logicians who proved all this). But famously blind spots are what one does not see in one's way of seeing. For the moment you seem happy this way. That's fine with me. You are free to believe whatever you like. But don't expect me to do so too. And insisting on a "blind spot" is close "sneaking us past something".

The part of control of a machine does not come from the machine itself, but from the programmer, designer, etc. You may not notice this fundamental dependency because you don't like the idea, but that's not my problem. BTW the alternative to Materialism is not Idealism. You will have to update your list. I have looked at Dennett's "Consciousness Explained", and I find he decribes a lot, but explains nothing. One can call his hypotheses "explanations", as many do, because as soon as they have some vivid imagery and scenarios, they believe they understand. But that's such a limited game. You never reach completeness, you only shift away the crucial points into ever new realms. You seem to think of the "id" as a "thing", and that's where you get off the track.

As I had expressed several times, more clearly than the usual account of the Cartesian Split, it arises every time concretely where a world view or activity is ruled by adopting the principle of distinguishing, describing, observing, measuring. This method logically inevitably entails a blind spot as to what can be distinguished, described, observed, measured. Your argument of my implying "a 'mind' that exists separate from the 'brain'" is mechanical repetition of what is often handed around as the Cartesian idea.
 
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  • #634
Originally posted by sascha
I am not talking about your consciousness that is doing something, I am talking about your capacity of a willful choice, which is not explained in the machine model you present. Of course control makes all the difference, because there the machine idea is not applicable any more. Machines don't make and control themselves. You need a meta-machine (programmer, manufacturer, power, etc.) for that.
If the intellect were fully controlled by some mechanism, it would not be able to think freely, i.e. choose what it wants to think and check whether that corresponds. If your mind is under the control of something, then this is a good reason for me to stop communicating with you, because then what you think and say would be determined by that. There is nothing interestring in that, and nobody needs to lose his time with zombies.
So in what you say the problem is only shifted away into words. But of course any words can be uttered and believed in.
The real trouble is that the machine metaphore does not operate in categories that allow to think things like consciousness and personal identity in a noncompromised way. I have hinted at this many times. The Cartesian Split has some logical drawbacks which you still seem to ignore. Hard luck, buddy.
I think, 'buddy', that you need a different thread to deal with your issues...there are plenty of 'free will/determinism' threads for you to make your case in. There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways...except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?
 
  • #635
Oh, and recall my earlier description of a plant 'choosing' to grow towards the sun. 'Consciousness' IMO, is nothing more or less than a highly complex form of simple biological function.
 
  • #636
Originally posted by Zero
I think, 'buddy', that you need a different thread to deal with your issues...there are plenty of 'free will/determinism' threads for you to make your case in. There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways...except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?
Are you trying to suggest we're just automatons then? If not, then that would imply that "somebody" is at control of the helm. Which, is something we would rather not deal with -- and perchance sneak past everybody? -- because it gives rise to this awful notion of a soul. And that I'm afraid, is just too intolerable to think of!

Whereas poof, just like that, there goes your whole materialistic point of view. :wink:
 
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  • #637
Originally posted by Iacchus32
Are you trying to suggest we're just automatons then? If not, then that would imply that "somebody" is at control of the helm. Which, is something we would rather not deal with -- and perchance sneak past everybody? -- because it gives rise to this awful notion of a soul. And that I'm afraid, is just too intolerable to think of!

Whereas poof, just like that, there goes your whole materialistic point of view. :wink:
First off, no. Second, it doesn't imply anything. You are making up connections between ideas, not following from one logical conclusion to the next.
 
  • #638
Originally posted by Mentat

Ok, I'll try that (and, perhaps, post some results). However, I feel it only right to inform you that people like Le Doux and Dennett (materialists who study the processes of the mind) have postulated that there are no such "emergent properties", and have explained (rather aptly, IMO) why this should be the case (just see my illustration (a few posts back, I guess) about the computer image. I came up with it from the information I gathered in these two Materialists' books).

And yet you haven't even read the opposing view?

however, you cannot (or, rather, shouldn't) use them as part of your definition of Idealism (except to say that Idealists believe that there is such a thing as an "emergent property").

And that is all I have done.

Erm...I probably shouldn't counter this, since it's not my main dispute with you, but I think you may be wrong. After all, the Materialist could tell the Idealist that the proposed kiss needn't be an indication of love, and thus "love" would still fall under the category of "things that cannot be shown to exist".

However, as I said, you may or may not be right about this and it probably makes no difference, as far as my main dispute with you goes.

Yes don't counter it cause you would be proving exactly what I was trying to prove. Don't you understand that the point of that example was not to defend Idealism? I wasn't trying to make a good argument for why love existed. I was merely trying to show that someone can take the view that it does because we cannot define "shown to exists". The fact that the materialist can make the claim you suggested just makes my point even more.

Whether the argument for or against materialism in my example is a good one or not is not the point. The point is that the definition doesn't lend itself to a debate on the topic at all. It just begs for more definitional clarification.


ARE YOU KIDDING ME?? I think it's been said WAY too many times, for me to need to say it again: To say that something "exists inside of consciousness" is a completely Idealistic assumption. The true materialist cannot believe that something "exists within consciousness", since such things would not be material.[/color]

I again apologize for getting a bit "worked up", but I don't think I should edit this paragraph any further - as it may lose its "flavor".

I just don't get why you cannot accept this.Your view seems VERY extreme and impractical. What does the word "color" mean to you? Under your understanding of what "color" is, do you think it is a creation of your subjective experience or do you think color really exists?


Not at all! To ask "does the thing exist outside of consciousness" is a non-sequitor to a materialist, since nothing exists "inside of consciousness". There is no phenomenological "world", as such things (again) would have to be immaterial.

I feel that we are having severe semantic problems here. Just answer the question about color and maybe I can understand better what you're view is because it seems totally radical and unusable to me right now.


No, no, no, it's not about their existing in a "secondary" form (or existing as "useful concepts that owe their existence to the material interactions"). Since you probably still don't see the bias, I will spell it out: If something immaterial exists as a result of something material, then the materialist viewpoint (that all things are material)is wrong, since the things that "owe their existence to" material interactions would not themselves be material![/color]

Am I wrong?

You are not wrong in your conclusion but your assumptions are wrong. I was trying to be extra careful so that you wouldn't make this claim but you did anyway. The labeling of the secondary "things" is simply assigning words to perceived effects to the processes of the primary "things". The word "color" is used to describe an effect of experiencing matter. Must people would agree color does not really exists but it is a very useful word for describing the effect. The materialists can easily make the conclusion that all things are material from this definition. The only bias here is desired bias. If you cannot see that this definition at least lends itself to helping people understand the distinctions between the views then I'm not sure what else to say.

And here you arrive at what I already posted some time ago: There is no grey area, from which to form a definition. You are trying to remain completely unbiased, but your attempt is in vain (AFAICS (as far as I can see)).

This is completely unreasonable for you to say there is no grey area. This goes against the whole idea of philosophy; claiming we cannot have a discussion on a topic because all the words are biased. When you started out participating in this thread you weren't saying this at all. You were disagreeing with me when I claimed that Zero's definition was biased and not effective for use in a discussion. Now you are trying to claim that it is impossible to come up with an unbiased definition of your view. So 2 things can be concluded from your view.

1) I was right. Zero's definition is biased.
2) There is no definition of materialism that will allow an opposing view. Because the materialists conclusion is built into the definition. And this apparently doesn't allow even a word to be assigned to an opposing view. Let alone an opposing argument.

This whole view to me is a lot like writing a dissertation that brings the theory of relativity and quantum physics together mathematically and then getting graded down for improper use of commas. Not practical, unreasonable and totally missing the point.
 
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  • #639
Originally posted by Zero
First off, no. Second, it doesn't imply anything. You are making up connections between ideas, not following from one logical conclusion to the next.
Well how about this. Does the body exist for the sake of that "somebody" at the helm? Or, does that somebody at the helm exist for the sake of the body? In other words, who (or what) exactly is in control here?
 
  • #640
Originally posted by Zero
I think, 'buddy', that you need a different thread to deal with your issues...there are plenty of 'free will/determinism' threads for you to make your case in. There is no problem with a purely material brain 'running' in purely mechanical ways...except it doesn't make you feel special, does it?

I've seen a few remarks of this nature in the last few pages and thought I would offer another perspective. The view that there is something non-material has been painted as a view where people think that they are "special" and not just another lump of mechanistic clay. That somehow these people believe this because it is more pleasant for them to believe it. I think in many cases this is a motivation for this belief. On the other hand, I will also point out that the materialists view that things are nothing but mechanics is generally consistent with the idea that there is no absolute meaning to people or life in general. This allows for each person to find their own meaning in life. To define ones own meaning in life and totally disregard the possibility of outside meaning is also a selfish position. As a matter of fact, it is probably the more selfish position. So I know many materialist desire to be materialist because it does eliminate any responsibility outside of what the self defines as important.

I don't think one view is better than another due to these motivations. But as someone who is more interested in learning rather than preaching, it helps to understand the motivations of people of all views.
 
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  • #641
Originally posted by Iacchus32
Well how about this. Does the body exist for the sake of that "somebody" at the helm? Or, does that somebody at the helm exist for the sake of the body? In other words, who (or what) exactly is in control here?
How about you don't start with such a huge assumption? You assume that the body is separate from the personality, that a person resides in a body. I say a person is their body, there is no distinction.
 
  • #642
Originally posted by Fliption
I've seen a few remarks of this nature in the last few pages and thought I would offer another perspective. The view that there is something non-material has been painted as a view where people think that they are "special" and not just another lump of mechanistic clay. That somehow these people believe this because it is more pleasant for them to believe it. I think in many cases this is a motivation for this belief. On the other hand, I will also point out that the materialists view that things are nothing but mechanics is generally consistent with the idea that there is no absolute meaning to people or life in general. This allows for each person to find their own meaning in life. To define ones own meaning in life and totally disregard the possibility of outside meaning is also a selfish position. As a matter of fact, it is probably the more selfish position. So I know many materialist desire to be materialist because it does eliminate any responsibility outside of what the self defines as important.

I don't think one view is better than another due to these motivations. But as someone who is more interested in learning rather than preaching, it helps to understand the motivations of people of all views.
That's strange because, while I have seen many anti-materialists state that one of their reasons for opposition is a 'lack of meaning', I have NEVER seen a materialist claim that the support materialism as a vehicle for living a less than ethical life.
 
  • #643
Originally posted by Zero
That's strange because, while I have seen many anti-materialists state that one of their reasons for opposition is a 'lack of meaning', I have NEVER seen a materialist claim that the support materialism as a vehicle for living a less than ethical life.

Did I say "less than ethical"? If I did then it was a typo. Materialists may be highly ethical for all I know. But they have the luxury of choosing their own ethic. That was my only point.

But it doesn't just stop at ethics. All aspects of life can be determined by selfish desires and be consistent with materialism.

Also, you would expect the "more" selfish view to be more careful admitting the truth wouldn't you :smile:

But I hear materialist making these comments in a round-a-bout sort of way about their view all the time. Usually you can hear it in complaints about the consequences of the other view.
 
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  • #644
Originally posted by Fliption
Did I say "less than ethical"? If I did then it was a typo. Materialists may be highly ethical for all I know. But they have the luxury of choosing their own ethic. That was my only point.
EVERYONE chooses their own ethic...so what IS your point? And, if you could, make it quick so we don't go too far off-topic?:wink:
 
  • #645
Originally posted by Zero
EVERYONE chooses their own ethic...so what IS your point? And, if you could, make it quick so we don't go too far off-topic?:wink:

Techinically this is true. But a non-materialist has limits to how often they can change their view, unless they change to materialism. To get up and change ones view kind of waters down the whole premise of an outside meaning to life to begin with. Credibility is certainly at stake. A materialists however can get up each day and justify anything and maintain consistency with their world view.
 
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  • #646
Originally posted by Fliption
Techinically this is true. But a non-materialist has limits to how often they can change their view, unless they change to materialism. To get up and change ones view kind of waters down the whole premise of an outside meaning to life to begin with. Credibility is certainly at stake. A materialists however can get up each day and justify anything and maintain consistency with their world view.
I'm not buying it...you have an idealized view that suits you, but I don't think it reflects reality. Everyone can wake up every day and do as they please, even in the framework of a superstition-based worldview, and many people do.
 
  • #647
Originally posted by Zero
I'm not buying it...you have an idealized view that suits you, but I don't think it reflects reality. Everyone can wake up every day and do as they please, even in the framework of a superstition-based worldview, and many people do.

It is definitely true that if a person is going to hold that there is meaning in life beyond themselves then they are limited as to what they can claim from then on. All aspects of life must conform to that "meaning" if that persons lifestyle is going to be consistent with their beliefs(which is a big if). A materialist can justify anything and still be consistent with their beliefs. These are the facts. I wouldn't expect for you to "buy it" because it would mean you would have to refrain from the insulting comments to those that disagree with you.:wink:
 
  • #648
Going back to the real topic, I was thinking alittle bit about what Mentat and I have been discussing. And I'd like to ask a question to all the proclaimed materialists to illustrate a point.

My question is this..."What possible result from a scientific experiment would convince you that all things are not material?"

IOW, what would it take for you to change your mind? Be very specific please.
 
  • #649
Originally posted by Zero
How about you don't start with such a huge assumption? You assume that the body is separate from the personality, that a person resides in a body. I say a person is their body, there is no distinction.
This is really not an assumption at all, because if "I" didn't consciously tell my body what to do -- unless of course I were an automaton :wink: -- my body itself would not respond. Indeed, sometimes I feel like I'm just dragging my body around with me (more so when I'm tired). Therefore it's most appropritate to make the distinction between my conscious identity -- and hence my personality -- and, my physical body. And for anyone to suggest otherwise is totally absurd.

By the way, what happens when you fall asleep? Where do "you" go? Your body is still there, but obviously "you" are not. That is, until "you" (not your body) wake up and become consciously aware of your body laying there.

Whereas this is the very argument which is necessary to substantiate the fact that you have a soul. And, just as with the example given of the radio, the signals that it receives, is a separate medium from the radio itself. Which is to say, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
 
  • #650
Originally posted by Fliption
It is definitely true that if a person is going to hold that there is meaning in life beyond themselves then they are limited as to what they can claim from then on. All aspects of life must conform to that "meaning" if that persons lifestyle is going to be consistent with their beliefs(which is a big if). A materialist can justify anything and still be consistent with their beliefs. These are the facts. I wouldn't expect for you to "buy it" because it would mean you would have to refrain from the insulting comments to those that disagree with you.:wink:
You haven't seen insulting comments from me...check your PM inbox later. I'll say that everyone does what they want to, and leave it at that.
 
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