Would a different kind separation of powers in gov be workable?

[Czcibor]

Problems faced by a republic following Montesquieu separation of powers:
-If voter supports party A on issues of military but party B on issues of healthcare, then he has to choose which area is more important to him.
-Everything that happens is the fault of president/prime minister. :D (yes, I know that from constitution perspective it is incorrect, however, people just seek some personification of gov that can be blamed). Anyway, there is no way for voter to only partially punish his gov for shortcomings in only one area.

What if there was a a possibility to divide gov into more detailed functions and give voter a chance to vote on politicians responsible for them separately? Each branch with its own taxes to finance its own expenditures? (Plus some constitutional safeguards concerning deficits and making future promises for each branch separately; and clear rules concerning areas of responsibility)

Possible branches ex.: education, social security, healthcare, infrastructure; security and national defence.

(On the other hand such system may allow to limit role of distinguishing between legislature and executive or point in having two chambers of parliament)

Do you consider such idea as workable or not? (yes, I know that's a pure political fiction)

 

[Choppy]

In principle, I don't think that's a bad idea, but there are too many practical hurdles for something like that to work, I suspect.

For one, it's hard enough to get people to vote as it is. If we had to elect individuals into each separate "branch" you would likely face voter fatigue.

For another this would likely lead to an expansion of government - more politicians, more laws, more scandals, and more taxes.

And would it actually improve anything? That's always the big question.

 

[SteamKing]

You would face political campaigns going 24/7/365. You can't get some people to take the time to check out a presidential candidate's record before you vote on his/her election to the highest office in the land. Who is going to bother with the record of the undersecretary for government-political affairs at the Dept. of Education?

Where I live, the local representative to the state legislature resigned in August 2013. The elections to fill this vacant seat have been on-going ever since, what with party primaries and runoffs, and there is still no replacement elected. By the time someone is elected to fill this seat, qualification for the next state-wide election later this year will be underway. Sometimes, I feel that it would be better to put the names of all registered voters in a district into a hat and draw the winner from that.

 

[snorkack]

So, voters would not have the skills to keep track of and elect all the various heads of departments.

Could the floor of the legislature do so?

For example, each house of US Congress elects about 20 committees, their chairpersons and members.

What would happen if the US Cabinet were abolished or removed from control of the president, and moved to be subordinates of the respective committees?

 

[phinds]

What would happen if the US Cabinet were abolished or removed from control of the president, and moved to be subordinates of the respective committees?

Total disaster, most likely.

 

[Czcibor]

So, voters would not have the skills to keep track of and elect all the various heads of departments.

In democracy we assume that voters have skill to choose their representatives on various level of gov (I can vote for five layers of gov including the EU). If you challenge this risky assumption, then I think that already existing systems suffer from the same problem.

For example, each house of US Congress elects about 20 committees, their chairpersons and members.

What would happen if the US Cabinet were abolished or removed from control of the president, and moved to be subordinates of the respective committees?

I'm more used to idea of parliament electing prime minister. It (more or less) works in many European countries.

For one, it's hard enough to get people to vote as it is. If we had to elect individuals into each separate "branch" you would likely face voter fatigue.

This risk I fully see.

For another this would likely lead to an expansion of government - more politicians, more laws, more scandals, and more taxes.

But I don't get this mechanism.

You would face political campaigns going 24/7/365. You can't get some people to take the time to check out a presidential candidate's record before you vote on his/her election to the highest office in the land. Who is going to bother with the record of the undersecretary for government-political affairs at the Dept. of Education?

Why can't there be one big coordinated election every four/five/whatever years?

 

[Hornbein]

In my view systems don't matter all that much. Power centers will reach their goals regardless.

It would be nice if we could do away with representative government and have the people vote on each issue, but the world is farfrom being ready for that.

 

[Hornbein]

What would happen if the US Cabinet were abolished or removed from control of the president, and moved to be subordinates of the respective committees?

During the Andrew Johnson administration the cabinet was more or less removed from the President's control. For good reason, I might add.

 

[Astronuc]

Problems faced by a republic following Montesquieu separation of powers:
-If voter supports party A on issues of military but party B on issues of healthcare, then he has to choose which area is more important to him.
-Everything that happens is the fault of president/prime minister. :D (yes, I know that from constitution perspective it is incorrect, however, people just seek some personification of gov that can be blamed). Anyway, there is no way for voter to only partially punish his gov for shortcomings in only one area.

Can voters, i.e., the electorate be objective (as opposed to subjective), rational and informed?

What if there was a a possibility to divide gov into more detailed functions and give voter a chance to vote on politicians responsible for them separately? Each branch with its own taxes to finance its own expenditures? (Plus some constitutional safeguards concerning deficits and making future promises for each branch separately; and clear rules concerning areas of responsibility)

Possible branches ex.: education, social security, healthcare, infrastructure; security and national defence.

Why would a divided government be more effective, or less costly? Wouldn't each seek predominance, or it's function be subject to the same vagaries or whims of the persons serving in the top position, or the vagaries of the electorate?

 

[AlephZero]

Can voters, i.e., the electorate be objective (as opposed to subjective), rational and informed?

What you need is a Government Department of Information and Rationality, to round up the dissenters.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
What would happen if the US Cabinet were abolished or removed from control of the president, and moved to be subordinates of the respective committees?

This happened during the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution. The rump National Convention acted as both legislature and executive with the Committee of Public Safety holding most of the executive power. It was effective in the sense of improving some conditions in France and gaining military victories over foreign adversaries, but was a bit hard on the 16000 or so people who lost their heads and many others who worried about losing theirs. All in all, I give it a C-.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reign_of_Terror

 

[Czcibor]

Can voters, i.e., the electorate be objective (as opposed to subjective), rational and informed?

No, democracy absolutely fails at that. It has, however some different advantages that partially justify its existence:
a) Some abuses of power and corruption among elites are so blatant that even masses correctly identify them and reasonably demand adjustments.
b) Its popular among people and perceived as legitimate (which is as good as saying that a king is perceiving as being the rightful heir which would provide him with some support regardless of his governance skills).
c) It provides social peace by giving people a chance to replace unpopular gov in the most possibly humanitarian and orderly manner every four years.
d) It silences all prospective revolutionaries by convincing them that if they really have as much support as they claim they should run in an election.

(other thing that point "a" and "c" could be also achieved in some less democratic and more meritocratic system)

Why would a divided government be more effective, or less costly? Wouldn't each seek predominance, or it's function be subject to the same vagaries or whims of the persons serving in the top position, or the vagaries of the electorate?

It should be more accountable. Whether more accountability would actually change anything concerning effectiveness and costs that's a more open question.

 

[D H]

For one, it's hard enough to get people to vote as it is. If we had to elect individuals into each separate "branch" you would likely face voter fatigue.

Case in point: Texas.

At the state level, we elect the governor and lieutenant governor; the attorney general; the comptroller; land office, agriculture, and railroad commissioners; and justices and judges for the highest courts in the state. We elect all judges and justices in Texas, from the highest courts of the state (Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals) all the way down to the local justices of the peace. We elect surveyors, tax assessor-collectors, treasurers. We elect members to the state board of education. (Aside: Because Texas is so big, our school board has a big influence on textbooks across the nation. The fight to keep evolution in the texts and creationism out has been massive.) The ballots are massive and the key state, district, and local elections are in held off years as if to ensure that only a few people vote.

 

[SteamKing]

In democracy we assume that voters have skill to choose their representatives on various level of gov (I can vote for five layers of gov including the EU). If you challenge this risky assumption, then I think that already existing systems suffer from the same problem.

In the states, you vote in local, state, and federal elections. Adding more layers of government is not the solution. The bureaucrats and elected officials in each layer of government are going to be working to make sure they are needed and that their departments and offices and budgets are not downsized or eliminated entirely. Government is the closest thing to perpetual motion which has been devised by man so far.

I'm more used to idea of parliament electing prime minister. It (more or less) works in many European countries.

Just like the US system, the parliamentary system works, except when it doesn't.

In the parliamentary system in the UK and other members of the Commonwealth, the PM is not elected by the parliament, but is the head of the party which has the most seats. In parliamentary systems which have a large number of parties, coalition government becomes a distinct possibility, since one party is usually unable to win a majority of seats and form a government. Coalitions tend to be unstable, leading to the fall of the government. If voters can't be bothered to vote every two years on a certain date, then they won't be bothered to vote at irregular intervals which arise from having a government suddenly fall in a parliamentary system.

Why can't there be one big coordinated election every four/five/whatever years?

Every four years in the states, we elect a president, a new house of representatives, and one third of the senate. That's just on the federal level. At the state level, there may also be an election for a governor plus various seats in the state legislature. In addition, there may be various referenda on local issues, like amendments to state constitutions or legislative initiatives. All it means is that for some people, they can ignore all of these issues at one time by not voting, instead of not voting in a lot of different elections.

 

[snorkack]

In the parliamentary system in the UK and other members of the Commonwealth, the PM is not elected by the parliament, but is the head of the party which has the most seats. In parliamentary systems which have a large number of parties, coalition government becomes a distinct possibility, since one party is usually unable to win a majority of seats and form a government. Coalitions tend to be unstable, leading to the fall of the government.

But usually somebody does get a majority. A parliament can replace the government without needing to call elections.

How does USA get to have a government all the administration?

Cabinet members do not need to keep confidence of Congress - but they do need advice and consent of Senate to get appointed in the first place.
Advice and consent for appointments can be done with simple majority and does not need 2/3 of Senate as is the case with treaty ratifications.

If President (elected by majority of Electoral College votes, so mostly by bigger states) is from a different party than Senate majority (equal representation of all states, so mostly small states), how does USA get a cabinet? The Senate would not consent to secretaries whom President would appoint, but the Senate does need the President to appoint secretaries the Senate would consent to, because the majority of Senate does not have a mechanism to elect secretaries and impose them on a President unwilling to appoint the secretaries Senate would consent to.

The Senate cannot remove an opposition President by simple majority no confidence, impeachment requires both 2/3 of Senate, which may not be forthcoming even though simple majority to block President´s appointments is, as well as passing the articles of impeachment by simple majority of Representatives which also would not be forthcoming because the President became President in the first place by enjoying the votes of most bigger States in Electoral College and therefore also a majority in Representatives.

 

[Czcibor]

In the parliamentary system in the UK and other members of the Commonwealth, the PM is not elected by the parliament, but is the head of the party which has the most seats. In parliamentary systems which have a large number of parties, coalition government becomes a distinct possibility, since one party is usually unable to win a majority of seats and form a government. Coalitions tend to be unstable, leading to the fall of the government. If voters can't be bothered to vote every two years on a certain date, then they won't be bothered to vote at irregular intervals which arise from having a government suddenly fall in a parliamentary system.

Not a distinct possibility, but a normal way of governance. There is a time lag between election and forming gov, but it seems to protect against such dysfunctional polarization which recently become a characteristic feature of the US system. (I would avoid saying anything as how democratic I consider US system when it effectively prevents from appearance of any third party, because I would like to concentrate on effectiveness) The situation become interesting and encouraging for compromise when it is possible to build more than one coalition from given distribution of seats in parliament.

Every four years in the states, we elect a president, a new house of representatives, and one third of the senate. That's just on the federal level. At the state level, there may also be an election for a governor plus various seats in the state legislature. In addition, there may be various referenda on local issues, like amendments to state constitutions or legislative initiatives. All it means is that for some people, they can ignore all of these issues at one time by not voting, instead of not voting in a lot of different elections.

In my country (Poland) we toyed with idea of coordinating a few voting in the same time to cut costs and increase turnover for the less popular ones.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Coalitions tend to be unstable, leading to the fall of the government.

I find that hard to believe. Do you have any examples? Many nations frequently have coalition governments, Germany for example and I wouldn't say that nation is doing badly for itself at all. Coalitions are common in nations with PR systems of voting which isn't surprising given the diverse nature of political opinions. In nations with FPTP systems two party dominance is common due to duverger's law. IMO the former is more desirable as it fosters more cross party cooperation and more accurately reflects the will of the public, thus being more democratic.

 

[SteamKing]

But usually somebody does get a majority. A parliament can replace the government without needing to call elections.

This can happen, but it takes an unusual set of political circumstances for it to occur.

How does USA get to have a government all the administration?

It's not clear what this sentence means.

Cabinet members do not need to keep confidence of Congress - but they do need advice and consent of Senate to get appointed in the first place.
Advice and consent for appointments can be done with simple majority and does not need 2/3 of Senate as is the case with treaty ratifications.

The president appoints the cabinet members, who become the heads of the various departments of government. The appointees are then installed in the cabinet only with the consent of the Senate. If an appointee's confirmation vote fails, the president must appoint a new cabinet member.

If President (elected by majority of Electoral College votes, so mostly by bigger states) is from a different party than Senate majority (equal representation of all states, so mostly small states), how does USA get a cabinet? The Senate would not consent to secretaries whom President would appoint, but the Senate does need the President to appoint secretaries the Senate would consent to, because the majority of Senate does not have a mechanism to elect secretaries and impose them on a President unwilling to appoint the secretaries Senate would consent to.

In most cases, the Senate defers to the choices the President makes in terms of cabinet positions, unless there is some concern that the appointee will not be a good choice for the position. A cabinet appointee's nomination can fail to gather Senate approval for a variety of reasons, some of which remain obscure to regular people.

Case in point: the first Pres. Bush nominated a sitting senator as his defense secretary. This senator had served on defense committees in the Senate and had amassed quite a bit of influence in that body. However, when his nomination came before the senate for confirmation, it was rejected by that body for reasons which were not that clear to the average non-political junkie.

The Senate cannot remove an opposition President by simple majority no confidence, impeachment requires both 2/3 of Senate, which may not be forthcoming even though simple majority to block President´s appointments is, as well as passing the articles of impeachment by simple majority of Representatives which also would not be forthcoming because the President became President in the first place by enjoying the votes of most bigger States in Electoral College and therefore also a majority in Representatives.

The dynamics of elections for president and for members of congress are often different, and there is no guarantee that a president of one party will have his party control one or both houses of congress. Even if both houses and the presidency are controlled by one party, control of congress can change in the so-called 'mid-term' elections, which occur 2 years after the presidential election.

When the party of the president does not control both houses of congress, you have the phenomenon of divided government in the US. When Clinton was elected in 1992, both houses of congress were in control of the Democrats, and had been since the 1950s with one brief period when the Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981-87. In the 1994 congressional elections, control of both houses flipped from Democrat to Republican and remained that way the rest of the decade.

In the last presidential impeachment in 1998-99, Bill Clinton was a Democrat and there was a slight Republican majority in the Senate (55R-45D) and the House of Representatives was controlled by the Republicans. The impeachment conviction failed in the Senate because none of the Democrats voted for it and there were a few Republicans voting against as well.

 

[SteamKing]

I find that hard to believe. Do you have any examples? Many nations frequently have coalition governments, Germany for example and I wouldn't say that nation is doing badly for itself at all. Coalitions are common in nations with PR systems of voting which isn't surprising given the diverse nature of political opinions. In nations with FPTP systems two party dominance is common due to duverger's law. IMO the former is more desirable as it fosters more cross party cooperation and more accurately reflects the will of the public, thus being more democratic.

Italy.

 

[snorkack]

It's not clear what this sentence means.

How does USA avoid lack of government due to deadlock between President and Senate?

The president appoints the cabinet members, who become the heads of the various departments of government. The appointees are then installed in the cabinet only with the consent of the Senate. If an appointee's confirmation vote fails, the president must appoint a new cabinet member.

The dynamics of elections for president and for members of congress are often different, and there is no guarantee that a president of one party will have his party control one or both houses of congress.

Precisely. A simple majority of Senate does not have a mechanism to remove and replace a President for belonging to the opposing party.

Even if both houses and the presidency are controlled by one party, control of congress can change in the so-called 'mid-term' elections, which occur 2 years after the presidential election.

An incoming Senate majority at midterm elections does not have a mechanism to vote no confidence in the sitting cabinet, but a 2/3 of lame duck Senate is in position to deny confirmation to the cabinet appointees of an incoming President.

When the party of the president does not control both houses of congress, you have the phenomenon of divided government in the US.

And since cabinet members need to be appointed with consent of Senate, President and Senate of different parties could lead to deadlock in confirming a cabinet.

 

[SteamKing]

How does USA avoid lack of government due to deadlock between President and Senate?

Sometimes, the deadlock can go on for weeks, but eventually, due to the press of other business, someone comes up with a compromise which allows both sides to retire gracefully. After all, if a deadlock occurs in an election year, no one in congress wants to stay in Washington when they should be home campaigning.

Precisely. A simple majority of Senate does not have a mechanism to remove and replace a President for belonging to the opposing party.

That statement is antithetical to the notion of government in the US. Just because the president and the Senate may be of different parties, it does not necessarily follow that governance is impossible. In any event, congress is composed of two houses, not just the senate, and each house has certain constitutional duties prescribed to it.

As an example, when Carter was president, he was famously unable to get along with the senate, even though the senate was controlled by the same party to which Carter belonged, namely the Democrats. On the other hand, when Reagan was president, he had a senate controlled by his party for the first six years of his administration, but the house of representatives was solidly in Democratic control. Yet, Reagan was able to craft compromises with congress to get key items of his agenda passed into law. The government did not collapse.

An incoming Senate majority at midterm elections does not have a mechanism to vote no confidence in the sitting cabinet, but a 2/3 of lame duck Senate is in position to deny confirmation to the cabinet appointees of an incoming President.

A 'lame duck' session of congress can occur only between the time of the federal election in November and the seating of the new congress in January, a span of only a few weeks. The president himself is not sworn into office until January 20, several weeks after the congress has been seated. The president can thus only send his nominees to the Senate after he is sworn in, and no lame duck congress would ever vote on a cabinet nominee. If a cabinet post did become vacant during a lame duck session of congress, in all likelihood, the outgoing congress would defer confirmation to the incoming congress, unless some unusual circumstances intervened.

And since cabinet members need to be appointed with consent of Senate, President and Senate of different parties could lead to deadlock in confirming a cabinet.

In those situations where the President and the Senate cannot agree on a nominee, usually the nominee has the grace and good sense to ask the President to withdraw his nomination. It would be unprecedented for the Senate to turn thumbs down on all of a President's cabinet nominees. The senate does not vote on all of the cabinet nominees as a bloc; each nominee is examined by the particular Senate sub-committee having oversight of the cabinet department to which the nominee is appointed, and the sub-committee recommends or not on the nomination to the full senate for the final vote.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Italy.

Italy's government has not fallen and whilst it has many problems I'm unaware of how that is traced to coalitions. Nor why it is a good case study compared to countries that regularly have coalition governments and get along fine. Care to elaborate?

 

[Vanadium 50]

It would be unprecedented for the Senate to turn thumbs down on all of a President's cabinet nominees.

Indeed. There have only been nine. cabinet secretaries rejected by the Senate in the entire country's history, with the last one being John Tower, 25 years ago. Before that it was 55 years : Lewis Strass for Commerce.

Four of the nine were under the Tyler Presidency. John Tyler was the first Vice President to become President upon the death of his predecessor and there was intense infighting in Congress whether he was really President or not.

 

[D H]

Indeed. There have only been nine. cabinet secretaries rejected by the Senate in the entire country's history, with the last one being John Tower, 25 years ago.

That's the number rejected by the full Senate. About the same number were rejected by committee or were never reported out of committee. The number of potential nominees whose names were floated as trial balloons made of lead? Who knows.

Nonetheless, it's still a small number.

 

[SteamKing]

Indeed. There have only been nine. cabinet secretaries rejected by the Senate in the entire country's history, with the last one being John Tower, 25 years ago. Before that it was 55 years : Lewis Strass for Commerce.

Four of the nine were under the Tyler Presidency. John Tyler was the first Vice President to become President upon the death of his predecessor and there was intense infighting in Congress whether he was really President or not.

It was Lewis Strauss (pronounced Straws). I think his defeat was a delayed reaction to his previous service as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the revocation of Oppenheimer's security clearance in 1954. The Democrats who controlled the Senate thought that Eisenhower was trying to sneak a recess appointment past them, and they wanted to pick a fight with Ike which would help them in the upcoming elections in 1960. Strauss' nomination lost by 3 votes in the full Senate vote.

In more recent history, there have been cabinet nominees who have requested that their nominations be withdrawn when it became apparent that confirmation would not be forthcoming from the senate. Bill Clinton famously went thru several possible candidates for attorney general before he turned up Janet Reno, and George W. Bush's nominee for Labor Secretary, Linda Chavez, encountered similar difficulty. Clinton's nominee for director of the CIA, Tony Lake, also had his nomination withdrawn after a protracted period in 1997.

http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2009/01/the-list-cabinet-picks-who-were-withdrawn-or-defeated/

 

[SteamKing]

Italy's government has not fallen and whilst it has many problems I'm unaware of how that is traced to coalitions. Nor why it is a good case study compared to countries that regularly have coalition governments and get along fine. Care to elaborate?

The current Italian government may prove the exception, but postwar Italian politics is littered with failed governments, at one point averaging about one a year.

In any event, I said coalition governments tend to instability, not that it was a sure thing that they will fail. Managing a coalition government takes a different set of political skills than managing a government with a majority party. The UK government during WWII was a de facto coalition led by Churchill, who was unpopular within political circles when he assumed the premiership. UK governments between the wars were composed of various coalitions, usually run by Stanley Baldwin or Ramsay MacDonald.

 

[Chronos]

America is subtle, if congress dislikes a president they merely vote down his suggestions then impeach him. Much cleaner and cheaper than a civil war. We already tried that, it didn't end very well.

 

[snorkack]

Sometimes, the deadlock can go on for weeks, but eventually, due to the press of other business, someone comes up with a compromise which allows both sides to retire gracefully. After all, if a deadlock occurs in an election year, no one in congress wants to stay in Washington when they should be home campaigning.

In an election year, there is little cause for deadlock, because the president has old, sitting administration (whom the Senate cannot fire by no confidence). Whereas incoming president in January may want to appoint a new cabinet... which the Senate is in position to block.

A 'lame duck' session of congress can occur only between the time of the federal election in November and the seating of the new congress in January, a span of only a few weeks. The president himself is not sworn into office until January 20, several weeks after the congress has been seated. The president can thus only send his nominees to the Senate after he is sworn in, and no lame duck congress would ever vote on a cabinet nominee. If a cabinet post did become vacant during a lame duck session of congress, in all likelihood, the outgoing congress would defer confirmation to the incoming congress, unless some unusual circumstances intervened.

Yes, I meant it figuratively. Since Senate is elected 1/3 at a time, after each election 2/3 Senators are the people who were elected at two previous elections... and who may be people who would not have been reelected had they been up for reelection.

Like the election of 1800. The outgoing Federalists were up to stunts like attempting to elect Aaron Burr and Midnight Judges... what did the Federalist Senators do after Democratic President did take office?

 

[D H]

In an election year, there is little cause for deadlock, because the president has old, sitting administration (whom the Senate cannot fire by no confidence). Whereas incoming president in January may want to appoint a new cabinet... which the Senate is in position to block.

It doesn't happen though, does it? One, maybe two, nominees will be blocked. More typically, none are blocked. Presidents pretty much get the cabinet they want.

Like the election of 1800. The outgoing Federalists were up to stunts like attempting to elect Aaron Burr and Midnight Judges…

Come off it. That you had to go all the way back to when the country was barely a decade old is rather telling. The Constitution is intentionally vague in many regard. The Cabinet (what Cabinet? About all the Constitution has to say in this regard is (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1) "The President ... may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices") is one of those regards. Those early shenanigans by the outgoing Federalists helped to cement the mechanisms, formal and informal, that shape the Cabinet today. The Cabinet resigns en masse on the day the outgoing President turns over power to the incoming President, and with a few exceptions, the incoming President gets the Cabinet he wants.

what did the Federalist Senators do after Democratic President did take office?

They pretty much let Jefferson have the Cabinet he wanted, and it's been that way ever since.

 

[Czcibor]

That statement is antithetical to the notion of government in the US. Just because the president and the Senate may be of different parties, it does not necessarily follow that governance is impossible. In any event, congress is composed of two houses, not just the senate, and each house has certain constitutional duties prescribed to it.

Isn't there a continuum of choice between pluralism and swift governance? I mean with clearly too-pluralistic algorithm when there is a dozen of parties in parliament (like in Poland between WW1 and WW2 or in contemporary Italy) there is a nightmare to build coalition. With a few (4-6) parties in parliament (like nowadays Poland or Germany) that elect prime minister one can have relatively high pluralism, but still no serious obstacle to rule.

With 2 parties, one dominating at least one chamber of parliament (congress, yes) and president of different party one can achieve both very limited pluralism and deadlock.

(the end of the axis of swift rule at expense of pluralism would be an electable president ruling by decrees)

 

[snorkack]

Come off it. That you had to go all the way back to when the country was barely a decade old is rather telling.

Certainly disagreements between the outgoing President and the President-Elect, over the less than 4 months, have had spectacular effects twice, even over a century later. In 1860-1861, Buchanan and Lincoln about how to relate to CSA, and in 1932-1933, Hoover and Roosevelt about how to deal with Great Depression.

A newly elected President faced outgoing one for under 4 months till 1933, and 2 and a half month since. He also faces 2/3 of the previously elected Senate for 2 years.

In 1861, the Senators elected by formerly united States simplified Lincoln´s administration by choosing not to attend and vote in the Congress of the country which their States no longer belonged to. What did the Senate do 1933-1935?

 

[SteamKing]

America is subtle, if congress dislikes a president they merely vote down his suggestions then impeach him. Much cleaner and cheaper than a civil war. We already tried that, it didn't end very well.

There have been only two presidents impeached (Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998). Neither was convicted and both remained in office.

If the congress passes a bill and the president vetoes it, congress has the option to override the president's veto if 2/3 of each house votes to do that. The last presidential veto overridden by congress occurred in July 2008.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_vetoes

Many bills introduced in congress with presidential support may not see the light of day once they are referred to committee for hearings. There have been many administrations where the president and the congress did not agree on a legislative agenda.

 

[SteamKing]

In 1861, the Senators elected by formerly united States simplified Lincoln´s administration by choosing not to attend and vote in the Congress of the country which their States no longer belonged to. What did the Senate do 1933-1935?

I think you are operating under some mistaken assumptions. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate form a branch of the US federal government which is separate from the executive branch, which the president controls. While the Senate is charged by the Constitution with confirming presidential nominees, ratifying treaties, and the like, the House is the chamber in which all revenue bills (federal spending laws) must originate, which is essential in developing a federal budget for the next fiscal year.

For a bill to become law, it must pass both houses of congress before it can be sent to the president for his signature. While the budget and appropriations bills originate in the House, the Senate can disagree with the plan, at which point a compromise bill must be worked out between the two chambers on which they can agree to pass. This process works with other legislation as well. Sometimes, no workable compromise can be achieved, at which point the legislation dies.

As to your specific question about 1933-35, when FDR (Democrat) was elected president in 1932, the House of Representatives was already under Democratic control (and had been since the congressional elections of 1930). In the 1932 election, which was a landslide for FDR, the Senate switched from Republican to Democratic control as well. After Inauguration Day, March 4, 1933, there was a dizzying avalanche of federal legislation introduced in the new 73rd congress to combat the effects of the Depression. This is why incoming presidents now are gauged on their first 100 days in office: it was during this period that much of FDR's New Deal legislation was passed by the congress and sent to him for signature into law.

To illustrate how great the FDR landslide of 1932 was, these are the breakdowns of party membership in both houses of congress at the start of FDR's first term:

Senate: 59 Democratic, 36 Republican, 1 other - 96 total members
House: 311 Democratic, 117 Republican, 5 other - 435 total members

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/73rd_United_States_Congress

FDR faced no serious legislative hurdles in getting his New Deal legislation thru congress. Later in his administration, however, FDR faced growing opposition in congress to some of his ideas until the entry of the US into WWII in 1941 brought about a unified government committed to winning the war.

(Note: 4 additional senators would be added when Alaska and Hawaii gained statehood in 1959, which brings the total number of senators to 100, which is the current number. The total membership of the House had been fixed by law at 435 since 1911, and no additional members were added for Alaska and Hawaii after they became states. The totals above by party may not equal the total membership due to death, resignation, or seats vacant for other reasons)

 

[SteamKing]

Isn't there a continuum of choice between pluralism and swift governance? I mean with clearly too-pluralistic algorithm when there is a dozen of parties in parliament (like in Poland between WW1 and WW2 or in contemporary Italy) there is a nightmare to build coalition. With a few (4-6) parties in parliament (like nowadays Poland or Germany) that elect prime minister one can have relatively high pluralism, but still no serious obstacle to rule.

With 2 parties, one dominating at least one chamber of parliament (congress, yes) and president of different party one can achieve both very limited pluralism and deadlock.

(the end of the axis of swift rule at expense of pluralism would be an electable president ruling by decrees)

Obviously, with a multiplicity of parties (say four or more), it is very difficult for a one party majority government to form, whether in a parliamentary system or the US system. There have been occasions where a strong third party has formed in the US, but most of the influence of third parties in recent US history has been on presidential, rather than congressional, elections. For the most part, since the Civil War, the US congress has been a two-party animal.

Third party candidates have arguably changed the outcome of several presidential races in the 20th century. In the election of 1912, Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose party split the Republican vote and allowed Woodrow Wilson to defeat W.H. Taft, George Wallace's candidacy in 1968 probably took enough Democratic votes from Humphrey to allow Nixon to win, and Ross Perot's quixotic race in 1992 did George H.W. Bush no favors in that election.

Having a president from one party and one or both houses of congress controlled by the other party can be an obstacle to getting a particular piece of legislation enacted, but the parties have not become so polarized politically that the entire government comes to a screeching halt. Both branches of the federal government know that if compromises can't be worked out, one party or the other is likely to take the blame at the next election.

 

[Czcibor]

Having a president from one party and one or both houses of congress controlled by the other party can be an obstacle to getting a particular piece of legislation enacted, but the parties have not become so polarized politically that the entire government comes to a screeching halt. Both branches of the federal government know that if compromises can't be worked out, one party or the other is likely to take the blame at the next election.

In the same way as you said "Italy":

Playing with debt default and gov shutdown

(as long as in eyes of your electorate you can blame the other party for lack of compromise this mechanism does not seem to work specially well)