Is Consciousness Beyond Physical Explanation?

[Hurkyl]

Note that we're not talking about explaining the configuration or physical state of the brain - that's not good enough.

We use fluid dynamics to describe the behavior of gases. However, we also have the kinematic description of gases as being a big collection of molecules bouncing around.

How analogous is this to what you vision dualism as?

 

[Hurkyl]

Qualia aren't explained by explaining the physical process.

Insert standard charge of "explaining" as a loaded term.


What follows seems more like a denial of the standard methods of analysis and synthesis than actually arguing any particular point.

There is no need to resort to describing qualia when describing a physical process.

Whether true or not, what is the point of this assertion? (it is a little awkward -- maybe what was said isn't what was meant?)

For example, the fact we can talk about frequencies and superpositions of photons without referring to subjective human experiences does not imply it is useless to do so. In fact, it is particularly useful when applied to the task of designing televisions and computer monitors. And it is useful studying both from the bottom-up (doing the physics and chemistry to predict how combinations of photons will trigger cones and rods to produce visual experiences) and from the top-down, using human feedback to validate and calibrate models for producing color.

Furthermore, describing the physical process leaves something out.

Why?

This charge is levied against all sorts of analyses. Most of the time, it comes from people who have made no attempt to connect the analysis to an understanding of what is being analyzed. Should I think differently of this particular charge?

Why should any physical process be accompanied by an experience of it?

A fairly meaningless question. You might as well ask "Why should electrons repulse each other?"

And why only certain physical processes?

Or "why isn't mass attracted to electric charge?"

if the process is merely a physical one, how can qualia be reported at all? (see Knowledge Paradox as discussed earlier in one of my posts).

Fairly easily, if qualia are a physical process.

 

[Pythagorean]

RR8--6aq4hk[/youtube]

 

[Q_Goest]

We use fluid dynamics to describe the behavior of gases. However, we also have the kinematic description of gases as being a big collection of molecules bouncing around.

How analogous is this to what you vision dualism as?

The analogy doesn't hold. Both descriptions are descriptions of the dynamics of 'stuff' whether that stuff be modeled as balls bouncing around, Navier Stokes equations, or some other description. They are all objectively verifiable descriptions of a phenomenon that can be described in various ways.

The wing flutter example is the same, it can be described in various ways (at the molecular level or at much higher levels).

 

[Hurkyl]

The analogy doesn't hold.

What aspect of your argument for dualism fails to apply to the kinematic description of gas? Or to the case of wing flutter? What, aside from the conclusion, is different, and what is the same?

 

[Q_Goest]

Most of the objections to dualism here tend toward an appeal to new physics. We’d like to think there is a physical explanation for everything. Conscious experience however, is the only phenomenon I’m aware of that resists any reductive explanation. Rather than explain again in my own words, I’ll use those of David Chalmers:

Sometimes it is held that the key to the explanation of consciousness may lie in a new sort of physical theory. Perhaps, in arguing that consciousness is not entailed by the physics of our world, we have been tacitly assuming that the physics of our world is something like physics as we understand it today, consisting in an arrangement of particles and fields in the spatiotemporal manifold, undergoing complex processes of causation and evolution. An opponent might agree that nothing in this sort of physics entails the existence of consciousness, but argue that there might be a new kind of physical theory from which consciousness falls out as a consequence.

It is not easy to evaluate this claim in the absence of any detailed proposal. One would at least like to see an example of how such a new physics might possibly go. Such an example need not be plausible in the light of current theories, but there would have to be a sense in which it would recognizably be physics. The crucial question is: How could a theory that is recognizably a physical theory entail the existence of consciousness? If such a theory consists in a description of the structure and dynamics of fields, waves, particles, and the like, then all the usual problems will apply. And it is unclear that any sort of physical theory could be different enough from this to avoid the problems.

The trouble is that the basic elements of physical theories seem always to come down to two things: the structure and dynamics of physical processes. Different theories invoke different sorts of structure. Newtonian physics invokes a Euclidean space-time; relativity theory invokes a non-Euclidean differential manifold; quantum theory invokes a Hilbert space for wave functions. And different theories invoke different kinds of dynamics within those structures: Newton’s laws, the principles of relativity, the wave equations of quantum mechanics. But from structure and dynamics, we can only get more structure and dynamics. This allows the possibility of satisfying explanations of all sorts of high-level structural and functional properties, but conscious experience will remain untouched. No set of facts about physical structure and dynamics can add up to a fact about phenomenology.

Chalmers, “The Conscious Mind” pg. 118

 

[Q_Goest]

What aspect of ... dualism fails to apply to the kinematic description of gas? Or to the case of wing flutter? What, aside from the conclusion, is different, and what is the same?

I think what you're asking is, why isn't phenomenal experience analogous to pressure or temperature of a gas or wing flutter in the same sense as a description of the physical state of a brain analogous to the description of the physical state of the molecules - in the gas; or the air flowing over the wing and molecules in the wing of an aircraft? Why isn't phenomenal experience just a 'shorthand' way of describing a brain's physical state? If that's your question, the answer below applies.

In short, it is taken as fact that phenomenal experience is subjective and not objective. Qualia are not phenomena that can be measured objectively. If you have nothing to measure other than the physical states of material things, we have everything we need to produce various descriptions of nature at various levels (such as descriptions of gases like pressure or temperature; or wing flutter), but nothing to describe that which we can't measure. The property of what we experience when we experience the color red for example, is not a property of some wavelength of light that's being captured by our eye. Red isn't a property of stop signs or fire trucks. It is a property that our brain creates that is not objectively measurable. Sure, we can claim it corresponds to a given physical configuration, but we can't claim that the physical configuration thus described (in any way we want to describe it) will give us even a glimmer of hope in understanding what the property of red is that we experience. We can't reduce qualia to the physical constituents on which the experience is had (on which it supervenes).

 

[chaoseverlasting]

As far as the experience of it goes, you've been subjected to a wide variety of experiences over the course of your life, ever since you were an infant. The various experiences and the reactions that you've had to them have been categorized in your brain. So, whenever you have an experience that is similar to one you've already had, it is easier for you to categorize it. On that basis, you can explain observations like the color red, what you think of music, the taste of the foods you like etc.

I think, the only thing that you can not explain on purely physical phenomena is creativity and the origin of ideas and the miracle of life. There is a boundary beyond which science is slightly helpless, but it isn't restricted by the experiences you have.

 

[Hurkyl]

I think what you're asking is, why isn't phenomenal experience analogous to pressure or temperature of a gas ...

That is not my question. I'm not asking about arguments that have dualism as a hypothesis -- I'm asking about arguments that have dualism as a conclusion.

Why, for example, doesn't one insist that reducing a gas to a physical arrangement of molecules leaves something out, or rhetorically ask "Why should an arrangement of molecules be accompanied by fluid behavior?"

The cynical answer is that the kinetic theory of gas has been "finished', but the "reductive explanation" of consciousness is still in progress.

You asserted that consciousness "resists reductive explanation" -- without assuming that as an axiom, how does one defend that position against progress in research into the brain?

 

[Pythagorean]

We don't really understand the nature of anything. We accept it, we are raised into it, we make use of how things are, but it doesn't mean we've understood their nature.

Take Quantum Mechanics. None of us... even those of us that have taken the classes and digested the applications and manifestations of it... none of us understand it. We have accepted it. We shrug now, as the familiarity trigger switches in our brain.. "oh, I've heard about this before." We may even take up work or research that deals heavily with the mechanisms of quantum mechanics. We get an intuition for the mechanics of what is. We construct our own emotional bond (and interpretation) of the "what is", each of us individually, and we know it. But this hasn't brought us any closer to understanding the nature of it, we have only been desensitized to how things are.

But my question to dualists is why? Why in Cthulh's name does it matter whether it's physical or not? What is it that's so restricting and containing about physical systems that our minds somehow shouldn't/couldn't be governed by them? This isn't reasonable at all. It's already been demonstrated to us how bizarre and majestic the physical reality is. Realtivity, Qauntum Mechanics... Life itself! So what's the reason to start looking outside of the physical reality when a) we don't even completely understand it b) it's proven to be the only agent of action, change, and existence in the known universe. Occam's razor.

 

[Ferris_bg]

I think, the only thing that you can not explain on purely physical phenomena is creativity and the origin of ideas and the miracle of life.

Trial and error.

We can't reduce qualia to the physical constituents on which the experience is had (on which it supervenes).

Take one conscious entity, stop time, copy it. Now you have two entities with identical qualia. Run time - not any more. Their different experiences contribute in different way to their qualia.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

We can't reduce qualia to the physical constituents on which the experience is had (on which it supervenes).

I can never know exactly what other people experience when they say "I see red". I assume their experience is very similar to mine because we are built pretty much in the same way. We can reduce this question to the hopeless philosophical muddle of "Do I know anyone else even exists?"

What does a dog experience when it sees a red light? Dogs are color blind, so they won't have the same experience a non-color blind human has. Color blindness can be explained in neurophysiological terms. Where's the dualism? Qualia are personal. We would need to inhabit every sentient creature in the universe to know how the color red is experienced in individuals. So why even talk about "dualism"? It's really a hopeless "polyism".

EDIT: There are ways to evaluate color perceptions in relative terms, such that orange is "closer" to red than blue. However 'red' cannot be described to a person who was born blind. If an alien being sensed a very different part of the electromagnetic spectrum then humans, how could we ever imagine that experience? It's a hopeless question. Why even ask?

 

[sganesh88]

You asserted that consciousness "resists reductive explanation" -- without assuming that as an axiom, how does one defend that position against progress in research into the brain?

So the non-dualist's take is that everything about them is controlled by laws. Two people conversing excitedly about the bizarreness of quantum mechanics or Life are like two systems exchanging files. When a person sees his father hit by a speeding car, the emotion and the sadness he experiences is analogous, if not exactly same as, a pc whining "Battery low!".

Laws can control the sensations i perceive but not my response to them. Everyone could be seeing the same thing, say a truck going down the road. but it is my consciousness, or rather ME, that contemplates and pictures the rolling motion of those wheels as continuous toppling(i did automobile engineering), smile at it for a moment and continue driving the other way.

My senses could give me the sight of mountains and rivers. It is ME, who decides to sit down, take in the moment; experience and cherish it. Of course, there could be opposing signals from the brain-
"ah we have seen these mountains all these years. Step on the gas pedal. speed up dude!" "Wheels, toppling,.. hell! Let's think about the girl we saw yesterday. her curvy hips,pouted lips.. and those beautiful pair of.."
"Shut up-!" that's ME.

The Shut up is not bound by any laws. Its plain ME. Like you don't have any reason for a single atomic particle undergoing radioactive decay, like you can't say through which slit the photon came, here I AM! and my "Shut up!"
Call it dualism or whatever.
On a side note, the girl did indeed have a beautiful pair.. of eyes!

 

[proof]

So the non-dualist's take is that everything about them is controlled by laws. Two people conversing excitedly about the bizarreness of quantum mechanics or Life are like two systems exchanging files. When a person sees his father hit by a speeding car, the emotion and the sadness he experiences is analogous, if not exactly same as, a pc whining "Battery low!".

Laws can control the sensations i perceive but not my response to them. Everyone could be seeing the same thing, say a truck going down the road. but it is my consciousness, or rather ME, that contemplates and pictures the rolling motion of those wheels as continuous toppling(i did automobile engineering), smile at it for a moment and continue driving the other way.

My senses could give me the sight of mountains and rivers. It is ME, who decides to sit down, take in the moment; experience and cherish it. Of course, there could be opposing signals from the brain-
"ah we have seen these mountains all these years. Step on the gas pedal. speed up dude!" "Wheels, toppling,.. hell! Let's think about the girl we saw yesterday. her curvy hips,pouted lips.. and those beautiful pair of.."
"Shut up-!" that's ME.

The Shut up is not bound by any laws. Its plain ME. Like you don't have any reason for a single atomic particle undergoing radioactive decay, like you can't say through which slit the photon came, here I AM! and my "Shut up!"
Call it dualism or whatever.
On a side note, the girl did indeed have a beautiful pair.. of eyes!

the "ME" you talk about is your mind and your mind is made up of physical matter. your reaction to the truck going down the road, the mountains, and the rivers, are determined by your genetics and your environmental conditioning, and both are controlled by physical laws.

 

[Upisoft]

Like you don't have any reason for a single atomic particle undergoing radioactive decay, like you can't say through which slit the photon came, here I AM! and my "Shut up!"

"Die!" said the VIRUS. It was the VIRUS, not its RNA.

 

[Q_Goest]

That is not my question. I'm not asking about arguments that have dualism as a hypothesis -- I'm asking about arguments that have dualism as a conclusion.

Why, for example, doesn't one insist that reducing a gas to a physical arrangement of molecules leaves something out, or rhetorically ask "Why should an arrangement of molecules be accompanied by fluid behavior?"

The cynical answer is that the kinetic theory of gas has been "finished', but the "reductive explanation" of consciousness is still in progress.

You asserted that consciousness "resists reductive explanation" -- without assuming that as an axiom, how does one defend that position against progress in research into the brain?

The fundamental idea behind what a physical theory is, is nicely explained by Chalmers in my last post. Any such theory regarding the structure and dynamics of physical processes is objectively measurable.

Clearly, phenomenal experience, qualia for example, are not objectively measurable. If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia. Note that this is not a description of the "structural dynamics" on which the phenomena supervene, it is a description of the qualia or phenomenal experience. In other words, we need a way to compare one instance of qualia with another such as an ability to compare one person's experience of the color red with another person's experience of it. We need a measure of some sort, but the best we can do is provide a measurement of the structure and dynamics of the objectively measurable physical processes.

If a phenomenon is not objectively measurable, it is not quantifiable. If it is not quantifiable, we can't create a physical theory of it. Note also that physical theories are all describable using mathematics, but without an ability to quantify the phenomenon we can't use mathematics to describe the phenomenon. Without a mathematical description, we have only a qualitative description. If all we have is a qualitative description, and making the assumption of the causal closure of the physical, we don’t even have a way of verifying this qualitative description per the Knowledge paradox.

It would seem that calling phenomenal experience a physical phenomenon is based solely on there being a physical substrate. Even dualism doesn't reject this basic premise. But to catagorize phenomenal experience as a physical phenomenon is to place it in the same category as the kinetic theory of gasses, or to call it a phenomenon analogous to wing flutter. Without a physical theory to quantifiably describe conscious phenomena, calling it physical might be considered a catagorical error, thus dualism.

 

[Q_Goest]

I think the idea of a zombie is flawed. The closest thing to a zombie is somebody that is dead (they have all the brain matter, but no thought process). But they're still not a zombie, because there's definitely a physical difference (in terms of events and interactions) between a live and dead person.

Why should the concept of a p-zombie be flawed? In my view it is perfectly logical. A zombie is simply the physical process less the phenomenal experience.

If things are measurable in a consistent way, they have a physical basis. If they're not... then we're pretty much screwed on understanding it.

I agree it’s tough to understand how we might incorporate consciousness into a physical description of the world. If mental phenomena have a causal influence over the physical, we might not be screwed but it might be a bit difficult to reconcile.

 

[Upisoft]

Clearly, phenomenal experience, qualia for example, are not objectively measurable. If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia. Note that this is not a description of the "structural dynamics" on which the phenomena supervene, it is a description of the qualia or phenomenal experience. In other words, we need a way to compare one instance of qualia with another such as an ability to compare one person's experience of the color red with another person's experience of it. We need a measure of some sort, but the best we can do is provide a measurement of the structure and dynamics of the objectively measurable physical processes.

Fascinating.

How one makes objective measurement? Let's say you have a battery and you want to measure objectively its voltage. You get a multimeter, connect it to the battery and there it is, it shows 1.48V. Then you realize that the multimeter can be malfunctioning, so you decide to repeat your measurement with another multimeter. It shows 1.47V. You decide that you have made objective measurement.

But did you look inside your multimeters? They are quite different. One of them is digital and the other is analog. They have "experienced" the measurement quite differently. Their "qualia" is different. Did you care? No.

Then why try to do that with us? What you care is the objective measurement, which is "red". How the measurement is done is of no consequence to the objectivity of that fact.

 

[Math Is Hard]

Fascinating.

How one makes objective measurement? Let's say you have a battery and you want to measure objectively its voltage. You get a multimeter, connect it to the battery and there it is, it shows 1.48V. Then you realize that the multimeter can be malfunctioning, so you decide to repeat your measurement with another multimeter. It shows 1.47V. You decide that you have made objective measurement.

But did you look inside your multimeters? They are quite different. One of them is digital and the other is analog. They have "experienced" the measurement quite differently. Their "qualia" is different. Did you care? No.

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and respresentations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.

Then why try to do that with us? What you care is the objective measurement, which is "red". How the measurement is done is of no consequence to the objectivity of that fact.

There can be an objective measurement of the properties of red, specifically as a wavelength range of visible light. But the "experience of red" still falls into the subjective.

 

[Upisoft]

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and respresentations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.There can be an objective measurement of the properties of red, specifically as a wavelength range of visible light. But the "experience of red" still falls into the subjective.

I didn't say there are unobservable mental events. Nor the events in analog and digital multimeters are unobservable. If you want to study and understand the digital multimeter you don't get the Analog Electronics textbook. The same is valid for us. If you want to understand what is going in someone's head you don't compare it with something else. Even if that something else is quite similar. The best you can get is to find the parts that perform similar functions. But still, how they perform these functions could be quite different in the details.

 

[Hurkyl]

If anyone disputes this, they have to explain how in principal, one might be able to objectively measure qualia.

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation. They will stop at red lights and follow the red line marked on floors when asked. That tells us nothing about what they "see". The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others. They probably do "see" the same thing other humans with normal anatomy and neural function see, but this is an assumption. In any case, IMO such sensations can only be described as the perceived signature of a physical effect.

My point is that dualism vs a monist physicalism is simply a version of the physical/metaphysical issue;questions that can be answered (in principle) and those that cannot be. In my previous post on this thread I asked how we could imagine the sensations of an intelligent alien who was able to sense wave lengths in the radio spectrum. IMO this really isn't about dualism but about observer-observed interaction and whether the observer can make statements about what is inherently unobservable (other observers' qualia).

 

[Upisoft]

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation. They will stop at red lights and follow the red line marked marked on floors when asked. That tells us nothing about what they "see". The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others. They probably do "see" the same thing other humans with normal anatomy and neural function see, but this is an assumption. In any case, IMO such sensations can only be described as the perceived signature of a physical effect.

My point is that dualism vs a monist physicalism is simply a version of the physical/metaphysical issue;questions that can be answered (in principle) and those that cannot be. In my previous post on this thread I asked how we could imagine the sensations of an intelligent alien who was able to sense wave lengths in the radio spectrum. IMO this really isn't about dualism but about observer-observed interaction and whether the observer can make statements about what is inherently unobservable (other observers' qualia).

The question "how do others experience something" is based on an assumption. You assume there is something different than your brain (name it soul) which is experiencing the sensations. You imagine it can somehow enter someones's head replacing their soul with yours, and then asking the question how your soul will experience what they see. So you assume something unknown as true (do we have a soul?) and conclude there are things that cannot be known. Bravo! What did you expect?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

So you assume something unknown as true (do we have a soul?) and conclude there are things that cannot be known. Bravo! What did you expect?

I assume no such thing. Where did I say anything about souls? I said that our sensations are the perceived signatures of physical effects. Moreover I believe that there are observable correlates of all aspects of what we call mind. I do believe there are limits to what we can know from observer-observed interactions and that I cannot prove to a metaphysical certainty that the world is not an illusion that exists only in my mind. But then again, what are the metaphysical standards? How do you prove a negative? IMO debating metaphysical questions is usually a waste of time. There are no answers, only opinions and beliefs. Choose what you like.

 

[Upisoft]

The private sensation they experience cannot be observed by others.

You made your assumption here. When I say I cannot sing (quite true), I assume there is someone else that can sing. When you assume that private sensations cannot be observed by others (humans), you assume that they can be observed by something else (God?). You cannot have the negative without the positive.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

You made your assumption here. When I say I cannot sing (quite true), I assume there is someone else that can sing. When you assume that private sensations cannot be observed by others (humans), you assume that they can be observed by something else (God?). You cannot have the negative without the positive.

You can choose to believe what you wish about metaphysical propositions, but that's not the issue here. I once did a thought experiment about literally getting into someone else's head. Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations. Now ask yourself the question: Who is the observer and who is the observed? From my point of view, I'm the observer. I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

 

[DaveC426913]

Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations.

...

I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

 

[Upisoft]

You can choose to believe what you wish about metaphysical propositions, but that's not the issue here. I once did a thought experiment about literally getting into someone else's head. Imagine wiring two brains together so that one brain could literally experience the other person's thoughts and sensations. Now ask yourself the question: Who is the observer and who is the observed? From my point of view, I'm the observer. I see red like I always see it. Assuming both brains are normal, could I expect anything different?

Your thought experiment is invalid. It is same as to assume that you can wire an analog multimeter parts with a digital multimeter parts, so that they can both experience what the other device is experiencing. There is no meaningful way to interconnect them. Thus, your question "who is the observer" is also invalid, because it is based on invalid assumption.

 

[sganesh88]

"Die!" said the VIRUS. It was the VIRUS, not its RNA.

Precisely the point!

 

[SW VandeCarr]

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

Yes. Are you anchored in your own identity seeing through the other's eyes, but processing visual data in your own observing brain? If so, you would see red as you always have. On the other hand, if you are processing with the other's brain, I argue that you become the other and therefore see red as the other does. However since your identity is now anchored in the other with the other's memory, you will see red as you (as the other) always did.

 

[Hurkyl]

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do.

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

The experiment is a measure of people's color memory, but as far as I can tell, does not address the issue of color perception. I have no way of knowing what you see when you say you see red. Since I can read and understand what you write, your brain and my brain content and processing seem to be are similar enough that I can infer that your red is the same as, or very similar to, mine. But I can't know this to a metaphysical certainty.

I want to address some possible questions I anticipate from the thought experiment in my previous post where the observer anchors his/her identity in the observed.

1) What happens to the identity of the observed "other".

2) What happens to the identity of the observer..

In my view the other's stream of consciousness does not miss a beat. The observed is not aware of anything unusual since the 'occupation' of her/his brain carries no external content. However the identity of the observer is effectively (if temporarily) erased.

When the experiment ends observer's identity is re-established in her/his own temporarily comatose brain with no memory of the experience.

My conclusion from this thought experiment is that it is not possible to experience the world as another experiences it without effectively being the other. I would, as an axiom, exclude the possibility one can anchor their identity in more than one individual at the same time (effectively be two people at the same time).

 

[Hurkyl]

The experiment is measure of people's color memory, but as far as I can tell, does not address the issue of color perception. I have no way of knowing what you see when you say you see red. Since I can read and understand what you write, your brain and my brain content and processing seem to be are similar enough that I can infer that your red is the same as, or very similar to, mine. But I can't know this to a metaphysical certainty.

But how is this different than any other topic of physical science? We make observations and notice some consistency, so we study it in more detail, formulate and test hypotheses, build scientific theories, and so forth.

What is "really" going on -- if that notion is even meaningful -- doesn't enter into it.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

But how is this different than any other topic of physical science? We make observations and notice some consistency, so we study it in more detail, formulate and test hypotheses, build scientific theories, and so forth.

What is "really" going on -- if that notion is even meaningful -- doesn't enter into it.

Well, I too am arguing that while I believe qualia exist, since I'm aware my own sensations and I cannot observe or experience other people's sensations; the term "dualism" suggests to me there are two streams of reality. I believe sensations are personal signatures of observable effects/events, but the sensations themselves only can be known by the individual. My view is that there is only one stream of reality which is in principle can be observed and measured by sentient observers, but that sentience itself is a private property of the observer that can only be indirectly observed or communicated to other observers. That does not constitute a separate stream of reality or "ghost in the machine", but simply is a limit on what we can observe or experience.

EDIT: It's true that we cannot know other's thoughts, but many thoughts can be described clearly and understood. When I tell you I'm thinking of the color red, I can only hope you understand what I mean because I can't describe it.

 

[Q_Goest]

An experiment to determine how well a specific television and RGB combination reproduces a specific color would be to grab 100 people, show them both the original color and the color on the television, and ask them if they are the same.

Voila -- you have an objective measurement that X of your 100 test subjects reported having the same color viewing experience.

Depending on your view of mental causation, SW VandeCarr has provided one reasonable perspective.

This doesn't tell you that they see the same thing you do. A person will learn to associate a sensation caused by light from the lower end of the visible light spectrum with a name and behave in a consistent way regarding that particular sensation..

That depends on the actual mechanism of the wiring. Are you tapping in before the processing, or after? If you are simply wired to the sensory inputs (i.e. before processing) then of course you would see 'red'. But if you are wired in after the processing ... the question is raised: what does it mean to be wired in "after processing"?

The experiment is an objective measurement of something. And "qualia are what people measure" is, IMO, a rather reasonable working definition.

What Hurkyl and DaveC are trying to suggest has of course, been considered before. I’m going to point out what I believe both of you believe and left unsaid. These things you believe and leave unsaid are what are in conflict with your statements. I believe both arguments fall into the knowledge paradox I mentioned earlier.

What was believed and left unsaid:
- The causal closure of the physical domain: I’m assuming you both accept the causal closure of the physical and reject any kind of nonphysical cause.
- Computationalism: I’m assuming you both accept computationalism.

If that’s correct, the knowledge paradox applies and any claims (or behaviors) that people are somehow “measuring” their own qualia, are incorrect. This problem is further exacerbated by computationalism, which makes it impossible in my mind for anyone to claim they are somehow measuring their own qualia or reporting it in any way.

The short explanation of the knowledge paradox is that there is always a physical cause for any physical behavior. This is essentially the “behaviorism” MIH (correct me if I’m wrong) is referring to:

I think that's quite in line with what the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism" were getting at in their heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. What could be observed and measured was important, but unobservable mental events and representations were trivial, and for all scientific purposes, meaningless.

A behavior is physically observable and we can treat it scientifically. We don’t need to even talk about mental states when referring to behavior. Physical states are assumed to influence other physical states, so mental states are basically ‘along for the ride’ and are epiphenomenal on the physical states. So if someone is to suggest that a mental state is a cause for a behavior, all one has to do to deny this is point to the causal closure of the physical domain. Jaegwon Kim among others has made his living making this point.

What makes this argument much more powerful is the aspect of computationalism which assumes classical mechanical interactions between neurons are those causal actions that give rise to the emergent phenomena of consciousness including qualia. And here is where any argument that a person is ‘measuring’ their own qualia in some way, becomes untenable. I’ll try and explain …

We often talk of the brain as being a computer of sorts, so I’m going to assume strong AI (ie: a suitable, classical computer can experience the same things as a person) is true for the moment only to help explain the problem. The example can then be extended to neurons.

The physical state of a computer can be fully described through a description of its 1) architecture, 2) a description of its physical state, and 3) a description of its input and output over a time period [dt]. Knowing how the computer’s billions of microscopic transistors are wired will fully describe its architecture. With this in hand, we can know the basic layout of the machine, but we won’t know what physical state it is in at some given time. If we know the position of each transistor at a given time, we can know the physical state of the machine at that time. The third thing we need is physical input and output to describe the machine, or boundary conditions over time. With these three things, we can describe in physical terms (by describing physical properties), everything there is to know about the machine’s function. We can know how it will “behave” at any time by knowing these three things.

We might extend this physical description to a molecular description of the switches, but this isn’t necessary to describe what the machine is doing. All we need to describe the machine’s function are the architecture, physical state and boundary conditions and we have enough information to determine the time evolution of the machine over any given time interval.

Next, we introduce qualia to the description of the machine. How should we do this? We can know everything about what a computer does over some time interval. However, we might also think that whatever the machine indicates in the way of behavior or verbal explanation, is also a description of the qualia that machine experiences. In other words, if a computer flinches as if in pain, and screams as if in pain, that behavior is equal to, and an indication of, the experience of pain. The behavior and the experience are one in the same. The experience of pain may be epiphenomenal, but we might assume that the experience of pain is THE SAME AS the physical behavior. This is the most common conclusion and why consciousness and mental states are often thought to be epiphenomenal. This conclusion holds there is a 1 to 1 correlation between the behavior, or time evolution of the physical states, and the experience of the qualia. The problem with this logic however, is the knowledge paradox.

The knowledge paradox points out that it doesn’t matter what experience the machine is thought to be having when it expresses a behavior or verbal description of some phenomenal experience, that behavior and that verbal description are utterly and completely controlled by the architecture, physical states and boundary conditions of the machine over that time interval. The phenomenal experience can not influence the architecture, physical state, nor can it influence the boundary conditions of the computer. Qualia can influence none of that. These phenomena we know as qualia can have no influence over any physical aspect of the computer. So we not only don’t know what the machine is experiencing, also; we can’t know if the machine is experiencing anything at all! All we can do is know that it is behaving in a way that we might describe as being in pain, but we can’t know if there is any experience going on at all inside, nor what it might be. The machine’s behavior is fully understood by understanding the architecture, physical state and I/O. We could not for example, know if the machine was experiencing the color red, or the smell of coffee, or experiencing an orgasm when it behaved as if it were in pain.

So there is a logical split between what physics tells us about the time evolution of a computer and what we can know about the experience a computer is having. Qualia are clearly not describable by describing the architecture, physical states and boundary conditions of a computer. And for the case of a computer, and by extension any computational system, the properties of qualia are not capable of influencing in any way, the physical evolution of those systems. Qualia can not be measured by the computer in any way because not a single measurement is taking place, nor are there any aspects of the computer that are responding to a specific type of phenomena except the change in the electrical state on the transistors.

When we come to a logical dead end and find there is no way out, then the problem is most likely with one of our unwritten assumptions.

Note that I haven't gotten into emergence or downward causation and don't think that's necessary here. Weak emergence as defined by Bedau for example, is all we need to understand what kind of emergence is applicable to a computational system, and I've maintained that version of emergence in the explanation above.