Is Apple's Argument Against Abortion Consistent with Other Ethical Stances?

[Smurf]

This is, as far as I can tell, a pretty solid argument against abortion.
Feedback? Flaws in reason? Alternative perspectives? It seems to me that the only way someone can accept abortion would be to accept many other (currently illegal) acts as perfectly ethical, or to be relativist, which I think most people here don't support.

http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/abortion/ab0045.html

 

[gerben]

As I see it his logical reasoning comes down to:
fetuses are person, killing persons is wrong, so abortion is wrong.
While this is a logical deduction, it does of course not justify his premises. Those are simply a matter of personal preference. Peter Kreeft adheres to the view that killing anything that he calls human is wrong, without any practical consideration. People that are pro-choice do consider pratical issues.

How is this solid reasoning?
"all humans have the right to life because all humans are human"

It seems to me that the only way someone can accept abortion would be to accept many other (currently illegal) acts as perfectly ethical, or to be relativist, which I think most people here don't support.

I do not understand this. Why can we not simply have the law state that abortion is legal, and also having it state that those "other (currently illegal) acts" are illegal?

 

[Psi 5]

Well, we do know what an apple is. But I didn't see him arguing that an apple seed is also an apple or that if you eat an apple seed it's the same as eating an apple. I also didn't see him arguing that if an apple is good, covering the whole planet with apple trees is that much better.

 

[Tisthammerw]

This is, as far as I can tell, a pretty solid argument against abortion.
Feedback? Flaws in reason? Alternative perspectives?

Simple. One simply denies the “scientific premise” that the fetus is a human, no more human than human cancer cells anyway.

 

[Tisthammerw]

As I see it his logical reasoning comes down to:
fetuses are person, killing persons is wrong, so abortion is wrong.
While this is a logical deduction, it does of course not justify his premises. Those are simply a matter of personal preference.

Are you an adherent of epistemological relativism? Otherwise your objection seems unsound (at least without further clarification). Truth is generally not a matter of taste—at least not in these cases.

Peter Kreeft adheres to the view that killing anything that he calls human is wrong, without any practical consideration. People that are pro-choice do consider pratical issues.
How is this solid reasoning?
"all humans have the right to life because all humans are human"
I do not understand this. Why can we not simply have the law state that abortion is legal, and also having it state that those "other (currently illegal) acts" are illegal?

Well, the author here assumes ethical (and epistemological) objectivism. Either the fetus is a human or it is not. If the fetus is a human, and if all humans have the right to life, then it logically follows that fetuses also have the right to life; and human laws cannot change that (regardless of what they consider to be practical).

 

[James R]

If the fetus is a human, and if all humans have the right to life, then it logically follows that fetuses also have the right to life; and human laws cannot change that (regardless of what they consider to be practical).

The argument is perfectly valid, but either premiss may be attacked. An opponent could argue either:

1. A fetus is not human, or not "fully human".

or

2. Not all humans have a right to life, or the same right to life.

Personally, I think (1) is silly. A fetus is genetically human, and nobody can really argue that, provided you define "human" as "having a complete set of human genes".

(2) is a perfectly valid argument, though. Most pro-lifers are not vegetarian. Why not? Why are they happy to eat a cow, but regard a human child as sacrosanct? It seems to me that many regard human life as inherently special, and accord special rights to humans just because humans are members of the species Homo sapiens. Cows do not have a special right to life, because they are of a different species. There appears to me to be no good ethical reason to make this distinction, but maybe you can think of one...

 

[selfAdjoint]

The argument is perfectly valid, but either premiss may be attacked. An opponent could argue either:

1. A fetus is not human, or not "fully human".

or

2. Not all humans have a right to life, or the same right to life.

Personally, I think (1) is silly. A fetus is genetically human, and nobody can really argue that, provided you define "human" as "having a complete set of human genes".

Ah, but ther's the rub. Why should possession of a certain set of genes be the test? Any stray skin cell, such as we shed all the time, has those genes. Does a single fertilized cell, a zygote, constitute a human being? If so then why not a swab from the inside of your cheek, which the doctors take for analysis of your genome?

 

[Tisthammerw]

The argument is perfectly valid, but either premiss may be attacked. An opponent could argue either:

1. A fetus is not human, or not "fully human".

or

2. Not all humans have a right to life, or the same right to life.

Personally, I think (1) is silly. A fetus is genetically human, and nobody can really argue that, provided you define "human" as "having a complete set of human genes".

(2) is a perfectly valid argument, though.

(2) is also dangerous, depending on how it is applied. Do Jews have the same right to life? Some people didn't think so. Who (if anyone) has the authority to decide such a matter here?

Most pro-lifers are not vegetarian. Why not? Why are they happy to eat a cow, but regard a human child as sacrosanct? It seems to me that many regard human life as inherently special, and accord special rights to humans just because humans are members of the species Homo sapiens. Cows do not have a special right to life, because they are of a different species. There appears to me to be no good ethical reason to make this distinction, but maybe you can think of one...

The idea that human life is “special” in the sense of having a right to exist is generally well accepted even among pro-choicers. One might question this belief, but to treat the killing of a human for food the same way as one would treat the killing of a cow for food does not seem reasonable. For whatever reason, there does seem to be some intrinsic value to human life (to me at least).

 

[Tisthammerw]

Ah, but ther's the rub. Why should possession of a certain set of genes be the test? Any stray skin cell, such as we shed all the time, has those genes. Does a single fertilized cell, a zygote, constitute a human being? If so then why not a swab from the inside of your cheek, which the doctors take for analysis of your genome?

Good point. So why is a fetus any different? The “ouch” point for many people is that (when given nourishment) the genetically complete human life form naturally develops to become an adult member of its species. Like newborn human children, preborn human children grow up. Killing such life forms thus makes some people uncomfortable.

 

[James R]

Tisthammerw:

(2) is also dangerous, depending on how it is applied. Do Jews have the same right to life? Some people didn't think so. Who (if anyone) has the authority to decide such a matter here?

It's not a matter of authority, so much as having a good argument, in an ideal world least. What distinguishes a Jewish adult from a non-Jewish adult? Is the distinction important? Now compare a general adult with a child. And what about intellectually disabled people? What about black vs. white?

The idea that human life is “special” in the sense of having a right to exist is generally well accepted even among pro-choicers.

You're right. A lot of pro-choicers have a long way to go in terms of an ethically consistent framework, but most don't have as far to go as pro-lifers, in my opinion.

One might question this belief, but to treat the killing of a human for food the same way as one would treat the killing of a cow for food does not seem reasonable.

Why? I suppose you are assuming the cow has less ability to feel pain or to reason, or has less "potential" to achieve great things. Are you? Is this really just disguised speciesism?

So why is a fetus any different? The “ouch” point for many people is that (when given nourishment) the genetically complete human life form naturally develops to become an adult member of its species.

What of intellectually disabled people? They don't have the same "potential" to be contributing members of society. Are they less valuable than fully cabable humans, or not? And is "potential" a good basis for judgement, anyway?

 

[loseyourname]

Ah, but ther's the rub. Why should possession of a certain set of genes be the test? Any stray skin cell, such as we shed all the time, has those genes. Does a single fertilized cell, a zygote, constitute a human being? If so then why not a swab from the inside of your cheek, which the doctors take for analysis of your genome?

The problem here is finding a cut-off point. Clearly a fetus does become a being that everyone agrees has rights at some point. Currently, we place that point at birth, but why? It acquires the ability to live independently of its mother before that, but it does not acquire its own bloodstream until after (when the umbilical cord is cut). It acquires sentience long before birth. The only major difference between a fetus directly before birth and a child directly after is that one breathes amniotic fluid and one breathes air. Maybe it's just me, but that doesn't seem like a good enough cut-off point.

Anyway, smurf, the hole in his argument is right here:

11. The argument from the nonexistence of nonpersons

Are persons a subclass of humans, or are humans a subclass of persons? The issue of distinguishing humans and persons comes up only for two reasons: the possibility that there are nonhuman persons, like extraterrestrials, elves, angels, gods, God, or the Persons of the Trinity, or the possibility that there are some nonpersonal humans, unpersons, humans without rights.

Traditional common sense and morality say all humans are persons and have rights. Modern moral relativism says that only some humans are persons, for only those who are given rights by others (i.e., those in power) have rights. Thus, if we have power, we can "depersonalize" any group we want: blacks, slaves, Jews, political enemies, liberals, fundamentalists — or unborn babies.

In answer to his initial question, persons are a separate class of entities from humans that most humans belong to. That is, there can be non-human persons, and there can be humans that aren't persons. Taking "person" to mean any entity worthy of all of the natural rights that we feel we are entitled to at birth, then there clearly are humans that are not persons. For instance, we almost universally agree that it is morally just to kill a man who is attempting to kill you. So a murderer, directly before his act of murder, can be considered to have forfeited certain of his rights and is no longer a person. We also have the case of humans that are brain-dead, probably the most obvious case of human non-persons with no rights other than to not be desecrated.

What we have to do is look at the reasoning behind why these humans are considered to have forfeited certain rights - specifically, their right to life, and then determine whether or not fetuses meet the criteria. In the case of murderers, they have forfeited their right to life by being a threat to another, otherwise innocent life. So, in the case where a fetus is a threat to its mother's life, most people will probably agree that it has no right to its own life. However, only a small number of fetuses fit this criterion. So let us move on to the case of the brain-dead.

In their case, there are two reasons why they are considered to be non-persons. The first is that they are not sentient, reasoning beings. If this was the only criterion, though, then any person that was unconscious would be a non-person, so there is a second reason. The second reason is that they have no chance of recovery; that is, they will never again be sentient, reasoning beings.

If we look at these cases, we can see that most fetuses do not fit these criteria. That is why, independent of all religious and political dogma, as well as legal concerns, looking at nothing but the morality of the act itself, I feel compelled to be pro-life, with the only exception being when a mother's life is threatened by the continued life of the fetus.

The only possible way I can really see to view abortion as morally acceptable is to take an act-utilitarian perspective. However, that requires us to rely on contingent future events to make the act morally acceptable. For instance, aborting the fetus may prevent its becoming a neglected, unwanted child that grows up to be a murderer, or some other morally equivalent situation that we could justifiably want to avoid. The problem is that we cannot know this is going to be the case, and I do not feel we are justified in taking a life because it might result in a better future.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

For instance, we almost universally agree that it is morally just to kill a man who is attempting to kill you. So a murderer, directly before his act of murder, can be considered to have forfeited certain of his rights and is no longer a person.
_______________________________________________

In their case, there are two reasons why they are considered to be non-persons. The first is that they are not sentient, reasoning beings. If this was the only criterion, though, then any person that was unconscious would be a non-person, so there is a second reason. The second reason is that they have no chance of recovery; that is, they will never again be sentient, reasoning beings.
_______________________________________________

The only possible way I can really see to view abortion as morally acceptable is to take an act-utilitarian perspective. However, that requires us to rely on contingent future events to make the act morally acceptable. For instance, aborting the fetus may prevent its becoming a neglected, unwanted child that grows up to be a murderer, or some other morally equivalent situation that we could justifiably want to avoid. The problem is that we cannot know this is going to be the case, and I do not feel we are justified in taking a life because it might result in a better future.

Consider the case of the muderer again in conjunction with conditions in your these other two examples.
At what point exactly does the murderer become a "nonperson"?
Is it contingent on future events?
Can the murderer "recover" from it's state of being a "nonperson"?

In the early stages of pregnancy could you consider the fetus insofar a "nonperson" with the ability to "recover" from this?

Just a couple of little kinks I see. I too often have a hard time with whether or not I agree that abortion is an ethical practice and just how to work out the logic.
Have you already considered and smoothed out these kinks yourself?

 

[gerben]

As I see it his logical reasoning comes down to:
fetuses are persons, killing persons is wrong, so abortion is wrong.
While this is a logical deduction, it does of course not justify his premises. Those are simply a matter of personal preference.

Are you an adherent of epistemological relativism? Otherwise your objection seems unsound (at least without further clarification). Truth is generally not a matter of taste—at least not in these cases.

I think both premises are not objective truths, but personal opinions that can be rejected or refined in many ways.

 

[gerben]

The only possible way I can really see to view abortion as morally acceptable is to take an act-utilitarian perspective. However, that requires us to rely on contingent future events to make the act morally acceptable. For instance, aborting the fetus may prevent its becoming a neglected, unwanted child that grows up to be a murderer, or some other morally equivalent situation that we could justifiably want to avoid. The problem is that we cannot know this is going to be the case, and I do not feel we are justified in taking a life because it might result in a better future.

How about the utilitarian perspective that the thing that is being killed will not notice being killed, and the persons that should make something of it are apparently not willing to do so? Nobody is hurt and some are helped.

 

[loseyourname]

How about the utilitarian perspective that the thing that is being killed will not notice being killed, and the persons that should make something of it are apparently not willing to do so? Nobody is hurt and some are helped.

Isn't that a pretty good argument for killing any homeless person in his sleep (particularly if he is a nuisance), just so long as no one who might care about him finds out?

 

[loseyourname]

Consider the case of the muderer again in conjunction with conditions in your these other two examples.
At what point exactly does the murderer become a "nonperson"?
Is it contingent on future events?

Yes, it is, and this is where morality becomes unfortunately very fuzzy. There is no way around the difficulty of this. In essence, we must rely on our own consciences to a large extent, some form of moral 'sense' that most people agree on. In the case of a potential murderer, we seem to generally agree that it is justified to kill him so long as it is reasonable to believe that he is a direct threat to your life that cannot be removed in any way other than killing him. For instance, if he is holding a gun to your head, or if he was attacking you with a knife and dropped it. Even in certain cases of domestic abuse, however, where it was determined that the woman had reasonable cause to believe that the husband would kill her if she outed him, she might be found innocent of murder. The line gets very fuzzy, but I would say that to deny personhood to a fetus on this basis, it must at least be the prognosis of a licensed pre-natal physician that the fetus constitutes a significant threat to the mother's life. What I mean by 'significant' I cannot say exactly (and part of the reason we leave certain legalese fuzzy in this way is to allow leeway for human judgement), but I insert because of the obvious fact that any fetus has the potential to kill a mother upon childbirth should something go wrong, but in the same way that the fact that your husband might someday make a bad decision on the road and kill you in a car accident does not justify killing him, this inherent danger in childbirth should not, by itself, justify the killing of the fetus.

Can the murderer "recover" from it's state of being a "nonperson"?

I don't really want to address full personhood here, but it is the case with law at least the a murderer regains his right to life at the point that he has finished committing his murder. In states with capital punishment, this right might again be forfeited upon his conviction, but you cannot simply kill him if he is no longer a direct, immediate threat to someone. Really, it is only this right to life that is being considered, and not full personhood, which a convicted murderer gives up even if he retains his right to live.

In the early stages of pregnancy could you consider the fetus insofar a "nonperson" with the ability to "recover" from this?

This is the 'cutoff line' I earlier referred to, and it's tough - maybe impossible - to answer this question. I have stated that I cannot see any good reason, whether legal or moral, to grant personhood upon birth, but that doesn't mean I know exactly at what point it should be granted. At conception? At the moment of first sentience? At the moment of first being able to reason? At the moment of first attaining a human morphology? It's easy for people to refer to it as nothing but a 'ball of cells,' but it ceases to be nothing but a ball of cells, and to be a sentient, human-shaped creature pretty quickly.

The way in which I personally solve this dilemma is to err on the side of caution. One isn't going to fire an uzi into a neighbor's house hoping that no one is home - or hoping that they are are irreparably comatose. By the same token, I don't think that we should be killing fetuses, hoping that they have not yet attained a state of moral personhood.

 

[russ_watters]

As I see it his logical reasoning comes down to:
fetuses are person, killing persons is wrong, so abortion is wrong.
While this is a logical deduction, it does of course not justify his premises. Those are simply a matter of personal preference.

From what I can tell, your interpretation of his argument is correct, but jeez - the way he presents it, most of it's just gibberish. He calls them 13 steps, but they aren't steps at all! They are mostly just separate arguments.

So I ask...

This is, as far as I can tell, a pretty solid argument against abortion.

Huh? It is? Can you explain it in your own words?

And I'm a little incredulous that a philosophy professor - even a deeply religious one - can make suck a basic error as to not mention the seed when comparing apples to humans and fetuses.

 

[russ_watters]

You're right. A lot of pro-choicers have a long way to go in terms of an ethically consistent framework, but most don't have as far to go as pro-lifers, in my opinion.

Interesting point. In here we can insist on logical arguments, but in the real world I tend to agree with you: the abortion debate has a lot of talking points, but precious little actual logic.

 

[Moonbear]

Well, we do know what an apple is. But I didn't see him arguing that an apple seed is also an apple or that if you eat an apple seed it's the same as eating an apple. I also didn't see him arguing that if an apple is good, covering the whole planet with apple trees is that much better.

This point got glossed over, but it is a big flaw in the logic. He's saying that because we know what an apple is, we must also know what a human is. But, he's overlooking that an apple is the fruit of the tree; it's the ovary containing the fertilized seeds, all of which have the potential, given the right conditions, to grow into new apple trees...technically, they contain the apple tree embryos. Yet, we do not call an apple seed an apple tree. We distinguish all of the different developmental stages, and even place different values on them. It would be rather insignificant if someone stole one apple from a tree, or ruined one apple, or destroyed the seeds of an apple (just minutes ago, I destroyed a bunch of apple seeds by sending them through the garbage disposal as I sat here and ate the apple; at no point do I expect anyone to accuse me of killing an apple tree for those actions). If someone were cultivating seedlings, it would be a greater offense to steal or destroy those seedlings, and an even greater offense to chop down the whole, mature, fruit-bearing tree.

 

[russ_watters]

A rebuttal: http://www.pcug.org.au/~dean/Kreeft/kreeft-apple.html

 

[3mpathy]

something that doesn't make sense is when the person says :

"In Case 2, where the fetus is a person and you don't know that, abortion is manslaughter. It's like driving over a man-shaped overcoat in the street at night or shooting toxic chemicals into a building that you're not sure is fully evacuated. You're not sure there is a person there, but you're not sure there isn't either, and it just so happens that there is a person there, and you kill him. You cannot plead ignorance. True, you didn't know there was a person there, but you didn't know there wasn't either, so your act was literally the height of irresponsibility. This is the act Roe allowed.

In Case 3, the fetus isn't a person, but you don't know that. So abortion is just as irresponsible as it is in the previous case. You ran over the overcoat or fumigated the building without knowing that there were no persons there. You were lucky; there weren't. But you didn't care; you didn't take care; you were just as irresponsible. You cannot legally be charged with manslaughter, since no man was slaughtered, but you can and should be charged with criminal negligence. "

he assumes that YOU, personaly don't know that abortion is wrong, not that you cannot prove that abortion is wrong, or that it cannot be known that abortion is wrong...but then he judges using the ideas that abortion is wrong. which doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me? anyone else see that?

 

[Tisthammerw]

I think both premises are not objective truths, but personal opinions that can be rejected or refined in many ways.

Am I understanding you correctly? Are you saying that whether or not a fetus is a person is not an objective truth?

 

[Tisthammerw]

he assumes that YOU, personaly don't know that abortion is wrong, not that you cannot prove that abortion is wrong, or that it cannot be known that abortion is wrong...but then he judges using the ideas that abortion is wrong. which doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me? anyone else see that?

In think you misunderstood him. Looking at the list again:

• The fetus is a person, and we know that;
• The fetus is a person, but we don't know that [i.e. if asked if a fetus is a person one honestly replies “I don’t know”];
• The fetus isn't a person, but we don't know that [i.e. if asked if a fetus is a person one honestly replies “I don’t know”];
• The fetus isn't a person, and we know that.

When he refers to the list he uses “you” instead of “we,” probably just to instantiate the situation. That is, he does it from the point of view of you doing the abortion, as is suggested from when he says, “In Case 1, where the fetus is a person and you know that, abortion is murder. First-degree murder, in fact. You deliberately kill an innocent human being.” His logic here is valid for each scenario. Only in the last item in the list (the fetus is a person, and we know that) can one be morally justified in doing an abortion. If we honestly don’t know whether an abortion kills a person, the best thing (logically and morally) would be to err on the side of caution.

Of course, most pro-choicers (I hope) honestly believe that the fetus is a nonperson.

 

[Tisthammerw]

Tisthammerw:

(2) is also dangerous, depending on how it is applied. Do Jews have the same right to life? Some people didn't think so. Who (if anyone) has the authority to decide such a matter here?

It's not a matter of authority, so much as having a good argument, in an ideal world least.

But then again, a lot of Nazis thought they had a good argument too.

One might question this belief, but to treat the killing of a human for food the same way as one would treat the killing of a cow for food does not seem reasonable.

Why? I suppose you are assuming the cow has less ability to feel pain or to reason, or has less "potential" to achieve great things. Are you? Is this really just disguised speciesism?

You bring up a good point, but at best this would argue for vegetarianism, not for the legalization of murder.

So why is a fetus any different? The “ouch” point for many people is that (when given nourishment) the genetically complete human life form naturally develops to become an adult member of its species.

What of intellectually disabled people?

They can still grow up to be adult members of their species.

And is "potential" a good basis for judgement, anyway?

Sort of. It's really not potential per se but the nature of the organism itself. Think of it this way: why allow a human newborn to live? It has no more intelligence then my pet cat, nor can it contribute much to society etc. Yet the fact is we have a life form with human DNA (genetically complete) that grows up to be an adult member of its species. So the life form is a person, even if the life form is not fully developed yet. To the very least it's a consistent set of criteria, arguably less arbitrary than the birth criterion.

 

[Evo]

In think you misunderstood him. Looking at the list again:

• The fetus is a person, and we know that;
• The fetus is a person, but we don't know that [i.e. if asked if a fetus is a person one honestly replies “I don’t know”];
• The fetus isn't a person, but we don't know that [i.e. if asked if a fetus is a person one honestly replies “I don’t know”];
• The fetus isn't a person, and we know that.

When he refers to the list he uses “you” instead of “we,” probably just to instantiate the situation. That is, he does it from the point of view of you doing the abortion, as is suggested from when he says, “In Case 1, where the fetus is a person and you know that, abortion is murder. First-degree murder, in fact. You deliberately kill an innocent human being.” His logic here is valid for each scenario. Only in the last item in the list (the fetus is a person, and we know that) can one be morally justified in doing an abortion. If we honestly don’t know whether an abortion kills a person, the best thing (logically and morally) would be to err on the side of caution.
Of course, most pro-choicers (I hope) honestly believe that the fetus is a nonperson.

Are you aware that early first trimester abortions do not abort a fetus? So, you are only opposed to later term abortions after it becomes a fetus? Because I am assuming you know enough basic biology to understand that.

 

[Tisthammerw]

Are you aware that early first trimester abortions do not abort a fetus? So, you are only opposed to later term abortions after it becomes a fetus? Because I am assuming you know enough basic biology to understand that.

Yes, I too sometimes nitpick the fact that—in abortion debates—the term “fetus” is often referred to a preborn child at any stage of the pregnancy, even though technically the term refers to the preborn child in the last two trimesters.

Nonetheless, if you prefer I can use the term “preborn child.” I used the term “fetus” because that term is more politically correct. That, perhaps, was a mistake.

Out of curiosity, what term do you use?
[Edit: added that last question]

 

[Evo]

Yes, I too sometimes nitpick the fact that—in abortion debates—the term “fetus” is often referred to a preborn child at any stage of the pregnancy, even though technically the term refers to the preborn child in the last two trimesters.
Nonetheless, if you prefer I can use the term “preborn child.” I used the term “fetus” because that term is more politically correct. That, perhaps, was a mistake.
Out of curiosity, what term do you use?
[Edit: added that last question]

I use the biologically correct term.

 

[Tisthammerw]

Yes, I too sometimes nitpick the fact that—in abortion debates—the term “fetus” is often referred to a preborn child at any stage of the pregnancy, even though technically the term refers to the preborn child in the last two trimesters.

Nonetheless, if you prefer I can use the term “preborn child.” I used the term “fetus” because that term is more politically correct. That, perhaps, was a mistake.

Out of curiosity, what term do you use?
[Edit: added that last question]

I use the biologically correct term.

Care to be a bit more specific? What is the biologically correct term to refer to a preborn child at any stage during the pregnancy? It isn't fetus, since that only applies to the 9th week on. Nor is it embryo, for that only refers to the period between implantation to the end of the 8th week. Nor is it zygote, for that only refers to the fertilized egg in the first ten days or so (the end of the zygote period is the implantation).

 

[gerben]

How about the utilitarian perspective that the thing that is being killed will not notice being killed, and the persons that should make something of it are apparently not willing to do so? Nobody is hurt and some are helped.

Isn't that a pretty good argument for killing any homeless person in his sleep (particularly if he is a nuisance), just so long as no one who might care about him finds out?

No, a law that would allow killing sleeping people would make us all afraid to sleep.

 

[loseyourname]

No, a law that would allow killing sleeping people would make us all afraid to sleep.

Yes, that is a good argument against such a law. That doesn't mean that you didn't previously make a good argument for such a law. Examine your reasoning:

How about the utilitarian perspective that the thing that is being killed will not notice being killed, and the persons that should make something of it are apparently not willing to do so? Nobody is hurt and some are helped.

A sleeping person will not notice being killed, and if no one knows him, then no one will make something of it. Nobody is hurt, and if the man was a nuisance, removing him will help some people. If your argument is applied, these facts mean that the murder of an unknown homeless nuisance is morally acceptable.

 

[Smurf]

That is of course, only an act-utilitarian perspective. The rule-utilitarian would recognize that it would make people afraid to sleep and would say that it it's self is inethical.

One thing really bothers me about this debate:

What we have to do is look at the reasoning behind why these humans are considered to have forfeited certain rights

Nobody "forfeits" their rights. Everyone is always a person.

For self defence what we say is that killing your attacked was justified because if you didn't he would have killed you. We don't say that in attacking you he'd forfeited his rights and is now to be considered a plant. Then we would have no use for the term justice because we don't need to be justified to uproot a tomato.

Bad analogy.

When a murderer kills someone he still has rights. He still has the right to be read his rights, he still has the right to a fair and speedy trial and he still has the right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment. If you kill a murderer you yourself will be charged, because that murderer is still a "person" and murdering him was wrong. As you will still be a person after murdering him as well.

A person does not forfeit rights, we merely justify violating them in accordance with law. Thus, this discussion about a fetus should, it seems to me, be about whether we can justify abortion and not whether a pre-born child in any stage of development has rights.

 

[Moonbear]

Care to be a bit more specific? What is the biologically correct term to refer to a preborn child at any stage during the pregnancy? It isn't fetus, since that only applies to the 9th week on. Nor is it embryo, for that only refers to the period between implantation to the end of the 8th week. Nor is it zygote, for that only refers to the fertilized egg in the first ten days or so (the end of the zygote period is the implantation).

The correct biological term that would apply to any stage from fertilization to birth is conceptus.

Sort of. It's really not potential per se but the nature of the organism itself. Think of it this way: why allow a human newborn to live? It has no more intelligence then my pet cat, nor can it contribute much to society etc. Yet the fact is we have a life form with human DNA (genetically complete) that grows up to be an adult member of its species. So the life form is a person, even if the life form is not fully developed yet. To the very least it's a consistent set of criteria, arguably less arbitrary than the birth criterion.

I'm going to throw a new wrench into the discussion on this point. Currently, at least in some species, we have the ability to use somatic cells to produce clones (i.e., Dolly the sheep). Yes, it's currently inefficient, imperfect, and we still need an oocyte to accomplish it (though, the nucleus is removed, so all of the genetic material comes from the somatic cell). However, as technology progresses, it's quite possible given the current status of this research that the necessary factors in an oocyte for conferring totipotency can be isolated and identified and a somatic cell treated with those without need for any gametes. Regardless of whether we ever choose to use such technology, hypothetically speaking, if it became possible to use it, then any cell in your body would have the potential of being used to make a clone. We all know that Dolly was cloned from a mammary cell; would that mean that no woman could ever get a mastectomy, even if she would otherwise die of breast cancer, because all of the remaining healthy tissue being removed that surrounds the cancer would have the potential of being another person?

There are some who do not draw the line at fertilized cells, but consider gametes equally special for consideration of potential (those who oppose birth control); does that mean a woman should also never be permitted to have a hysterectomy with oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries), even if she has ovarian cancer? What if the cancer is only in one ovary? Should she risk it spreading to the other by not removing it because of the potential of all the oocytes in it?

In other words, the term "potential" is very ambiguous. We are now approaching the level of technology where one could argue any cell in your body has "potential" to be another person. Thus, it becomes more important to distinguish a more concrete property of the conceptus (or of specific stages, zygote, embryo, fetus), that makes it unique or special from any other cell in a woman's body.

I would argue a consistent line be drawn at the beginning of life as for the end of life. That line would be the time at which life can be sustained independently of outside support of the circulatory and respiratory systems, two functions that are internally regulated and without which, survival cannot occur. This would not mean you couldn't choose to provide these supportive measures, either via the placenta/umbilical cord or via heart/lung machines, but it would mean it is not murder nor ethically/morally wrong to not provide that support and to instead allow the natural process of brain death to follow. The same conditions would apply to someone choosing to suspend life support for a prematurely born infant as for a terminally ill adult, as for a conceptus still dependent upon maternal circulation. Any other criterion that allows for technological intervention and consideration of "potential" would be subjective relative to the current status of technology, thus is an insufficient criterion. Something either is or is not a person, and the term "potential person," by definition, means something is not a person.

By the way, such a criterion would also eliminate the need to draw artificial lines based on time of gestation for when it is too late to have an abortion. If a fetus is removed from the woman's body and does not require life support to survive, it can be called a baby and conferred with all the rights of personhood. This would generally apply to third trimester pregnancies, and the possibility of viability independent of technological intervention during this trimester is one of the reasons it is legally treated differently from the first two trimesters. Such a test of requiring the fetus to be delivered to determine viability if abortion is sought in the third trimester (or if the fetus is determined in advance to be sufficiently developed that it is highly likely it will be viable independent of technological intervention), would not be inconsistent with even the majority of pro-choice proponents views, mainly because an abortion for any other reason than threat to the life of the woman or discovery of severe developmental abnormalities is a decision usually made well before the third trimester, and if a woman's life is at risk if she continues the pregnancy, it's hard to imagine a scenario where she wouldn't want the option to try to save the baby if possible; likewise, if severe developmental abnormalities are at issue, the survivability of the removed fetus would be unlikely as such decisions that late in pregnancy are usually made because the survivability of an infant with those abnormalities is slim to none.

Another consideration if we use the "potential" argument rather than a viability without technological intervention argument, or if we make the case that viability with technological intervention should be considered, then to what extent are we obligated to provide technological intervention to sustain a miscarried conceptus? If a conceptus is considered a person from the earliest stage of development, and a woman miscarries in the first trimester, do we need to attempt to implant the embryo into another surrogate? What would make a miscarried conceptus different from an aborted conceptus? A miscarriage can occur due to a problem with the conceptus or with the woman's reproductive system, thus it is not always the case that miscarriage implies the conceptus has no potential per se, but that the woman carrying that conceptus has something wrong with the way her body functions in supporting a pregnancy. Thus, again, the only way to make this distinction would be to use the criterion of viable without technological intervention. I further specify respiratory and cardiovascular support as the deciding intervention, because those are the systems that distribute oxygen and nourishment to all the other tissues of the body, and without which, brain death is imminent (brain death being the generally accepted criterion for the end of personhood). This also errs on the side of caution of not excluding medical interventions that may not be immediately necessary for maintaining life, but may extend lifespan or improve quality of life, such as high blood pressure medication or insulin for diabetics. I know I would balk at a criterion that would allow me to declare a diabetic a non-person, although one might also argue that we are under no obligation to force a diabetic to use their insulin or monitor their blood sugar. Nonetheless, none of these other medical interventions is immediately necessary to avoid brain death.

This criterion is then consistent from fertilization through adulthood, regardless of whether we are talking about an entire organism or a few cells. This criterion also does not require that life support be withheld, it only specifies that one is not morally obligated to provide life support. This leaves the question of "Is there a time when it is wrong to provide life support/keep a person alive?" as a separate issue.

 

[loseyourname]

A person does not forfeit rights, we merely justify violating them in accordance with law. Thus, this discussion about a fetus should, it seems to me, be about whether we can justify abortion and not whether a pre-born child in any stage of development has rights.

Then you can mentally change every time I've used that wording, because it does not make any difference to the argument itself, which simply aims to get at why we sometimes find it acceptable to kill human beings (whether we say he 'forfeited his right to life' or that it is simply 'just' to kill him). If a fetus fits these criteria, then abortion is probably justified. If it does not, then abortion is probably not justified.

 

[loseyourname]

There are some who do not draw the line at fertilized cells, but consider gametes equally special for consideration of potential (those who oppose birth control); does that mean a woman should also never be permitted to have a hysterectomy with oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries), even if she has ovarian cancer? What if the cancer is only in one ovary? Should she risk it spreading to the other by not removing it because of the potential of all the oocytes in it?

Thankfully, I don't think we need to address such fringe people here. I think we can all agree that something is flawed about a moral stance that would equate masturbation with several billion murders.

In other words, the term "potential" is very ambiguous. We are now approaching the level of technology where one could argue any cell in your body has "potential" to be another person. Thus, it becomes more important to distinguish a more concrete property of the conceptus (or of specific stages, zygote, embryo, fetus), that makes it unique or special from any other cell in a woman's body.

The more concrete property (though this does not necessarily give it any added moral consideration) is that the conceptus is actually in the process of becoming a fully-grown human.

I would argue a consistent line be drawn at the beginning of life as for the end of life. That line would be the time at which life can be sustained independently of outside support of the circulatory and respiratory systems, two functions that are internally regulated and without which, survival cannot occur. This would not mean you couldn't choose to provide these supportive measures, either via the placenta/umbilical cord or via heart/lung machines, but it would mean it is not murder nor ethically/morally wrong to not provide that support and to instead allow the natural process of brain death to follow.

While you are not being philosophically rigorous and providing any moral justification for drawing the line at this point, I do think you are least taking a step in the right direction. And you are addressing the right problem - where do you we draw the line? It should be clear to anyone that seriously considers it that birth is almost completely arbitrary and has no justification as a cutoff point. The one problem I would find with your proposed cutoff point is that it doesn't seem to cover cases of higher-brain death, wherein a patient still retains all of their autonomic musculatory functions, but (as far as we can tell) loses sentience. The Schiavo case is a good example of that. Most people would agree that if her ability to feel and think and to have a personality is permanently gone, then her life should be ended, even if she could still maintain a heartbeat and breathe. The debate was about whether or not she was actually in such a state.

 

[Smurf]

Thankfully, I don't think we need to address such fringe people here. I think we can all agree that something is flawed about a moral stance that would equate masturbation with several billion murders.

Only several billion?
Regardless, given the life span of a sperm and the very small chance of a sperm actually impregnating a woman I think that that position is indeed meritless (on the same premises).

Also, a sperm doesn't even fit the criteria for life, let alone a human. It doesn't reproduce, it doesn't grow, it doesn't feed, it doesn't excrete, ect.

As for female masturbation.. well, the egg it's self is not at all involved, so that's an obviouse "Whatever".